re: HCSA Request of 9 March, 1978, item #2:

"A statement, including any written regulations, which establishes the criteria utilized by the CIA in classifying its relationships with individuals with whom it has had contact...."

Attached are:

1. DEFINITIONS OF: AGENT, ASSET, SOURCE, COLLABORATOR, WITTING & UNWITTING

2. Hqs Regulations on Management of Nonstaff Personnel

   20-53 on Contract Personnel to define Contract Employees and Independent Contractors and

   20-54 Agents (& clearly distinguish between agents and contract personnel)

3. DOI 50-10 on Restrictions on Operational Use of Certain Categories of Individuals (a primer on do's & don'ts)

4. DOI (CSI) 10-5 on Covert Approvals and Related Matters (processes required before an individual may be used in any way)

13-00000

From Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary

AGENT:

1) A power that acts; a moving force; as by some human AGENT.

2) One who acts or performs an act or who has power to act; as, a free moral AGENT.

3) That which produces or will produce a certain effect; an active cause; also, esp. chem., a substance or element capable of producing a reaction.

4) A means or instrument.

5) One who acts for, or in the place of, another, by authority for him.

ASSET:

2) That which is a resource; as, character is an asset.

SOURCE:

2) The origin; the first or ultimate cause.

3) A person, book, document, etc. that supplies information.

COLLABORATOR: n.
COLLABORATE:

1) To work or act jointly, esp. to share in literary, scientific, or other intellectual production.

2) To cooperate voluntarily as a nation with another or other nations in international political or economic adjustment.

3) To comply with, cooperate with, or assist willingly the conquerors occupying one's country;--usually with an implication of traitorous dealing in distinction from passive acquiescence; also, sometimes to give to an enemy nation aid of nonmilitary kind, as by radio propaganda in enemy service.

WITTING: Done with the knowledge of the doer, or knowingly; not unintentional.

UNWITTING:

1) Not knowing; unconscious; unaware.

2) Unintentional.

S-E-C-R-E-T

HQ. INSTRUCTION SHEET 733

REMOVE			INSERT			EXPLANATION
REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	
HR 20	iii 125- 127	2/6/73 3/9/64	HR 20	iii 125- 127	2/23/73 2/23/73	Paragraph 53 is revised to redefine categories of contract personnel. Minor revisions are made to up-date the paragraph.
	128	6/16/70		128 - 131	2/23/73	Former paragraph 54, Procurement Contracts for the Services of Individuals, is renumbered 55 with no change in text. New paragraph 54, Agents, is added to establish authorities and responsibilities for the management of agents and to clearly distinguish between agents and contract personnel.
HN 20-129		3/9/64				Rescinded.

Arrows in the page margin show the locations of the changes described above.

DISTRIBUTION: AB

E2 IMPDET
S-E-C-R-E-T CL BY: 002230

CONTENTS—Continued

53. CONTRACT PERSONNEL. This paragraph sets forth policy, authorities, and responsibilities concerning the management of contract personnel. It does not apply to consultants (see HR 20-52), to personal services acquired through industrial or procurement contracts (see HR 20-55), to personnel employed by proprietary projects (see HR 230-8), or to agents (see HR 20-54).

a. **GENERAL.** There are two categories of contract personnel: contract employees and independent contractors.

(1) CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. Although they are not appointed employees, contract employees are employees of the U.S. Government. They have all the rights and privileges granted by law to U.S. Government employees in accordance with their citizenship status as well as those rights and privileges specified in their contracts. They work under supervised conditions and are compensated on a salary basis. Contract employees are grouped into three categories:

(a) **Career Associate (Type C) Contract Employees:** Contract employees who perform duties, usually of a clandestine and operational nature, on a career basis. They are normally required to demonstrate their operational value to the Agency for not less than three years, in the case of U.S. citizens, or not less than five years, in the case of foreign nationals, to qualify for career associate status. When it is necessary for a career associate to have the staff-type access to an Agency installation or classified information, he must meet the same security approval criteria as a staff employee.

(b) **Internal (Type I) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work inside Agency installations. They are required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees, but are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(c) **External (Type E) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work outside Agency installations. They are not required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees and are not permitted the same access to Agency installations as staff employees or internal contract employees. They are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(2) INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals who are engaged under contract to provide specific services. They receive only the compensation and benefits considered necessary to retain their services. In the Operations Directorate, their duties are normally limited to historical research and analysis and to the direction, utilization, spotting, or support of agents. They normally do not carry out espionage or covert action tasks. (Care must be taken to distinguish between independent contractors, defined herein, and agents, defined in HR 20-54.)

b. **POLICY**

(1) Contract personnel may be engaged when

(a) it is necessary to provide for operational or support needs which cannot be met through the use of available staff personnel;

(b) services are required of particularly well-qualified individuals who cannot meet all requirements for staff employment;

(c) there is a requirement to meet operational needs without obligating the Agency to long-term employment;

(d) the nature of the mission for which the individual is being engaged precludes his being subject to administrative control or working specifically defined hours;

(e) the individual's primary employer or interest is not the Agency and the services the Agency desires from him are supplementary to his primary interest or vocation; or

(f) there is a long term requirement for personal services which, for operational or security reasons, cannot be performed by Agency staff personnel.

(2) The engaging of contract personnel is subject to the following restrictions:

(a) New contracts, contract renewals, and contract amendments for individuals under current or anticipated nonofficial cover, must have prior approval of the appropriate component of the Operations Directorate.

(b) Contract personnel may be engaged only for approved activities for which funds have been made available. Funds for these activities will be budgeted annually and will not exceed limitations imposed by the head of the component concerned.

(c) Contract employees are subject to directorate manpower controls and ceilings established by the Director of Central Intelligence during the annual budgetary review cycle. Independent contractors are excluded from ceiling controls.

(d) Contracts will, whenever possible, be written and signed. However, when special security or operational factors prevent the execution of a formal written contract, a memorandum in lieu of such a contract may be prepared to document the commitments and obligations of the Agency and the individual.

(d) Appropriate security or operational approvals will be obtained before any contractual commitments are made to individuals and before any disclosure to them of classified information.

(f) No commitments relating to the use of the services of an employee of another Government agency will be made without prior approval of the Operating Official or Head of Independent Office concerned and the Director of Personnel.

(g) No commitments will be made to contract personnel that appointed employment status will be offered at the conclusion of or during any period of their contract service, without prior approval of the Director of Personnel and the Director of Security.

(h) Contract employees must meet Agency medical standards prior to the approval and authentication of their contracts. A psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation of those contract employees in whom the Agency may have more than a short-term interest will be carried out whenever feasible.

(i) Independent contractors are normally not required to meet Agency medical standards; however, if their contract contains any provision which obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits. a satisfactory medical examination is required, to include a psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation, if necessary.

(j) Contract personnel candidates whose employment with the Agency cannot be acknowledged must be provided adequate cover and an appropriate cover legend. This requires that legal entitlements and other contractual benefits be provided and tax liabilities satisfied in a manner consistent with the character of the cover and cover legend.

(k) Although staff employees are expected to sever active connections with the Agency upon retirement, there may be instances in which continuation in service under contract after retirement is necessary or clearly in the best interests of the Agency. The use of retired annuitants under contract is governed by policies specified in HR 20–13.

(l) Not used.

(m) Contracts providing for basic compensation at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum annual rate for a GS–15, will not be executed without the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence. All such requests will be forwarded through the Director of Personnel for his recommendation.

c. **RESPONSIBILITIES**

(1) THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL will

(a) formulate contract personnel management policies and procedures and provide guidance in improving the effectiveness and flexibility of the program within the Agency;

(b) monitor contract personnel management to assure consistency among the directorates while giving due regard to their differing needs;

(c) provide a repository for sensitive suitability information using the guidelines for special files set forth in HR 20–60b(4);

(d) approve and authenticate contracts;

(e) monitor contract employee ceiling authorizations established by the Director of Central Intelligence;

(f) maintain computer-based records on contract personnel and ensure currency and accuracy of input and output data.

(2) THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY will

(a) establish standards and procedures for granting security approvals which meet the Agency's contract personnel requirements;

(b) grant security approvals for the use of contract personnel including their access to classified information and Agency installations;

(c) ensure currency and adequacy of security approvals by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;

(d) provide a repository for all security information pertaining to contract personnel.

(3) THE CHIEF, CENTRAL COVER STAFF will

(a) provide cover and cover legends for contract personnel whose employment by the Agency cannot be publicly acknowledged;

(b) ensure currency of such cover and cover legends by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;

(c) ensure that the methods of providing legal entitlements and contractual benefits and satisfying tax liabilities are consistent with assigned cover and cover legends.

(4) THE DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL SERVICES will

(a) establish standards and procedures for medical and psychiatric evaluations and for psychological assessment of contract personnel;

(b) make periodic reviews and medical reevaluations of contract personnel when requested to do so.

(5) DEPUTY DIRECTORS AND HEADS OF INDEPENDENT OFFICES will ensure directorate uniformity of contract administration in matters such as qualifications determination, compensation, allowances and other benefits, personnel record keeping, systematic cost accounting, performance evaluations, cover determination and training, terminations, and security and medical approval processing requirements.

(6) THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING will provide appropriate training courses and facilities for contract personnel.

(7) THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE will

(a) administer pay, leave, and allowance entitlements of contract personnel consistent with contract provisions and cover requirements;

(b) in coordination with the Covert Tax Board, administer a secure system for the settlement of Federal income tax and social security tax obligations.

d. AUTHORITIES

(1) The Director of Personnel, his Deputy, and the Special Contracting Officer (Chief, Contract Personnel Division) are, upon request of a Deputy Director, an Operating Official, Head of Independent Office, or a duly appointed contract approving officer, authorized to execute, amend, renew, and terminate contracts with contract personnel.

(2) Deputy Directors and Heads of Independent Offices may designate Contract Approving Officers to approve contracts when payment is to be charged against funds under their control.

(3) Authority delegated to Chiefs of Station and Base under the provisions of FR 20-31 is subject to the following limitations:

(a) All contracts executed in the field will be subject to review by the Director of Personnel.

(b) Deputy Directors may limit the exercise of the authority granted to chiefs of field installations to any extent they deem desirable.

(c) Contracts prepared by headquarters will be amended only by, or with the prior approval of, headquarters. Contracts executed in the field may be amended in the field, but all such amendments must be forwarded to headquarters.

(4) All contracts written under the authority of this regulation will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

e. PROCEDURES. Requirements and procedures concerning personnel records, personnel actions, security approvals, cover, cover salary, medical evaluations, compensation, qualifications determination, training, and processing of contracts, are set forth in HHB 20-12.

54. AGENTS. This paragraph sets forth policy, responsibilities, and authorities concerning the engagement and the management of agents.

a. GENERAL. Agents are witting manpower assets, unique to the Operations Directorate, who carry out espionage and covert action tasks on behalf of the Agency. Agents are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals whose services may be acquired or terminated at any time. Care must be taken to distinguish between agents, defined herein, and independent contractors, defined in HR 20-53a(2).

b. **POLICY**

(1) Agents cannot claim rights and privileges normally granted to U.S. Government employees; therefore, they will not be managed in accordance with normal personnel and administrative standards.

(a) Initial approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff is required before any commitments are made or any classified information is disclosed to an agent.

(b) Agents will receive compensation, benefits, and emoluments in amounts and a manner deemed best by the Operations Directorate to motivate and control them, subject to the following limitations:

(*1*) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide gross compensation (basic compensation, additional compensation, fees, etc.) at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum rate for a GS-15, without prior approval of the Director. This limitation applies only to payments made by the Agency. It does not apply to bona fide cover income.

(*2*) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide special benefits, without the prior approval of the Director of Personnel. Special benefits are Agency obligations other than basic compensation, normal overseas cost of living payments, and travel or operational expenses.

(*3*) No commitment may be made to an agent that appointed status will be offered at the conclusion of his service unless such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security, and has been approved by the Director of Personnel.

(c) Engagement of agents will not be subject to Agency personnel ceiling controls.

(d) In general, agents will not be required to meet Agency medical standards. However, if an agreement with an agent obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits, a medical examination will be carried out, unless precluded by security considerations.

(e) Agents who are U.S. citizens, resident aliens, or foreign nationals in the United States, must pay Federal tax on all income derived from their association with the Agency. Procedures for satisfying Federal tax liability will be determined by the Covert Tax Board. (See HR 20-35.)

(f) The use of retired civilian annuitants of the U.S. Government as agents will be governed by policy set forth in HR 20-13.

(2) All commitments made or implied to agents will be recorded in either a Formal Agreement or a Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

(a) A Formal Agreement is a written agreement, signed by the agent and an authorized Agency representative. Formal Agreements will be negotiated whenever operationally feasible.

(b) A Memorandum of Oral Commitment is a written record of an agreement, signed by an authorized Agency representative but not by the agent. Use of Memorandums of Oral Commitment will be limited to those cases when it is in the Agency's best interest not to solicit an agent's signature on a Formal Agreement.

(c) An agent will never be given a copy of the Formal Agreement or Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

c. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES

(1) The Deputy Director for Operations is authorized to

(a) formulate procedures for the engagement and management of agents and to issue operating directives and special instructions, as necessary, to control the use of agents by headquarters and field units;

(b) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment with agents; and to review Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment executed in the field;

(c) suspend procedures implied in this regulation upon his personal determination that operational and security aspects of an agent's management are so sensitive as to require processing through special channels.

(2) The Director of Personnel is authorized to

(a) approve, after coordinating with affected Agency components, the commitment to an agent that he will receive special benefits;

(b) approve the commitment to an agent that he will be offered appointed status at the conclusion of his service, when such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security;

(c) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment when requested to do so by the appropriate Operations Directorate approving officer. This authority may also be exercised by the Deputy Director of Personnel and the Special Contracting Officer, Office of Personnel.

(3) All Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment written under the authority of this paragraph will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

55. PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS FOR THE SERVICES OF INDIVIDUALS

a. **POLICY.** Procurement contracts whose basic purpose is to obtain the services of one or more individuals, negotiated with profit and nonprofit institutions, associations, partnerships, proprietorships, and other organizations, are permitted only when the particular services sought cannot be obtained in any other practicable way.

b. **PROCEDURES**

(1) Except as provided in subparagraph b(3) below, all proposals for such procurement contracts and their renewal must be justified in writing by the component seeking the services and be submitted to the Director of Personnel for his approval before commitments are made or negotiations started. These proposals will describe in some detail the services to be rendered, the qualifications required, the proposed duration of the task, and the reason or reasons why a procurement contract is judged to be the best method of acquiring the needed services.

(2) The Director of Personnel will ascertain whether any staff or nonstaff personnel are available to perform the needed services. If not, he will examine the feasibility of satisfying the requirement by hiring new personnel. If this latter course of action also proves impracticable, the Director of Personnel will approve the proposal and return it either to the Office of Logistics or to the originator for subsequent submission of a contract request to the appropriate procurement unit. Procurement contracts are written under the authority of the Director of Logistics as stated in HR 45-2.

(3) The approval of the Director of Personnel is not required

(a) for procurement contracts involving the services of individuals incidental to research and development or the preparation of studies or reports, where the fee reflects an end product (a report written, a task performed, etc.) rather than a computation based mainly on time (per hour, per man year);

(b) for procurement contracts involving the purchase of equipment which requires the services of experts or technicians in delivery, installation, testing, initial operation or maintenance, training, etc. However, any follow-on contract for services only—such as maintenance or operation—requires the Director of Personnel's prior approval as set forth above.

c. RESTRICTIONS

(1) Operating Officials are responsible for monitoring all personnel acquired through these procedures. They will ensure that such personnel are properly briefed and thoroughly understand any limitations on their access to Agency information and buildings and other pertinent security restrictions. Operating Officials are required to advise appropriate offices at any time the relationship or use of such individuals is subject to a change which affects the terms of their contractual arrangements, their status, or security clearances.

(2) Technical representatives and other types of personnel engaged under procurement contracts or other agreements which do not create a direct employer-employee relationship are prohibited by law from holding formal organizational positions or positions requiring the exercise of any administrative authority. They are also prohibited from formally representing the Agency in meetings with representatives of other Government agencies, private industry, or foreign governments or industries.

56-59. Reserved.

DOI 50-10

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970

1. GENERAL

a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In general, it is DDO policy to select agent assets with primary regard to the agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following:

(1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to restrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of individuals.

(2) The Agency has entered into a special restrictive agreement with an organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a category of individuals.

(3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently pertain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where appropriate, reference has been made to another publication which provides more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI and DOI-F 10-5. (attached)

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3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*
Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*
Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*
Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):
(a) Members and trainees of ACTION;
(b) Fulbright grantees;

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(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom;
(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations;
(e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies.

(2) *Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence* (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.
(a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
(b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
(c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;
(d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand;
(e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
(f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) *Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO* (see paragraph 7):
(a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;
(b) CARE employees;
(c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
(d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;
(e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned;
(f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
(g) Officials of the Vatican State;
(h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
(i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
(j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
(k) Volunteers to America.

(4) *Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division* (see paragraph 8):
(a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
(b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.;
(c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

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5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION*

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION.

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. *Fulbright Grantees*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

e. *Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations.

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies*
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions.

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI.

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*
The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.

b. *CARE Employees*

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

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4 September 1973

d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United ~~States~~* NATIONS
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations*

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute*
Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America*
Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)
The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.*
The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community.

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is

operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad.

DDO approval

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

CSI NO. 10-5

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

SECURITY
Revised 17 July 1958

COVERT APPROVALS AND RELATED MATTERS

Reference: CSI-F No. 10-5, 17 July 1958

Rescission: CSI No. 10-5, 31 January 1955

CONTENTS

1. PURPOSE

This instruction describes the functions of headquarters components with regard to covert approvals and related matters which are the subject of CSI-F No. 10-5.

2. GENERAL

a. The Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, is delegated authority to act for the Deputy Director (Plans) in the exercise of all functions which are the latter's responsibility with regard to the granting of Operational Approvals and Provisional Operational Approvals.

b. The Director of Security has designated the Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support, Office of Security, to represent him in discharging the functions which are reserved to him with regard to the granting of Covert Security Approvals, Provisional Covert Security Approvals, Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. It is the basic intent of both components that sensitive operational data shall remain within the custody and knowledge of the Clandestine Services, and that sensitive security investigative data shall remain in the custody and knowledge of the Office of Security. It is recognized, however, that such data may be necessary for proper performance by either component and, consequently, where necessary, it shall be made available or shall be discussed to the extent necessary.

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3. INVESTIGATIONS

The function of performing all investigations in the United States in connection with approval matters, except for the check of certain Agency records, is reserved to the Office of Security.

4. OPERATIONAL APPROVALS

a. The assembly and analysis of all file material (including the files of the Records Integration Division) in the Clandestine Services will be accomplished by professional personnel of the interested operating divisions under the technical supervision of the Counter Intelligence Staff and subject to spot check by the Counter Intelligence Staff. Certification will be made in each case by a responsible official of the requesting division that the material furnished is complete and accurate.

b. The requesting division will assemble any biographical data; information of investigative or security significance (such as additional names the subject may have used); information relating to character, reputation, politics, or other activities, favorable and unfavorable information or comments; background information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. Any information previously furnished by the subject concerning himself (such as a personal history statement, records of activities or employments, memberships in organizations, etc.) will be furnished verbatim. All pertinent information thus produced--including that resulting from technical interrogations, personal observation, field investigations, etc.--will be furnished to the Counter Intelligence Staff for necessary transmission to the Office of Security. It is also necessary to forward PRQ Part II to the Counter Intelligence Staff before an Operational Approval will be issued. The Counter Intelligence Staff will not forward PRQ Part II to the Office of Security. In rare, complicated, or sensitive cases the Office of Security, in coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff, may wish actually to review the material of the Records Integration Division. A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of the proposed usage of the subject will be furnished to the Office of Security along with the other data.

c. The requester should also furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff for transmission to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

d. Following appropriate investigation and analysis of a case, the Office of Security will forward its recommendation to the Counter Intelligence Staff, with the investigative data enclosed. Upon receipt of this material

the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or his designee, will, if the Office of Security does not recommend against the use of the individual, determine whether an Operational Approval should be granted and will notify the Office of Security of its decision. However, in the event the Office of Security recommends against the use of an individual and the Clandestine Services still desires, on a calculated risk basis, to use the individual, the Counter Intelligence Staff will inform the Office of Security of this fact. In this event, the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Security Support Division will endeavor to arrive at an agreed position and, to this end, the former will hold the granting of the Operational Approval in abeyance until five days have elapsed after the Office of Security has been advised of this intention. The Counter Intelligence Staff will notify the Office of Security whenever it has:

(1) Granted an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval.

(2) Cancelled an Operational Approval.

e. In Operational Approval cases the Office of Security will forward investigative reports, name check results, etc., to the Counter Intelligence Staff. In extremely sensitive cases, however, particularly those in which the security or good of the Agency as a whole is involved, the Office of Security will not be obliged to furnish all investigative material. In such cases the Office of Security will inform the Counter Intelligence Staff that such material has been withheld and will, upon request, discuss the matter with the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or other appropriate official of the Clandestine Services.

f. A Provisional Operational Approval may also be requested where circumstances warrant. A search of the indices of the Agency, including those of the Office of Security, is a minimum requirement for issuance of a Provisional Operational Approval.

g. Whenever interest in an individual under consideration for either an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval is terminated for any reason, the requester, in order to prevent needless processing, will notify the Counter Intelligence Staff promptly so that the latter may in turn advise the Office of Security.

5. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS AND PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

a. All background material will be assembled by the interested divisions and will include any biographic data; information of an investigative or security significance; information relating to character, reputation, politics, past employment, residences, and other activities; favorable and unfavorable information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. This material is forwarded directly to the Office of Security in its original form. (Traces need not be obtained from the Records Integration Division; see paragraph 5.b., below.) A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of use of the subject will also

be furnished to the Office of Security. The requester should also furnish to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as, special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

b. In Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases, the files of the Records Integration Division will be searched by representatives of the Office of Security. All files of the Records Integration Division, except those portions containing specific sensitive operational data, will be made available to the representatives of the Office of Security. In those instances where a document of interest contains sensitive operational data, designated professional personnel within the operating division will review that portion of the information and furnish therefrom to the representatives of the Office of Security all information of the nature described in paragraph 5.a., above. The Office of Security will conduct appropriate investigation in each case and will issue or deny Covert Security Approvals and Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Covert Security Approvals and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. The Office of Security will retain the investigative files in Covert Security Approval cases or Proprietary Approval cases, but will:

(1) Make available to the Counter Intelligence Staff any significant information in cases where Covert Security Approvals or Proprietary Approvals are granted.

(2) Immediately call to the attention of the Counter Intelligence Staff any new evidence in Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases that reflects the subject's connection with a foreign government, the Communist Party, or any front organization of the Communist Party.

d. Where the Office of Security issues or denies a Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval, formal notification will be directed to the requester. In the case of disapproval one copy of the security disapproval will be forwarded to the Counter Intelligence Staff. Where a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval is denied and the Clandestine Services still desires to use the subject on a calculated risk basis, the Office of Security will, upon request, furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff a summary of the investigative data. Thereafter, the Counter Intelligence Staff, the requester, and the Security Support Division will attempt to reach an agreed position.

e. A Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval may be preceded by a Provisional Covert Security Approval or a Provisional Proprietary Approval.

f. Unless otherwise designated by the Office of Security, investigative data in either Operational Approval or Covert Security Approval cases involving aliens may be shown to proper offices of the division and may, if deemed necessary by the division, be forwarded to the field. The dispatch or cable in such cases will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Office of Security. No investigative data will be transmitted or disclosed to other than Agency staff officials without the specific prior approval of the Office of Security. The need-to-know principle will be applied strictly in such cases. No investigative data regarding United States citizens will be transmitted to the field without the specific prior approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Director of Security and subsequent to such approval without coordination with the Office of Security on the dispatch or cable involved.

6. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS FOR LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

Requests for Covert Security Approvals for Liaison with U. S. officials, whether such officials are in the United States or abroad, will be transmitted directly to the Office of Security. Each request shall be specifically indicated as a request for a Covert Security Approval for Liaison. The request shall be accompanied by all available biographic information, to include wherever possible in cases of civilian employees of United States Government agencies the name, date and place of birth, the employing agency, and the position and assignment of the person involved. In cases involving military personnel the minimum biographic information required shall consist of the name, date and place of birth, rank and serial number, and the parent service. In each case the details of the liaison with the individual must be set forth.

7. SERVANTS OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES

Requests to headquarters for appropriate checks on domestic personnel employed in the homes of Agency employees overseas shall be forwarded by the requester to the Office of Security accompanied by all available biographical information and the results of overseas investigations.

8. EMPLOYEES OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Proper clearance of staff or contract employees (including indigenous employees) of other U.S. Government agencies for operational use includes notification to and approval by the employee's parent agency in Washington. Requests for clearance will be forwarded to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, Attention: CI/Liaison. Clearance will not be given until the approval of the parent agency has been obtained. If, after such approval is obtained, it is decided that the employee will not be used as requested, or upon termination of use, CI/Liaison will be notified so that the employee's parent agency may be advised.

9. EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN SERVICES

Requests for searches of the indices of other United States agencies or the Office of Security, or investigation of employees or officials of foreign

intelligence services with whom Agency employees maintain liaison, shall be forwarded by the requester to the Counter Intelligence Staff for processing to the Office of Security. Such requests shall be transmitted with complete results of field traces, all available biographical information, and a statement as to the service which the subject represents.

10. NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OR DISCONTINUANCE OF COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS OR PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

The Office of Security shall be promptly advised by the requester of the discontinuance of interest in or termination of employment or use of a person on whom a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval has been requested or granted.

11. SPECIAL SERVICES

a. Requests for Covert Name Checks and Special Inquiries will be transmitted to the Office of Security through the Counter Intelligence Staff. Each request shall indicate the reason for the inquiry, shall specify the exact action required, and shall contain all available background and/or biographical information concerning the subject.

b. In the case of Special Inquiries, the request should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed during the inquiry and any other information which would provide guidance as to the conduct of the investigation.

12. DOUBLE AGENTS

The operational decision authorizing the doubling of an agent of a foreign power will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff even though no Operational Approval or Provisional Operational Approval is required.

13. DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT IN PLACE

No attempt to defect or recruit in place (a) a member of the Communist Party or (b) a government official of a denied area country shall be made in the United States without prior coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff which will immediately inform the Director of Security and such other United States agencies as may be appropriate.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

~~TOP~~ TOP SECRET
~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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	TO OFFICE	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE
1	SA/C/LAD	William C. Sturbitts	W. C. Sturbitts	6/30/77
2	C/LA/COG	[Frederick W. LaTrash]	[Frederick W LaTrash]	6/30/77
3	AC/LAD	George V. Lauder	George V. Lauder	30 June 76
4	ADDO	Theodore G. Shackley	T. Shackley	
5	IG	Scott Breckinridge, Jr.	S. D. Breckinridge	13 July 77

- [ ] Approval
- [ ] Action
- [ ] Comment
- [ ] Concurrences
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SC-01755-77

30 JUN 77

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

ATTENTION : Mr. Scott Breckinridge, Jr.

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Operations

FROM : George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Latin America Division Task Force Report of Possible Cuban Complicity in the John F. Kennedy Assassination

1. Attached is the Latin America Division report of findings relative to Cuban complicity in the assassination of former President John F. Kennedy. This research which was conducted from mid-October 1976 to June 1977 at the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, E. Henry Knoche, reviewed all Agency operations conducted against Cuba from 1 January 1960 to 1 January 1965 (concentrating on the period 1 January 1960 to 22 November 1963). We found no definitive proof that the Castro regime was implicated in the Kennedy assassination.

2. The report is comprised of the following sections:

LAD/JFK Task Force - How Research was conducted

Attachment A: Chronology of Findings (125 pages) with a Top Secret Annex (14 pages)

Attachment B: List of Task Force participants

Attachment C: Outline of the complete LAD/JFK Task Force files and description of their contents.

This massive and thorough research effort with all back-up documents has been assigned the official classification number 019-604-001. This report is submitted in the format requested by Mr. Scott Breckinridge, Jr., Task Force Leader.

George V. Lauder

Attachments, a/s

June 1977

SUBJECT: Latin America Division/JFK Task Force How Research was Conducted

1. The LA Division Task Force to investigate records in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy was formally organized in mid-October 1976. Its purpose, basically, was to research all Agency operations conducted against Cuba from 1 January 1960 to 1 January 1965 (concentrating on the period up to 22 November 1963) for any evidence that such operations might have provoked the Government of Cuba to take executive action against President Kennedy. Researchers were also alert to activities seemingly directed against the U.S./CIA.

2. Reference to material for this research was obtained from the LAD Registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by ISS (Information Services Staff). It was originally thought that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900 operational folders, plus related 201 dossiers. It was later determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional operational and subject files which brought the total to well over two thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it, both operational

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and subject ', has been retired to Archives at [Warrenton, Virginia] The remainder is held at Headquarters in IP/Files or IP/Archives. All 201 dossiers are retained at Headquarters. This material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the LAD/JFK Task Force files (too numerous to cite herein.)

3. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and organization of the material:

a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed:

1.	Operational (601 with findings and 1,128 with no findings)	1,729	
2.	Subject (186 with findings and 361 with no findings)	547	
3.	Cuba Policy Files	101	
4.	C/WHD Chrono Files (TFW Chronos)	37	(13 -49)
5.	Official 201 dossiers	100	plus
	TOTAL	2,514	

b. Criteria Used in the Research:

As a guide the research group followed some 33 Terms of Reference provided by the Deputy IG, which were compiled on the basis of issues raised in Book V,

1/mc

of the Senate Select Committee Final Report on the Assassination. (Book V, and a 23 May 1967 Memorandum for the Record by the Inspector General on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro, were required reading for the researchers.) In addition to the Terms of Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest brought to its attention by the IG staff, on an ad hoc basis. A name trace was always run, and/or 201 dossier, if available, reviewed, on any individual allegedly involved in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975, based on traces of the names in the Black Book that Fidel Castro passed to George McGovern which dealt with individuals allegedly involved in assassination attempts against Castro.

c. Findings and Organization of the Findings:

Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the Subject of the folder (s) reviewed, a brief description of the activity, and a copy of the document (s) (findings) which contained information believed to be pertinent to the review. Also included were Job numbers, Official File numbers, inclusive dates of material researched, and number of volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or other government agencies knowledge of

information. Separate, finished, memoranda were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document number (s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing the gist of the document (s) for purpose of easy and quick reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document (s) attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official LAD/JFK Task Force files under the official classification number 019-604-001 (Volumes XI through XX). Also included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X) containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings.

4. Appended are the following:

A) Chronology of Findings (125 pages) with Top Secret UMBRA Annex (14 pages);

B) List of Task Force participants and their functions;

C) Outline of the complete LAD/JFK Task Force files and description of their contents.

ATTACHMENT A

CHRONOLOGY of FINDINGS (125 Pages)

with a TOP SECRET Annex (14 Pages) Code Word Material

CHRONOLOGY OF FINDINGS

Anti-Castro Activities - Cuba 19-9-9

HVCA 11020 dated 28 February 1964

A Caracas Station asset reported an operation called "Plan Judas" being constructed at that time inside Cuba. The plan reportedly involved an internal uprising with the support of certain Cuban military figures conspiring against Fidel CASTRO. Key figures reportedly included Juan ALMEIDA, Efigenio AMEIJEIRAS Delgado, Pepin NARANJO, Regino BOTTI, and two COSSIO brothers. On 24 February 1964, Francisco SUAREZ Quinones, a JURE (Revolutionary Junta) member in Caracas, told U.S. Embassy officials that JURE was then sponsoring a plan to assassinate Fidel CASTRO and other high-ranking Cuban Government officials as part of an operation designed to incite an internal rebellion in Cuba. The Station reported this plan, speculating that it may be connected in some way with Plan Judas.

DBA 77673 dated 15 July 1964 (FBI)

Reported plan of Cuban exile leaders to assassinate selected Cuban Government leaders. Individuals involved included Byron CAMERON, owner of m.v. "Cayman Hope," Teofilo BABUN Franco, co-owner of Antillean Marine Shipping

Corp. and two BABUN employees, Oscar FERNANDEZ Veigo and Eliseo GOMEZ Fernandez; also, Jose "Pepin" BOSCH, Julio LOBO Olavarria and Eduardo GARCIA of the Garcia Lines, New York City. One of the ship owners allegedly had contacts with the underworld through his partner, a former police officer from St. Louis with tie-in to elements of the "Cosa Nostra."

DBA 92798 dated 7 December 1964 (FBI)

An FBI source reported an attempt to be made against Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO and "Che" GUEVARA within Cuba during period 20 Dec 64 to 10 Jan 65 by a small elite group in La Cabana Military Base, Havana, which belonged to a security section inside of the Cuban Intelligence Service. Plans were to be carried out by Cubans in Cuba with no help from the U.S.

Anti-CASTRO PM Operations 19-9-9

DBA 43687 dated 20 June 1963 (FBI)

On 18 June 1963 an unnamed representative of Ejercito Cubano Anticomunista (Cuban Anti-Communist Army) met with a representative of Santos TRAFFICANTE, described as a former gambling czar in Cuba and presently a member of the Mafia in the U.S., in an effort to obtain rockets, high explosives, and detonators for use in raids against Cuba.

DBA 45327 dated 12 July 1963 (FBI)

Manolo AGUILAR, 829 S.W. 9th Avenue, Miami, leader of the Frente Revolucionario Anticomunista (FRAC) (Anti-Communist Revolutionary Front) obtained some 100 Beretta 7.65 caliber pistols with silencers which his organization planned to eventually use in Cuba to assassinate various Cuban leaders. AGUILAR allegedly obtained these pistols from an unidentified American who had connections with the Mafia.

DBA 45895 dated 19 July 1963 (FBI)

On 15 July 1963 the Miami News carried an article "Back Stage with Bobby" by Hal Hendrix, which related growing speculation in Miami and Washington that Attorney General Robert Kennedy was quietly backing a new anti-Castro operation with exiles Manuel ARTIME, Enrique RUIZ Williams, and Roberto and Jose SAN ROMAN. All held high posts in Brigade 2506 (Bay of Pigs). Speculation linked Kennedy's close association with these exiles to a deal with Nicaragua through ex-President Luis SOMOZA.

Anti-CASTRO PM OPERATIONS 19-9-9/1

DBA 78251 dated 18 August 1964 (FBI)

Reported plan of Cuban exile leaders to assassinate

selected Cuban Government leaders. Prices allegedly agreed upon were $100,000 to assassinate Fidel CASTRO; $20,000 for Raul CASTRO; and $20,000 for "Che" GUEVARA. This information was provided to the FBI by another Government Agency that allegedly had several meetings with one Byron CAMERON, Fort Lauderdale, Fla. CAMERON allegedly was acquainted with several policemen in St. Louis with ties to the underworld. CAMERON denied involvement with policemen connected with the underworld and said he had never discussed with anyone plans to assassinate Fidel or others.

JMARC Operation - 19-120-15

DIRECTOR 36823 (OUT 90086) 25 June 1960

Cable to Mexico and Havana. Reported that five Castro agents recently left Cuba, 3 for Miami and 2 for New York,with task to abduct AMHAWK (Manuel Antonio VARONA y Loredo). Source was PELAEZ (fnu) thru BARKER's wife. Information was passed to the FBI. Suggested that VARONA be warned to take normal security precautions.

XAAZ 6269 (OUT 90031) 26 June 1960

The Agency provided the above information on proposed abduction of VARONA to the FBI, and advised that the same information was being sent to I&NS.

JMARC - PM Operations General 19-132-2

DIRECTOR 09972 (OUT 88974) 31 Oct 1960

Cable to Guatemala giving details of training of assault force for paramilitary ops against Cuba.

GUAT 821 (IN 1688) 13 January 1961 to BELL.

FYI: Reported that Alexander ROURKE, free lance newsman from New York City in Miami, told ESOLEO-1 that Frank FIORINI and Dr. Orlando BOSCH of Miami, representing man in Cuba named DIEGO (fnu), were recruiting and equipping force in Florida to assault Cuba 18 January. The organization was receiving financial aid from an organization in New York City known as Anti-Communist International Association.

DBF 90801 dated 10 March 1961 (FBI)

New York FBI office advised that invasion of Cuba was to take place week of 6 March 1961 by members of an anti-Castro group from Nassau, Bahamas, British West Indies.

JMARC Program 19-120-15/2

MASH 1470 (IN 38669) 6 Nov 1960.

Cable to CIA Headquarters and Havana stating that RECAREY, (fnu), cousin of a Guat trainee, arrived MASH from Havana on 5 November to check bonafides of Eduardo OJEDA Camaraza. OJEDA had made contact with AMYUM/AMRUNG Havana and told details of MASH recruitment, training, names of trainees and mission in Cuba. MASH feared AMRUNG/AMYUM may try kill OJEDA as Castro penetration/provocateur if bonafides not established.

RIMM 5846 (IN 2708) 4 June 1961

Radio message #84 from agent in Cuba advised "functionary of Italian Embassy by name of MORATORI says he works for one intelligence org. of yours, says he is in contact with Martin Elena and others and that you have plans for invasion within 30 days after killing Fidel. Advise if we can confide in MORATORI."

BELL 0987 (OUT 9804) 6 June 1961

Radio message #72 to agent 'MORATORI unknown to us. Do not confide in him. MORATORI's information of pending invasion within 30 days after killing Fidel not true. Beware of rumor mongers and provocateurs."

AMBLEAK 19-6-58/3,4

UFG 2267 dated 23 January 1963

Reported on activities of Manuel Antonio VARONA of "Rescate" (Revolutionary Democratic Rescue) in Costa Rica and other Central American countries re discussing Cuban situation with foreign ministers of those countries. While in Costa Rica he negotiated with local political personalities to recruit and train an anti-Communist paramilitary force along lines then being developed in Colombia.

AMBRUSH Operation 19-5-6

Document dated 19 August 1961 (No document symbol)

Handcarried to Headquarters from JMWAVE. Document contains comments from AMPAL-1 on pro-Cuban sources in the U.S. He reported information from other sources that Fidel CASTRO is sending in many G-2 women instead of men for his clandestine operations between U.S and Cuba. Also reported that the Russians have spies in the Pentagon that pull for Fidel CASTRO, and agents in all branches of the U.S. Government of importance including the CIA. Further, that all people in Cuba picked up for working for CIA are done so because of information from these agents. The source was told of suspicions of one Eugenio, a Cuban. /COMMENT: SLIPSTREAM-1 in 1976 advised that one Eugenio MARTINEZ in Miami was a Castro

agent. One Eugenio Rolando MARTINEZ Careaga was a Miami Station agent involved in the Watergate breakin.7 There was no reference to assassination in this file.

AMCANOE Operation 19-6-91

TDCSDB 3/654,571 dated 9 May 1963

Reported meeting on 7 May 63 between Paulino A. SIERRA, a Cuban lawyer from Chicago, and representatives of 43 Cuban exile groups in Miami. SIERRA claimed he had backing of wealthy Chicago business people who were willing to loan up to $30 million dollars for the purpose of overthrowing the Castro Government. SIERRA said the money could be made available to organizations having the capability of carrying out clandestine activity in Cuba.

WAVE 8743 (IN 43724) 22 May 1963

A Miami Station asset reported information from Julio GARCERAN del Vall y Souza, of the PGCC,(Pro-Constitutional Government of Cuba in Exile) who,on 9 May 63,said that Cuban exile groups were puzzled with regard to the American policy toward Cuba and the exile community. GARCERAN said that among persons who recently visited him were Enrique RUIZ Williams Alfert, a personal friend of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and Jaime VARELA Canosa;also

PERULLERO (fnu). Those three reportedly represented a group of members of Brigade 2506 who had been training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. RUIZ Williams was trying to form a nucleus for an invasion force. GARCERAN had been offered use of a large ranch in Colombia for operations against Cuba but feared that use of such would create an international incident and provoke a war between Cuba and Colombia.

Memorandum for the Record by Carl Trettin 3 Mar 1964

AMCANOE-1 reported that an acquaintance of his (unidentified), a businessman and ship owner with interest in slot machine business - placing them in gambling houses - placed the man in contact with elements in the underworld primarily through his partner, a former St. Louis police officer. Through the latter, there was tie-in with the Cosa Nostra. The Cosa Nostra interests alleged to have numerous contacts still available to them in Cuba and offered to assassinate Castro for $150 thousand dollars.

UFGA 15233 dated 15 April 1964

Report on a Byron CAMERON who said that he represented an unidentified group of persons who had made contact with two Cuban gangsters who were willing to kill Fidel CASTRO. CAMERON reportedly was associated with a Mr. S.W. TYLER (no identifiable traces) of Caribbean Producer, Inc., Miami Springs, Fla., and Herbert F.

JENNE (no traces) with the firm F.A. Johnson, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Fla. CAMERON was reported as allegedly belonging to the Mafia.

UFGA 15954 dated 11 May 1964

On 3 March 64 CAMERON held a meeting with Teofilo BABUN Franco, Oscar FERNANDEZ Viego, Eliseo GOMEZ Fernandez, Freddie GARCIA, Eddie GARCIA and Miguel Guillermo TRUYOL-Gimeno. CAMERON mentioned that he was in contact with an unidentified group who would be willing to assassinate select Cuban officials for cash: specifically CAMERON was interested in assassinating Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO and "Che" GUEVARA. They agreed on $100 thousand for Fidel, $20 thousand for Raul and $20 thousand for "Che." CAMERON made it fairly clear at the beginning that the Mafia was involved.

AMCLOCK Production and Correspondence 19-6-133/4 (Currently PLSLSTEEL)

ESGW 193 dated 2 September 1960

Dispatch from Headquarters to Geneva and Bern forwarding general requirements for asset. One question was precautions taken to prevent possible assassination attempts of top Cuban officials.

TDCSDB 3/651,885 dated 25 October 1962

Reported view of Soviet diplomat on the Cuban situation. The Soviet diplomat, Minister MOLYAKOV, told a Bloc diplomat that he thought the U.S. action with regard to Cuba was "an election affair." He professed to believe that Kennedy learned on an election tour that his popularity had dropped and undertook the Cuban measure to "become the leader again," and gain mass support. Further, that it worked, and Kennedy again had succeeded in being the "man of the nation." The Soviet diplomat commented that the USSR would not let the American move go without retaliation. /COMMENT: This no doubt referred to the missile crisis./

TDCSDB 3/652,011 dated 1 November 1962

Reported reaction of Satellite officials to the Cuban missile developments. One remarked that Cuba was as important to the USA as to the USSR and thus conflict was inevitable. Some agreed that President Kennedy had made a tactical error in not simply invading Cuba without warning. An East European remarked that all the European nations had shown understanding of "Kennedy and his ships, and would let him play around with them until the elections, but after the elections he would have to put them away and negotiate seriously." The source commented that it was clear that the officials had no clear insight into Soviet intentions, or what the real

ramifications of Cuba would be, but were talking to reinforce their faith.

GNVA 6117 (IN 00894) dated 18 January 1964

Report on Soviet Bloc officials' attitude towards U.S. internal political developments. An East European attributed the assassination of President Kennedy to the Birch Society but stated that something must have gone wrong at the last moment. He speculated that an attack on the USSR was to have followed on the heels of the assassination but had somehow been forestalled.

GNVA 4523 (IN 38202) dated 19 December 1962

Reported that Soviet offensive missiles were introduced into Cuba as part of a twofold Soviet-Cuba plan which was agreed upon "several months ago." Emplacement of Soviet defensive missiles was to constitute the first phase. For the second phase, a major Soviet fleet unit was to have been invited to visit Cuba on a cruise. This was expected to cause immediate U.S. reaction, but the presence of Soviet fleet units surrounding Cuba was considered an effective guarantee that the U.S. would not resort to immediate invasion or other armed action to eliminate missile threat. Purpose of exercise was to force

a major change of U.S. policy towards Cuba. It was anticipated that U.S. reaction would be violent, and from the beginning the plan called for immediate withdrawal at the price of agreement by U.S. that it would end hostile attitude towards Cuba. The Soviets did not implement phase two. This disappointed and angered the Cubans. The Cuban leaders considered that the Soviets had besmirched its own honor and offended the pride of Cuba. KHRUSHCHEV composed a letter to President Kennedy proposing a deal concerning Soviet missile bases in Cuba and American bases in Turkey. KHRUSHCHEV reportedly later regretted the phraseology and not having consulted with Cuba prior to dispatch of the letter.

GNVA 6316 (IN 31199) dated 3 March 1964

Raul ROA said that prior to his assassination, President Kennedy "established certain contacts" with Cuba. Kennedy had sent emissaries to contact Cubans. ROA specifically cited contacts that had taken place in New York. ROA thought that Kennedy would have gone on to negotiate with Cuba, for practical reasons, which would have been to Cuba's advantage. He thought that President Johnson was unaware of Kennedy's actions.

AMCOBRA (later AMBANTY) Operation 19-132-11

WAVE 7250 (IN 57364) dated 12 November 1963

Radio message from agent. "The sewage chief of Havana was executed. He was accused of having given the sewage plans to the CIA in order to install the bombs that exploded during Fidel's speech to the Defense Committees."

WAVE 7523 (IN 61119) dated 15 November 1963

Radio message from agent. "The obligatory military service makes us reduce intelligence information. I will have to decide between insurrection and departing Cuba. I have decided on insurrection. I hope you will help me with the weapons I need."

WAVE 7594 (IN 61966) dated 16 November 1963

Message to agent. "As you agreed when you were here, there can be no insurrection in Cuba until it can take place simultaneously throughout Cuba. Such a total uprising is not possible at this time."

WAVE 7593 (IN 61967) dated 16 November 1963

Message to agent. "If you insist on precipitant action before the whole plan is ready you are going to draw all the enemy forces down upon you and the people of Pinar which will result in the complete destruction of everything you and your men have labored so hard to create. We cannot support an insurrection now. We will continue to support you and group as agreed upon."

WAVE 7707 (IN 62544) dated 17 November 1963

Message to agent. We are unable to support insurrection in Pinar now because it would be premature.

WAVE 8125 (IN 67382) dated 24 November 1963

Message from agent. "Sincere grief and condolence for loss of the greatest leader and statesman of our time, John Kennedy."

WAVE 8598 (IN 75428) dated 6 December 1963

Message to agent. "Thank you for sincere condolences on death of President Kennedy."

AMCOG Operation 19-6-63

WAVE 1465 (IN 11710) dated 4 February 1964

Agent reported that he was told that OSWALD was in Havana between 2 and 7 October 1963. A lady saw him in shirt sleeves, wearing good shoes and smoking American cigars accompanied by Clemente MORERA, an employee of Terminales Mambisas who belongs to the DSE. He (OSWALD) was seen by the sister of Comandante MIRANDA."

/COMMENT: Note document # 517-218 for FOIA Review on June 1976./

COMMANDOS MAMBISAS 19-126-45

A 4 November 1963 Miami Herald article, and 12 November 1963 Washington Post article revealed that Fidel CASTRO was extremely upset at the recent successes of the Commandos Mambisas raids targetted principally against sugar cane industry.

AMCONCERT Project - 19-6-41

The Agency began this project in March 1960. Its objective was to provide information on plans and activities of the Government of Cuba and opposition to the GOC. The principal asset was Francisco VARONA Alonso (201-234983.) VARONA was recruited in April 1959 to elicit information from contacts in Cuba. He was arrested in April 1961, released, and returned to Miami in February 1962. He was used by Miami Station as an informant and terminated February 1969 for being unproductive, unreliable, a poor security risk, and hostile to the U.S. and the U.S.G.

Control of Cuban Travelers 200-9-49

KNGS 0948 (IN 54974) dated 5 November 1963

On 15 October 63 Dominican student Carlos Manuel CABRAL Lofontaine attempted to enter Cuba via Kingston ostensibly to attend architect conference. Jamaican authorities, suspecting the trip to be a pretext, returned CABRAL to the Dom. Rep.

The First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy Ottawa, Osvaldo RELOVA, visited Kingston from 14-21 October 1963, purpose unexplained. While there he lived in the Consulate the entire stay.

HABA 12,838 dated 5 November 1963

Report concerning unofficial irregular air service established between Cuba and Brazil, for transportation of political rather than commercial travelers.

POSN 0340 (IN 54917) dated 5 November 1963

On 25 October 1963 a Russian plane arrived in Pointe-A-Pitre, Guadeloupe, with 60 passengers. 41 transferred to Panama for Rio; the remainder left on the "Russian" plane. /COMMENT: note on cable states that the Cubans were returning from architects congress./

AMCOVE Operation 19-6-93/2,3,4

WAVE 7356 (IN 58343) dated 10 November 1963

Re security crackdown in Cuba, largest since early 1961. Believed to be due to discontent among Cuban populace re economic failures, and CASTRO's fears of impact of recent raids on Cuba which would increase spontaneous sabotage inside Cuba which he may interpret as meaning U.S. Government has stepped up activities to overthrow his regime. CASTRO plans to counter these aspirations by USG with full use of police powers and repressive measures.

TDCSDB 3/658,075 dated 27 November 1963

All Cuban combat units were confined to bases effective 23 November 1963. Following news of death of President Kennedy, Defense Committee members and personnel at certain work centers in Cuba began to celebrate event.

AMCOVE-1 SW Message #60 dated 24 November 1963

Reported strange activities at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana following news of President Kennedy's death 22 November 1963.

AMCOVE-1 SW Message #66 dated 5 December 1963

Report giving names of travelers from Prague on 22 November 1963; travelers from Spain on 23 November 1963. Also, report that high figures of CASTRO regime were very nervous on the day of Kennedy's death. This information came from AMCOVE-11 who obtained it from a doctor friend, who obtained it from a Navy Comandante who was not a sympathizer of the regime.

AMCOVE-1 SW Message #68 dated 6 December 1963

AMCOVE-11 [Dr. Pedro Antonio RODRIGUEZ Inigo] reported "rumors in Cuba that Lee OSWALD, assassin of Kennedy, was photographed in Varadero and Pinar del Rio, and that his (sic) sister, employed at Cuban Embassy Mexico, was a prisoner in Dallas, Texas, with personal documentation of OSWALD and $65,000 dollars. Swiss Ambassador Havana told employees that Lee OSWALD was an associate of Fidel CASTRO."

AMCROAK Operation 19-6-97

MADR 9866 (IN 74333) dated 5 December 1963

AMCROAK-1 (Dr. Bernardo MILANES Lopez) discussed an operational plan with AMOT-2 (Joaquin SANJENIS Perdomo)

which consisted of elimination of high GOC personalities. MILANES had not mentioned the plan to the case officer. (MILANES was recruited by CIA in Madrid in December 1963. At the time of recruitment he was involved with a group planning to kill CASTRO, a completely extra- CIA affiliation.)

MADR 9928 (IN 78595 dated 11 December 1963

The above plan mentioned by MILANES concerned the physical elimination of Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO, and "Che" GUEVARA. MILANES said that seven persons were involved in the plan and that they had studied it for eight months. The case officer told MILANES that the USG did not look with approval on such activities, but he would pass the information on /to his supervisors/

DIRECTOR 88949 dated 12 December 1963

In discussions with MILANES he was to be told that a coup against CASTRO resulting in ouster of CASTRO and the Communist regime was an internal affair for which only Cubans could be responsible. That in the event of a real coup against the CASTRO regime, the U.S. Government was prepared to render full support, upon invitation.

UFGA 13793 dated 27 January 1964

When discussing the plan with MILANES, the case officer

learned that Mario SALABARRIA Aguiar was one of the principal planners. When the case officer told MILANES that the US Government did not condone such actions, MILANES replied that in view of our lack of support of this undertaking, he considered it not prudent to reveal further details, but added that he actually did not know the names of any other possible participants and had only a general idea of the scheme which was to waylay CASTRO as he was leaving an apartment.

UFGA 13794 dated 28 January 1964 (JMWAVE to Hqs.)

In January 1963 Fidel CASTRO asked MILANES what he thought of President Kennedy and his relationship with Fidel. MILANES replied that Fidel probably underestimated Kennedy, that the latter by no means was illiterate or the imbecile Fidel often described him to be, and in the long run Kennedy would be Fidel's undoing. Fidel laughingly replied that he would be the one who ruined Kennedy because within eight months Fidel would have Latin America burning. Fidel made an obscene motion and said he would have Kennedy "in the air."

/COMMENT: Mario SALABARRIA, who worked closely with MILANES, reportedly drew up the assassination plans

and allegedly obtained money and weapons from the U.S. MILANES and SALABARRIA were arrested in mid-1965. SALABARRIA was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. As of May 71 his name appeared on a list of prisoners of Guanajay Prison, Pinar del Rio, Cuba. MILANES, according to one of his sub-sources, served only a few years of his sentence because of collaboration with the Cuban Government. As of 1973 MILANES reportedly was living in Miami, Florida and had been singled out for elimination by members of the Cuban exile community in Miami._7

CUBANA Airline Manifests (non-CS) No File

The Cubana Airline Manifest for 27 November 1963, showing air travel from Mexico City to Havana, lists one Gilberto LOPEZ PP #310162. /See separate file on Gilberto POLICARPO Lopez, both the 201-741600, and the file set up by LAD/JFK Task Force./

Cuban Army of Liberation 19-9-17

DBA 80042 (FBI) dated 14 July 1964

Concerns an interview of Julio LOBO in July 1964.

LOBO claimed he was contacted by Teofilo BABUN and asked to contribute $100,000.00 toward a plot to assassinate Fidel CASTRO and other Cuban leaders. The assassins were described as three or four "Chicago-type Cosa Nostra" individuals who would be going to Havana, Cuba on other legitimate business.

CUBAN Developmental Operations 19-120-40

UFGA 4176 dated 31 May 1962

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters Task Force W, concerning the debriefing of Dr. Jaime CARBONELL Rivero, former nightclub operator in Havana, about two proposals by him to assassinate Fidel CASTRO. Both plans were considered amateurish and not acceptable by CIA officers in Miami.

CUBAN Foreign Relations 19-9-2

DBF 47612 (FBI) dated 27 April 1960

This document deals with Luis CONTE Aguero, a former JMWAVE Station asset, and controversial personality. CONTE, in the U.S. as of April 1960, among other things

associated himself with the White Rose Organization through his nephew Carlos RIVERO Collada. /COMMENT: RIVERO was one of the ransomed returnees from the Bay of Pigs, December 1962. In 1974 he defected to Cuba, saying he had been a CASTRO agent and penetration of exile organizations in the U.S. all the while./ /COMMENT: CONTE in 1960 was attempting to be placed in charge of anti-Cuban programs of the "Voice of the Americas." Hqs. has speculated that CONTE Aguero might be iden/with Bernardo MORALES, recipient of a letter dated 29 November 1962 from a Jose MENENDEZ in Cuba concerning a plot to assassinate President Kennedy. See LAD/JFK Task Force folder on CONTE/.

The FBI informant learned that a person by the name of Roberto had requested biographical and personal information from the Cuban Foreign Ministry on a fnu BEATON and CONTE Aguero for writing of articles concerning these persons, for the "Fact Sheet." Roberto may be iden/w Robert TABER listed in a 6 April 1960 New York Times article as a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. TABER reportedly had made trips to Havana, Cuba from New York City to confer with Fidel CASTRO.

CUBAN GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO 50-9-12

((Mexico City Station Teltap Operation Against Cuban Embassy - LIENVOY) (Job #64-518/84)

FOLDER #20 (Covers Teltap Traffic 20 Aug - 2 Sept 63)

30 Aug 63 - Incoming call to Embassy. OSVALDO with JORRIN. OSVALDO says he is one of the scholarship holders and wants to speak with AZCUE.

FOLDER # 22 (Covers 24 Sept - 3 Oct. 63)

HMMA 22252 dated 4 October 1963

24 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1707 hours from Prensa Latina reporter to Fernandez ROA. Asks if Embassy has any statement about the supposed attempt against CASTRO. ROA says they have no declaration; it's the work of the sick mind of the pseudo-Cubans in Miami. (Item #18).

24 Sept 63 - Call from Embassy at 2007 hours from Raul to OSVALDO, saying Saturday they are having a party. (Item #290).

24 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1835 hours. Luis PRIETO calling in to Luisa asks her if what they are saying about Fidel is true; he has been so alarmed that he has called everyone. Luisa says if they kill Fidel or do something it's worse yet because what remains is terrible. (Item #574).

24 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1258 hours. Woman calling in asks LLAGOSTERA (Cuban Embassy gardner) if he knows about the attempt against CASTRO. LLAGOSTERA says he knows nothing. She asks if the news comes from Miami. He says yes. (Item #272).

25 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1731 hours. OSVALDO calling in asks to speak with AZCUA, so that he will get the medicine for them and LLAGOSTERA. After informing OSVALDO that he isn't there, suggests that he call the Condesa Pharmacy, ask for the medicine and pass the bill to the Embassy. OSVALDO accepts. (Item #343).

25 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1754 hours. Woman from the Condesa Pharmacy says that they made a request for Sr. Osvaldo HERNANDEZ of Chiapas 148, but as it concerns about $300 (pesos) she wants to know if she should supply it. LLAGOSTERA says he will let Srita. MECHE know if she should dispatch it. MECHE accepts. (Item #404).

25 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy from male university student to man in Embassy, to tell him that a few minutes ago they heard news that Fidel had died and they wanted to know if it were true. He says it is news from Miami going around a few days ago; that yesterday's newspaper from Havana says Dr. Fidel CASTRO is enjoying perfect health. (Item #954).

26 Sept 63 - Call from Embassy at 1721 hours. Raul in Embassy talks with Osvaldo. Osvaldo talks to him about the exams he's having all this week and next. Osvaldo asks if they are collecting tomorrow, Saturday's the party. That about the dirty thing will be left until next week.(Item 714

27 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1054 hours. Silvia talks with Guillermo RUIZ (DGI). RUIZ still has not been able to speak with the Consul and that's why he hasn't called her. Silvia asks him to give her the Consul's number because there isn't any time for that. RUIZ says don't get angry; and asks if she wants to speak directly with him. Silvia says yes. RUIZ says it's 11-28-47. She says fine. (Item #191).

2 Oct 63 - Call from Embassy at 1206 hours. Teresa talks with Sra. Neus and says the Ambassador wants the History of the CIA, all the latest books, a copy of each one. Neus says they will be sent. (Item #452).

/COMMENT: The name "Osvaldo" is mentioned in several conversations. In one he gave his name as Osvaldo HERNANDEZ and resided at the same place as the Cuban Ambassador, whose last name is also HERNANDEZ. It is speculated that they might be related. Traced Osvaldo HERNANDEZ, but could not positively identify him for lack of more data./ /COMMENT: Above is the only call made by or to Silvia (DURAN) on the 27th of September

the day on which Lee Harvey OSWALD reportedly came to the Cuban Embassy, according to Washington Post article dated 26 Nov 76.

FOLDER #25 (Covering teltap from 15 Nov - 30 Nov 63)

22 November 1963

ITEM 038 Page 1

1648 hours - Long Distance call from Vera Cruz.

Caller (SAMA) (Ovilio SAMA, Cuban Vice Consul in Vera Cruz).

Receiver Ambassador HERNANDEZ Armas.

HERNANDEZ: Tells SAMA that tomorrow's meeting will have to be postponed until another Saturday at the same time because he has another invitation and possibly will have to leave.

SAMA : Accepts and asks if there is any instructions regarding the recent incident.

HERNANDEZ: Says no, all is perfectly well.

SAMA : Says yes, there is some instruction concerning Kennedy's death.

HERNANDEZ: Says no, that the thing is very lamentable, but "we are here as always."

SAMA : Says that the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps will call at eight in the evening to go give their condolences, but they will not go.

HERNANDEZ: Gives him the reason, and asks that he explain

to the Dean that they cannot go because of the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

ITEM 084 Page 2

Hour not specified - Call to the Embassy.

Caller (Guillermo OCHOA de Novedades), spoke with Receiver (PEREGRINA) inside the Embassy.

OCHOA : Called to say that that afternoon he went to the Embassy to see if there was an article for the newspaper regarding Kennedy's death.

PEREGRINA: Told OCHOA that the Ambassador had been invited to a dinner and that OCHOA should call back at 5 o'clock in the evening at which time she will tell him something about the matter. PEREGRINA tells OCHOA to wait a minute, then says that the Ambassador has not arrived yet and up to now has not said anything. She tells OCHOA he can call back later if he wishes.

OCHOA : Said that he would call that night.

ITEM 101 Page 2

1730 hours - Call to Embassy.

Caller (Unidentified man) calls LUISA (inside Embassy)

Caller : Asks if she knows the latest news.

LUISA : Jokingly said "yes, of course, I knew about it almost before Kennedy ."

Caller : Laughs and comments that that is very bad.

In principle they thought it was one of those reactionary extremists who was against the integration and all ... but it seems that they apprehended a man who is nothing more than the president of one of those Fair Play for Cuba Committees.

LUISA : Says she also knows that.

CALLER : As of yet nothing is confirmed but it appears that whoever did it was crazy, independently (so deranged) that he could have blamed that to Kennedy... say the international conditions and internal conditions in the United States... because...

LUISA : And more external principally.

CALLER : That's why I say international... one can see a sufficient effect and not suffer a big change, with a change of President or with a thing of this type ... above all...

LUISA : Was it a gringo (American) that killed him?

CALLER : Yes, but he said he had been in Russia, that he wanted to become a Russian citizen, but Russia didn't want to give him the citizenship.

LUISA : Surprised...said listen, how do they know those things over there?

CALLER : He knows Russian well, and moreover this fellow went with Fidel's forces into the mountains,

		or wanted to go, something like that. Who knows how the thing was?
LUISA	:	Serious.
CALLER	:	Asks how much more they know over there?
LUISA	:	Almost precisely that. They heard about it sometime ago and now they are ...
CALLER	:	That is very bad. He was eating with some friends and commenting on the magazine Politica which had just come out, when one arrived and gave them the news. That really surprised him and he thought they were being kidded.
LUISA	:	She was looking at the magazine but her friend must have accidentally taken it away.
CALLER	:	Said his friend commented that a Mexican had killed him (Kennedy) because he (the Mexican) realized that the United States had taken Texas from them and he killed the President for vengeance; that it was all a joke but they didn't believe him until he said that they should turn on the radio; that's when they heard about it. The last thing he heard, a little while ago, is that the fellow is someone named OSWALD. They believe he is the one but he hasn't confessed anything.
LUISA	:	But they already know that he speaks Russian and belongs to a pro-Cuba committee. They

know that he wanted to be naturalized, but the man hasn't confessed.

CALLER : Says the reason may be they are trying to find out something about the man, because...

LUISA : Says wait a minute, can you tell me?

CALLER : We thought that if it had been, or appeared to the public to be one of the segregationist or those opposed to integration that had assassinated Kennedy, that there might be a civil struggle, or a Civil War in the United States. Considering the critical situation the country is going through, they will find a resolution to that man, no? Already it is more international. Are they going to find out for certain, who knows? Let's see what happens.

LUISA : Laughs and asks what will happen.

CALLER : Who knows?

LUISA : Figuratively, one, two, three, and already there are three. (She laughs). What barbarians!

CALLER : That will probably be the topic of conversation at Silvia's party today.

LUISA : It was cancelled because they couldn't go.

CALLER : Asks why.

LUISA : "So they can later say that we were celebrating Kennedy's death" (sic). /COMMENT: appears that transcriber left out negative - can not say/. Silvia agreed to change the party to next week,

but not to coincide with the funeral (laugh).

CALLER : One must take that into consideration.

LUISA : What will be after the sorrow, the mourning, and all that junk.

CALLER : Asks where she is going to stay now.

LUISA : Says that she plans to move to the doctor's house tonight.

CALLER : Asks if all is known there.

LUISA : Says yes, but she doesn't know how everything is or if they have to stay at the Embassy; however, she believes that it will not be possible today, because everyone left for the airport and there isn't a car at the Embassy. Possibly tomorrow morning, instead of going to the study group, she will move.

CALLER : Said he would talk to her tomorrow.

LUISA : Said that he should inquire at the Embassy or at the house. It she doesn't stay at the Embassy, she will go to her house, where she will be by 10.

CALLER : Concurs.

<u>ITEM 118 Page 2</u>

1721 hours - Call to the Embassy.

CALLER (identity unknown) wants to talk with FERNANDEZ Roa.

RECEIVER (PEREGRINA) says he is outside of Mexico and there is no one there from the news department.

CALLER : Says he is from the revolutionary newspaper and would like the opinion of Dr. Roa regarding the assassination of Kennedy.

PEREGRINA : Repeats that Roa is in Havana, and with regards to Kennedy, they can't say anything because they know nothing about it and the Ambassador isn't around at the moment.

ITEM 159 Page 3

1744 hours - Call to the Embassy.

CALLER (Norma) tells Bertica (in the Embassy) that at this moment the following news story is appearing on the teletype: "Interrogation of young OSWALD who assassinated President Kennedy, says that he was in the Soviet Union, married a Soviet woman, wanted Soviet citizenship but wasn't granted it. He is president of a pro-Cuban committee called PERPLEX (Fair Play) for Cuba. The note says that these committees, pro-Cuban, are committees that fight ... without sympathizers of Fidel CASTRO and make propaganda for the Cuban Government."

ITEM 205 Page 3

Hour unknown - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (female) Asks LLAGOSTERA (Cuban Embassy gardner) if he has the radio turned on.

LLAGOSTERA: Says yes.

CALLER : Asks if LLAGOSTERA heard the news that an attempt was made on life of Kennedy.

LLAGOSTERA: Says no. He changed the conversation and said that his wife and son, Pepito, were arriving the coming month.

CALLER : Said that is good and asked LLAGOSTERA to turn on the radio at 1,000 because that's where the news was given.

LLAGOSTERA: Agrees.

ITEM 236 Page 3

1319 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (COTY) Asks LLAGOSTERA if he is listening to the the radio.

LLAGOSTERA: Says yes.

COTY : Asks if it is true that Kennedy has been killed.

LLAGOSTERA: Says no, but that an attempt was made against his life.

COTY : Says there is no radio where he is and he doesn't know what is going on. They say that he was shot three times and died. At that moment it was being given in a bulletin and that LLAGOSTERA should turn on the radio to hear the news.

LLAGOSTERA: Says he will.

ITEM 275 Page 4

Hour not given - Call to the Embassy.

CALLER (Female) Asks ROGELIO to come to see her right away because she has something very important to tell him.

ROGELIO : Asks if it is to tell him that Kennedy was killed.

CALLER : Says yes.

ROGELIO : Says he already knows it.

ITEM 294 Page 4

1340 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (Alejandro) Advised LLAGOSTERA that he will be in the Foreign Relations office in case the man calls.

LLAGOSTERA : Says that's fine.

Alejandro : Said "you know that your patron died, no?"

LLAGOSTERA : Yes, very well.

Alejandro : That there was an attempt against Kennedy's life, and it seems that he died.

LLAGOSTERA : Said he did not know that. That he will call back later.

ITEM 302 Page 4

1350 hours - Call from Embassy to Tele # 35-54-12.

Jorge ROJAS : Asks his wife, Cachita, if she knew about the news.

Cachita	: Said yes, that they were just giving it on the radio.
ROJAS	: Said what a dreadful thing.
Cachita	: Replied what imbeciles, what do they gain with terrorism.
ROJAS	: Who knows what will happen now.
Cachita	: Changed the subject and told her that "the airplane arrives after four" and that he is going over there right now.
Cachita	: Said she will wait for him.

ITEM 317 Pages 4 & 5

1400 hours - Call to Embassy

CALLER (COTY)	Asks LLAGOSTERA if it's confirmed.
LLAGOSTERA	: Said yes, that's correct, may his soul rest in peace.
COTY	: Asks if the plane arrived.
LLAGOSTERA	: Said the plane will arrive at 4:15.
COTY	: Said it was strange that LANDRIAN or MENA had not called him, because he had some things of theirs.
LLAGOSTERA	: Said that's correct.

ITEM 339 Page 5

1402 hours - Call to Embassy

CALLER (PENA) Asks for ROGELIO.

LLAGOSTERA : Said he wasn't in.

PENA : Said he called to tell him the news.

LLAGOSTERA : Said they already know it.

PENA : Said then he is happy.

LLAGOSTERA : Said no, the only thing they desired, was to make him a ..... of flowers.

PENA : Laughed and agreed.

ITEM 347 Page 5

1405 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (CONCEPCION's wife) Tells LLAGOSTERA that when her husband, (Oscar CONCEPCION) arrives, tell him that he left some candies "here". /The CUIS had a commo drop in Mexico City referred to as Candy./

LLAGOSTERA : Said he will, but if Oscar arrived at home first, to tell him that the airplane arrives at 4:15.

CONCEPCION's wife : Agreed and said that the problem is that she bought some candies to send to VEGA but her husband forgot them.

LLAGOSTERA : Said, today a good man died.

CONCEPCION's Wife: Asks who.

LLAGOSTERA : Responded, Kennedy.

CONCEPCION's Wife: Laughs.

LLAGOSTERA : Said, poor man, may God have him in glory.

CONCEPCION's Wife: Laughs again.

ITEM 522 Page 8

1330 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (Female,unidentified) Asks if LUISA knows about the news of Kennedy's death.

LUISA : Surprised, says it is a lie and asks who.

CALLER : Said in an attempt in Texas.

LUISA : Again surprised, LUISA questions if the news is official and asked when it occurred.

CALLER : It happened at 1300 hours.

LUISA : Becomes joyful and says "how great!"

CALLER : Langhs and indicates that his (Kennedy's) brother and wife were also injured.

LUISA : Laughs and says again, "how great, nevertheless, I don't believe it."

CALLER : Says turn on the radio.

LUISA : Asks for her husband whom she hasn't seen.

CALLER : Said "he was here, but he left."

LUISA : Said she has been waiting for him for a while because she has to give him a list of people to review (or revise).

CALLER : Told LLAGOSTERA that he should turn on the radio.

LUISA : Again rejoices and says how great it is.

CALLER : Became serious and asked if LUISA knows the consequences.

LUISA : Says "good."

CALLER : Said she felt sorry because he was a man and the father of a family.

LUISA : Said she felt sorry because he was a father, but he was "a degenerate, unfortunate, an aggressor."

CALLER : Apart from his politics with Cuba, she didn't believe anything had been resolved; "one must now wait to see what will happen."

LUISA : After asking her to wait, asked what more was said.

CALLER : Said they have now been given the news; he has died, was shot three times in the face.

LUISA : Said perfect. Now I'm going to come down.

CALLER : Replied, good.

ITEM 571 Page 9

1344 hours - Call to Embassy.

NICO (Called in) Asked if any calls had come for him.

LUISA : Until now, nothing.

NICO : Asked if VACILIO had called.

LUISA : Said, no, only SOLORAZANO called saying it was not possible for him to send the note because of a problem. For major reasons it was not possible that day; maybe not until Monday. If he wishes to speak with him, he will be at 21-35-70 until one in the afternoon.

NICO : Correct.

LUISA : Said that NELA just called to give her the news of Kennedy's death and the wounding of his brother; that it happened in Texas. Asked what NICO thought about it.

NICO : "can you imagine!"

LUISA : Laughs and adds that that is all for now; that the list is almost ready, she is finishing the last page.

NICO : Says okay. Asks what time the airplane will arrive.

LUISA : Says at 4 and that at 4:30 they must be at the airport.

NICO : Says okay.

ITEM 594 Page 9

Hour not given - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (YOYA) Asks LUISA if she has already heard the news.

LUISA : Says yes.

YOYA : Asks what she thinks of it.

LUISA : "Well, I don't know. I still don't know what opinion to have about it."

YOYA :"What brutes. A good shot. Direct. Listen, now they are going to say that it was from here; that it was some Cuban."

LUISA :"That is possible, then if they don't say it, they will die."

YOYA : "That is certain."

LUISA : Changed the conversation and asked how her mother is.

YOYA : Said she is better; that when she arrived at the house, she received the news and it caught her by surprise.

LUISA : That even he was caught by surprise.

YOYA :"Yes, well if he was alerted, they would have done nothing; what brutes! What is going to happen today, is that it was some Cuban."

LUISA :"That it will be a problem for world politics. It is a large problem; enormous."

YOYA :"It is going to be that."

LUISA :"Now no way, it already happened, and it happened in Dallas, Texas."

FOLDER #25 -

25 NOVEMBER 1963

ITEM #93 Page 1

0946 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER : Asks for ROA.

RECEIVER : (JORRIN) Replied that he wasn't in.

CALLER : Identified self as John RETTY, BBC Correspondent from London. Asked receiver if he had read the report in that day's EXCELSIOR (Mexico City newspaper), about the presence in Mexico in September of the presumed assassin of Kennedy.

JORRIN : Said he hadn't read anything.

RETTY : Said that OSWALD was here in Mexico and went to the Cuban Embassy asking for a visa to go to the Soviet Union; and that he also was in the Soviet Embassy. RETTY asked if JORRIN could confirm the story.

JORRIN : Said RETTY would have to call the Consulate later on 11 28 47 -- 55.

FOLDER #25

27 NOVEMBER 1963

ITEM #26 Page 1

1026 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (Male) From Ultimas Noticias says that they have had

a cable from Havana stating that an employee of the Foreign Relations Office of the embassy had been badly treated with regard to finding out about OSWALD's passport; OSWALD, Kennedy's assassin. That they would like to confirm if it is true.

CHELO : Ignores him, since they had not received the cable directly from Havana.

CALLER : Said Cuba had protested against Mexico for that action.

CHELO : Said, wait a moment. The embassy has no news concerning that particular --

CALLER : Tells PEREGRINA that the cable is from Miami. A radio transmission from Havana was picked up. Minister Raul ROA announced that he had delivered a protest to Ambassador Gilberto BOSQUES of Mexico against the Mexican authorities who had arrested Silvia DURAN, an employee of the Cuban Embassy, supposedly concerning OSWALD's passport.

PEREGRINA : Said they had no news with regard to that.

CALLER : Asked if the arrest took place.

PEREGRINA : Said no, they have no news of that.

CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 19-5-1

OOA 3/215,189 dated 27 March 1962

Concerns Fidel CASTRO's intelligence service that operated out of the 13th floor of the INRA Bldg., in Havana. Appears that its mission was to infiltrate counter-revolutionary groups operating in Cuba and the U.S. Juan ORTA was head of it before he defected to the U.S.

OOA 3/215,192 dated 27 March 1962

Concerns agents of Fidel CASTRO's intelligence service. Luis TACORNAL made several trips to the U.S. on missions for Fidel. TACORNAL told Juan ORTA he was recruited by Rolando MASFERRER to form resistance unit in Havana. ORTA told TACORNAL to carry out mission to see how many counterrevolutionaries he could get to join the resistance unit.

DBA 67028 (FBI) dated 24 March 1964

Concerns interview of Harry DEAN in California on 10 December 1963. DEAN said he was connected with July 26th Movement as early as 1958; visited Havana and saw Juan ORTA personally in June 1960; and on return to Chicago joined the FPCC (Fair Play for Cuba Committee) at the instigation of Cuban Consul in Chicago. DEAN

met in Cuba man by the name of Frank VEGA who spoke perfect English, and is believed to have identified himself as G-2; was disturbed that DEAN saw ORTA before seeing him (VEGA).

CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES - General 19-5-1

CSCI 3/764,016 dated 20 February 1961

Jose PAZ Novas, an exile formerly with the G-2, reported that Juan ORTA worked for the Premier's group; a group of intelligence operators who worked directly under Fidel CASTRO with offices on the 18th floor of the INRA Building.

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (CRC) 19-124-25

UFGA 3926 dated 1 May 1962

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters. Noted that the Station had major concern with regard to the extent and scope of non-CIA support, in the clandestine field, to the Cuban exiles and to the Cuban underground.

WAVE 6617 (IN 98730) dated 1 April 1963

Cable from WAVE to Headquarters, states widespread anti-Kennedy, anti-U.S. reaction to U.S. State Dept.

ban on travel of Cuban exiles outside Dade County, Fla.

DGI (GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE) Organization, Functions, Policies, Standards (Soft File)

CSCI 3/777,001 dated 10 July 1963.

Bureau "N" in the National Section of the G-2 was charged with controlling six targets including hotels, casinos and former gambling groups.

DGI - Targets and Assignments (Soft File)

Cross-reference form, 3 September 1963 (FBI doc?)

Subject of document - Alwin Artilano ODIO TAMAYO y Suarez. "Target of greatest importance was to penetrate Cuban Army of Liberation to determine date of any possible invasion of Cuba. Leaders were to be identified to be assassinated later."

DGI - Guerrilla and Miscellaneous Training of Foreigners Soft File

TDCSDB 3/657,936 dated 18 Nov 1963

Source AMTURVY-1 (Arturo Maria de Jesus VERONA Alonso), from sub-source, a militiaman: As of 17 November 1963 rumors were circulating that Fidel CASTRO may have left Cuba for China or the Soviet Union.

DSE - DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY A-13 - General

Non-Official file - No file no. - Soft File

TDCSDB 3/656,765 dated 20 September 1963

A Bogota [liaison] source reported that Manuel PINEIRO said that the Cubans were aware of two CIA agents among delegation of U.S. students; also, that the CIS was aware of an assassination plot against Fidel CASTRO by a group in the GOC being directed by CIA.

DSE - Soft File

CSCI 3/779,828 dated 4 February 1964

Report on Mario GUTIERREZ, nicknamed "Mayito", a Cuban, who in February 1964 was residing in the U.S. In 1959 he was working in hotels and night clubs and acting as a penetration agent for the Cuban Intelligence Service. GUTIERREZ and Manola ALVAREZ worked for the Chief of "N" Bureau of the National Section of the G-2 Secret Aparat in Havana.

AMDOSE Project 19-6-77/2-4

OSMA 14727 Att. A. dated 2 January 1962

SW message from agent, AMDOSE-1, dated 7 December 1962, includes the statement "the majority of us hope that Kennedy finishes with Fidel before Christmas." /Seems to be

more a statement of mood or feeling rather than fact.7

AMEMBER Operation 19-6-116/2,3,4

Memorandum to the DCI from the DDP dated 10 June 1964

Concerns plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban Government leaders. Persons, who were parties to this action, advised Agency officers of plans to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Further advised there was tie-in with elements of Cosa Nostra with on-island contacts who could do the job. Agency officers made clear that the U.S. Government would not condone such action.

AMFAUNA Project 19-6-50/3

UFGA 10,085 dated 24 July 1963

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters, advised that AMFAUNA-1 reported that a friend of AMFAUNA-7 was planning to assassinate Fidel CASTRO before the 26th of July and wanted financial support.

SW Message from AMFAUNA-1 received 30 July 1963

(Mge #134 dated 15 July 1963)

AMFAUNA-7 reportedly asked AMFAUNA-1 to inform the latter's friend abroad (CIA) about A-7's plans to

assassinate CASTRO and to request financial support. A-1 said he was one of the five persons who knew the identity of the person who was organizing it, but could not reveal it, even to CIA, because those Cubans believed that U.S. policy toward Cuba had been so wrong that the U.S. Government agencies must have been penetrated by traitors to democracy. A-1 said he did not believe in assassination but felt it was his duty to report it. A-1 said the conspirators didn't know him (A-1) at all, that they knew only A-7, but they did know that the above information reached CIA.

WAVE 2086 (IN 91617) dated 2 August 1963

On 23 July 1963 an unidentified individual said he was raising money for the purchase of more dynamite to use in the assassination of Fidel CASTRO. He said that he was one of six men planning to kill Fidel. RENGO (fnu), formerly an official of the CASTRO Government, was leader of the group. They planned to trigger an explosion in a sand truck when Fidel went by. If not killed by the explosion, Fidel was to have been shot by five of the group who would close in on him.

WAVE 2316 (IN 95289) dated 8 August 1963

SW Message #143 dated 1 August 1963

Reported information from a Bernardo ALVAREZ Mon, that an attempt on CASTRO's life had been prepared for 26 July

banquet at the Presidential Palace. A large caliber machine gun on a tripod had been discovered behind a curtain. AMFAUNA-1 said that this had nothing to do with AMFAUNA-7's plan which was still pending.

UFGA 13428 dated 15 January 1964

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters, reported information from [HULAKE-1] 01 on 8 Jan 64 indicating that there had been a general roundup in Cienfuegos, which began on 26 Dec 63, possibly in connection with a suspected plot against the life of Fidel CASTRO. At least 17 persons were arrested. One person appeared to be AMLAME-5 (Luis PUIG Tabares 201-329604). Neither AMFAUNA-26 nor AMLAME-5 were believed to be involved in any plot against the life of Fidel, but could have been high on the general suspect list.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO 19-9-11/1
(Democratic Revolutionary Front)

UFGA 1933 dated 24 July 1961

Dispatch from JMWAVE to Headquarters, transmitting an operational plan presented to WAVE Base by Raul F. HERRERO Morales, Member of the Executive Board, Frente Revolucionario Jose A. ECHEVARRIA. HERRERO was told by a WAVE Base contact that the Agency could not help him. The plan called for the physical elimination of Fidel CASTRO, several members of the Cuban Communist

Party, the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba, a few members of the Minister's Council and some other 2,000 persons connected with the Communist Party or Cuban Government.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO (FRD) 19-9-11 (General)
(Revolutionary Democratic Front)
DBF 71256 (FBI) dated 15 January 1962

On 19 January 1961 Thomas Frank MIKA and Thomas Lawrence KANE told the Chicago FBI office the following: KANE said he was recruited into the CASTRO movement in Miami in May 59, went to Cuba, became disillusioned and returned to the U.S. in December 1959. He visited the FRD office in Chicago, and was advised of a plan to assassinate the principal members of the CASTRO regime; Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO, and "Che" GUEVARA. Allegedly members of the FRD sounded out KANE for participating in such an attempt. If the mission could be successfully executed, the members participating would be paid $500,000.00.

AMHIM Project 19-126-41/3,4

UFGA 15383 dated 8 May 1964

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters. AMHIM-2

learned during a visit to San Juan, Puerto Rico in late March 1964 that Manuel RAY Rivero, leader of JURE (Cuban Revolutionary Junta), planned to infiltrate Cuba. Included in RAY's plans was a plot to kill Fidel CASTRO.

JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA CUBANA (JURE)
(Cuban Revolutionary Junta)
SJAN 0884 (IN 44753) dated 4 January 1963

Manuel RAY Rivero, head of JURE, told SKDIKE-1 (San Jose Station source) that JURE was then concentrating on infiltrating Cuban militia through which he hoped ultimately to effect the assassination of the Cuban hierarchy.

WAVE 7824 (IN 05509) dated 13 June 1964

Manuel RAY Rivero on 11 June 1964 denied to AMCARBON-1 (JMWAVE Station contact) that he and JURE were receiving CIA help. He indicated, however, that he was getting non-specific help from Tad SZULC of the New York Times, Karl MEYER of the Washington Post, and Sam HALPER of Time.

The ZRKNICK section, because of its classification - TOP SECRET UMBRA - is included as an annex. According to Mr. King, Richard King, the Comint Control Officer for the Office of Sigint Ops, the material should retain that classification.

AMLACE Operation 19-6-62/2,3,4

3

Memorandum to Chief, TFW/FI from [F.W. Flott] dated 1 October 1962

AMLACE-1 was asked about succession in the event of CASTRO's death. He responded in October 1962 that in the event of CASTRO's death, even the gusanos (worms) say it would be useless to kill Fidel. No one thinks that his death would be useful to the counter-revolution.

AMLEG Operation 19-6-80/2,3,4

DIRECTOR 33866 dated 19 April 1963

Cable from Headquarters to the Hague, stating that approval has been granted for sabotage of Cuban ships ranging from delaying ship to putting ship out of commission.

1/mc

DIRECTOR 34099 Dated 20 April 1963

Cable from Hqs. to the Hamb and Fran, stating sabotage program against Cuban shipping of sufficiently high priority to require utilization any appropriate asset.

HAGU 3698 (IN 22804) Dated 22 April 1963

Proposed that AMLEG-29 place a four hour delay explosive "CLAM" to one of 34 drums of "TETRAHYDROFURAN" which to be loaded on the deck of the HAVANA.

DIRECTOR 35006 Dated 24 April 1963

Cable from Hqs. to HAGU, BRUS, HAMB, FRAN, CASB, RABA stating U.S. Govt policy calls for all feasible forms pressure on CASTRO Regime to inhibit its success and culminate in disorder leading to its downfall. Realize motivation of assets will be major key to success ops, and that difficulties will be encountered due their interpretation USG policy. Burden of positive motivation thus rests on case officers involved who must decide each case on own merits and use considerable judgement to induce cooperation.

DIRECTOR 41673 Dated 21 May 1963

Sabotage operation failed for reasons yet unclear. Prohibition on use explosives or incendiary devices has been removed. All addressees now urged consider utilization full range sabotage and harrassment techniques against Cuban

ships and cargoes. Now appears AMLEG agents generally unsuited for violent sabotage.

DIRECTOR 39186 Dated 11 May 1963

Restriction on sabotage applies only to explosive and incendiary type actions such as limpets and shape charges. Wish to explore possibility of non-violent methods of sabotaging Cuban ships. Wish to minimize USG sponsorship of sabotage acts whenever possible. This program is to be held on stict need to know basis. Therefore, no briefing of State personnel without prior Hqs. approval. Request for approval in most cases will be denied. Rationale for revision is that State fully represented in approval this program and may brief their Chiefs of Mission thru own channels if they wish. /RESEARCHER COMMENT: In view of large number of persons briefed on the program in a short period of time, it appears likely that the Gov't of Cuba could have possibly learned of the program by June 1963, some four months before the assassination of President Kennedy. The State Dept. approved the operation and Ambassadors were to be informed on a strictly "need to know basis." There was a minor flap when it was learned that Amb. McArthur (Belgium) was informed of the program./

AMLEO Operation 19-6-75/2,3,4

UFGA 15995 Dated 2 June 1964

In February 1963 AMLEO-3 (Capt. Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez) Cuban defector, in debriefing claimed that he had high-level anti-Communist contacts in the GOC (whom he refused to name) who would listen to Rebel Army exiles but would take no positive action with them unless they demonstrated their power by eliminating Fidel or carrying out other strong action that would prove they had strong outside backing. RABEL said that the death of Fidel would be the best way to change the Government of Cuba. /COMMENT: RABEL was used in relation to the AMTRUNK Operation. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965. RESEARCHER COMMENT: Appears possible RABEL may have been CIS provocation agent whose mission was to convince the CIA or some exile group to try to undertake a plot to assassinate Fidel./

LIAISON with Department of the Army (ACSI) re Cuba 19-2-12

WAVE 1196 (IN 07492) Dated 20 June 1964

A letter from AMSHOT-1 (now SLFREE-1) on-island, dated 8 January 1964, advised that one Francisco BLANCO was arrested on 17 Oct 1963 for involvement in a planned assassination of Fidel CASTRO. BLANCO was employed by the Office of Planificacion (sic) JUCIPLAN. JMWAVE Station

provided a copy of the letter to local FBI office.

LIAISON WITH OTHER U.S. AGENCIES 19-2-4

DIRECTOR 03964 Dated 8 December 1962

Hqs. CIA Cabled Secret Service, FBI and State Dept. Security, giving text of a letter from Havana, dated 27 November 1962, concerning a plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Letter also stated that Fidel was very anxious to know how plans were progressing. Letter was addressed to a Post Office Box in Miami belonging to the Radio Libertad La Voz Anti-Comunista de America. Since the addressee was unknown to members of Radio Libertad, one of their Maimi reps. passed the letter to a contact of JMWAVE Station. Addressee was Bernardo Adalberto MORALES-Rivero. /COMMENT: See CUBAN Foreign Relations 19-9-2, DBF 47612, 27 Apr 1960./

DIRECTOR 04013 Dated 8 December 1962

Hqs. CIA provided White House Secret Service, FBI and State Dept Security with traces on Bernardo MORALES, above, who entered the U.S. in May 62 on fraudulent visa.

DBA 28980 (FBI) Dated 12 December 1962

Advised the Agency that the FBI had no information iden/with MORALES-Rivero, intended recipient of the above letter, or Jose MENENDEZ, the sender.

UFGA 15233 Dated 20 April 1964

JMWAVE Station forwarded to Hqs. Special Affairs Staff, copy of a report on Byron CAMERON which it had sent locally to the FBI. A usually reliable source reported that CAMERON said he was representing an unidentified group of persons who had made contact with two Cuban gangsters who were willing to kill Fidel CASTRO.

DIRECTOR 23308 Dated 22 May 1964

Hqs. CIA sent to State Dept. EYES ONLY to CRIMMINS and BOWDLER, message which Harvey SUMM asked CAS Miami Station to transmit to Office of Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Dept. of State. During visit to SUMM'S office 21 May, Tad SZULC mentioned conversations he had had with Manuel RAY of JURE within past few days. RAY expressed appreciation for help he had received thus far from USG, and said he could use more.

DBA 73544 (FBI) Dated 8 June 1964

Memo from FBI Newark, N.J. office. Reportedly man or men working for H.L. Hunt, Texas millionaire, discussed the possibility of doing away with Cheddi Jagan or CASTRO or both. Was on private basis; not in any way connected with U.S. Government. Reportedly the CIA knew about it though.

DIRECTOR 61320 Dated 2 November 1964

Cable from Hqs. to WAVE, stating FBI requested declassificatin of pages 1,8,10 and 11 of FBI Miami Report, 20 December 1963, File # 105-8342, Subj: Lee Harvey OSWALD, based on WAVE info. dated 7,11,12 December 1963. Material required for use Warren Commission.

AMLILAC Operation 19-132-29/1,3,4

UFGA 13775 dated January 1964

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Hqs. Special Affairs Staff providing a list of sabotage and caching attempts and the results, conducted during January 1963 through January 1964. There were 7 successes out of 25 attempts; several failures; most were cancelled for one reason or another.

MEMORANDUM Dated 3 June 1964

Lists following sabotage operations (raids) run by CIA from 1 August 1963 to date of memo. Those from Aug to Nov were:

19 Aug 63 - attack on sulphuric acid plant at Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province; considerable fire damage.

30 Sep 63 - sabotage operation to destroy a lumber mill in Baracoa, Oriente. Heavy damage was inflicted.

21 Oct 63 - an underwater demolition team attacked a dredge in La Isabela harbor, Las Villas Province. Vessel

was sunk.

15 Nov 63 - had information that Cuban defense forces were on the alert and possibily forewarned of upcoming operations.

23 Nov 63 - sabotage operation against sawmill postponed indefinitely.

AMLISP Project 19-6-59/3

SW Message #352 dated 24 January 1964, from AMLISP-1 reported an attempt on life of Fidel CASTRO that failed because one of the conspirators talked. Was to have been carried out at meal in Jagua Castle. Many persons in Cienfuegos allegedly were executed.

SW Message # 44 dated 18 March 1964 to AMLISP-1 Agency requirements were sent to asset for more details on all assassination attempts and plots against CASTRO by civilians or disaffected military.

SW Message #390 dated 14 March 1964 from AMLISP-1 Reported conversation with a Cuban military officer who said "they can prepare it (a coup d'etat) but when its ready the government will pull the string and squash it, because everything was under control." It is unknown whether this information was sent to the FBI or other agencies.

AMLOAN Operation 19-6-79/3

EGGA 3171 Dated 2 November 1964

Dispatch from Hamburg Base to Hqs. On 15 Oct 1964, after publication of the Warren Commission Report, untested source [Prof. Walter SIMON] reported the following to AMLOAN-1 [(Wilhelm Bernhardt John KESSLER.] [SIMON] obtained the information from well-known Cuban scientist APIAGAS (fnu) in Havana on 23 November 1963. APIAGAS claimed he was at the Havana Airport, by chance, on 22 Nov 63 when at 1700 hours an aircraft with Mexican markings landed and parked at the far side of the field. Two men whom he recognized as Cuban "gangsters" (identities not given), alighted, entered the rear entrance of the administration building and disappeared without going through the normal customs procedures. APIAGAS learned that the aircraft had just arrived from Dallas, Texas via Tijuana and Mexico City. The plane had been forced to land at Tijuana due to engine trouble. By combining the date, the origin of the flight, and the known reputation of the two men, APIAGAS theorized that the two men must have been involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. APIAGAS speculated that Lee Harvey OSWALD had acted in the pay of CASTRO, and that

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the two Cubans had been in Dallas to organize or oversee the operation. APIAGAS said he had been greatly distressed by what he had seen and heard.

CSCI 316/02545-64 dated 15 December 1964

Provided the foregoing information to the FBI. It did not include the name of APIAGAS (fnu) or [Prof. Walter SIMON] but did state that follow-up was impossible because the source [(SIMON)] had since passed away.

DBA 94347 dated 31 December 1964 (FBI)

The FBI responded that "in view of the geographical location of Tijuana in relation to Dallas and Mexico City, it seemed unlikely the aircraft would have landed there due to engine trouble if it was on a flight from Dallas to Mexico City. Also, that due to the distances between Dallas and Tijuana, Tijuana and Mexico City, and Mexico City and Havana, the aircraft would have had to leave Dallas a number of hours before the assassination of President Kennedy to arrive in Havana at 5 p.m." The FBI suggested that CIA may wish to determine at the airport in Tijuana whether any aircraft

landed there from Dallas on 22 November 1963 reporting engine trouble and then proceeded on to Mexico City. The FBI advised it was making no investigation of the matter in the absence of further information from CIA.

/COMMENT: There is no name trace record of APIAGAS (fnu), [Walter SIMON] or his widow. Since [SIMON's] widow had been willing to provide information in the first interview, a subsequent interview after her husband's death might have yielded results. In view of vagueness of original report, its receipt a year after the assassination, and lack of CIA assets in Tijuana, Headquarters decided not to follow-up./

MISCELLANEOUS - Cuba 19-500

DBF 54461 Dated 4 August 1960 (FBI)

Dr. and Mrs. Benjamin WARENSAJOLD advised the FBI Honolulu office on 1 August 60 that on 29 July 60 an unidentified male, said to be Cuban, whom they met at Canlis Broiler Cocktail Lounge Honolulu, said the U.S. would find its President with a bullet hole in his head and that Cuba would get even with the U.S. for what this country did to Cuba in the sugar field. Unidentified Cuban was described as: ca. 30 years old, 5'10" tall, 160 lbs., black hair, brown eyes, prominent teeth, well built, handsome and prosperous looking. Said he was in the sugar business.

DBA 72715 Dated 21 May 1964 (FBI)

On 12 May 1964 one Orlando Antonio Salomon DIAZ Canal, Cuban, appeared at Dallas, Texas FBI office; had a scrapbook which reflected he had plans to go to Cuba for the purpose of assassinating Fidel CASTRO. /COMMENT: traces show that he claimed (in 1963) to be founder of organization called "Suicide Battalion" with 200 men in U.S. and about 50 in Cuba, with purpose to assassinate CASTRO/

UFGW 4420 Dated 12 October 1964

Dispatch from Hqs. SAS to JMWAVE Station requesting WAVE Station reaction to request from FBI to declassify for

release to public by Warren Commission, report believed to have been passed to FBI Miami by WAVE Station. Concerned information from a Western diplomat alleging that the assassination of President Kennedy was the result of a plot prepared and executed jointly by Chinese Communists and Fidel CASTRO through intermediaries. The intermediaries were alleged to be Ramon B. CORTES, Mexican-American, and FERNANDEZ Feito (fnu), a Cuban, both located in Dallas, Texas. It was also alleged that these men were financed through an unidentified bank at 14 Wall Street, New York City.

Memorandum to the FBI from CIA (SAS) Dated 7 Dec 1963

Reported the above information to the FBI. Also noted that reportedly Fidel CASTRO was extremely worried about the current probings taking place into the assassination of President Kennedy and about the possible findings. The utterances about the plot came from SAAVEDRA (fnu), allegedly a close friend of Celia SANCHEZ. It further states that there appeared to have been no Soviet participation in the plot because at that time the Soviets were too close to the Americans. We advised the FBI of no Agency traces on CORTES and FERNANDEZ, but cited a Robert NIETO then living in Miami who could give details on CORTES

and FERNANDEZ. CIA advised the FBI that the Agency was taking steps to further develop the information and to identify the original source and additional data would be provided the FBI immediately.

DBA 88772 dated 23 October 1964 (FBI)

FBI Miami Office, reported that one John H. WILLINGHAM (true name Virdell WILLINGHAM) at that time lived in Charlotte, North Carolina. He had served 10 months in U.S. Penitentiary Atlanta, Georgia for mailing a letter threatening the life of the President of the U.S. WILLINGHAM wrote a letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense in August 1964 stating that he would be released from prison in a few months and would like a pass so that he could go directly from the U.S. to Cuba. He added that he would try to join the Cuban military service and would not be returning from Cuba.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES A/2

American Embassy Havana Document #1347 dated 24 Mar 60

Juan ORTA and another officer in CASTRO's office made arrangements in which Cuban Col. Damasco MONTESINO was arrested March 1960 for attempting to leave Cuba. (The other officer was Alfredo GUERRA).

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR A/3 (Job #70-540 - No File Number)

DBF 95904 Dated 8 December 1961 (FBI)

Sent to Secret Service, I&NS, State Department Security, and CIA. Stated that I&NS Office in Honolulu was requested by I&NS Regional Office in San Pedro, Calif., 4 December 1961 to place lookout notice on Aldo Pedro MARGOLLES Duenas. MARGOLLES was reported to be son of Chief of National Police in Cuba, and attempting to enter the U.S. to meet with CASTRO agents to assassinate President John Kennedy.

WAVE 0793 (IN 13094) Dated 18 January 1962

WAVE advised it had photos of MARGOLLES and Emilio ARAGONES (also involved in plot) and would attempt to develop further information on the assassination plot.

UFGA 3134 Dated 23 January 1962

JMWAVE Station forwarded to Hqs. photos and bio. data on MARGOLLES and ARAGONES.

DIRECTOR 38056 (OUT 94877) Dated 27 January 1962)

Cable to Latin American Stations and Bases concerning plot by MARGOLLES and ARAGONES. Requested any info their current whereabouts, on priority basis.

MEMO WAS 50/7 Dated 29 January 1962 to Regional Commissioner from District Director, Wash., D.C.

To Regional Intelligence Officer giving information on Raul DIAZ Arguelles. DIAZ reportedly trained in

Czech. to be head of political police of Cuba. Reportedly took refuge in Brazilian Embassy Havana which appeared to be cover-up to carry on secret activity. Attended school in U.S. for several years (believed to be military school in Georgia) and to be a graduate of the University of Havana. His father reportedly lived in Miami at this time (1962). An uncle by the same name, living in Cuba in 1962, is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. In 1962 DIAZ was head of the Department of Technical Investigation (DTI) of the Rebel Army. A known terrorist, he is said to be capable of use of explosive bombs and automatic weapons. Is believed to have directed assassinations in the past from somewhere in Mexico. A good friend of Rolando CUBELA.

MEXI 0092 (IN 26086) Dated 10 February 1962

According to [Mexico 24 immigration] records, MARGOLLES and ARAGONES arrived Mexico City by air on 27 June 1957 as political refugees from Batista regime. Both sought political asylum in Mexican Embassy Havana in mid-1957.

MEMO For The Secret Service from William McClare Dated 13 February 1962

Gives summary of information on Raul DIAZ Arguelles.

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Although DIAZ has a position of great influence in the DTI, he is poorly regarded. He is (62) reportedly working with former U.S. gangsters who were deported from the U.S. and also affiliated with the narcotics racket. Is believed to be in complete charge of "any activity as contemplated by Aldo Pedro MARGOLLES-Duenas, which involved a plot to assassinate the President of the United States."

UFGA 3302 Dated 16 February 1962

JMWAVE Station advised Hqs. of information on DIAZ, MARGOLLES and ARAGONES that it had sent to U.S. Secret Service Miami, Florida.

CICS 3/769,904 Dated 26 March 1962

CIA provided U.S. Secret Service, FBI and I&NS information on MARGOLLES and ARAGONES.

Unofficial Memo - Mr. Alfred Cox from Ernest Aragon Undated

States ARAGONES is believed to be General Coordinator of the National 26th of July Movement and National Chief of CASTRO's militia. Is one of CASTRO's right hand men and accompanies CASTRO in all public appearances. ARAGONES is coordinator of alleged plot (against President Kennedy.) Both ARAGONES and MARGOLLES have fanatical tendencies.

UFGA 15107 dated 8 April 1964

Transmitted to Headquarters Target Personality Study on Aldo Pedro MARGOLLES Duenas (201-315161).

MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO (CDM) 19-120-13

(Christian Democratic Movement)

U.S. Embassy Foreign Service Dispatch, Havana, #1614 dated 9 May 1960 (837,432/5-2460)

Reported that the Revolutionary Government has skillfully maneuvered Rolando CUBELA, the President of the FEU, and his pro-Communist cohorts into a position of power. First, on May 7, it was CUBELA who was given the task of inciting the mob and bruiting the fact that the powers-that-be disapproved of Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango. Communist "goon-squad" tactics had become so vicious that even many students who had heretofore been circumspectly apolitical are afraid to attend classes. The Vice-Secretary of the School of Agronomy asked how it was that if CUBELA leadership so deplored violence that it had remained impassive in the face of the physical violence perpetrated against his person by members of the Communist Youth from the Instituto de la Habana, who had entered the University grounds completely armed. CUBELA and Angel QUEVEDO, went about the campus carrying arms, in direct violation of the University regulations.

MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO del PUEBLO (MRP) 19-120-22

(Peoples Revolutionary Movement)

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Memo to Cleve (Dr. Cleveland C. Cram) from [M. Oldfield]

Dated 8 November 1961

Concerns a Cuban Government report published in the press which claimed that the Peoples Revolutionary Movement directed and supplied by the U.S. CIA and Department of State, planned acts of sabotage and more recently planned an attempt to assassinate Fidel CASTRO and other government leaders early in October. The attempt on Fidel allegedly was discovered the day before it was due to take place.

Moscow TASS in English to Europe 8 November 1961

Reported the information in the 8 November 1961 Memorandum, above, and cited it as new proof of American imperialism's criminal conspiracy against free Cuba.

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MOVIMIENTO de RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO (MRR) 19-120-18

(Revolutionary Recovery Movement)

UFGA 4948 Dated 18 July 1962 Report No. AA 134

One Juan FALCON Tamar, alleged National Coordinator of the MRR in Cuba was interviewed on Cuban "Radio Rebelde" Station 17 July 1962. He said he planned the assassination of Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ. He also talked about a plot to assassinate Raul CASTRO on 26 July 61, a plot he attributed to the CIA. He also mentioned the assassination of Fidel at the same time. FALCON claimed that the plot against Raul was invented by the CIA, and that the CIA provided financial support to MRR activities./No indication FALCON worked for CIA./

WAVE 5879 (IN 30751) Dated 18 July 1962

WAVE Station advised that FALCON's presentation appeared previously taped and poorly rehearsed. Cable is slugged AMBRONC-5 complex. /AMBRONC-5 was an Agency asset executed by the Cuban Government./

Memo to Chief, Task Force W from COS, JMWAVE, 16 Aug 62

The Ops That Failed/MRR

Concerns interview 14 Aug 62 of Victor MARTINEZ Zambrano, a former hot-shot activist of the MRR in Havana who was an asylee in the Argentine and Brazilian Embassies and left Cuba. In Sept. 61 he organized the operation which

failed, the plan to assassinate Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ. Reportedly one of the persons involved pulled the pin of the hand grenade prematurely, it exploded, one man was killed and another critically injured. MARTINEZ escaped, went into hiding, and later came to the U.S.

MOVIMIENTO de RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO (MRR) 19-300-11
(Revolutionary Recovery Movement)
TDCSDB 3/656,595 Dated 12 September 1963

On 7 September 1963 the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR-Insurrectional Movement for Revolutionary Recovery) made an abortive attempt to bomb a target in Cuba. On 8 September 1963, Jack GRIFFIN (U.S. citizen), an unidentified American, and a Cuban described only as a demolition expert and former member of Brigade 2506, bombed a sugar plant and dropped 6,000 leaflets near Moron, Camaguey Province. Five of the six bombs exploded with violent force, and started several fires in the sugar mill. There was estimated 50% destruction. This was done in the name of the MIRR. An American by the name of Bill Johnson, reportedly had full control over all MIRR operations. Money was supplied by Orlando BOSCH Avila, obtained from Chiri MENDOZA. Johnson worried for fear that their next planned

raid, target of a military nature, could cause international repercussions and/or bring them under prosecution on the neutrality act. BOSCH and MENDOZA were collaborating with Jose Mario "Pepin" BOSCH Lamarque and two former sugar mill owners to back a daylight raid on a Cuban MIG base with two rocket-firing P-51's.

AMMUG Project (Cuban DGI Defector) 19-6-102

Memo for the Record dated 4 June 1964

Re Debriefing Report #119 of AMMUG-1 (Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lahera). He did not recognize photo of Braulio MARTINEZ Alfonso, Cuban born naturalized U.S. citizen. MARTINEZ returned to Cuba after the fall of Batista. Also known as "SUAREZ" and Francisco De RAVIRICH, he has been reported as an intelligence officer.

HHTA 3782 dated 16 June 1964

Dispatch from Tegucigalpa to Mexico City. A Tegucigalpa Station asset assigned to [monitor certain Honduran ham radio operators] of interest to the Station, reported the following, most unusual,

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conversation. On 14 June Mexico came in very clear and by chance picked up a strange conversation from a ham station in Cuba. The Cuban station was talking to Mexico ham radio operator named Alfonso, call letters XRIWA. Cuban station told Alfonso to contact a famous band leader named Antonio Maria Romero and kept referring to "El Corsario Negro." The Cuban station instructed Alfonso that once he contacted Romero he should have him record 'Tres Lindas Cubanas."

Memo for C/WH/PO/A from C/WH/SA/CI dated 15 Oct 1964 19-6-102/3 AMMUG-1 Debriefing Report #203.

AMMUG-1 said when President Kennedy died "Augusto" DGI Deputy Chief, Carlos Sixto CHAIN Soler, arranged a meeting at the National Liberation Building in Havana. He asked the National Liberation officers to urgently prepare commo system for a message to their agents to be transmitted by Radio Havana. Musical recording to accompany message was 'Three (or Six) Beautiful Cubans."

HHTW 1721 dated 15 October 1964

Dispatch that transmitted the foregoing information to Tegucigalpa from Hqs. WH/SA.

/COMMENT: The AMMUG information duplicates that recorded under ZRKNICK./

NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL INSIDE CUBA 19-9-13

Memo to Chief, Contact Division, OO from Chief, Washington Field Office, 31 July 1961

Julio HUERTEMATTE, Vice-President of National Bank of Washington, told OO on 25 July 61 that a Cuban underground leader (identity unknown) who had been in prison in Cuba and recently come to Miami, told HUERTEMATTE that CIA agent Pedro CUELLAR had denounced five underground leaders to the CASTRO authorites. /COMMENT: This confirms previous information that CUELLAR was a double agent. He reportedly caused the execution of a number of counter-revolutionaries operating in Cuba. CUELLAR's dependents have been paid under Project [SLSTIPEND] since the early 1960's. In view of evidence that CUELLAR was not executed by the CASTRO Regime as publicized in the Washington Post in the early 1960's, it has been recommended to the Commercial Cover Staff that administers the [SLSTIPEND] Project, to further investigate the case and stop payments if possible./

WAVE 7900 (IN 39024) dated 14 Sept 61; and DIRECTOR 13231 (OUR 99328) dated 20 Sept 61

Both these cables discuss CIA support to AMBLESS-1 [Alberto del JUNCO Mesa] one of the Agency's best

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controlled on-island CA asset. We provided financial and other support for on-island operations. /Comment: if brought to the attention of the GOC, such activities might have prompted the GOC to consider retaliatory action against the U.S. Government./

OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE 19-126-4

Memo to C/WH/4 from Dave Phillips dated 2 July 1960
Concerns propaganda action to be taken against visit of Nikita KHRUSHCHEV to Cuba re 25th of July celebration, including rumor of attempted assassination against KHRUSHCHEV. Speculation on the assassination attempts was to be surfaced on WRUL program, in AMPACA's paper, etc.

Memo to Director of Central Intelligence from C/WHD dated 5 July 1960
In effort to prevent or counteract KHRUSCHEV's visit to Cuba, Hqs. proposed prop action to instigate a rumor or rumors that KHRUSHCHEV's life woud be in danger while in Cuba, from a well-planned assassination attempt. This would be propagated from other Latin American countries.

DIRECTOR 84642 dated 22 November 1963
Prop guidance to WAVE Station for media assets. Requested they use tape excerpts of appropriate portions of

Kennedy speech to LA newspaper conference held in Miami that week, and to note in broadcasts that President's last major address directed to LA audience concentrated on Cuban freedom. This was to be broadcast over JMHOPE with tributes and appropriate comment on 25 November, and have JMHOPE stress religious theme on Sunday 24 November.

AMOT Project (Later Became SLIGO Project) 19-5-3

TDCSDB 3/655,033 dated 12 June 1963 (UFG 3021)
Report that members of Cubanos Libres (Free Cubans) left Florida on 6 June 63 with mission to infiltrate Cuba and assassinate Fidel CASTRO Ruz. Was intercepted by Cuban boat, exchanged gunfire, and returned to Florida. Mission was unsuccessful. Manuel QUIZA Docal, leader of Cubanos Libres, a Cuban exile action group, had officially committed himself to JURE for any executive action which JURE might undertake against CASTRO's Cuba. /QUIZA was not connected with CIA./

UFG 5099 dated 4 May 1964 19-6-95/4 (AMOT Report)
Concerned a plot discovered by the DSE (Department of State Security) on 9 or 10 March 64 to assassinate CASTRO. The assassination was planned for 13 March when Castro was expected to visit the CMQ Radio and TV Studio in Havana.

DIRECTOR 31178 dated 25 June 1964

This referenced documents (UFGA 15954 and WAVE 7129 (IN 93714) having to do with plot to assassinate CASTRO. This information was dissemed to the Special Group and other key officials. The Special Group was concerned about the matter and referred it to the Dept. of Justice as a matter of law enforcement.

WAVE 9168 (IN 26320) dated 12 July 1964 Cable to Hqs.

AMWAX-1 (Oscar FERNANDEZ Viega) and [UQAMBER-2 (Miguel Guillermo TRUYOL-Gimeno)] were independently interviewed by local FBI reps. concerning plot to assassinate CASTRO. Both denied any knowledge of or participation in any plan to assassinate CASTRO. For Hqs. FYI: "Regarding AMWAX-1 and [UQAMBER-2], WAVE wishes emphasize that both sources clearly understand they have no sanctions from WAVE to directly or indirectly promote, sponsor, or support such plan or any similar plans regardless of person against whom they directed."

WAVE 5446 (IN 32990) dated 1 Dec 1964

AMOT Report DD-1206 dated 19 Nov 1964 stated that as part of plan to assassinate CASTRO, a rumor was to be floated that one of the organizations belonging to the alliance was fighting inside Cuba. The rumors were

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expected to impress U.S. Government officials who were already having talks with Manuel URRUTIA Lleo, and willing to provide financial assistance to him.

PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. 100-300-12

DIRECTOR 03964 dated 8 December 1962

Cable from Agency to Secret Service, FBI and State Dept. Security forwarding text of a letter from Havana, dated 27 Nov 62, to Miami, concerning plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Letter was addressed to a Post Office Box in Miami belonging to the Radio Libertad La Voz, Anti-Comunista de America. Since the addressee was unknown to members of Radio Libertad, one of their Miami reps. passed the letter to a contact of JMWAVE Station. Addressee was Bernardo Adalberto MORALES-Rivero.

DIRECTOR 4013 dated 8 December 1962

Cable from Agency to addressees cited above. Provided traces on Bernardo Adalberto MORALES-Rivero who entered the U.S. in May 62 on a fraudulent visa.

UFGA 6884 dated 10 December 1962

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Hqs. Stated that letter similar to 27 Nov 62 one cited above, possibly written by

same author, was in possession of Treasury Dept., Wash., D.C. by official who was in contact with CIA on the matter. JMWAVE forwarded the 29 Nov 62 letter, from Jose MENENDEZ to Bernardo MORALES in Miami, and suggested that Hqs. pass it to the Treasury Dept. for technical handling. JMWAVE was anxious to receive results of both of the letters on the grounds that they may be part of a planned G-2 PW operation in the U.S. or against U.S. targets.

DIRECTOR 04538 dated 11 December 1962

Hqs. CIA cabled to Secret Service, FBI and State Security, traces on Olga DUQUE de Heredia and Aida MAYO, Miami reps. of the org. Radio Libertad La Voz Anti-Comunista de America, address to which letter to MORALES was addressed. DUQUE and MAYO turned the letter over to a contact of CIA, since MORALES was reportedly unknown to them. DUQUE was married to Humberto LOPEZ Perez, operator of Radio Libertad, Caracas, Venezuela; Aida MAYO was a close friend of Fidel CASTRO and was believed to act occasionally on behalf of the Cuban Government.

DIRECTOR 04501 dated 12 December 1962

Hqs. advised JMWAVE Station that Hqs. in disseming information did not reveal [Cesar Augusto GAJATE Puig] as intermediary between WAVE and DUQUE and MAYO. Suggested WAVE advise Secret Service of [GAJATE's] role since Secret

Service investigation would surface him anyway. Asked that the Secret Service protect his identity.

WAVE 2266 (IN 33425) dated 11 December 1962

WAVE cabled to Hqs. traces on DUQUE, MAYO and Radio Libertad.

Memo dated 12 December 1962 re Information from Sedret Service

Gives information from a usually reliable source on Jose MENENDEZ Ramos. MENENDEZ, born in Cuba, was a baker in Tampa, Fla., and member of Executive Committee of the FPCC. After Oct. 61 his wife defected to Cuba with the children, and Jose left to join her shortly thereafter. Jose was later seen in Cuba by people who said he had a top job there. Jose also was reported to be connected with INRA, (Agrarian Reform Institute).

PRO-GOBIERNO CONSTITUCIONAL de CUBA (PGCC) 19-9-15

UFGA 2242 dated 30 August 1961

A sub-agent of JMWAVE Station outside unit (AMOT's) reported on 22 Aug. 61 a statement by Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona that Kennedy was still backing him and was going to give him immediately the sum of four million dollars for sabotage and propaganda.

WAVE 9026 (IN 18296) dated 6 November 1961

WAVE cabled Hqs. info. from independent sources following meetings between HURWITCH, PASSAVOY and MIRO Cardona. AMCLATTER-1 (Bernard Barker of Watergate fame) reported that HURWITCH and a CIA official were discussing revolutionary affairs with MIRO Cardona, and that CARDONA and his group were backed by President Kennedy. It was further reported that CARDONA had full powers from President Kennedy and was in a position to give orders to CIA which would be on a secondary level. In addition CARDONA reportedly stated that he had U.S. Government support to direct CASTRO underground activities, and that all other groups must join him to get support. Other groups not interested in joining CARDONA, because his ideology was different from their's. CARDONA had never come out strongly as anti-CASTROITE.

UFGA 3806 dated 20 April 1962

Concerned plans of Central American countries for action against Cuba. One General SOMOZA (President of Nicaragua) stated that CIA would be handling the intelligence ramifications toward organizing a Cuban military group in Central America. The dispatch deals with additional U.S. Government aid. Also, one YDIGORAS (President of Guatemala) was to be in Wash., D.C. on 28 April 62 as a guest of President Kennedy, at which

time he expected to present the Cuban-in-exile plan.

UFK-16 dated 15 May 1962

Reported information from GARCERAN, leader of the Pro-Gobierno Constitucional en el Exilio (an anti-Castro organization operating out of Miami, Fla.) GARCERAN stated that lawyer Geno NEGRETI had made an appointment to see him stating that a Mr. WARBELL wanted to see him. NEGRETI made his appointment on 8 May 62. It was GARCERAN's understanding that WARBELL was the go-between for a Mr. TROUTMAN from Atlanta, Georgia, who had been the boy friend of President Kennedy's sister (the one who had died). WARBELL indicated that he wanted the appointment to see what GARCERAN's needs were and what aid and assistance GARCERAN wanted for carrying the war to Cuba.

Department of State Memo dated 14 July 1965

Had attached to it a PGCC memo to the Department. It contained a quote of Fidel CASTRO that he wanted to arm Cuba with the most modern equipment (arms, planes, etc.) capable of stopping the United States, and the Latin American countries as well, "before they discover our strategic plans. To that end I need from hundreds of thousands of light infantry arms to planes and long range artillery. Every country in the

Continent must be the target of our guns, from New York and Washington to Santiago de Chile and Buenos Aires." On 2 Jan 61 CASTRO asked Latin Americans to take arms against their own governments; on 26 July 62 he demanded a continental revolutionary drive; in 1963 he predicted that Venezuela and Guatemala would surrender the said year. CASTRO's sister Juana (Juanita) arrived in Mexico City from Cuba on 20 June 64. Although she was considered a defector of the CASTRO regime, she had been an agent (CIA) for the prior two and a half years.

AMPUNCH Project 19-6-118/2,3,4

23 November 1963 open text letter from asset, in Cuba, Filed in SW Chrono June 63 -Dec.

Acknowledged the death of President Kennedy.

AMQUAR Project 19-124-28/1-4

HAMB 3879 (IN 50361) dated 30 Oct 63; HAMB 3880 (IN 50478) Identities

Concerns debriefing of [CASAILOR-25] on 24 and 25 Oct 63.

1/mc

He reported that Faustino PÈREZ, born ca. 1923, commander in CASTRO's army in Havana Hqs., Granma veteran and former minister in CASTRO's Government, told C-25 in August 1963 that CASTRO must be killed and all resistance groups organized. C-25 described PEREZ as an opportunist who would need promise of advantage in return for help.

AMRANGE Project 19-6-81/1-4

Memo for Chief TFW from DC/TFW/FI re DEGRIP Report dated 28 August 1962

Concerns one Vasco CECCHI, proprietor of the MONTECATINI Restaurant in Vedado quarter of Havana frequented by Fidel CASTRO and his entourage. Employees of the restaurant reportedly were anti-Castroites. Source of the report called attention to closet, partly under stairs used for storage, but which he believed could be used to hide man comfortably. On one of the floors above the restaurant lived a certain Lt. RAMOS who was evidently an intimate of Fidel CASTRO. CASTRO often visited him. /COMMENT: See File "Plots to Assassinate the President of the U.S."100-300-12, Memo from Secret Service dated 12 December 1962, concerning one Jose MENENDEZ Ramos who may be identifiable with Lt. RAMOS/.

MEXI 6844 (IN 57745) dated 8 November 1963

Cable to Hqs. DEGRIP reported that CASTRO visited restaurant at least once a month and was "a sitting duck." CECCHI reported to be cowardly type."

MEXI 0880 (IN 73754) dated 14 Sept 1964

Cable to Hqs. reported that CECCHI was arrested and imprisoned in La Cabana Fortress and to be tried for plotting against life of Fidel CASTRO. Prosecutor to ask for 30 year sentence. Employees of reataurant in mid-Aug 64 told source CECCHI was arrested for illegal currency transactions. /COMMENT: No 201 file on CECCHI. Preliminary traces do not indicate connection with CIA.7

AMRAPT Project - La Voz de Cuba 19=126-10

WAVE 0662 (IN 44282) dated 13 April 1965

In April 1965 Francisco CHAO Hermida revealed to a WAVE case officer his "grand plan" for which he requested CIA support. Plan was to recruit trusted men in Miami, infiltrate Cuba, surveil CASTRO, and at opportune time, assassinate him. C/O told CHAO CIA was not interested and could not do business with him.

RESCATE (MOVIMIENTO de RESCATE CONSTITUCIONAL DEMOCRATICO) (Cuban Revolutionary Democratic Rescue Committee) 19-120-39

Anti-Castro revolutionary group; one of among groups forming FRD (Democratic Revolutionary Front) and subsequent CRC (Cuban Revolutionary Council). Was controlled by Antonio de VARONA with Hqs. in Miami.

RIMM 4359 (IN 2330) dated 8 April 1961

Radio message from on-island agent. Concerns fact that Cuban by name of Hilly PATTEN, who was in exile in Miami a year previously, belonged to Rescate group and apparently would be bringing arms in from Venezuela soon. Agent said his personal opinion was that Tony VARONA wanted to produce armed action before other groups and for that reason had purchased arms on his own.

DBA 5681 dated 28 March 1962 (FBI)

Stated that Sergio APARICIO, Sec. Gen. of Rescate in New York City advised State Dept. rep. that Rescate had purchased about 30 weapons which were delivered to Miami and then by boat to the underground in Cuba. Jose F. GONZALEZ, associated with Rescate and VARONA, called APARICIO to Wash., D.C. on 2 March 62 and told him not to engage in collection of funds for purchase of any arms or munitions, because there was nothing the Cubans

could do in a military way which would be capable of overthrowing the present Government of Cuba. An FBI source advised on 16 Mar 62 that APARICIO and Rescate were making arrangements to picket the White House on 14 Apr 62 for several hours to ask President Kennedy to keep his word re assisting the Cuban exiles in overthrowing the CASTRO Government. APARICIO described the 30 weapons as M-1's delivered to Miami and taken to Cuba by boat and distributed among the underground. APARICIO stated that they had been attempting to supply Osvaldo RAMIREZ, who was in the Escambray Mountains. The weapons were reportedly delivered to Cuba by Commandante AUGUSTO, war name for Ramon RUISANCHEZ, brother-in-law of Tony VARONA.

DBA 23967 dated 28 September 1962 (FBI)

Reported that a small group of Cuban exiles living in Panama was planning to assassinate highest Cuban Gov't official attending 9th Central American Games in Kingston and hoped that it would be Fidel CASTRO. Plotters were reported to be: Rene MARSELLA Garaboto, Conrado RODRIGUEZ Sanchez, Eulogio LOPEZ, Antolin SANCHEZ Govin, and Jose Julio FERNANDEZ. Garaboto planned to leave Panama for U.S. 3 Aug 62 to present plan to Manuel Antonio de VARONA, ranking member of CRC (Cuban Revolutionary Council), request financial and visa

assistance and moral support. MARSELLA said that he worked actively in a clandestine manner for Rescate. VARONA did not give much encouragement to the plan; in fact, said he could not sanction or assist in assassination plan.

REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA OF NATIONAL LIBERATION 19-9-12/1
(Right-wing Anti-Castro Group in Exile)
Prensa Latina Havana Broadcast 21 July 1961

Reported that "Cuban Counterrevolutionary Council, headed by Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona, was liquidated together with the mercenary brigade of the CIA in the Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs) disaster. However, a new team has emerged which intends to form a government in exile to be supported and recognized by the U.S. New York Congressman Victor L. ANFUSO, intimate friend of former Cuban dictator Fulgensio BATISTA is principal promoter of idea, which is based on uniting all counterrevolutionary groups established in the U.S." /COMMENT: ANFUSO planned to call a meeting in Washington in a few days to set up the new government. List of participants had not been announced, but included among those believed to be present was Guillermo ALONSO Pujol. DGI defector

SLIPSTREAM-1 in Nov 71 said that ALONSO was a Cuban Gov't agent. He had high USG contacts back then (in 60/61) and knowledge of U.S. Government/CIA cover for activities. ALONSO was used as a cut-out, or intermiediary, supposedly unwittingly, in sensitive Agency operations, in the late 60's and early 70's.7

ZRRIFLE Project Job # 69-S-551 - No File Number

ZRRIFLE/Administrative Financial Folder

OIRT 2173 dated 13 October 1960, Att. Top Secret DEPIGRAM, Italian Interpol representative, source and spotter for Corsicans. Altman to pick his brain and pinpoint his ability to do this job for us, but once selection made, DEPIGRAM to be cut out of the operation.

Memo to C/FI from William Harvey, 27 June 1963

"As far as ZRRIFLE aspects this op, which have been covered under the QJWIN authorization for security reasons and with which Fletcher Knight is fully familiar, except for one precautionary 'life line', aspects of this case have been terminated and need no longer be considered part of this project."

Folder entitled Personality Sketches

Tab M - Harold MELTZER

Harold MELTZER with aliases was involved in the rackets

with upper echelon "hoodlums" throughout the U.S. (pg. 1 Encl. 3 dated 19 Dec 1960.) "In 1959 he furnished information to our QJWIN California office but has not since cooperated with us. N.B. He has the background and talent for the matter we discussed but it is not known whether he would be receptive."

Tab Y - Hanna YAZBECK

YAZBECK lived in Beurit and worked for QJWIN's office intermittendly during the past 10 years (dates not given - possibly 51-61). YAZBECK's chief bodyguard from 50-58 (not named) was a convicted murderer. The bodyguard was murdered. States that YAZBECK has an available pool of assassins.

JMROC Project (Travel of President Johnson to Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1967) 200-6-351/9

Memo CO-2-39,887 to Mr. James Ludlum Liaison Officer CI Staff, dated 7 March 1967

Concerns individual by name of Jose PEREZ, Colombian. Document shows undetermined association with assassinations in Guatemala.

CP-9212 dated 10 March 1967

Concerns Jaime CARDONA-Londono, Colombian, arrested in New Orleans in May 64 for trespassing. He had in his possession typewritten document which purported to be proposed constitution for new super world government with provisions to condemn to death various personages including L. Johnson, daughter of L. Johnson, and Mrs. J. Kennedy. When interviewed 12/22/64 he did not indicate any interest in the death of the President.

16-17

[CARACAS] 6104 (IN 8778) dated 25 February 1967

A usually reliable source reported to CIA that well-known

Venezuelan terrorist, Carlos SAVELLI Maldonado, by own admission met on 30 April and 1 May 1965 with leftist extremist reps. to discuss assassination of, among others, American ambassador (presumably American ambassador to Venezuela).

AMSANTA Project 19-6-73/3

MEMO for the Record dated 10 July 1963 by Lou De Santi

Concerns FBI informant Victor Thomas VICENTE, Puerto Rican citizen, who penetrated Communist Parties in New York City, left New York for Cuba via Mexico as guest of ICAP (Cuban Peoples Friendship Institute). Was debriefed by CIA staffer Lou DeSanti upon return to the U.S. in July-Aug 63. VICENTE stated he had had interviews with CASTRO and Che GUEVARA. VICENTE penetrated the FPCC, the Casa Cuba, and Jose Marti Club in New York City. /COMMENT: Page 127 of IG 1967 report mentions unnamed Puerto Rican who claims he participated in CASTRO inspired assassination plot in Dallas. Don't know if VICENTE could be that individual./

AMSLOUCH Project 28-6-33

RIOD 2944 (IN 83322) dated 18 December 1963

Mario Rogerio MESTRINHO de Mello, official in Brazillian Embassy Havana, reported the following to Rio Station contact in Rio on 13 December 1963:

a) wide rumor of assassination attempt against Fidel CASTRO after his TV appearance 6 Dec resulting in killing of man next to him. CASTRO uninjured. Would be killer at large.

b) wide rumor Cuban Jose "Pepe" LLANUZA met Lee OSWALD in Mexico before Kennedy assassination.

AMSOUR Project 19-6-70

SW Message #27 from agent dated 11 October 1964

"On the assassination attempt against Fidel, we know they took two civilians wounded by shooting to the Calixto Garcia Hospital. Moments later, two soldiers from Fidel's guards presented themselves in said hospital taking away the wounded. We do not have more details."

CSDB 312/01128-64 dated 19 November 1964

In late September 1964 a Cuban soldier guarding the Algerian Embassy in Havana attempted to assassinate Premier Fidel CASTRO Ruz, who was in the embassy at the time. The soldier killed another sentry before being shot on the spot by the security forces. By early October 11 officers and men involved in the attempt on Fidel's life were apprehended while trying to escape and were executed without trial. /COMMENT: In Aug 64 there were rumors of uprising and plots against the Castro regime, some within the armed forces, which reportedly lead to summary arrests and secret executions. During this period underground sources reported that 70 Cuban Army officers had been arrested in connection with a plot to topple CASTRO's regime; the plot allegedly had been discovered by a CASTRO agent who pretended to be a participant. (Could this have been the AMTRUNK Operation.?7

AMSPELL Project - Directorio Revolutionario Estudiantil (Student Revolutionary Directory) 19-124-26 (Project) and 19-120-19 Subject File

Memorandum dated 22 May 1962 in 201-316766 (Luis FERNANDEZ-Rocha Rodriguez) File

Last para of page 2 "Jose I. LASAGA has returned from

Washington and is very depressed. He claims that JFK has decided on the co-existence line and that everything is going down the drain. He states that present American policy is to work towards an acceptance of Castro."

WAVE 9060 (IN 29221) dated 26 September 1962

FERNANDEZ has accepted bid to appear on nationwide TV networks and is leaving for NYCity morning 26 Sept. Publicity schedule included how DRE 24 Aug attack on Teatro Blanquita was planned, and adverse reaction within Cuba to President Kennedy's definition of defensive arms.

Contact Report dated 16 Nov 1962 (201-316766)

Contact with AMHINT-2 and FERNANDEZ

FERNANDEZ mentioned meeting in Wash., D.C. in which broad proposal for AMBARB funding [(Prop. project 24 to place students in universities in Latin America)] was discussed. FERNANDEZ mentioned "negotiation" underway with "three industrialists" in Texas who were sympathetic and would provide AMBARB delegates in these countries (Latin American countries?) with Agency representations for their products.

UFGW 1595 from TFW to JMWAVE dated 18 January 1963

Forwarded answer from State Dept. to the DRE letter written to President Kennedy.

1/mc

DIRECTOR 8214 to WAVE dated 2 January 1963

HURWITCH (State Dept. Cuban Coordinator) replying briefly to AMSPELL letter to President Kennedy by referring DRE organization to President Kennedy's 29 December Miami speech as latest official statement of U.S. policy.

"Using DRE 26 Dec coded broadcast over WMIE as opening wedge, NEWBY reprimanded FERNANDEZ for failure report unusual substance text. Also pointed out this flagrant violation FCC regulations thus placing CIA in embarrassing position. FERNANDEZ apologized but said it urgently necessary alert Cuba DRE to penetration danger. This was first time existence of penetration was reported by FERNANDEZ or other DRE member. To inquiry why FERNANDEZ withheld such info. from CIA, although known to DRE for months, FERNANDEZ replied DRE merely suspected penetration before but only now certain. Avoided giving specifics. /COMMENT: After four years as chief of CIA subsidized DRE group, FERNANDEZ resigned July 64 to pursue medical studies./

UFGA 7383 from JMWAVE to Hqs. dated 28 January 1963

Stated that Jorge MEDINA Bringuier, Sec. Gen. of the DRE in Cuba, was G-2 agent. That MEDINA was in contact with FERNANDEZ while in Cuba and planned to use FERNANDEZ to establish his bona fides with CIA.

WAVE 4222 (IN 17952) dated 12 September 1963

IMMEDIATE Action: Stated that Nov 63 issue of See Magazine already on newsstands contained wanted poster of Fidel CASTRO on front cover. Poster read "wanted dead or alive, Fidel CASTRO for crimes against humanity, 10 million dollars reward." Same copy highlighted these stories with top billing given story titled "The CIA needs men - can you quality?" The wanted poster was part of a story, gist of which was DRE offers 10 million dollar reward "to person or persons who with the help of the DRE will assassinate Fidel CASTRO." Offer alleged that reward was on deposit with Banco de Santo Domingo, and was signed by Luis FERNANDEZ-ROCHA Rodriguez. /COMMENT: FERNANDEZ first came to the U.S. in May 1960. Was polygraphed Mar 62, suspected of being G-2. Clearance granted 18 Apr 62 for use in DRE; encrypted AMHINT-53. Featured on Channel 4 TV 26 Sept 62 as having been organizing DRE underground Cuba since 20 May and having directed attack 24 Aug on Teatro Blanquita./

AMSPILL Project 19-6-76/2-4

Ops Folder July 62 - May 64: SW Outgoing Mge #7, 5 Dec 62

"can you confirm or deny through contacts in medical

field about assassination attempt of Lazaro PENA by (sic) on? Fidel?" /COMMENT: Message #46 from A-1 was dated 13 Sept 63. Next message in file is #56 dated 27 Dec 63. File has a gap of 10 messages which are unaccounted for. Message #58 dated 27 Dec 63 mentions interruption of contact. A-1 did not specify how long he was without contact. It may be that contact was indeed non-existent from 13 Sept to 27 Dec but the numbering system should have picked up and continued from the last number./

PLSLSTEEL-1 Project 68-6-147

TDCSDB 3/651,885 dated 25 Oct 1962 filed 68-6-147/4

Minister MOLYAKOV told a Bloc diplomat that he thought the U.S. action /missile crisis/ was an "election affair"; that President Kennedy discovered that his popularity had dropped and undertook the Cuban measure to "become the leader again."

GNVA 4357 (OUT 53779) 25 Oct 1963 filed 68-6-147/4

MOLYAKOV commented that the USSR would not let the American move go without retaliation. That with this measure he /President Kennedy/ had become the "man

of the nation" again, and the nation was in a state of hysteria behind him.

GNVA 4376 (OUT 53800) 27 Oct 1962 filed 201-9239

At a dinner party on 25 Oct 62 in Geneva attended by orbit officials, MOLYAKOV reportedly stated that KHRUSHCHEV was aware that Kennedy was mad, an adventurer, and must not be allowed to pull strings, meaning, to retain initiative or control pace in the current international situation.

GNVA 4470 (OUT 53909) 19Nov 62 (TDCSDB 2/652,244) Filed 68-6-147/4

Reported the following on he probable reaction of Fidel CASTRO and his principal associates to the Soviet withdrawal of offensive missiles from Cuba and to U.S. demands re the withdrawal of Soviet IL-28 aircraft and on-spot inspection: Source said that CASTRO's vanity was immense and no matter how it had been explained to him by MIKOYAN or other Soviet officials, he must have been furious at the fact that the Soviet Union had "backed down" before the U.S. and was negotiating with the U.S. on an independent basis. CASTRO must have considered himself as being in a desperate situation. Source said that CASTRO was dominated by vanity, had megalomaniacal tendencies, and possessed a compulsion for revenge which was notorious; on occasion his compulsion caused him to

reach back as far as twenty years to revenge actions taken against him at that time. Source added that in the current situation CASTRO was fully capable of undertaking an act of desperation, for example the aerial bombardment of the U.S. or some gross act against the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba.

GNVA 5006 (OUT 54584) 28 Mar 1963 (TDCSDB 3/653,939) Filed 68-6-147/4

At the height of the October 62 Cuban crisis, CASTRO haranged a Soviet commander about the "impossibility" of permitting U.S. planes to photograph Cuba. The Soviet succumbed to CASTRO's persuasiveness and took action which resulted in shooting down a U-2 plane. The Soviet command was furious and the Soviet officer was returned to the USSR under arrest.

GNVA 6022 (IN 79271) 12 Dec 63 filed 68-6-147/3

Report that there was no speculation among orbit or Soviet officials re implications of Johnson's accession. There was a special alert status ordered for Cuban Missions as a result of the assassination of President Kennedy. The alert was still in effect 9 December 1963.

GNVA 6029 (OUT 65853) 12 Dec 63 (TDCSDB 3/658,469)

Filed 68-6-147/4

Report that circa 2 days after the assassination of President Kennedy, Cuban dip missions abroad began to receive a series of messages placing them on a special alert status. These messages were obviously due to apprehension by the Cuban Government that the circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy might lead to hostile activity directed against the missions. They were instructed, among other things, to be certain that there were "no compromising documents on the premises."

GNVA 6313 (IN 30483) 2 March 1964 filed 201-9293

Source reported at 29 February meeting that CASTRO was concerned that Johnson would not follow Kennedy's course which might have lead to negotiations. KHRUSHCHEV was convinced that CASTRO's Caribbean Peace must be strengthened.

/COMMENT: Ref. IG Memo dated 25 April 1967 SECRET EYES ONLY, Page 112 - Discussion of Assassination at High-Level Government Meetings. HURWITCH of State, and McGeorge BUNDY, White House, among others, attended 10 Aug 62 Special Group (Augmented) meeting at Dept. of State. Bill Harvey attended with McCone for CIA. Remember Harvey's Mafia contacts. Also, keep in mind that Tad SZULC allegedly had access to Hurwitch,

both President and Attorney General Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy. Could he have learned or heard of the plot and let the word out? McCone recalled that liquidation of CASTRO, and other regime officials, was mentioned at JCS op room meeting 8 or 9 August 1962. It was later determined that McCone's recollection was probably faulty, that assassination came up for discussion at the 10 August State meeting.7

AMSWEEP Operation 19-6-69

SW Message #45 from Agent (undated)

Expressed deepest sympathy for death of President Kennedy. Added that death of Kennedy produced great nervousness and concern in CASTRO and his close associates. Further, that there was a great mobilization of troops throughout the country.

SW Message #14 from AMSWEEP-12 dated 19 Nov 1964

Reported attempt against Fidel CASTRO's life at odontological building located at 23rd Street; one of his bodyguards was killed.

AMTRUNK Operation 19-6-84/1-4

UFGA 11375 dated 30 September 1963

AMLEO-3 (Jose Ricardo RABEL Nuñez) defected to the U.S. in December 1962, became a JMWAVE asset, and was used to screen names for the AMTRUNK Operation. His wife reportedly had direct contact with Fidel CASTRO on 7 September 1963 and requested permission for herself and children to join RABEL in the U.S. CASTRO reportedly expressed knowledge that RABEL phoned his wife in Cuba every day. RABEL was terminated in July 1964, reportedly due to conflict with JMWAVE Station for not having exfiltrated his wife and children. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, arrested, and set free in July or August 1967. There are two firm accusations that he was a CASTRO agent as early as July 1963. If true, he could have been providing CASTRO information on the AMTRUNK Operation.

UFGA 11829 dated 18 October 1963

Tad SZULC wrote an article on changing trends among high-level personnel within the CASTRO Government, which appeared in a major daily newspaper, and which he told a high-level U.S. Government official was sourced to Dr. MORENO, the AMTRUNK team leader. Debriefing of

MORENO produced information of considerable variance to that in the article. He admitting talking to SZULC but denied that article was based on information he provided. The article (not in files) created considerable furor in Washington, D.C. /COMMENT: If true, SZULC' article(s) could have been used as a channel for providing information to the Cuban Government, wittingly or unwittingly./

WAVE 7300 (IN 58037) dated 9 November 1963

A radio message to the AMTRUNK's in Cuba on 9 November 1963 asked if they had developed any leads into the higher echelons of the Rebel Army, and who at higher levels appeared to be good prospects for recruitment. It cited rumors that persons in top positions of the army were dissatisfied to the point that they may have been thinking of plotting against Fidel. /COMMENT: There is no proof that this information came to the attention of CASTRO; however, if the AMTRUNK operation was penetrated, as it appears it might have been, this information could have reached him./

WAVE 9630 (IN 87039) dated 25 December 1963

AMTRUNK-9 (Modesto OROZCO) reported in an SW Message dated 6 November 1963, that during the early part of November Fidel CASTRO, in the course of a private

conversation, expressed fear of the possibility of "Commando Insurrections" which might take place on a large scale in Cuba, as the Cuban economy was such that he could not maintain a state of military alert for a long time. He indicated that any prolonged period of military alert might cause discontent among the troops, a situation which would be dangerous and create irreparable consequences. So as to negate the possibility, CASTRO was undertaking an intensive propaganda campaign to give confidence to his troops and to limit the occurrence of any internal uprising.

MEMORANDUM for the Record by Mike Maney dated 23 Jan 1961

Rufo LOPEZ Fresquet allegedly leaked confidential information re U.S. Government backing of provisional government in Cuba, following invasion, given to him by President Kennedy in strictest confidence.

/COMMENT: Tad SZULC reportedly had a standing invitation for direct contact with President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy, since November 1961. SZULC reportedly kept abreast of all important AMTRUNK operational developments but took no active part in the operations. SZULC was in touch with George VOLSKY, one of the operations planners, who was in touch with Manuel PINEIRO (DGI) at the time of the missile crisis in 1962.

Aldo VERA Serafin, then in Miami, formerly with the Department of Technical Investigation (of the DIER - Department of Investigations of the Revolutionary Army), was considered for use in the AMTRUNK Operation. (VERA was assassinated in October 1976 in San Juan, Puerto Rico.) VERA reportedly was receiving financial aid from Santos TRAFFICANTE and the Mafia for arms and ammunition, but there is no indication that such activity was related to the Agency./

AMTABBY Operation 19-132-30

Part of the net, a major PM operation consisting of numerous sabotage operations against on-island targets, was wrapped up by CASTRO in November 1962. Through captured agents, CASTRO learned that the operations were approved at the highest levels of the U.S. Government and that the major sabotage operations were approved by President Kennedy. The captured agents appeared on TV. The Cubans referred to operation CUPID (true) and to Robert Wall (CI Staff.) /We wonder how the agent knew the operational crypt. The Cubans believed Wall to be a close friend of Robert Kennedy. Mr. Wall said he had never met Kennedy, but that the agent's case officer phoned him once in the agent's presence, and referred to Wall by true name./

13-00000

AMTAUP Operation 19-132-19

SW Message #32 from Agent - Undated

Sent condolences on death of President Kennedy and added that "the traitors rejoiced with the news. The radios never turned off the happy music. When they learned through the news services the background and history of the assasin they were preoccupied and on the same Friday they placed all troops on alert and also all the doctors were alerted and kept at the hospitals."

AMTHEO Project 19-6-99

SW Message #14 from agent, undated

Reported that "relatives of neighbors of a sub-source in Santiago de Cuba were arrested for being involved in a frustrated plot to kill Fidel when a bomb was found under the floor of the house in which Fidel was to be the guest on the occasion of the celebration of 26th of July."

SW Message #28, undated

Reported that a sub-source confirmed the frustrated assassination of Fidel at the corner of 10th and 23rd Streets (Vedado) in which one of Fidel's bodyguards was killed.

THIRTIETH OF NOVEMBER GROUP (MRTN) 19-120-37

Specific document not cited

/RESEARCHER COMMENT: "Of interest is the fact that a delegation of MRTN members held a meeting in Dallas, Texas in May 63. They complained about the fact that the U.S. Government was prohibiting further hit and run raids on Cuba and stated that if within 30 days these raids were not allowed to continue, the organization would conduct a protest march to Washington, D.C. Most of the documents in the file are from the FBI./

2506 BRIGADE 19-300-2

Memo for Attorney General Robert F.Kennedy from John A. McCone, Director, CIA 25 January 1963

Concerned interrogation of members of 2506 Brigade ransomed and returned to the U.S. in December 1962. One individual interviewed (A 13 310 184) said he was very mad at Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Rusk and Mr. Kennedy, the President of the U.S. for denying needed support. (By this he meant, by air and Naval gunfire).

Memo for the Record dated 28 January 1963 by Robert MORONEY, Office of Security Subj: Roberto PEREZ San Roman (201-282287)

PEREZ was to speak with HURWITCH of State Department. PEREZ had a dinner appointment with Robert Kennedy at Kennedy's Palm Beach home 26 Jan 1963. Kennedy was to explain in detail plans for future use of the Brigade which emerged from a high-level meeting Friday 25 January 1963.

WAVE 3068 (IN 45935) dated 8 January 1963

Concerned 5 January 1963 meeting between ZAMKA (Dave Morales) CIA and Manuel ARTIME for purpose of re-recruiting ARTIME, debriefing him on brigade activities, and to provide guidance. RUIZ-Williams reportedly told ARTIME that Robert Kennedy instructed RUIZ, OLIVA and Jose PEREZ, not to accept any money from the CRC or CIA; that Kennedy was setting aside $25,000 dollars from families committee funds for brigade leadership use for trips, expenses, etc. WAVE Station had no other information to confirm or deny this statement by Robt. Kennedy to RUIZ. WAVE Station commented that within the present policy framework the CRC could engage in: full spectrum of prop and political action activities; intell. collection; military training of officers and enlisted men via current DOD program; counter-insurgency training;

leadership development training, etc. Should USG policy become more aggressive re Cuba, they could also have commando raids on Cuban coast, attacks on Bloc shipping going to or from Cuba, and sabotage operations in Cuba.

WAVE 3103 (IN 46462) dated 8 January 1963

Reported that Brigade leaders asked families committee for $25,000 ops funds which they claimed Robert Kennedy indicated to RUIZ Williams and Roberto/(PEREZ) SAN ROMAN, should be made available to them through establishment of joint bank account between committee and the Brigade. The families committee turned down the Brigade request but was disturbed that the request was made.

Memo for the Record dated 24 January 1964

Subj: Roberto PEREZ San Roman (201-282287)

In his 23 January meeting with Robert Kennedy, PEREZ remarked that he had discussed Brigade problems, in general, with the writer (Office of Security) whom he apparently identified only as his Agency contact. According to PEREZ, the Attorney General asked for the writer's identity, which PEREZ, who knows the writer only as "Bob", was unable to give. (Was Robert F. Moroney).

AMWARM Operation. 19-6-57

SW Message #45 from Agent dated 1 December 1963

Sent condolences on untimely passing of President Kennedy and speculated that CASTRO was not entirely out of the planning if Moscow had anything to do with it, although it could have been one of his (CASTRO's) unpredictable movements which is backfiring.

Radio Message #64 to Agent dated 4 April 1964

Requested any information the agent had picked up on plots against Fidel and others, and identity of those behind the plots.

AMWEE Operation 19-6-68/2-4

WAVE 9577 (IN 35284) dated 6 Oct 1962

AMWEE-1 on Sept. visit to Miami reported that on 11 September Cuban Army trucks delivered large trunks to house across the street from him (Nr. 116 Calle 18 Miramar, Havana), at that time occupied by a Chilean technician. From other activities in front of house, AMWEE-1 concluded that house was being used as LP target probably for the house of Cuban Supreme Court Chief Luis M. BUCH who lived around the corner from A-1.

The Chilean technician threw out a corrugated box brought there a few days previously by an Army truck escorted by the G-2. A-1 retrieved the box and noted it contained the address Acoustic Research, Inc. Cambridge, Mass. (The Agency checked with the firm and learned that the firm dealt in manufacture of high fidelity components for home consumption. Firm official said if box found its way to Cuba it no doubt was used for second time and original contents removed).

/_In [Don Heath] 22 March 1977 Memo on Miami Station Action to Aid USG Investigation of Murder of John F. Kennedy, [Heath] said [AMWEE-1] reported that on the night of the day of the Kennedy assassination [A-1] saw Osmani CIENFUEGOS drive up to the house [across the street] at about 0100 hours; he stayed several hours. The house at that time was occupied by an American expatriate technician who built audio surveillance gear for the CUIS._7

WAVE 2171 (IN 92822) 3 Aug 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

A letter intended for Fidel CASTRO was given to [AMWEE-1] in [Mexico] on 2 August. He was to mail it within a day or two after return to Cuba on 2 August.

WAVE 2286 (IN 95047) 7 Aug 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

[AMWEE-1] was given letter on 2 August for wife of AMLEO-3, returned to Cuba that day, and was instructed

8/mc

to deliver the letter to her soonest. Included in the letter was the name of the Mexican Ambassador in Cuba given as an emergency contact for wife of AMLEO-3. /COMMENT: If AMLEO-3 was an agent of CASTRO, as suspected, this information could have fallen into the hands of CASTRO./

WAVE 3331 (IN 06371) dated 23 Aug 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

States that DIRECTOR 63497 instructed [AMWEE-1] not to use W/T set except for urgent messages such as report on Fidel CASTRO's death and related momentous developments. We purposely did not tell [A-1] that his radio reportedly was blown.

DIRECTOR 72045 from Hqs. to WAVE 30 Sept 63 filed 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

Para 2 states "see CASTRO reference in 28 September speech to money caches."

WAVE 2329 (IN 81847) dated 26 Sept 1964 filed W/T Chrono 19-6-68/3 Vol. #3

[AMWEE-1] message #2. ["My government (Italian)] has intervened violently re imprisonment of Vasco CECCHI, Italian citizen who owned Montecatini Restaurant, Havana. Requests immediate release or else will take severe measures.

WAVE 8316 (IN 70529) dated 30 Nov 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #4

Para 1 gave translation of WAVE 8279 (IN 69695) Mge. 45 from [AMWEE-1] to Case Officer: "Our condolences on death President. MAURI (Mario MAURI, Italian diplomat) reports on 22 Nov the Cubana aircraft delayed its departure five hours from 1700 to 2200 waiting for an important passenger who arrived Mexico City Airport in private twin motor aircraft at 2130 hours Mexi time transferring directly from his plane to the Cubana plane without going through customs or immigration. Travelled in pilot's cabin. MAURI returned on same aircraft to Cuba. I shall come out 29 Nov but do not know whether I can stay. Best that you come to the airport that day. Here there is great movement of troops toward Pinar del Rio." /COMMENT: See AMCOVE Operation Memo, AMCOVE-1 SW Mge #71, dated 10 Dec 63. [A-1] reported that Mario MAURI flew from Mexico to Havana on 23 November.

[AMWEE-1] Production Folder #6 Oct 63 thru May 65: 19-6-68/4

There is nothing between 24 Oct 63 and 4 Dec 63 (void). WAVE 8100 (IN 67217) 23 Nov 63 contains no requirements to [AMWEE-1] re assassination, nor do subsequent messages through 30 December 63.

4/mc

[AMWEE-1] SW Chrono 14 Jan 63 thru 20 Apr 65 Folder #9

19-6-68/3

There are no messages between SW #119 dated 12 Nov 63, received Miami 20 Nov 63, and SW #124 dated 15 Apr 1964, received Miami 20 April 1964. Four messages are missing from this file.

Message to Agent (IN 04498) dated 12 June 64

Asked if agent had learned the name of the young man in peasant clothes who rides Cubana plane to Mexico and back every Friday.

Message from Agent (IN 81847) dated 26 Sept 64

States that Vasco CECCHI was arrested "some months ago" and charged with dollar dealings and being part of a plot against CASTRO.7

[AMWEE-1] Operational File 19-6-68/3 Vol. #4

Memo dated 4 November 1964

Shows that 8 names gleaned from the "Warren Commission documents" were checked in WH/SA/IOS (Cuba Desk) files with negative results. Reports traces attached.

2/mc

AMWORLD Operation 19-124-27

Memo for the Record by Henry Hecksher, 10 July 1963

Washington, D.C. Meeting with ARTIME (BOX 18)

ARTIME related events prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. Manuel RAY had just arrived in the U.S. from Cuba. He enjoyed strong Department of State support. It was his intent to get the U.S. to withdraw support from the FRD and to obtain control over the training camps himself. VARONA's and CARILLO's intention was to see the FRD go down. Hecksher said he masterminded RAY's defeat and RAY knew it.

Memo by Henry D. Hecksher on AMWORLD Meeting in

Washington 7 to 10 Nov 1963 Subj: Dr. La Saga (BOX 18)

LaSaga was the MRR delegate in the U.S. while ARTIME was imprisoned in Cuba (following the Bay of Pigs invasion.) ARTIME demoted LaSaga. LaSaga described by Hecksher as one of the most intelligent men he had ever met. It was LaSaga's firm position that while President Kennedy was in power it would be impossible to defeat CASTRO.

WAVE 6925 (IN 89430) dated 23 May 1964

Concerns Tad SZULC' articles in the New York Times 19, 20 and 21 May which AMCARBON-1 believes were fabricated and violated newsbeat agreement he had with AMCARBON-1.

Memo for Chief, Special Affairs Staff, by Henry Hecksher dated 3 September 1963 19-124-27/3 (Box 28)

A Tad SZULC article in a special to The New York Times datelined Key West, 1 Sept(1963) quotes "the judgement of authoritative quarters in Cuba" that Washington tolerance of small refugee groups that are identified with political factions objectionable to most Cubans, specifically the groups that apparently operate from Nicaragua and are identified with ARTIME, works against the emergence of meaningful opposition. /Hecksher comment: I wonder who is actually behind what looks to me like a concerted denigration campaign?/

DBA 42843 dated 3 June 1963 (FBI) 19-124-27 (Box 29)

From interview of Santiago ALVAREZ Rodriguez on 23 May 1963 and information from his contact in April 1963 with attorney Paulino A. SIERRA. SIERRA planned to go to Miami, from Chicago, to help establish a unity movement among Cuban political groups. SIERRA wanted ALVAREZ to meet an American arriving in Miami from Chicago (name unknown) who claimed to have $30,000,000. available to donate to Cuban exiles to establish unity and provisional government in exile. The American said the money would be given on condition that the unity would be established, and that the group he represented would

be given certain concessions in Cuba in the future. The American claimed he did not represent the U.S. Government but had good contacts with the government. It was not known what he meant by the term concessions - whether that was with reference to gambling concessions, business franchises or possible business contracts with the Cuban Government. ALVAREZ concluded that the American was completely unreliable. The American was described as white, male, about 45 years old, 5 ft. 10 inches, 180 lbs., well-dressed, businessman type who spoke a little Spanish and obviously had been in Havana at one time. The American indicated that he was from Chicago.

WAVE 1013 (IN 78067) dated 11 July 1963 (Box 29)
Concerns activities of Cuban Committee for Liberation (CCL) sparked by Guillermo ALONSO Pujol 21 May 1963. (Agency learned from DGI defector SLIPSTREAM-1 in Nov 71 that ALONSO was a Cuban intelligence agent.) Cable goes on to state that Enrique RUIZ Williams had apparently been inactive, at least in Miami circles, since denying via local press on 22 May that he was hand-picked by Attorney General Kennedy to unify anti-Castro exiles.

CSDB 3/656,611 dated 13 September 1963 (Box 29)
Indicates that SIERRA's actions relating to Cuba Committee for Liberation would lead to chaos and anarchy.

At a meeting 20 Aug 1963 members of the group decided to report SIERRA's irregularities to the group's financiers in Chicago. Calls were made to Chicago to VANDERBUILT (fnu) and Dillon BRADEN.

WAVE 8562 (IN 74653) dated 5 Dec 1963 (Box 29)

Reports that PRIO's declarations wherein he accused the U.S. Government of agreement with Russia to replace CASTRO with Tito-type government originated with Guillermo ALONSO Pujol in Washington. It was received by PRIO through Guillermo BELT. Pujol has friendly relations with certain members diplomatic circle Washington and thinks he is well informed although he lives in Europe. Guillermo MARQUEZ, publisher of New York weekly Ahora and Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling are both part of PRIO's plan and allegedly have become associated with Richard NIXON in accordance with Republican Party plan to bring up Cuban case before the elections.

WAVE 8563 (IN 84654) dated 6 Dec 1963 (Box 29)

Information from Francisco CHAO Hermida, who attended 10 Nov 63 meeting with Miguel A. "Cuco" LEON - involved PLAN JUDAS. LEON told CHAO that while in Wash., D.C., he met with Enrique RUIZ Williams. RUIZ informed him that he (RUIZ) was to lead new Cuban republic and had been so named by Robert Kennedy who had gone to New York to interview him. Kennedy allegedly said that RUIZ could

work with any or every sector he wished but important point was that RUIZ was to be the boss.

Memo for the Record by Alfonso RODRIGUEZ dated 23 June 1964 re Telecon with Tad SZULC (Box 29)

SZULC stated that the detention of RAY was due to "double" nature of U.S. policy; meaning by that that the U.S. Government was anxious to depose Fidel CASTRO, but would not permit anyone to act against Cuba. RODRIGUEZ pointed out to SZULC that RAY as well as "all of the other fellows" have been constantly reminded that they cannot use U.S. territory as a base but apparently they have got to lose all of their assets before they realize that this is a serious policy.

AMWREN Operation 19-6-51/1-4

AMWREN-1 Report dated 5 February 1962 19-6-51/4

Report that during a speech on 4 February 1962 Fidel stopped reading the text prepared by the Communist Party and, on his own, referred to Kennedy as "impudent". He tried to separate himself from the text and continue on his own, but was brought back in line by Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ and Anibal ESCALANTE.

On 1 February 1962 AMTURVY-1 reported that Rolando CUBELA and other prominent government figures were under arrest in La Cabana Fortress and were kept

separated from the other prisoners.

AMYUM Operation 19-132-32

UFGA 8466 dated 12 April 1963 19-132-32

Transmitted intelligence debriefing reports on Operation FINA exfiltrees. Debriefing of Caridad MACIAS Rodriguez. On 26 July 1961 MACIAS was involved in an action to kill Fidel CASTRO at the 26th of July ceremony at the Plaza Civic. The action was to kill Fidel CASTRO by firing a bazooka shell at the speaker's platform. This action failed because of a defective firing device on the bazooka. The G-2 had had persons involved, working in resistance, under surevillance for some time. MACIAS was connected with the MRR. A G-2 interrogator said that the Cuban security forces knew everything that was going on in the resistance movement. They permitted these resistance organizations to organize and exist until it was decided to roll up the group. She seemed to be connected with AMBRONC-5 (a CIA on-island asset) who was arrested and executed the latter part of August 1962.

13-00000

ATTACHMENT B

List of Task Force Participants

LAD/JFK Task Force Participants

William Sturbitts	Task Force Supervisor
Chris Hopkins	Group leader
Jane Zerance	Researcher and Administrative back-up to Ms. Hopkins. Served from mid-Oct [illegible] 1976 to mid-February 1977.
3 [Felipe Acevedo]	Researcher and Translator Served from mid-October 1976 to mid-February 1977.
3 [Kathleen Blevins]	Researcher and Translator Served from mid-October 1976 to mid-February 1977.
3 [Taylor (Mike) Belcher]	Researcher (Strong along CI lines) Served from mid-October 1976 to January 1977, prior to PCS assignment.
3 [Daryl Geisler]	Researcher Served from mid-October 1976 to mid-November 1976. (Part-time due to personal tragedy).
3 [Martin Miller]	Researcher Served approximately 3 weeks from January to mid-February 1977.

5/mc

3
[Barbara Boyle] Researcher

Served approximately three weeks from January to mid-February 1977.

3
[Alva King] Researcher

Served approximately 2 weeks in February 1977.

3
[Howard Brubaker] Researcher

Served approximately 2 weeks in February 1977.

Annie Goodpasture Recalled from retirement by the IG Staff.

Served with LAD Task Force from mid-March to mid-May 1977. See following paragraph on Ms. Goodpasture.

Based on her long tenure at the Mexico City Station which spanned the critical period, September to November 1963, Ms. Goodpasture was recalled by the IG Staff in February 1977 to answer numerous questions which focused primarily on Mexico City Station activities. The IG Staff has written a statement regarding Ms. Goodpasture's review of the Mexico City Station files. After assisting the IG Staff, Ms. Goodpasture then joined the LAD Task Force from mid-March to mid-May 1977. Her contribution during that period consisted primarily of the following:

a) Recall, review and translation from Spanish to English (when not provided) of microfilm of Mexico City Station

3/mc

teltap take against the Soviet Embassy during the period September through November 1963, to determine a possible Soviet link with OSWALD.

b) Preparation of report on Cubana flights and flights from Mexico City to Havana based on research and translations by other members of the Task Force.

c) Preparation of report on Gilberto Policarpo Lopez based on research and findings by other LAD Task Force members.

d) Reviewed at Headquarters and [Warrenton] 99 photo coverage of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for pictures of the "unidentified man."

e) Reviewed 8 boxes of policy material for possible findings.

13-00000

TS (CODE WORD) ANNEX
TO ATTACHMENT "A"

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. SC-01755-77A

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(Security Classification)

E2 IMPDET

ZRKNICK Operation 200-5-38 (FBI Monitoring of Cuban Espionage Net in Miami, International in Scope)

BOX I - Non-CS Documents Filed AMAPOLA (Juan AMESTOY Folder)

On 8 April 1963 the FBI intercepted an SW message from ZRKNICK agent in Miami to CUIS Headquarters in Havana. Said Juan ARMESTOY /should read AMESTOY; was CIA agent/ told ZRKNICK agent about a trip he planned to Cuba with other Cubans. That an internal uprising was being prepared and six men, four Cubans and two foreigners, had already arrived in Cuba to assassinate Fidel. "Ricardo CABRERA told RIN last night that from now until December 63 many things are expected in Cuba and that the American Government will take advantage of the opportunity of the attack on the Russian boat to control the gusanos (worms) who work on their own and then in the work of CIA in its job of infiltration. ARMESTOY says that they always take an American with them and it is he who gives the orders and communicates by radio with the airplanes which explore the route. ARMESTOY took eleven thousand five hundred pesos to Cuba. Be careful. Regards." /COMMENT: ZRKNICK at request of CUIS Havana, continued to report on AMESTOY. AMESTOY was later arrested and killed in a gun battle or executed by the Cuban Government./

<u>CSCI 3/776,625 Dated 19 June 1963 Memo to FBI from CIA</u>

<u>Subject: Ricardo CABRERA Amoedo</u>

Attached memo dated 30 April 1963 states that Ricardo CABRERA Amoedo aka "Cayo" who lived in the U.S., returned to Cuba when CASTRO assumed power in January 1959, returned to Miami in 1960 as an active G-2 member and continued to work as an informer for CUIS. During 1960 he went to Cuba and had an interview with VALDES, Fidel CASTRO, NARANJO and Juan ORTA, then secretary to Fidel. In Miami CABRERA worked for the G-2, together with PIMENTAL (fnu) and Pepe NOVA, who were chiefs of G-2 in Miami. Was a man who would sell his mother. Became an American citizen and used to brag about being a member of CIA.

<u>VOLUME II (Box I) Summary of Relations with FBI</u>

<u>TOP SECRET DINAR</u>

On 15 March 1963 the FBI's ZRKNICK supervisor met with CIA personnel for discussion of the case and promised to keep CIA Headquarters informed of all developments. The FBI provided text of SW message from AMAPOLA letter drop indicating travel of one Evaristo FERNANDEZ to Costa Rica in connection with some kind of operation. CIA sent the information immediately to Costa Rica <u>in view of President's trip.</u>

 SC-01755-77A

VOLUME II (Box I) Memo from FBI to CIA dated 12 Aug 1963

Memo attached text of intercepted message; although in code, deciphered, it said the following: "Antonio ROJAS told me the following. CIA is still recruiting people but they are warned before hand that they have to accept Huber MATOS as their leader. My friend, Luisito AQUIAR, who was second in command to Tom DIQUE, was recruited and he will soon be sent to Cuba. RID told me the following: my prison mate Ernesto SANTANA, was also recruited a few days ago and sent by CIA and transferred to another place for his preparation. Tony, no good, and I believe the attempt (on the life) of the horse would be more effective, tell us how the check-out is going."

Memorandum for Chief of Station, Mexico dated 3 Sept 1963 (Box I) TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 5 para 7 A states that AMAPOLA /crypt for CUIS/ with outstation located in the Miami area, has for its main objective the penetration of CIA and exile organizations directed against Cuba. One important agent, possibly the P/A /Jose CARBONNEL Marrero/ has been identified by the FBI and is a naturalized U.S. citizen of Cuban birth. The FBI is currently reading his S/W messages, and CIA is interrogating a WAVE asset (?) who has an unexplained connection with the agent. Another WAVE asset (name unknown) who has had contact with the agent

has been interrogated and found to be clean. A third WAVE asset (identity unknown) in contact with the agent, has been turned over to the FBI for possible use against the agent."

VOLUME III (Box I) Intercepted Message from Cuba to Agent in Miami, Dated 24 Nov 1963 TOP SECRET DINAR

Asked following questions:

1. Whether there is concentration of the Yankee Army.
2. Whether there is a concentration of mercenaries.
3. Whether there is an increase in pressure on those sympathetic to Cuba and the left.
4. Whether active counter-revolutionaries are disappearing.
5. To inform fully via CANDI (CUIS clandestine drop in Mexico City) the reaction of the Gusanos and the Republicans to the death of Kennedy.

VOLUME III (Box I) Memo for Chief, JMWAVE from SAS/CI Dated 11 March 1964 - TOP SECRET DINAR

Memo attached copies of ZRKNICK intercepts provided CIA by the FBI:

25 Dec 63 plain text letter (translated from Spanish to English) to Irma SUAREZ in Cuba. Para 6 states "I will tell you about Kennedy's death in the other letter when I am in New Jersey. All that is a ?."

30 Dec 63 letter from Miami to Irma in Cuba. Para 3 states "Irma, I certainly did not forget those medicines you asked me for. I was very sure that they would give them to you and that you would be able to go to Camaguey to see Pepe."

VOLUME IV - FBI Summaries TOP SECRET DINAR (Box 1)

Letter to Irma SUAREZ in Cuba from H. DIAZ in Miami, dated 17 Oct 63. Second para. of SW text states "Irma, do not bother asking Manolo GARCIA about the letters which he has sent me, since I turned them over to CONTE AGUERO and he has read them." /COMMENT: This appears to be Luis CONTE Aguero, a former JMWAVE Station asset terminated in 1969. His file indicates that he is (was) a suspected CASTRO agent. He reportedly got the Cuban vote for President-elect Carter and was in Wash., D.C. in December 1976 with the Carter transition team./.

BOX 2 - "NOE" FOLDER - TOP SECRET DINAR

25 November 1963 intercept of message from Cuba to agent in Miami. "In view of the assassination attempt in the U.S., report the reaction in that city, commentaries in government circles, right and left. Report change, accelleration, or maneuvers of any kind with regard to the aggression plan against Cuba."

SJOS 6429 (IN 68164) Dated 26 November 63 (BOX 2)

Cable from San Jose to Headquarters. "Costa Rican Deputy Julio SUNOL Leal (ZRKNICK suspect, Communist fellow traveller and pro-CASTRO propagandist) planned depart 24 Nov to attend Peace Conference in Poland. Delayed departure and now planning leave San Jose by air for Poland 26 Nov. Plans stop en route in Texas repeat Texas. Then will travel on to Poland. Station suspected SUNOL will attempt gather data in Texas for use in pro-Communist CASTRO propaganda re assassination Kennedy. SUNOL travelling with dip. passport."

MEXI 7085 (IN 68561) Dated 27 November 1963

Cable to Headquarters from Mexico City. "Subject arrived Mexico Taca Flt. 772 1600 26 Nov. Leaving KLM Flt. 684 for Amsterdam 27 Nov. Flt. stops Houston and Montreal en route."

HZPA 13,960 Dated 3 December 1963 (BOX 4)

Dispatch from Panama City to Headquarters. "At 22 Nov 63 Esterline-HYSAGE-1 (Thelma King) meeting, news was received of President Kennedy's death. This had a profound effect on H-1. Her first reaction was that it must have been done by racial extremists and she spent a considerable time extolling the virtues of President Kennedy, and what he had been trying to do. At the 27 Nov 63 Esterline-HYSAGE-1 meeting, H-1

made quite a point of saying that she was absolutely positive that Fidel CASTRO could have had nothing to do with the act.

(BOX 10) TOP SECRET DINAR - Intercepted Message from Cuba to Agent in Miami dated 27 Oct 1962

Stated "Principal objective is the physical elimination of counter-revolutionary scum and the destruction of their centers. The less important ones you can beat up and request their expulsion from the country. Keep the material secured from the Yankee Embassy in a safe place until receipt of further instructions."

(BOX 10) PAMELA Folder - Periodic Activity Report Presumably dated December 1963

PAMELA Folder (CUIS agent). "In addition to the regular bi-weekly schedules held on 10 and 24 November, a special schedule was held on 29 November, as was done in the case of AMAPOLA (CARBONNEL). Among various matters dealt with in the message transmitted on 10 November, one in particular was of high interest. This was the request for a man to be chosen to handle commo in cases of emergency inasmuch as it would be more difficult to accomplish this as "the struggle worsens." An exhaustive report on all aspects of counter-revolutionary groups and activities was also requested of the agent." On 24 Nov 63, as in the case of AMAPOLA, a special code was set up to enable "A--CH (illegible) to report by cable directly to drops in Cuba

on the situation in Puerto Rico after the assassination of President Kennedy. SANTOS, the agent who actually receives all messages transmitted to PAMELA was to contact AB--N (illegible) and have him report on the development of any of the following situations:

a. if a contingent of gusano (worm) Cubans has arrived there;
b. if mobilization of resident gusano Cubans is noticed;
c. if mobilization of U.S. forces is noticed;
d. if the Cubans who arrived and those who were there before have "developed circulation;"
e. if activities of repressive organs against popular forces have increased.

A special transmission was scheduled for the following Thursday at the same time. As there were no adverse developments in the situation after the President's death, this subject was not dealt with in the special transmission made on 29 Nov (1963).

(BOX 10) SEPIO File

The "SEPIO" file contains a letter from MENENDEZ in France to Oliva LOPEZ, Mexico. /COMMENT: believe letter may have been written by the MANENDEZ who wrote letter to a Bernardo MORALES in Miami 27 Nov 62, discussing plans for assassination of President Kennedy. See MENENDEZ shadow file./

(BOX 10) "ROBERTO Folder" Periodic Activity Report

Dated (presumably) December 1963

On 25 November (63) the agent was asked to report on the reaction of the assassination of President Kennedy by governmental right-wing and left-wing circles. The agent (Roberto) was also asked to report on the status of plans of aggression against Cuba.

(BOX 10) Memo to Chief of Station, JMWAVE from C/SAS/CI

Dated 6 December 1963

Cites memos of 22 and 29 November 63 attached (which are not attached to document). 22 Nov 63 memo reportedly included an intercepted SW message which mentioned one Ricardo IRURETA Goyena who worked at the Hotel Fontainebleau in Miami. The 29 November 63 memo reportedly contained an intercepted SW message, a letter addressed to Irma SUAREZ in Cuba in both open text and in secret writing, and another letter which apparently was intended for Manolo GARCIA, also both in open text and secret writing.

ZRKNICK Unnumbered Box - VOL. III

PACY 1073 (IN 48464) dated 26 October 1963

Cable from Panama City to Headquarters. "Hope you understand that PONCHAY (Jake Esterline) and Station CI group as dissatisfied with unresolved aspects HYSAGE Ops. as is Hqs. Do not, however, at this point, see spectre

of Soviets or massive provocation efforts directed by Soviets and/or CASTRO in progress. /COMMENT: PONCHAY was in touch with HYSAGE-1 (Thelma King), a Panamanian left-wing politician, pro-Castro Deputy to National Assembly, and personal friend of Fidel CASTRO. Recruited by Fidel Aug 62 to perform espionage mission in Panama./

MEXI 6969 (IN 64256) Dated 19 Nov 63 (VOL. III)

Cable from Mexico to Hqs. "16 Nov. LICOOKY-1 with LINLUCK-1 visited Maj. Alfonso PRERA Sierra, employed by Francisco "Paco" AMADO at Maquinas Coloso. "Paco" still involved Guatemala guerrilla ops and receives money from Cubans to pass to Guats. "Paco's" wife says "Paco" now in U.S. but Alfonso thinks he either in Guatemala or Cuba. Alfonso's brother Enrique still firmly pro-Cuban."

DIRECTOR 84449 Dated 21 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Cable from Hqs. to WAVE. "Hqs. has sensitive information indicating that Cuban Intelligence Service is targetting against person employed in State Dept. office in Miami. (Matter discussed with the FBI.)

DIRECTOR 84791 Dated 22 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Cable from Headquarters to Panama City. "HYSAGE-2 (Victor Augusto NAVAS-King) turned plane ticket over to "MEDINA" on 22 Nov. Ticket expires 7 Dec 63. Has decided remain U.S. over Xmas holidays. Wants to raise grade at

Georgetown (University). Was much affected by death of President and did not want to talk much.

DIRECTOR 85343 Dated 27 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Cable from Hqs. to WAVE and Panama City. "Hqs. suspects Blanca Alicia FRANCO may be spearhead of penetration of AMOT/CIA ops on behalf ZRKNICK complex. AMOTS /JMWAVE Station Ops./ in direct contact with FRANCO. FRANCO, suspect Cuban agent, in contact with AMOT-110. (Norberto Felipe MARTINEZ Garcia).

HDCA 3405 Dated 29 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Dispatch from Santo Domingo to Hqs.concerning one Eduardo TAVARES Justo. TAVARES queried EMGLUE-1 ( ) on 2 Oct 63 about his experiences in the U.S. but did not give any indication that he was going there. On 9 Oct. five days after TAVARES departure, EMGLUE-1 reported that TAVARES had not gone to Canada as planned, but to New York. On 22 Nov 63 EMGLUE-1 reported that as of 17 Nov TAVARES was still in New York. E-1 believed TAVARES a Communist, or at least has Communist ideas.

HMMA 22632 Dated 18 December 1963 (VOL. III)

Dispatch from Mexico City to Hqs. "On 21 Nov 63 LICOOKY-1 obtained following info re Francisco AMADO. For past year AMADO has continued to receive visits from emissaries of Fidel CASTRO and to make mysterious trips. On each occasion (sic) AMADO receives money for various expenditures.

Right after receiving these visitors and the money, AMADO goes on trips. AMADO was in Cuba for a while last year. He may be working for the Govt of Cuba in intelligence work. AMADO's wife was educated in the U.S. She has friends in Washington and also at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico. As of this date, AMADO has been outside Mexico for some time. His wife explains that he is in the U.S. Last year when AMADO went to Guatemala, taking funds from CASTRO for the guerrillas, he applied for membership in the Guatemalan Communist Party. He has CASTRO's confidence and performs services for the Communists."

DIRECTOR 90507 Dated 20 December 1963 VOL. III)
Cable from Hqs. to Panama City and Bern. "Appears likely someone may have used HYSAGE-1 ticket. Can Panama City identify? Was HYSAGE-1 in Panama 4-17 Dec?

DBA 57414 (FBI) Dated 21 November 1963 100-5-14 (VOL. IV)
Page 11, para 3, mentions a Manolo GARCIA who had in his possession driver's license in name Manolo RODRIGUEZ. /This Manolo RODRIGUEZ may be iden/ with one Manuel RODRIGUEZ Seoane (201-920072) Cuban DSE officer in 1964 responsible for recruiting Emilio ECHARTE Pedroso. ECHARTE's mission was to enter the U.S. for the purpose of assassinating Cuban exile, Manolo RAY. DIRECTOR 501359, 15 Jan 74/.

ZRKNICK Continued

PACY 4074 (IN 30576) dated 17 July 1964 (Vol. VII)

Cable from Panama City to Hqs. "Station will do everything possible to get additional answers and clarification from HYSAGE-1. If H-1 trying to divert attention from more important target or activity any of the following possibilities may be considered:

c. H-1 may be involved in or aware of impending action. Perhaps a golpe de Estado (coup d'etat) or assassination, and is trying detract attention from persons actually involved."

BOGO 4761 (IN 41774 dated 3 August 1964 (Vol. VII)

Cable from Bogota to Hqs. "On 28 July 64 a State Dept. officer received information that there was a pro-CASTRO group in the Civil Aeronautics Administration and names Alvaro REYES Nieto as a member of the group. REYES, a Colombian, is a radio technician, now in Wash., D.C. area on ODWIFE (International Corporation Administration) training grant. Hernando REYES Nieto, believed to be Alvaro's brother, reportedly travelled to Cuba via Mexico in January 1962. CSDB 3/654,557 lists him as architect in employ of the Cuban Government.

HHTW 1721 dated 15 October 1964 (Vol. VIII)

Dispatch from Hqs. to Tegucigalpa. "When President Kennedy died, Augusto (DGI) directed officers in National Liberation Bldg., to prepare radio communication using

song "Three Beautiful Cubans" or "Six Beautiful Cubans," which could be transmitted by Radio Havana, Cuba and be used to send easily understood ciphered messages. AMMUG-1 (DGI defector) believed that Norberto HERNANDEZ Curbelo (DGI) officer chose the musical recording. Augusto is believed to be iden/with Carlos Sixto CHAIN Soler, Deputy to Manuel PINEIRO, Chief of the DGI.

ATTACHMENT C

Outline of the Complete LAD/JFK Task Force Files

and Description of Their Contents.

LAD (Cuba) Task Force to Investigate

Assassination of President Kennedy

019-604-001

Vol. I	Administrative - Background Working Papers
Vol. II	Administrative - Background Working Papers
Vol. III	Administrative - Background Working Papers
Vol. IV	Press Clippings
Vol. V	Interagency Memoranda
Vol. VI	Interagency Memoranda
Vol. VII	Terms of Reference - Folders 1 thru 34 Cuba/Mexico
Vol. VIII	Interim Report on AMTRUNK Operation and Operation to Split Castro Regime
Vol. IX	Memoranda (Draft) - Operational and Subject Files Negative Findings A thru H
Vol. X	Memoranda (Draft) - Operational and Subject Files Negative Findings I thru Z
Vol. XI	Memoranda with Findings Attached - A and B
Vol. XII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - C
Vol. XIII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - D thru J
Vol. XIV	Memoranda with Findings Attached - K
Vol. XV	Memoranda with Findings Attached - L
Vol. XVI	Memoranda with Findings Attached - M and Mc
Vol. XVII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - N thru R
Vol. XVIII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - S thru V
Vol. XIX	Memoranda with Findings Attached - W thru Z

Vol. XX	Memoranda on Personalities Checked - A thru N
Vol. XXI	Memoranda on Personalities Checked - O thru Z
Vol. XXII	Final Report - How Research was Conducted -
	Chronology of Findings
	List of Participants
	Outline of LAD/JFK Official Files

FILE NO.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

-3-

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 97713
OUT 97713

TO INFO CITE DIR 35831
35831

ABIJ	ACCR	ADDI	ALGI	AMMA	ANCH	ANKA	ASUN
ATHE	BAGH	[redacted]	BANG	BEIR	BELG	BRLN	BERN
BOGO	BOMB	BONN	BRAZ	BRUS	CAIR	CALC	CAPT
CARA	TRUJ	COLO	CNRY	LISB	COPE	DKAR	DAMA
DARE	DJAK	FRAN	GUAT	HAGU	HELS	HONG	HULA
ISTA	JIDD	KABU	KAMP	KAHI	KTMN	KHAR	KUAL
KUWA	LAGS	LAPA	LEOP	LIMA	LOND	[redacted]	LUXE
MADR	MANA	MANI	MELB	MEXI	MOGA	MNRV	MONT
MUNI	NOBI	NEWD	OTTA	PACY	PARI	PENH	PRIN
PRET	QUIT	RABA	RNGO	REYK	RIOD	ROME	SAIG
SLBY	SANJ	JUAN	SAGO	SALV	SEOU	SING	STOC
TAMI	THAR	TEGU	TEHE	TOKY	TPLI	TNIS	VIEN
VETN	WELL	YAOU					

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1389 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

5834 — [illegible] Hospital

[illegible] 25th ST. - HIALEAH, FLA.

PATIENT'S NAME & ADDRESS

PEREZ, RIGOBERTO (CRUZ) 6
1700 N.W. 21 TERRACE 8
MIAMI, FLA.

8 TO

SAM [illegible]
P.O. BOX 1608
MIAMI, FLA.

TYPE INSURANCE OR PRE-PAYMENT

DATE ADMITTED 4-12-66 TIME [illegible]

DATE DISCHARGED [illegible]

DOCTOR A. VARGAS

DATE	ROOM NO.	RATE	NO. DAYS
4-12	105A SP	21.00	

Room			Dressings, Costs & Supplies	SPL. Column A Amount / Code	Column B	Oxygen Service	Total Charges	Payments	Old Balance	Date	Balance
21.00							21.00			APR 12'66	21.00
21.00	83.00	15.25	.25	26.00 +20 LIVER SCAN; 30.00 +[illegible]	1.50 +23 KIT	60.00	306.00		21.00	APR 13'66	327.00
21.00	11.00	6.00	9.75	30.00 +20		35.00	112.75		327.00	APR 14'66	439.75
21.00			5.00								
21.00	6.00	26.50	2.00	10.00 +19		35.00	171.50		439.75	APR 16'66	611.25
21.00	3.00						24.00		611.25	APR 17'66	635.25
21.00	13.00	3.50					37.50		635.25	APR 18'66	672.75
21.00	2.00	3.25					27.25		672.75	APR 19'66	700.00
.00	3.00	19.25				35.00	78.25		700.00	APR 20'66	778.25
1.00			1.25	20.00 +19			42.25		778.25	APR 21'66	820.50
21.00		5.50									
1.00	25.00	6.00	2.00	[illegible] +19			[illegible]		820.50	APR 23'66	[illegible]
.00		3.00		[illegible] +19			34.00		[illegible]	APR 24'66	942.00
		10.00		10.00 +19; 30.00 +19			.00		943.00	APR 24'66	943.00
21.00		2.50		10.00 +19							
		10.00		10.00 +19			34.50		943.00	APR 25'66	977.50
21.00		4.75		10.00 +19			35.75		977.50	APR 26'66	1,013.25
21.00		6.25		10.00 +19			37.25		1,013.25	APR 27'66	1,050.50
21.00	13.00	[illegible]	2.00	10.00 +19			46.25		1,050.50	APR 29'66	1,096.75
357.00	160.00	91.00	17.25	250.00	1.50	216.00	1096.75		TOTAL	BALANCE FORWARD	

PAID MAY 10 1966 CHECK NO. 2156

WE DO OUR BEST TO HAVE A FINAL BILL WHEN REQUESTED. AT TIME OF DISCHARGE THIS IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE, SO MEDICINE GIVEN AND SERVICES RENDERED ON DAY OF DISCHARGE WHICH ARE NOT CHARGED WHEN PATIENT LEAVES THE HOSPITAL WILL BE BILLED LATER.

ADD INSURANCE DEDUCTIBLE · DUE FROM PATIENT · LESS PAYMENTS · BALANCE DUE

DISPOSITION OF CASE

FINAL DIAGNOSIS

1 OPERATION

SHOULD [illegible] BE MADE TO SUBSCRIBER? YES [ ] NO [ ]

SPECIAL SERVICES CODE EXPLANATION

COLUMN A	COLUMN B
16 ELECTROCARDIOGRAM	7 PATHOLOGY
18 ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAM	9 X RAY THERAPY
19 PHYSICAL THERAPY	21 BLOOD & BLOOD PLASMA
20 TRANSFUSION SET UP	24 ORTHOPEDIC EQUIPMENT
23 EMERGENCY SERVICE	40 TEL & TEL.
27 RADIO ISOTOPES	

* BY: H. M. SIMON, JR., M.D.
RALPH L. PIPES, M.D.
RADIOLOGISTS

OUR BUSINESS OFFICE IS CLOSED FROM SUNSET FRIDAY TO SUNSET SATURDAY.

3/12

FORM 1-62 1303a

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 26 AUG 62

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
RR ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS K	251743Z	Ø9376

TO DIR WAVE INFO CITE RIOD 8325

GYROSE AMLACE

1. AMTOAD-1 SAYS HE PERSUADED AMLACE-1'S WIFE (HEREAFTER AMLACE-2) TO SEND HIM REPORTS FROM HAVANA. BELIEVES SHE WOULD BE WILLING ACT AS COURIER FOR ANTI CASTRO REFUGEES. REPORTS TO BE SENT VIA DIP POUCH TO MARIA C. NIEMEYER (NO RECORD STATION FILES) OF BRAZIL CONSULATE MIAMI. RENARD AND HARRY V. WITHERBY, NEW GYROSE CASE OFFICER VICE ANDRIETTE, DISPLAYED NO PARTICULAR INTEREST. AMTOAD-1 OF COURSE UNAWARE OUR TIE TO AMLACE-1. AMTOAD WILL PROBABLY RRRRØR REPORT AMLACE-2 OP TO AMBUD HQS AND MAY SEEK TRIP TO MIAMI TO EXPLOIT.

2. THIS MAY BE MINOR INFORMAL AGREEMENT ON WHICH AMLACE-2 DOES NOT INTEND TO ACT, ALTHO AMSTRUT-1 HAS STATED AMLACE-2 STRONGLY ANTI CASTRO AND WILLING WORK.

3. WE FEEL THIS DEVELOPMENT NO THREAT TO AMLACE-1 SECURITY. WILL TAKE NO CORRECTIVE ACTION UNLESS ADDEES INSTRUCT OTHERWISE.

END OF MESSAG

INFO
CS
CCS
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RI

GKR

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

DISTR:
ACTION:
INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 25 AUG 62
FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
RR ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS K	242040Z	09350

TO WAVE INFO DIR CITE RIOD 8317

GYROSE

REF RIOD 8316

IDEN - AN[illegible]NIO L. NEVES
AMERICAN EMBASSY - POL
APO 676
NEW YORK N.Y.

END OF MESSAG

ACTION INFO

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

REPORT NO. UFG-1759

FROM: JMWAVE

DATE OF REPORT: 25 October 1962

REPORTING OFFICER: Alice B. CAPONONG / Douglas C. NISLEY

REPORTS OFFICER: Wilma J. MARKWALTER/dml

APPROVING OFFICER: Andrew K. REUTEMAN

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

CYROSE

Source: Para 1. AMTUD-1 by letter dated 24 September from friend Melquia from Habana. Para 2. AMFAUNA-13 by SW message 11 dated 9 October, received by WAVE/Techs on 15 October. Legibility of message was somewhat impaired; the footnote stating that the vessels had discharged their cargo as signified by the (D) is confusing since the date of the message is earlier than the last expected date of arrival (19 Oct.)

Accompanying report are attached untranslated shipping documents entitled "Movement of Steamships in the Republic", for dates 5 through 16 August 1962, supplied by AMFAUNA-1, received 18 October 1962.

OFFICIAL ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY:

Attachment: H/W
Shipping Documents
4 - Headquarters w/mat & atts
1 - OO/C
1 - File

EXTRA-AGENCY:

COUNTRY:

NO. OF ENCLOSURES:

NO. PAGES: 2

SUBJECT:

REFERENCES:

PADA:

APPR:

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DOI:

FORM 1467

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	UFG-1759
SUBJECT	Soviet Merchant Vessels in Cuban Ports	DATE OF REPORT	25 October 1962
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	1 September - 19 October 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Cuba (24 September - 16 October 1962)		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Para 1: Leading official (C) in an anti-Castro group, from a Habana resident. Para 2: Cuban businessman (F). Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. From 1 to 10 September the following Soviet merchant vessels, transporting war materiel, arrived at the port of Isabela de Sagua:

KHIRUG VISHNEVSKY	9,600 tons
BELORETSK	8,700 tons
MICHURINSK	7,532 tons
VOLGOLES	4,345 tons
DVINOGORSK	7,838 tons
USOLYE	4,500 tons

2. The following merchant vessels arrived at the ports listed on the dates indicated, with the following cargo:

Ship	Date	Port of Origin	Tons	Cargo	
MARKX	2 Oct.	Habana	424	General Cargo	(D)
PAMIT	3 Oct.	Habana	446	Cattle also	(D)
			1,094	General Cargo	(D)
ARKHANGELSK	3 Oct.	Habana	226	Trucks	(D)
REINHOLT	3 Oct.	Habana	3,400	Gral	(D)
MATOUBA	3 Oct.	HABANA	957	Potatoes	(D)

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

MATOUKA	ID	ID	158	Grease	(D)
USOLYE	3 Oct.	Matanzas	5,000	Cement	(D)

TANKERS DUE TO ARRIVE FROM THE BLACK SEA

LISICHANSK	3 Oct.	Habana	231,000 (barrels)	Petroleum	(D)
DRUZHBA	8 Oct.	Habana	269,000 (barrels)	Petroleum	(D)
UKRAINY	9 Oct.	Habana	21,000 (barrels) also,	Petroleum	(D)
			9,500 (barrels) also,	Oil	(D)
			31,600 (barrels)	Gasoline	(D)
OCEAN EXPLORER	14 Oct.	Habana	170,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)
BAUSKA	10 Oct.	Habana	Cargo unknown		
LONDON PRESTIGE	14 Oct.	Santaigo de Cuba	171,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)
LENKORAN	7 Oct.	Habana	234,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)
ALDEBARAN	5 Oct.	Santiago de Cuba	143,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)

NOTE:

(D) Indicates that cargo was disembarked (unloaded).

DOMINGO [illegible]

HABANA	[illegible]	1090	5	1559	7479	--	Gral. D
NICARO	APOLLON	1073	2	1130	1400	--	nickel C

HABANA	REDESTOS	1075	3	0035	535 [illegible]	7	Gral. D
HABANA	[illegible]	1050	5	1[illegible]	[illegible]	--	arroz D
HABANA	ANNINCA	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Superf.	Gral. D
HABANA	D. SEGUANDA	2105	3	2005	[illegible]	--	Ferg. C
HABANA	FUNDADOR	13[illegible]	3	2595	[illegible]	--	Fert. C

SANTIAGO	O[illegible]	[illegible]o.	5	[illegible]	--	café C
HABANA	[illegible]		6	[illegible]	--	Gral. D
CIENFUEGOS	[illegible]		7	7097	--	Gral. D
HABANA	[illegible]		7	[illegible]37	--	Gral. D
HABANA	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
HABANA	[illegible]		9	[illegible]	--	Gral. D
HABANA	CH[illegible]		9	[illegible]	--	Gral. D
SANTIAGO	CARLA		9	[illegible]	--	arroz D
NICARO	BAHIA NIPE		11	240	--	nickel C
HABANA	HABANA		13	2000	--	Gral. D
HABANA	OLE[illegible]		1[illegible]	[illegible] hierro 800 conserv 500 arroz 534 Gral.		D

Lunes [illegible]

[illegible] Otros Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

Cienfuegos [illegible] 1029 4 [illegible]   51,000 Brrls. Gal.Motor
S. de Cuba [illegible] 1034 5 [illegible]   100,000 " de P. Crudo
S. de Cuba ALDEBARAN 1042   148,000 " " " "

Habana [illegible] 10[illegible] Ago.10   240,000 Brrls. P. Crudo
Habana O. PIONEER 1015 Ago. 6   174,000 " " "
Nicaro VLADIMIR 1069 Ago. 11   [illegible],000 " " F. Oil
[illegible] 10[illegible] Ago. 1[illegible]   122,000 " " P. Crudo
[illegible]   [illegible] " " " "
FRUNZE 1070
L. SPIREP 10[illegible]

(Cargar)...Antilla THOMSON 1029   1,600,000 Glns. de Miel
Nuevitas " "   1,900,000 " " "
I.de Sagua JACOB 105[illegible]   [illegible],400,000 " " "
Nuevitas " "   [illegible]00,000 " " "

[illegible]

HABANA	[illegible] 7 0?45	737 D [illegible]	--	Gral.	D
HABANA	[illegible] 7 0?32	892	--	pulpa rayón	D
HABANA	[illegible] 2637	422 2500	--	ajo cebolla	D
CIENFUEGOS	[illegible] Ago. 8	7097	--	arroz	D
HABANA	[illegible] Ago. [illegible]	[illegible]	--	Gral.	D
HABANA	CABO [illegible] "	[illegible]	--	mante-quilla	D
HABANA	[illegible]				
SANTIAGO	[illegible] "	[illegible]	--	arroz	D
HABANA	[illegible]	[illegible]	--	Gral.	D
HABANA	[illegible]	[illegible]	--	Gral.	D
NICARO	BAHIA [illegible] Ago 13	245	--	nickel	D
HABANA	[illegible]	[illegible]	--	Gral.	D
HABANA	SANTA [illegible] " 13	5774	--	Gral.	D
HABANA	[illegible] " 13	245	--	ganado	D

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

S. de Cuba AIBAMAR 1048-2 0730 140,000 Brrls. P. Crudo

S. de Cuba [illegible] 1034-5 0700 100,000 " " "

Cienfuegos KRASNOVODSK 1029 S 1430 53,000 Brrls. C. Motor

Nuevitas JACOB 1058 Ago. 7 0730 hrs. 700,000 [illegible] Mieles

" Antilla THORSON 1019 [illegible],000 " "
" Nuevitas " " [illegible],500,000 " "

Habana BAUSKA 1099 Ago. [illegible] 122,000 Brrls. P. Crudo

Antilla VLADIMIR 1069 Ago. [illegible] 49,000 " " Oil
551,500 [illegible]s. Amoniaco Liq.

L. SPIRIT 1075 Ago. 13

FRUHE [illegible] " "

Habana [illegible] Ago. [illegible] 240,000 Brrls. de P. Crudo

S. de Cuba VASILINE 1097 Ago. [illegible] 0000 hr. 124,000 " " " "

Habana [illegible] 1015 174,000 " " "

Cesión de Tuques Tanques Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol.

	Habana	[illegible]	[illegible]		75,000 Brls. C. Oil
(Carga...)	Nuevitas	JAJCE	[illegible]		300,000 Gls. de Mieles
	S. de Cuba	[illegible]	[illegible]		100,000 Brls. de P. Crudo
(...arga)...	Antilla	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible],300,000 Gls. de Mieles
	Nuevitas	"			1,900,000 " " "
	S. de Cuba	VASSILEKA	[illegible]	Ago. 11	124,000 Brls. de P. Crudo
	Habana	[illegible]	[illegible]	" 16	237,000 " " " "
	Habana	[illegible]	[illegible]	" 16	122,000 " " " "
	Nicaro	VLADIMIR	[illegible]	" 11	49,000 " " F. Oil
					351,500 Kgs. de Amoniaco Liq.
	Habana	O. PIONEER	[illegible]	" [illegible]	274,000 Brls. de P. Crudo
	Habana	LUGANSK	[illegible]	" 11	240,000 " " " "
		FRUNZE	[illegible]		

Lunes 8 13 62

Sección de Buques Tanques, Petroleo, Mieles y Alcohol

	Habana	LUGANSK	11	240,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
	S. de Cuba	VASSILIKI	11	124,000 " " "
(Cabotaje)	Nuevitas	KRASNOVODSK	19	56,330.28 Brrs de Gas Oil Carga tomada en la Habana
	Nicaro	VLADIMIR	11	49,000 Brrs de Fuel Oil 551,500 Kls Amoniaco
(Cabotaje)	Cienfuegos	KRASNOVODSK	14/8/62	20,000 Brrls de Gas Oil Carga tomada en la Habana
		L. SPIRIT		
	Habana	MIR	18/8/62	267,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
	Nuevitas Habana	CHERNOVCI "	18/8/62	36,000 Brrls de [illegible]
		G. GARIBALDI	22/8/62	
	S. de Cuba	TRUD	22/8/62	
	Habana	BAUSKA	16/8/62	122,000 Brrls Petróleo Crud

- -

(Cargar)	Antilla	SHORSOY	1,600.000 Glns de Mieles
"	Nuevitas	"	1,100.000 " "
			800,000 " "

Lunes 8.13 62

Sección Carga General

Matanzas	TROLLEHOLM	8	[illegible]	rayón	D
Habana	[illegible]	10	8956	Gral	D
Santiago	[illegible]	9	8500	arroz	D
Habana	OLBRATT	12	1800 Hierro, 800 Conservas 500 arroz, 531 Gral		D
Habana	CAMAGUEY	13	245	Ganado y Correo	D
Habana	[illegible]	11	2000	Gral	D
Habana	GOLFO DI NAPOLI	12	10160	Cemento	D
Santiago	KORDUM	11	462	café	C
Habana	OLGA	10	10,161	Gral	D
Habana	LUBEN KARAVELOV	12	5,754	Gral	D
Habana	CHILEAN REEFER	13	1,731	Gral	D
Habana	SAINT JAMES	13	5,083	papel	D
Habana	GLORIA	14	10201	Gral	D
[illegible]	[illegible]	14	4778	Gral	D
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Gral	D
Habana	BUCCANERO	14	2000	papas	D
Habana	HELGA WITT	14	5000	Superfosfato	D
Habana	ATLANTIC GLADIATOR	15	12915	Sulfato	D
Habana	BIRTE OLDENDORFF	16	5300	Gral	D
Habana	ROTTE	17	11425	arroz	D

Martes 8-14-62

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

(Cargar)	S de Cuba	N. [illegible]ICO	18/8/62			Mieles
"	Cienfuegos	" "				"
	Nuevitas	[illegible]	18/8/62	36,000	B[illegible]s	de Gasolina
	Habana			19,300	"	" Aceite de Aviación
				9,606	"	" " Vapor
	S de Cuba	[illegible]		54,000	"	" P. Crudo
	Matanzas	"				Amoniaco
	Habana	MIR	18/8/62	267,000	"	" P. Crudo
	Habana	G.GARIBALDI		209,000	"	"
	S. de Cuba	TRUD		162,000	"	"
	Habana	BAUSKA		122,000	"	"
	S. De Cuba	L. SPIRIT	23/8/62	110,000	"	"

Jueves 6 16 62

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

Cienfuegos KRASSVODOSK 15 20,00 Brls de Gas-Oil

(Cargar) I. de Sagua CHERNOVCI 29 7,000.000 Ltrs. Alcohol

****

S. De Cuba [illegible] Mieles
Cienfuegos "

Antillas

- -

Habana	BAUSKA	22	122,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
Habana	MIR	18	267,000 " "
Habana	G. GARIBALDI	22	209,000 " "
Habana	PEKIN	22	196,000 " "
S. de Cuba	TRUD	22	162,000 " "
S. de Cuba	M. SPIRIT	23	110,000 " "
Habana	RABARUSKAYA (SU)	28	78,000 " "
S. de Cuba	FRUNZE	29	54,000 " "
Guantánamo	"		546 Tons de Amoniaco
Habana	CHERNOVCE	20	19,300 Brrs Aceite Aviación 9,606 " " Vapor
Nuevitas	"	20	36,000 " Gasolina

Jueves 6 16 62

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

	Cienfuegos	KRASNOVODOSK	15	20,00 ~~Brrls de~~ Gas-Oil
(Cargar)	I. de Sagua	CHERNOVCI	29	7,000.000 Ltrs. Alcohol

****

S. De Cuba Cienfuegos	[illegible]RINELLA D. [illegible] "	19	Mieles "
Antilla Nuevitas	THORSOY "	16	" "
Habana	BAUSKA	22	122,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
Habana	MIR	18	267,000 " "
Habana	G. GARIBALDI	22	209,000 " "
Habana	PEKIN	22	196,000 " "
S. de Cuba	TRUD	22	162,000 " "
S. de Cuba	L. SPIRIT	23	110,000 " "
Habana	RABANUSKAYA (NE)	28	
S. de Cuba Guantánamo	[illegible] "	29	54,000 " " 546 Tons de Amoniaco
Habana	CHERNOVCE	20	19,300 Brrs Aceite Aviació 9,606 " " Vapor
Nuevitas	"	20	36,000 " Gasolina

6537

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 8 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1930 9 DEC/LWS)

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, CI/[illegible], WH 7, CC 8, VR

SECRET [illegible]

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7033 9 DEC 63 IN 78536

TYPIC COMMO

1. REQUEST PRITY POA TO INCLUDE COMMO TRAINING FOR MARIA (VALDES) HERNANDEZ, SINGLE, D/O LUCAS AND JULIA, DPOB 22 JULY 29, MATANZAS, RESIDING MAZON NUMBER 163 HAVANA.

2. (VALDES) EMPLOYED AS STATISTICIAN MINISTRY HEALTH AND WELFARE HAVANA. SHE SCHEDULED RETURN CUBA CA 23 DEC FROM MEXI WHERE RECENTLY COMPLETED LENGTHY STUDIES PROGRAM UNDER AUSPICES WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.

3. NO MEXI TRACES. INDEX.

SECRET

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (WE AND SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT [illegible] 13 DEC 63)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, [illegible]

S E C R E T [illegible]

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7373

RYBAT TYPIC KEYWAY VASLOUCH

REF MEXI 7359 [illegible]

DIR 85855

DIR 85858

C/S COMMENT: [illegible] C/S COMMENT: VASLOUCH-2 CALL STATION [illegible] DIFFICULTY WITH MEXICAN CUSTOMS ON BAGGAGE.

13 Dec 63 IN 80239

1. STATION OFFICER ACCOMPANIED VASLOUCH-2 AGAIN TO AIRPORT MORNING 13 DEC. AFTER ROUTINE DELAY ADMITTED TO AIR CARGO AREA. DOCTOR'S CASE INSPECTED. THIS TIME TWO BOTTOM STUDS ONLY WERE MISSING. VASLOUCH-2 HAD INSPECTED DAY PREVIOUSLY AND FOUND THREE OF FOUR MISSING. NOTE THAT FIRST INSPECTION WAS IN ANOTHER BUILDING. CONSEQUENTLY BETWEEN TIME VASLOUCH-2 SAW BAG 12 DEC AND 1030 MORNING SOMEONE HAD INSERTED ONE MISSING STUD-GOOD. VASLOUCH-2 SAYS SHE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN SHE NOT MISTAKEN CONCERNING ABOVE.

2. DOCTOR'S BAG AND OTHER FIVE PIECES REMOVED FROM CARGO AREA BUT WERE NOT PASSED BY BUILDING DOOR INSPECTOR WHO INSISTED ON OPENING ALL SIX PIECES. VASLOUCH-2 PROTESTED. CHARGE HER LOCAL EMBASSY CONTACTED AND HE SPOKE ON TELEPHONE TO CUSTOMS OFFICIAL TO NO AVAIL. VASLOUCH-2 THEN SAW CHIEF AIRPORT CUSTOMS WHO REITERATED FACT THAT PARCELS WOULD BE INSPECTED

SECRET

Copy No.

UNLESS LOCAL EMBASSY OBTAINED FREE ENTRY. STATED REASON WAS BAGGAGE ARRIVED "DESTINATION MEXICO" RATHER THAN "IN TRANSIT". CUSTOMS CHIEF REFUSED RECONSIDER EVEN AFTER OFFER OF BRIBE BY VAELOUCH-2.

3. BY THIS TIME PRACTICALLY EVERY CARGO AND CUSTOMS OFFICIAL AIRPORT AWARE OF SITUATION AND OF ASSISTANCE BEING GIVEN VASLOUCH-2 BY STATION OFFICER WHOSE KUBARK FACE WAS GROWING LESS AND LESS FINNISH.

4. PARCELS WERE RETURNED AIR CARGO STORAGE AREA. ALL INCLUDING DOCTOR'S BAG WERE FIRMLY BANDED. VASLOUCH-2 THEN TURNED OVER PAPERS TO LOCAL EMBASSY WHICH WILL OBTAIN FREE ENTRY AND KEEP ALL PARCELS MEXI. VASLOUCH-1 WILL TRAVEL MEXI SOON AFTER 1 JAN TO RECOVER THEM. CONSEQUENTLY STATION WILL NOT HAVE ACCESS TO DOCTOR'S BAG UNTIL THAT DATE.

5. VASLOUCH-2 TALKED TO VASLOUCH-1 AFTERNOON 12 DEC. LATTER INSISTED SHE RETURN PERUVIAN FLIGHT 13 DEC AS HER EMPLOYERS WERE PROTESTING TARDY ARRIVAL. THIS COMBINED WITH VASLOUCH-2 FEAR THAT DOCTOR'S BAG HAS BEEN TAMPERED WITH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE PERSUADE HER REMAIN MEXI LONGER. SHE PLANS DEPART 13 DEC IF FLIGHT LEAVES. IT NOW CONFIRMED AS DELAYED AND MAY NOT DEPART UNTIL 14 DEC.

6. LAST FIRM STATION CONTACT WITH VASLOUCH-2 IS AT 1500 LOCAL 13 DECEMBER. CANNOT PROMISE ANY INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE FROM HQS WILL REACH HER VIA STATION AFTER THAT HOUR.

7. REGRET THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND FACT THAT RS-4B WILL BE HELD (IF IT STILL IN DOCTOR'S CASE) FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES FELT FURTHER STATION INVOLVEMENT AND MORE PRECIPITOUS ACTION CONSTITUTED UNACCEPTABLE SECURITY RISK.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WE 6

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, O/OA, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 142235Z

DIR INFO STOC CITE MEXI 7334

IN 80448

KEYWAY PBRUMEN TICRYSTAL

REF DIR 84498 *

LETTERS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO: ANGEL GUADALUPE RIVERA, HAMBURGO 72, DEPT. 302, MEXICO, D.F.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED MEXI PROVIDE LETTER DROP FOR TICRYSTAL-1.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, VR

SECRET 171636Z

PRIORITY TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7416 17Dec63 IN 82479

REF DIR 89728

1. AT 16 DEC MTG SVLUCK/1 SAID WIFE WROTE SHE ARRIVING MERIDA 23 DEC BY AIR AND WILL COME ON MEXI CITY SPEND XMAS WITH HIM. HE BELIEVES SHE BRINGING CHILDREN AND WANTS GO MERIDA MEET HER.

2. S/1 REQUESTED 150 DOLLARS IN VIEW WIFE'S VISIT AND TO PURCHASE SANTA CLAUS FOR CHILDREN. ALSO MENTIONED XMAS BONUS BUT DID NOT PRESS POINT.

3. REQUEST TEGU DECISION ON AMOUNT BE GIVEN S/1. ALL PAYMENTS HERE WILL BE MADE IN PESOS.

4. S/1 ASSIGNED BY PARTY LEADERS HERE LIVE ALONE IN HOME OF HELIODORINA GARCIA, PCM MEMBER, CALLE NO. 17, COLONIA MONTEZUMA. GARCIA IS DIRECTOR OF NEARBY SCHOOL WHERE FIVE PCM MEMBERS TEMPORARIL QUARTERED. S/1'S WIFE AND CHILDREN WILL LIVE WITH HIM AT ABOVE ADDRESS WHILE MEXI.

5. NEXT OP MTG WITH S/1 SCHEDULED 20 DEC.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: REQUESTED INFO ON PRESENT STATUS SVLUCK 1 IN MEXICO AND OUTLOOK FOR NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

SECRET

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MEXI MANILA HONG KONG

MEXI 00781

[illegible] CALIFORNIA 1923, [illegible] 1950-55 [illegible] 1956-62
NO [illegible] LIAISON CHECKS PROVIDE NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST [illegible]
END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SAME BELOW

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WE 4, NE 9, FE 6, WH 7, VR

INFO

[illegible] STOC [illegible] ROME
[illegible] VIEN CHVA BERN ATHE
[illegible] TOKY ANKA TEHR
[illegible] KARI MEXI BUEN MONT
[illegible]
LOND BRUS HAGU [illegible]
100

REF: DIR [illegible]

1. FOLLOWING POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS [illegible] CURRENT [illegible] ECONOMIC [illegible]. AS NOTED REF, THESE INTENDED AS OPERATIONAL AID FOR ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION SOVIETS, AND AS MEANS SOW DOUBT OF REGIMES ABILITY DEAL WITH [illegible]. ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT REPORT ALL [illegible] BUT SELECT THOSE APPROPRIATE FOR OWN USE. REPORT RESULTS CONTACTS VIA OPS CHANNELS. HQS WILL SCREEN FOR VALUE [illegible].

2. WESTERN PRESS (REUTERS VIENNA 16 NOV) REPORTED STRIKE BY WORKERS KRIVOI ROG. REASONS WERE BREAD SHORTAGE AND DEMAND FOR WAGE INCREASES [illegible] FOOD COSTS. SINCE NO ANNOUNCEMENTS FOOD PRICE INCREASES TO DATE, ARE THEY BEING RAISED SECRETLY? WHAT ITEMS AFFECTED? BREAD PRICES BEING INCREASED? HOW MUCH? AS MUCH AS THIRTY PERCENT [illegible] PRICES LAST YEAR? IF PRICES BEING RAISED, [illegible] FAILURE [illegible] GOVERNMENT [illegible] RIOTS SUCH AS LAST YEAR

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CITE DIR 91660

NOVOCHERKASSK WHEN MEAT AND MILK PRICES INCREASED?

3. KHRUSHCHEV IN PLENUM SPEECH SAID GRAIN CROP TWENTY PERCENT BELOW LAST YEAR BUT MEAT SUPPLIES UP. IS LATTER RESULT EXTENSIVE [illegible] SLAUGHTERING LIVESTOCK IN VIEW SEVERE FODDER SHORTAGE. KHRUSHCHEV ALSO SAID MILK PRODUCTION DOWN THIS YEAR. DOES THIS INDICATE EVEN MILK COWS BEING SLAUGHTERED DUE FODDER SHORTAGE?

4. IF FODDER IN SUCH SHORT SUPPLY WIDESPREAD SLAUGHTERING NECESSARY, WILL SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOLLOW HUNGARY EXAMPLE AND BUY FEED GRAINS ABROAD, IN ADDITION WHEAT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION?

5. KHRUSHCHEV SAID SOVIET CITIZENS STARVED 1947 WHILE GRAIN BEING EXPORTED, PRESUMABLY TO PAY FOR IMPORTS MACHINERY AND OTHER CAPITAL GOODS. COULD SITUATION BECOME THAT SERIOUS THIS YEAR? HAS OR WILL SOVIET GOVERNMENT PUT MORATORIUM ON ALL FOOD SHIPMENTS ABROAD, OR WILL IT CONTINUE SHIP FOOD EASTERN EUROPE AND CUBA AS IN PAST YEARS WHETHER HARVEST GOOD OR BAD?

6. WESTERN PRESS (REUTERS VIENNA 10 NOV) REPORTED SOVIET DOCKWORKERS ODESSA REFUSED LOAD BUTTER FOR CUBA. HAVE SUCH SHIPMENTS BEEN STOPPED? KHRUSHCHEV SAID SUGAR SUPPLIES DOWN THIS YEAR IN USSR. SINCE USSR NORMALLY BUYS CUBAN

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

PAGE THREE

CITE DIR 91660

[illegible] WILL [illegible] AS CLAIMED CONTINUE FOOD SHIPMENTS CUBA IN EXCHANGE REGARDLESS [illegible] AT HOME? [illegible] FOOD USSR HAS SENT FOOD PRODUCING EQUIPMENT [illegible] CUBA. WILL THESE SHIPMENTS CONTINUE OR WILL GOODS BE DIVERTED [illegible] NEW AGRICULTURAL EFFORT?

[illegible] CHEMICAL PROGRAM WILL BE TREMENDOUS DRAIN ON SOVIET ECONOMY, [illegible] SOVIET MILITARY POWER OR SLACKENING ECONOMIC GROWTH. THEREFORE WILL NOT CONSUMPTION SECTOR BEAR BRUNT THIS INVESTMENT? SINCE INVESTMENT PROGRAM (FERTILIZER, INSECTICIDES, HERBICIDES) LARGELY [illegible] FOOD AND FIBER PRODUCTION, AND [illegible] TALKED OF INCREASING FOOD AND CLOTHING PRODUCTION THROUGH CHEMICAL PROGRAM, WILL NOT MUCH OF BURDEN INVESTMENT FALL ON HOUSING, ONLY [illegible] CONSUMPTION SECTOR REMAINING? WILL NOT HOUSING CONSTRUCTION BE CUT SHARPLY OR ALMOST HALTED? BESIDES WILL NOT HOUSING PROBLEM BE INTENSIFIED BY INFLUX WORKERS TO MAN NEW CHEMICAL FACTORIES, MANY OF WHICH [illegible] OF AREAS WHERE LITTLE HOUSING NOW AVAILABLE?

6. IS KHRUSHCHEV DEMAND FOR CREDIT FROM WEST TO FINANCE INVESTMENT PROGRAM INDICATION SOVIET GOLD RESERVES AT MINIMUM LEVELS? IS THERE EFFORT IMPROVE PRESENT MINING METHODS OR FIND NEW GOLD DEPOSITS TO PAY FOR MASSIVE IMPORTS?

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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S-E-C-R-E-T

PAGE FOUR

CITE DIR 97660

9. IF USSR RECEIVES LONG TERM CREDITS FROM WEST FOR CHEMICAL [illegible] AND [illegible], WHAT MEASURES BE TAKEN PAY BACK LOANS? WILL [illegible] BE SOUGHT, [illegible] OTHER SOLUTION AT HAND?

10. PRIVATE PLOTS OF FARM WORKERS MOST PRODUCTIVE PART SOVIET AGRICULTURE. [illegible] ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT THEREIN WOULD RESULT LARGEST GAIN FOOD OUTPUT. WILL [illegible] FERTILIZER PRODUCED BE SOLD PEASANTS FOR USE ON PLOTS?

11. SOVIET GOVERNMENT MUST REALIZE FROM NEP PERIOD AND WARTIME EXPERIENCE, FROM EXAMPLE OF [illegible] PRIVATE PLOTS SINCE 1930s THAT GIVING LAND TO PEASANTS WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY [illegible] ENOUGH FOOD FOR SOVIET POPULATION. [illegible] POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT IS NOT ANOTHER REASON THIS NOT BEING DONE FEAR OF [illegible] [illegible] SUCH AS [illegible] DURING NEP PERIOD. [illegible] WOULD RESULT FROM OVERPRODUCTION ON FARMS, FOR WHICH NO CONSUMERS GOODS TO EXCHANGE? IS [illegible] AGRICULTURE AND POOR PEASANTRY ONE WAY HOLD DOWN DEMAND FOR CONSUMERS [illegible], WHICH [illegible], AND TO CONCENTRATE ON MILITARY AND [illegible] PRODUCTION WITHOUT EXCESSIVE INFLATIONARY [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] AGRICULTURE, WHILE SOVIET GOVERNMENT REALLY WANT PROSPEROUS PEASANTRY, [illegible] MILITARY [illegible], FOREIGN AMBITIONS, ECONOMIC GROWTH?

[illegible] AT [illegible] TEACHERS AND DOCTORS TOO LOW AND MANY

S-E-C-R-E-T

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NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

TO

FROM DIRECTOR

PAGE FIVE

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

INFO

CITE DIR 91660

[illegible] INCREASED. AGRICULTURAL WORKERS LOWEST PAID IN SOVIET UNION. DOES NOT GOVERNMENT ALSO BELIEVE THEIR INCOME TOO LOW AND MUST BE INCREASED?

13. CHEMICAL PROGRAM LATEST IN LONG SERIES PANACEAS, INCLUDING NEW LANDS, [illegible] PLAN TO CATCH UP TO U. S. IN MEAT AND MILK OUTPUT, FALLOW LAND PLOW UP PROGRAM AND OTHERS, ALL OF WHICH FAILED. EACH PROMISED ASSURED ABUNDANCE IN FUTURE. WILL SOVIET PEOPLE BE WILLING WAIT AGAIN, THIS TIME TILL 1970, WHILE LATEST PANACEA TESTED, OR THEIR PATIENCE AND HOPE EXHAUSTED? DO THEY BELIEVE GOVERNMENT SERIOUS IN PUTTING FORTH PROGRAM, OR THEY THINK IT JUST ANOTHER ATTEMPT BY REGIME GAIN TIME IN HOPE PROBLEM SOMEHOW DISAPPEAR?

14. MUCH OF SOVIET UNION TOO DRY FOR EFFECTIVE FERTILIZER UTILIZATION, ESPECIALLY GRAIN [illegible]AS. WILL CONCOMITANT INVESTMENT IRRIGATION BE MADE SO FERTILIZER, IF AND WHEN PRODUCED, BE EFFECTIVELY USED? WHERE WILL INVESTMENT FUNDS FOR THIS COME FROM?

15. IN PLENUM SPEECH KHRUSHCHEV ONCE MORE TURNED TO LYSENKO AS EXAMPLE SCIENTIFIC PRACTITIONER. DOES THIS MEAN LYSENKO AND HIS THEORIES, COMPLETELY DISCREDITED BY AGRICULTURAL SCIENTISTS EVERYWHERE OUTSIDE BLOC, CONTINUE HAVE

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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S-E-C-R-E-T

PAGE SIX

GREAT INFLUENCE IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE EVEN IN TIME OF CRISIS?

[illegible] SHOULD BE [illegible] IN THOSE [illegible] LINE-[illegible] MAKES AT [illegible], PECULIAR [illegible].

END OF MESSAGE

IN DRAFT:

(CSR/CI - Mr. [illegible] Bailey
(CSR/CS - Mr. James Dorson
(CSR/C3 - Mr. High Montgomery
(SR/RR - Mr. A. S. Vaivada
(IN - Mr. George Allman
(PS - Mr. Orvin Magill
(UT - Mr. Paul F. Paxton
(VE - Mr. [illegible] [illegible]
(EE - Mr. Walter L. O'Brien
• [illegible]/PROF [illegible] [illegible]

CSR/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

EE 6

CI/CA, CCS 3, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 202235Z

CITE MEXI 7479

OXASSAY LPSHRINX

REF: MEXI 7400 (IN 85135)

IDEN IS MR. GEORGE STEERS.

S E C R E T

20 [illegible] 85191

SECRET

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: [illegible]

ACTION: [illegible]

INFO: [illegible]

TDCS

S E C R E T 210Ø3ØZ DEC 21 Ø14 Z 63 IN 85247

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI [illegible]

INTEL TYPIC [illegible]

REF DIR [illegible]

SUPDATA SOURCE [illegible] FROM ITALINA AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS TO CUBA, CUBAN MERCHANTS AND SUGAR EXPERTS

FILED 21/ØØ35Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM-8185 SUBJECT EFFORTS OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO INITIATE COMMERCIAL BARTER WITH WEST EUROPEAN CONTRIES DOI DEC 63 PADA MEXICO MEXICO CITY 2Ø DEC 63 APPR 3 SOURCE WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESSMAN WHO TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO CUBA WHERE HIS COMPANY MAINTAINS COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TO PORT [illegible] HAS BEEN MADE [illegible] PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING INSTR.

DATE DISTRIBUTED

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

COUNTRY

REPORT NO. TDCS

SUBJECT

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCES

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS RESULTING FROM EXPROPRIATIONS MADE FROM CERTAIN WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESS INTERESTS. THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE IS TRYING TO INTEREST WEST GERMANY, ITALY AND FRANCE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES SO THAT A FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE WILL PREVAIL AT THE TIME OF THE COMPLETION OF THE SUGAR CROP HARVEST, IN MARCH 1964, WHEN THE COMMODITY IS NORMALLY MARKETED. NEGOTIATIONS FOR REPARATIONS ARE TAKING FORM IN CUBAN OFFERS TO SELL TOBACCO AT DISCOUNT PRICES.

2. IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO OBTAIN

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FERTILIZER, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS IN EXCHANGE FOR SUGAR ON A STRAIGHT BARTER DEAL. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTS A BIGGER CROP IN 1964 WHICH, IF SOLD AT THE AVERAGE WORLD PRICE OF 8 CENT A POUND (US CURRENCY), SHOULD PRODUCE ABOUT 850 MILLION DOLLARS (US) IN CREDITS.

3. FIELD COMMENT. SOURCE SAID THAT EXAMINATION OF THE CROP CONFIRMS THAT IT IS ONE OF THE BEST CUBA HAS HAD IN YEARS.

4. FIELD DISSEM STATE ECON CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: Mr. Weinwright:swk
UNIT: WH/SA/EOB
EXT: 6153
DATE: 17 April 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6

17 APR 64 18 08z

TO: GENEVA BERN MADRID ROME PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 3, VR

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO GNVA INFO BERN MADR ROME PARI CITE DIR 15094

DESENSITIZED PBRUMEN AMWHIP

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AMWHIP-1 PROCEED GNVA.

REF: GNVA 6486 (IN 62186) (not sent ROME PARI)*

1. RE PARA 2 REF, AMWHIP/1 (IDEN) UNABLE LEAVE NEW YORK PRIOR 24-25 APRIL. HAS MINIMUM THREE DAY PRTY KUBARK BUSINESS PARIS. WILL TRY EXPEDITE BUT DOUBT AMWHIP/1 AVAILABLE GNVA BEFORE 30 APRIL. WOULD HOPE THEREFORE ROME CAN ASK AMWHIP/2 BE AVAILABLE FOR ASSISTANCE, PRIOR A/1 ARRIVAL.

2. FOR PARIS. WILL COMMENT SUBSEQUENT TRAFFIC RE ARRIVAL AND USE AMWHIP/1 FOR PARIS BUSINESS RE CARRILLO AND ROBRENO.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SA/EOB [signature]
WE/5/C R C Loeb
WE/3 [signature]
WE/4 [signature]
EE/SA/S [signature]
WH/SA/SO/NS [signature]

[signature]
~~BRONSON TWEEDY~~
C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[signature]
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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201-252234

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: Mr. Wainwright:swk
UNIT: WH/SA/EOB
EXT: 6153
DATE: 17 April 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO: GENEVA BERN MADRID ROME PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 3, VR

17 Apr 64 18 08z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

☒ ROUTINE

TO GNVA INFO BERN MADR ROME PARI CITE DIR

DESENSITIZED PBRUMEN AMWHIP 15093

REF: DIR 15094 *

IDEN IS CARLOS (TEPEDINO) GONZALEZ, AGE 38 (LOOKS 45), 5'8", 170 LBS. MOUSTACHE, ROUND, FULL, KIND-LOOKING FACE, THINNING, GRAYING BLACK HAIR COMBED STRAIGHTE BACK, BOW-LEGGED.

END OF MESSAGE

* Cable Sec: PLEASE REF ATTACHED CABLE.

WH/SA/EOB [signature]
WE/5/C [signature]
WE/3 [signature]
WE/4 [signature]
EE/SA/S [signature]
WH/SA/SO/NS [signature]

BRONSON TWEEDY
DC/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

17-4

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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201-252234

734

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 29 NOV 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

NOV 29 0152Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 26114

PRITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE PARI 4521 IN26114

GYROSE

RE PARI 4520 (IN 26113)

IDEN:

NORMAND POULIN

C/O U S EMBASSY

APO 230

NEW YORK, N Y

END OF MESSAGE

C/WE/3	C/IIO
DC/WE/3	PA
Reports	Labor
C/EYO	FCP
Liaison	Prop
3rd C...	Press
CE	Support

29 NOV 1962

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

2nd December, 1963

from Harrack
[illegible]
[illegible]

Dear J.

Subject: Jack RUBENSTEIN
Your RJ 2995 of Nov. 29, 63
and further to our tele com.
of Dec. 1st.

The only Jack RUBENSTEIN known to have arrived in ISRAEL during 1962 stated that he is a native of POLAND, born 1905 and a resident of NEW-YORK.

He arrived on May 17 and departed on June 7, accompanied by his wife Mimi.

K.

SECRET

21 NOV. 63

TO: MULTI - ADDRESSEE CABLE SEE BELOW

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 6

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE 4, WE 4, NE 4, FE 6, WH 7, (POUCH FRAN 9, BONN 5, BRLN 5, ... 5, ATHE 6, ALL OTHER STA'S 3)

ROUTINE

CITE DIR 85387

MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE

PBRUMEN ZRPRIMA

LOND PARI BRUS HAGU COPE STOC OSLO MADR

ROME

CABLE SEC: (PLS POUCH CABLE TO FOLLOWING:) (WRENCH POUCH)

FRAN FROB BONN HAMB BRLN MUNI VIEN ATHE

BERN GNVA CAIR BEIR TEHE TELA RIOD SAOP

MEXI MRID SAGO MONT BUEN CARA LAPA LIMA

QUIT GUAT SNTO HELS TOKY HONG WAVE BARC

HELS LISB MILA OTTA TRIE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG: D. FONIS:jd
UNIT: SAS/EOB
EXT: 5153
DATE: 21 NOV. 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-47

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

22 Nov 63 17 03z

TO: CERTAIN STATIONS AND BASES

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE INFO CITE DIR 85087

RBRUMEN ZRPRIMA

REF: DIR 22218

1. RECENTLY CONCLUDED HQS REVIEW OF ZRPRIMA PROGRAM SHOWS THAT KUBARK EFFORTS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ANY SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND CONTINUATION OF PROGRAM AS SUCH NO LONGER WARRANTED. MAIN REASON FOR KUBARK FAILURE IS THAT CUBAN TECHNICIAN RECRUITING PROGRAM HAS BEEN MISERABLE FAILURE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST FIDEL'S ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF 2000 TECHS FROM WESTERN EUROPE ALONE. THOUGH OUR FIGURES NOT COMPLETE, WE ESTIMATE PROBABLY LESS THAN FIFTY CANDIDATES HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL AND WE ABLE CONFIRM ABOUT TEN WHO HAVE ACTUALLY MADE IT TO THE ISLAND. KUBARK SUCCEEDED IN INSERTING ABOUT THIRTY RECRUITED TECHS INTO THE VARIOUS HIRING CHANNELS, BUT SO FAR ONLY TWO HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL FROM HAVA.

2. CUBAN FAILURE TO RECRUIT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS APPEARS DUE LARGELY TO RELUCTANCE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS PURSUE TECH RECRUITING MISSION AGGRESSIVELY, BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE IN HAVANA, FEAR OF INFILTRATION OF HOSTILE AGENTS

CONT...

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

INDEX
NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

PRIORITY
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

AND PROBABLE LOSS OF INTEREST IN THE PROGRAM ON PART OF CASTRO HIMSELF. THESE FACTORS WHICH EMERGE FROM OUR STUDY OF THE CUBAN PERFORMANCE ACCOUNT FOR LACK OF RESPONSE FROM EMBASSIES TO APPLICATIONS, LONG DELAY IN GETTING WORD BACK FROM HAVANA AND SMALL NUMBER OF TECHS ULTIMATELY HIRED. LONG TIME LAG BETWEEN INITIAL APPLICATION AND ULTIMATE APPROVAL FROM HAVA, WHICH RUNS SIX TO NINE MONTHS, HAS COST CUBANS NUMBER OF TECHS WHO WERE INITIALLY EAGER BUT SUBSEQUENTLY LOST INTEREST OR TOOK OTHER JOBS.

3. IN FACE OF FOREGOING WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE TO CONTINUE INTENSIVE SEARCH FOR ZRPRIMA CANDIDATES FOR INSERTION INTO CUBAN HIRING CHANNEL. WISH STRESS STATIONS WITH ACTIVE LEADS SHOULD STAY WITH THEM IN THE HOPE THEY MAY STILL BE HIRED, BUT CEASE EFFORTS TO GENERATE LEADS FROM SCRATCH. ON OTHER HAND, THERE ARE FAIR NUMBER NON BLOC TECHS IN CUBA AND IT LIKELY CUBANS WILL CONTINUE TO HIRE NEEDED TECHS ON LIMITED SELECTIVE BASIS AS THEY DID PRIOR TO ZRPRIMA PROGRAM. STATIONS THEREFORE ARE URGED TO CONTINUE [illegible] ALERT FOR SUCH OPPORTUNITIES AND TO EXPLOIT THEM IN SAME MANNER [illegible] ALL OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO PLACE RESIDENT AGENTS IN CUBA.

CONT...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

CABLE MESSAGE

SECRET

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT MOST PBRUMEN[3] OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECRUITING TECHS TEND TO RELY HEAVILY ON LOCAL CP STAMP OF APPROVAL OR OTHER STRONG INDICATION THAT CANDIDATE IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. LACKING THIS THEY MAY EITHER IGNORE THE APPLICATION OR REJECT IT.

4. RESPONSE OF MOST STATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING ZRPRIMA[1] HAS BEEN MOST GRATIFYING. WE PROVIDED CUBANS WITH GOOD NUMBER HIGHLY QUALIFIED ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS WHICH THEY FOR REASONS CITED UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ACCEPT. KUBARK[2] HAS MADE A RESPECTABLE EFFORT TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY AND FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS IS MERELY REFLECTION CUBAN CONFUSION AND INEPTITUDE WITH RESULTANT FAILURE ACHIEVE THEIR OWN GOALS.

5. DISCONTINUE USE ZRPRIMA[1] SLUG AND FILE 200-120-47.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Cable pre-dates CS files. Copy may be seen in CIA reference file.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

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TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE FOUR

TO INFO CITE 35387

SAS/EOB [signature]
SAS/EOB [signature]
WE/5 R C Loebe
C/WE Thomas F Thiele
AC/WE [signature]
C/WE/[illegible] [signature]
C/[illegible] W [signature]
C/FE [signature]

[signature] 1001

WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
C/WE

[illegible]

[signature]

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/CI

INFO: ..., WH/AN DUMMY, C/WH 2, D/DS 2, VR

ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

65974

KUDESK ZROCEAN

RE DIR-

IDEN A RUPEK DUDIN 201-83827.

IDEN B ARLETTE FRANCOISE HEZARIFEND ALIAS CARTIER BORN 2 MARCH 36 PARIS FRANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

(Please cross-ref to attached outgoing)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZROCEAN CABLES.

C/WH

C/WH/3

DC/CI

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/CI

INFO: ...

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 65975

KUDESK ZROCEAN

RE MEXI 7005 (IN 66032)

1. SUBJ IS PSEUD CALVIN E RAKERRAND (IDEN A) WHO HAS COOPERATED WITH ODENVY AND KUBARK IN CONTINUING INVESTIGATION BEGAN 1960 BASIS SURFACING IN EMIGRE CHANNELS BY KGB OF TOP SECRET ODYOKE DOCUMENT ACQUIRED THROUGH ESPIONAGE OP.

2. SUBJ CURRENTLY IN MEXI STUDYING SPANISH CONNECTION PLAN DEVELOP JOURNALIST EMPLOYMENT LATIN AMERICA. HAS WORKED AS EEX SCRIPT WRITER AND ANNOUNCER FOR VOA AND CURRENTLY DOING SOME SCRIPT WRITING ON PIECE WORK BASIS. BELIEVE WOMAN JOINING HIM MEXI IS MISTRESS(IDEN B)RATHER THAN WIFE WHO EMPLOYED NEW YORK CITY. NO DEROG.

3. REQUEST NO STATION ACTION. ODENVY WILL HAVE NO CONTACT MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZROCEAN CABLES.

(Ref is trace request on subject)

C/WH/3 DC/CI

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

L.G. MORRIS:jpm
WH/3/Mexico
5940
21 Oct 1963

S E C R E T

MEXICO CITY

TO PRIORITY MEXI

LILINK

REF DIR 77179

77180

1. IDEN A: ASH & COMPANY, 420 LEXINGTON AVE NEW YORK, N.Y.

2. IDEN B: OVERSEAS REALTY SURVEY ASSOCIATES, SEATTLE WASHINGTON (KUVEST NOTIONAL)

END OF MESSAGE

J.C. [illegible]
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible] WHITTEN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

JANET NIX[illegible]
SAS/EOB
S E C R E T/RYBAT
X
X
200-120-80

MADRID GENEVA ROME CASABLANCA RABAT FRANKFURT
HAMBURG BRUSSELS HAGUE LONDON MILAN OTTAWA PARIS
MEXICO CITY

C/SAS 5

DDP, ADDP, C/[illegible], C/[illegible] 2, C/TSD 3, C/AF 3, C/EE 3,
C/WE 2, C/W[illegible] 5, RF, VR

IMMEDIATE MADR INFO HAMB BRUS H[illegible] LOND CASB
(ROUTINE) [illegible] OTTA PARI MEXI

WAVE ROME

FRAN MILA

77347

RYBAT ZRWAGON T[illegible]

1. FOLLOWING IS FBIS TICKER ITEM FROM CASTRO'S 21 OCTOBER SPEECH: "CASTRO REVEALS THAT HIS SECURITY FORCES HAVE JUST DISCOVERED AN ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE OF THE CUBAN MERCHANT SHIP LAS VILLAS. CASTRO CLAIMS THAT THE CIA PLACED A BOMB ABOARD THE VESSEL IN GENOA, ITALY, BUT THAT IT WAS DEFECTIVE AND FAILED TO GO OFF. THE BOMB WAS FOUND, HE SAYS, WHEN THE SHIP WAS BEING UNLOADED."

2. KUBARK POLICY IS NO COMMENT AND COMPLETE DENIAL IF SPECIFICALLY ASKED.

END OF MESSAGE

WE/G West Park[illegible] by phone
WE/2 Jack Del[illegible]ney by phone
WE/BC/C [illegible] by phone
WE/4 Steve Munger by phone
WE/3 Mr. Ti[illegible] phone
WE/5 Vaughn Sherman by phone
WE/3 Mr. M[illegible] phone
WE/BC Joe Lynch by phone
[illegible] Arthur Maloney by phone
[illegible] Austin [illegible] by phone
AF/1 Mr. Charles Baker by phone

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RICHARD P. HAVES
C/WE/X

EDWARD A. [illegible]LLIUC
C/SAS/EOB

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
S E C R E T
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG: [illegible] MONGEL/AVH
UNIT: DC/WE/4/X
EXT: 5559
DATE: 3[illegible] SEPT 1963

S E C R E T

TO: MEXICO ROME WAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WE 2

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

1 OCT 63 [illegible] 53z

SIG CEN

X ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE

KAPOK KEYWAY PERUMEN

72346

REF: ROME C534 (IN 28856)* (NOT SENT MEXI)

1. DESIGNET (IDEN A), FORMER LONG TERM RESIDENT PERUMEN, WILL RETURN PERUMEN ON BUSINESS TRIP FOR IDEN B. LATTER IS FIRM HE REPRESENTED ALONG WITH OTHERS. PLANS DEPART ITALY 6 OCT TO VISIT FRIENDS SUISSE THEN PROCEEDING MADRID TO TAKE IBERIA FLIGHT DIRECT PERUMEN 11 OCT HAS ITAL SERVICE PASSPORT. WILL ATTEMPT EXIT PERUMEN APPROX TWO WEEKS AFTER ARRIVAL FOR BRIEF TRIP MEXI FOR DEBRIEFING BRIEFING BY KUBARKER. HOPES RETURN PERUMEN FOR TWO OR THREE MONTHS MORE.

2. REQ MEXI CABLE ROME CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PASSAGE DESIGNET PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. HQS FORWARDING MEXI FULL DETAILS THIS OP.

END OF MESSAGE

* DESIGNET will travel PERUMEN; requests contact Mexico City for brief exit.

WE/5 [signature]
SAS/EOB [signature]
SAS/MOB [signature]
C/WH/3 [signature]

[signature] [signature] C/WE/ [signature]

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ORIG: STEPHEN I. MUNGER/AVH
UNIT: DC/WE/4/X
EXT: 5559
DATE: 30 SEPT 1963

SECRET

TO: MEXICO ROME WAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WE 2

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE CITE DIR 72347

KAPOK KEYWAY PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 72346

IDEN A GIULIO MONDELLO, BORN 26 FEB 1917 IN ITALY, ITAL CITIZEN, FORMERLY AGENT IN CUBA FOR FIAT AND OWNER TV TUBE FACTORY.

IDEN B NEBIOLO (LINOTYPE) FIRM, TURIN

END OF MESSAGE

WE/5
SAS/MOB
SAS/MOB
C/WH/3

C/WH W [signature]

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: W. [illegible]/[illegible]
UNIT: SAS/IOB
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 30 SEPT 63

INDEX
NO INDEX
X FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-733547
201-338838

SECRET

TO: JMWAVE MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/SAS 5
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, RI/AN DUMMY, C/WH 5, RF, VR

1 OCT [illegible]

TO: WAVE INFO MEXI CITE DIR 72383

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: WAVE 4369 (IN 20073)*

JOSE LUIS (ZALA) SUBJ PARA 4 REF, RESIDENCE ULTIMAS NOVEDADES S.A., [illegible] 37-219 MEXI IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JOSE LUIS (ZALA), 201-338838, SAME ADDRESS WHO CURRENTLY REGISTERED ANOTHER SERVICE. 201 FILE CONTAINS NO OTHER INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/COMMENT: *REF is RYBAT.

SAS/EOB [signature]
SAS/MOB [illegible]
SAS/CI [illegible] (in draft)
WH/3/MEXI [illegible] (by phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for J. K. KING
C/SAS/INTEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Manuel Aragon
CA/35
5352
8 October 1963

PARIS/LCPIPIT

PALP

4043

REF: DIR

IDEN A ALFONSO DIBILDOX PRESIDENT CDE

END OF MESSAGE

WE/CA

WE/3/

C/CA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CA/35

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG D. RONIS : tw
UNIT SAS/EOB
EXT 6172
DATE 8 OCTOBER 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-6-78

ROUTING

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2		5	
3		6	

TO MEXICO CITY

8 OCT 63 2 25z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, RF, VR

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 74184

TYPIC AMLONG

IDENTITY A ALFREDO DAVINS

... RONIS

END OF MESSAGE

J. C. KING
C/WHD

C/WH/3

A. ...
C/SAS/EOB

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

R. E. SCOTT
WH/3/MEXICO
3040
6 NOVEMBER 1961

S E C R E T

TO : MEXI MERIDA MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS

TO MRID INFO MEXI CITE DIR 81481

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REF: MRID 0312 (IN 53124)

1. ODCOIL MEXI SHOULD BE GIVEN LEAD ON HILTON LYNN, AVOIDING KUBARK INVOLVEMENT THIS CASE.

2. NO TRACES ERNESTO ABREU GOMEZ. AGREE HE IS TARGET FOR DEVELOPMENT FOR PBRUMEN OPERATIONS. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ABREU GOMEZ ON LYNN CASE AND POSSIBLY LATER INTRODUCTION TO ODCOIL AGENT MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPING RAPPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref reported U.S. citizen LYNN told Merida police chief of drugs case. Chief suggested U.S. agent be inserted in net. Merida wishes develop Chief ABREU for PBRUMEN ops.

SAS/EOB Ronis (In Draft)

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

R. REICHHARDT
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

TO: MEXICO CITY PANAMA CITY RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, VR

TO MEXI FOR [illegible] INFO PACY RIOD (ROUTINE) CITE DIR 81525

(IMMEDIATE)

1. ENINBEING TOLD BOIZELLE HE PROVIDING CR$ 5,000,000 TO ARI CAMPISTA, PRESIDENT GUANABARA CHEMICAL WORKERS FEDERATION, THRU RIO TPHOODCAP OFFICE FOR USE IN DECEMBER CNTI ELECTIONS. CAMPISTA USING FUNDS GAIN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC SLATE, HOWEVER DEMOCRATIC GROUP NOT ABLE AGREE ON SLATE NOR WHO TO HEAD IT.

2. REQUEST OF DETAILS FROM ENINBEING AS RIOD DEVELOPING PARALLEL ELECTION OP AND ANXIOUS AVOID CONFLICT OR COMPETITION AMONG DEMOCRATS. BELIEVE ENINBEING OP NOT NECESSARILY COUNTERING RIOD PLAN BUT NEED CLARIFICATION.

3. FYI RIOD PREPARING PROVIDE FUNDS TO HUGO GOMES DA COSTA, OF ALCOHOL AND SUGAR WORKERS, WHO NAMED AS MEMBER OF CAMPISTA'S DEMOCRATIC GROUP.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/4 Mr. Ong[illegible] (in draft)

WH/3/Mexico [signature]

WH/CA [signature]

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

J. B. NOLAND
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

104-10529-10196 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

MEXICO CITY

REF DIR

IDEN A - JOSEPH MONTLLOR

IDEN B - JOHN H BARBER

IDEN C - GOODWIN SHAPIRO

END OF MESSAGE

J. C. KING
C/WHD

SECRET

S E C R E T

ROME PRIORITY

PRIORITY ROME MEXI, SALV 83692

REF: SALV 4839 (IN 63096)

IF PCI DOES NOT GIVE DEVISTA-1 CONTACTS IN SALV, STATION SHOULD PASS TO DEVISTA-1 ONLY FIRST FOUR NAMES OF ABOVE REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: Suggested Communists as possible contacts DEVISTA-1

C/WH/3

WE/Italy S. Munger

WH/3/MEXI

WH/3/CAN

C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T/RYBAT

ROUTING

BRUSSELS HAMBURG FRANKFURT HAGUE MADRID PARIS LONDON

DIRECTOR

C/SAS 5

C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, RF, C/AF 3, C/WH 5, RF, VR

BRUS INFO HAMB FRAN HAGU MADR (ROUTINE) PARI LOND DIR 75 24

RYBAT KEYWAY PBRUMEN ZRWAGON

REF: BRUS 3460 (IN 38181)* (NOT SENT PARIS AND LOND)

1. HURRICANE FLORA DAMAGE TO CUBA WILL PROBABLY RESULT HEAVY CONCENTRATION FOOD AND MEDICINE IN MARITIME CARGOES TO CUBA, THUS ALTERING PERCENTAGES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ANY SABOTAGE OPS AGAINST CUBAN SHIPPING. WISE EFFECT MORATORIUM SABOTAGE OPS UNTIL THIS FACTOR DISAPPEARS AND USE INTERVAL TO MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES IN APPROACH.

2. FURTHER GUIDANCE FORTHCOMING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/Comments: * Plans for sabotaging Rio Cronro.

SAS/EX

TSD/CAD Wally Jones by phone

WE/2 Jack Delaney by phone

WE/5 Vaughn [illegible] in draft

WE/3 Roger [illegible] by phone

WE/BC [illegible]

EE/G [illegible] by phone

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

THOMAS THIELE
C/WE/INT

EDWARD A. [illegible]
C/[illegible]

S E C R E T/RYBAT

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: BECKY FRANK
UNIT: FE/CIOP
EXT: 5661
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-736761

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/FE 6

INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

12 OCT 63

ROUTINE

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

RYBAT
KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF MEXI 6483 (IN 38148)*

1. LIANG SZU CH'ENG 2733 1835 2052, 201-736761 BORN 1901, TOKYO. LANGUAGE ENGLISH. MEMBER CCP.

BACKGROUND:

1923	BA TSINGHUA UNIV
26	BA, MA UNIV PENN
28	MA HARVARD
28-31	PROF AT NATIONAL NORTHEASTERN UNIV, CHINA
31-41	RESEARCH FELLOW, INSTITUTE/CHINESE ARCHITEC URE
32-33	PROF NATIONAL PEKING UNIV; PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING
41-43	RESEARCH FELLOW, ACADEMIA SINICA
46	PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING
47	HONORARY PHD YALE; VISITING PROF YALE
50-61	MEMBER OF TSINGHUA UNIV
53-61	HEAD OF DEPT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE, TSINGHUA; VICE PRESIDENT ARCHITECTURE SOCIETY

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : [illegible] FRANK
UNIT : FE/[illegible]
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 October 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

56	ASSOC, ENGINEERS CIVIL AND ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEERING, ACADEMY OF SCIENCES CPR, [illegible]
DEC 58	MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, [illegible] CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHINA DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE
SEP 58	MEMBER NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHINA SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ASSOC
APR 59	DEPUTY SECOND NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS FROM PEKING; MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, THIRD NATIONAL COMMITTEE CPPCC
OCT 62	VICE CHAIRMAN CHINA ARCHITECTURAL SOCIETY
SEP 63	DEPUTY LEADER OF CPR DELEGATION TO SEVENTH INTER-NATIONAL CONGRESS OF ARCHITECTS, HAVANA

2. RE SELF CRITICISM FOLLOWING EXTRACTS FROM LIANG'S SPEECH TO THE NPC, JULY 13 1957 ENTITLED "WHY I LOVE OUR PARTY". DEPUTY LIANG, AFTER DESCRIBING "THE BRILLIANT INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUR NATION," TOLD OF HIS PAST ANXIETY AND PERPLEXITY IN HIS OWN WORK. HE SAID THAT AT THE TIME HE HAD USED OUT-DATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES TO TEACH THE YOUNG INSTRUCTORS AND STUDENTS OF THE TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY BECAUSE HE WAS BOTHERED

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : BECKY FRANK
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 OCTOBER 1962

[ ] INDEX
[ ] NO INDEX
[ ] FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

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2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

BY THE STATEMENT THAT EVERYTHING OF THE PARTY WAS GOOD. HE SAID THAT AFTER HE HAD WRITTEN ARTICLES, MADE REPORTS, AND DELIVERED LECTURES ON HIS ANTIQUATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES, HE SUDDENLY DISCOVERED THAT HE WAS A NATIONAL TARGET FOR REFUTATION. HE SAID "I WAS DOWNHEARTED. I HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE PARTY. I WAS SURE I WAS BEING SUBJECTED TO CRITICISM BECAUSE MY ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES DID NOT FIT INTO THE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. MY PAIN WAS AS DEEP AS THAT OF A CHILD BEING PUNISHED BY HIS MOTHER. WHY? BECAUSE I TRUSTED OUR PARTY AS MUCH AS I HAD TRUSTED MY MOTHER. THE PARTY, HOWEVER, WAS VERY PATIENT WITH ME. AFTER I HAD STRAIGHTENED OUT MY THOUGHTS, I ADMITTED MY MISTAKES." HE SAID: "I WAS A PRODIGAL SON. AFTER THIS EDUCATION, I WILL NEVER LEAVE OUR PARTY --- NOT EVEN A STEP AWAY FROM IT."

[illegible]

(CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: RICKY FRANK
UNIT: FE/CIOP
EXT: 5661
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6

TO:
FROM: DIRECTOR
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INFO:

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ROUTINE

PAGE FOUR

TO: IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

3. STPLATE 1 (IDEN) WHO [illegible] LIANG AT UNIV YALE OF OPINION THAT LIANG WOULD NOT ACCEPT RECRUITMENT IN PLACE BUT THERE IS CHANCE HE WOULD DEFECT IF OFFERED CHANCE [illegible] CHINA. HQS CONSIDERS LIANG [illegible] CANDIDATE FOR [illegible] OR DEFECTION. DOUBTFUL DUE AGE AND BACKGROUND THAT WOULD MAKE GOOD IN PLACE AGENT.

4. SENDING STPLATE 1 TO WORK UNDER STATION DIRECTION AS A POSSIBLE BRIDGE TO LIANG. STPLATE 1 LONG TIME [illegible] CONTACT BUT IS ~~NOT~~ TRAINED CASE OFFICER. HAS BEEN USED PRINCIPALLY IN [illegible] WORK IN PAST. SANSEED ~~CAN~~ MAY BE FILL [illegible] FURTHER BACKGROUND.

5. STPLATE 1 WILL USE TOURIST COVER AND WILL REMAIN ONLY TWO DAYS DUE HEAVY PERSONAL COMMITMENTS. HIS FUNCTION WILL BE TO USE PAST FRIENDSHIP TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CONTACT LIANG AND DETERMINE WHETHER LIANG INTERESTED DEFECTION. IF SO STATION SHOULD BE PREPARED SAFEHOUSE UNTIL FURTHER STEPS CAN BE TAKEN.

6. STPLATE 1 ARRIVING MEXI 12 OCTOBER 2145 HOURS VIA EASTERN AIR LINES FLITE 305. HAVE BRIEFED HIM WILL BE MET BY SANSEED. STPLATE 1

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG: ... FRANK
UNIT: FE/CIOP
EXT: 5661
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

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IN CS FILE NO.

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ROUTINE

PAGE FIVE

INFO

CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

WILL WEAR RED WHITE BLUE TIE. IF CONTACT MISSED STPLATE 1 TO PROCEED CITY AND CONTACT MARINE GUARD AT EMBASSY ASKING FOR SANSEED. AUTHORIZE STATION ADVANCE OPERATIONAL FUNDS AND PER DIEM AS NECESSARY TO STPLATE 1 SINCE NO OPPORTUNITY DO SO HERE. CHARGE LCHARVEST OOA.

END OF MESSAGE

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)

DC/PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)

CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)

DCFE(C) ✓

C/WH/3 J. Whitten (by phone)

William Co...
CFE

RAYFORD W. HERBERT
DC/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: BECKY FRANK
UNIT: FE/CIOP
EXT: 6708
DATE: 12 OCTOBER

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☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-730701

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/FE 6
INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 75339

IMMEDIATE MEXI

KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 75338

IDEN:

RICHARD WALKER, Chairman, DEPARTMENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)

DC/PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)

CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)

DC/FE(C)

C/WH/3 (by phone)

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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William Colby
C/FE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Polly Pike
WH/LOG
7282
16 October 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Mexico City

DIRECTOR

WH 8

16 OCT 63 15 27z

SIG CEN

X ROUTINE

MEXI INFO MIDW CITE DIR 76566

REF: MEXI 6547 (IN 40710)*

MIDW 3207 (NOT SENT MEXI)

MIDW ADVISES CARTRIDGES DELIVERED CORPUS CHRISTI 1 OCTOBER ONE BOX FIFTY POUNDS CARGO 64-MS1104 MDIF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: *Requests Hdqs advise action taken on Reqn 559-5-64.

C/WH/3

Telecoord:
OL/TD/CB, Mr. Daly

WILLIAM E. BROOKS
CHIEF, WH SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CHARLES F. REINER
ACTING CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

1. Attached is Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO - which is part of the summary entitled, Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, (copy number 7) dated 1 October 1968. The aforementioned summary was forwarded for your review on 13 March 1978.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 7) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

SECRET

1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278 281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and 357

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in Annex A.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by a jealous naval officer whom he then protected by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, and that he actually did accidently shoot himself. [a sensitive source] quoted [a KGB offic] to the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a naval college in 1942.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued)
After NOSENKO's defection was publicized, Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered to CIA that he had known the son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV. A sensitive source [redacted] is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO served in the RU. According to [redacted] this sou, NOSENKO attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU Information Department for about a year before securing a transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports) Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held Reports assignments.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

A sensitive source [redacted] has quoted two KGB officers [redacted] respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947 or 1949.

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the FRIPPEL case.)

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter. According to [redacted] a sensitive source, FRIPPEL, who is now in New York City, is a current target of the [redacted] Soviet intelligence service.

Johannes PREISFREUND

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961) and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.

Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175) and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.

who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961, but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and 'not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow, a sensitive source [redacted] identified him as "an employee of the KGB": and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still "under suspicion", according to [redacted] a sensitive source.

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Yu.I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A), because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUK was dismissed from the KGB.

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Headquarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.

Comment: A sensitive source [redacted] had reported to the FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer [redacted] "might be trying to develop SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some other agent capacity."

NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether SLESINGER had "ever been bothered by the FBI."

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

Comment: (Continued)
In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case.

KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent [redacted]

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, but from the description he provided he is believed identical with [redacted] a KGB S&T agent identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report from [redacted] a sensitive source.

NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN.

Comment: Earlier, [a sensitive source] identified an [redacted] agent apparently identical with SHUBIN and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel to the USSR in summer 1961 and in September 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHEREPANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.

Comment: Other sources, including sensitive sources, [redacted] have also reported various aspects of the CHEREPANOV incident.

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's Information

On 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of 4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived, instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to participate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thenceforth in CIA custody.

Comment: Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's assertion regarding the existence of the recall telegram. According to Special Intelligence, there were enciphered communications from Moscow to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and later, but there was none from 1815 on 3 February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram

NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he signed the following statement:

> "On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY, the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held. [redacted]

KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists
1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

Other Sources - 1964 and 1965

As indicated in Annex A, a sensitive source reported several items of information he stated he obtained from various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO's defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired because he had been NOSENKO's friend and patron, that GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO's father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief despite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence, and that GRIBANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence", paralyzed the work of [redacted] KGB [redacted]

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?

1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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Annex A

Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

4 February 1964

NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

6 February 1964

The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February. They speculated privately between themselves that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an automobile accident.

8 February 1964

An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four days.

9 February 1964

Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February 1964

The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

A U.S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

According to a sensitive source,
Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

According to a sensitive source,
The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

Comment: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in Geneva; he asserted that some others, known by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

According to a sensitive source [redacted] NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine.

Comment: NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until 1953, when he entered the KGB.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] several KGB officers It appeared quite certain to [redacted] that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been a KGB lieutenant colonel.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] from KGB officers [redacted] The photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO. One KGB officer worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: [redacted] [redacted]. The photograph accompanying American and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection was by error not that of NOSENKO but of Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom [redacted] a sensitive source and NOSENKO both identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working against American citizens.

Comment: Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962 (before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.

11 February 1964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release, and to demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February 1964

S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

(Annex A)

12 February 1964 (continued)

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.

NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.

12-13 February 1964

14 February 1964

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

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(Annex A)

14 February 1964 (continued)

"gross provocation by American Intelligence organs". GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

18 February 1964

Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of International Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV, NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".

13-00000

~~Top Secret~~

(Annex A)

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According to a sensitive source,

NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books. A KGB officer expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. a KGB officer said that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."

Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB telephone book referred to above.

13-00000

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] in response to a question whether NOSENKO actually defected or whether the defection might be a KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

22 February 1964

According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the Embassy.

Comment: Although NOSENKO knew that there were microphones in three general locations in the Embassy, his specific information regarding the number and location of microphones was limited to that contained in a written list brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he claimed no one in the KGB knew he had.

24 February 1964

Women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time, expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his family and country and requesting a personal meeting with him.

13-00000

(Annex A)

24 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife and mother on the basis of physical descriptions. On only one previous occasion have members of a defector's family called on a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him.

According to a sensitive source, KUROCHKIN (fnu), a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor referred to the name.

(Annex A)

February 1964

Nikolay ARTAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO's defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO in 1944-1946.

Comment: ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved differs from those claimed by NOSENKO.

KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a CIA double agent in Vienna. TULAYEV said that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV later said on another occasion that he had friends who knew NOSENKO well.)

Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied knowing him.

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February-March 1964

According to a sensitive source:
A KGB commission was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was very large, formed from different departments of the KGB. The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many details about life of the leaders of the country, in the government...that he knew very much about internal relations between the people working in the KGB, that he had many close friends among them and [spent] days and nights together with them. The whole history of his life was studied step by step very carefully."

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9 March 1964

According to a sensitive [redacted] source, [redacted] (from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers [redacted]: NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms until the January-March 1965 interrogations, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room".

(Annex A)

23 March 1964

The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

(Annex A)

27 March 1964

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted] certain [redacted]: There seems to be unanimous opinion among [redacted] KGB chiefs [redacted] that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some [redacted] KGB "chiefs" [redacted] that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.

Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB directories described.

31 March 1964

KGB officers I.I. PETUKHOV nad P.P. BORISOV in Canada told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intelligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be prepared for himself and his family. SPRECHER asked whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recently publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it, asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".

(Annex A)

31 March 1964 (continued)

Comment: When PETUKHOV recontacted SPRECHER in February 1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENKO had in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he had had some connection with NOSENKO, and NOSENKO may have known something of what the KGB was doing in Canada.

NOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name was unknown to him, who apparently is identical to SPRECHER.

March 1964

According to a sensitive source who [redacted], was briefed in his office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief Directorate officer of the American Department. Personnel of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served until his defection, were so shocked at the event that they would not mention it at all.

Comment: In this and other contexts a sensitive source [redacted] has stated or implied that NOSENKO served in the American Department in 1963-1964. NOSENKO asserts he left the American Department in January 1962 and served in the Seventh Department until his defection.

(Annex A)

April-May 1964

KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See p. 24 for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)

May 1964: According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB officers [redacted]): Two commissions have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

(Annex A)

20 May 1964
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]

[redacted]: The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.

12 June 1964

Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a profligate with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow to be someone they are well rid of.

22 June 1964
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted] [redacted]: The consensus among some KGB employees [redacted] is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to

22 June 1964 (continued)

the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

29 June 1964

GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959. When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department. NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during 1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsibilities or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or 1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the Section during this period.

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(Annex A)

29 June 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in 1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not identify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied since defection that he has ever met or even seen him.

June 1964

According to a sensitive source [redacted]: "Just after" NOSENKO's defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some sixty Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return to Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known [redacted] to [redacted] Source had been discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. According to one rumor, the chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed, would also lose his job.

Comment: MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly stationed in New York City, was said by ~~[redacted]~~ by a sensitive source to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conducted interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. ~~[redacted]~~ Another sensitive source identified MEDVEDEV,

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(Annex A)

June 1964 (continued)

Comment: (Continued)
[redacted] a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.

29 July 1964

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] (from unnamed sources, presumably KGB officers [redacted] [redacted]): An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK [BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB

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(Annex A)

29 July 1964 (continued)

Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.

Comment: NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identified by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO said he had never worked with him at KGB Headquarters since GOLUBEV had always been in the First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the USSR on 28 August 1964.

July-August 1964

According to a sensitive source: [redacted]: The first information [redacted] about NOSENKO was [redacted] from KGB Headquarters which reported the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The letter, which was very brief, said that "the loss was very great and some new forms of work should be created to be efficient in the future". The Legal Residency had not before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's escape".

13-00000

(Annex A)

November 1964

Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American acquaintance that they had not been told officially but they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. It was in this way, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance. According to the "grapevine", the defection was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States.

November 1964 (continued)

Comment: GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements, actions, and unusual freedom of solitary movement while on visits to the United States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he had met with their American counterparts". During that 1964 meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country".

December 1964

Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's a [redacted] source roommate in Geneva at the time of his defection, told [redacted] that he had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection, and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK reported to [redacted] source the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what RESHETNYAK said, [redacted] source thought the KGB might go so far

(Annex A)

December 1964 (continued)

as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. ([redacted] later identified RESHETNYAK as a KGB officer.) Source

Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation.

29 January 1965
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers [redacted]): It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.

Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV was responsible for sending him to Geneva in 1964, but after retracting his claim that GRIBANOV had played any special role in his assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father and GRIBANOV were acquainted.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

[redacted]): Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, [the KGB officer] on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these. Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the KGB. [the KGB officer] attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified [the KGB officer]. NOSENKO always claimed that he had been a lieutenant colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when he retracted that claim and asserted that he had been only a captain.

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
[redacted]: GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965 (continued)

Comment: GRIBANOV was reported in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat until late autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's defection), when he turned over that contact to another KGB officer.

9 February 1965

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

Early June 1965

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from conversations with KGB officers [redacted]): Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing".

13-00000

(Annex A)

15 July 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted] who attended the Moscow meeting described): A meeting of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second (British) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A. TARABRIN, about three and a half months earlier. I.A. BELOV and other officers also attended the meeting. According to official statements made at the meeting, after the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there. [redacted] (a sensitive source) described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.

Comment: NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met GRIBANOV socially only three times during his KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or November 1963 in circumstances similar to those referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.

(Annex A)

Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source [redacted]): As a result of NOSENKO's defection, many KGB officers were punished, expelled from the Party, and from the KGB. These included KGB Chairman SEROV, and Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and they were "buddies and night buddies".

Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.

Winter 1965-1966
Source, a [redacted] self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962. Source said that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations against the American Embassy in Moscow):

NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.

(Annex A)

Winter 1965-1966 (continued)

Comment: Source's [redacted] allegation is the single report from any source describing NOSENKO as other than a KGB officer.

March 1966

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] (from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO, who was not personally known to [redacted] Source, was an important boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and "not very good". He was to have been discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion of persons to whom [redacted] Source talked that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the microphones.

March 1966 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he, like [redacted], called the GRU Military Academy), by choice accepting assignment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in 1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO did attend the school, he could not have served as he claimed in the GRU. [redacted] is the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged NOSENKO served in the GRU.

Source

Source

TS No. 197124
Copy ______

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(Annex A)

TS No. 197124
Copy 10

(Annex A)

Mid-1966

Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

Comment: KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International Moscow correspondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. KOROLEV has travelled previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik, and to Japan and the United States as a correspondent for Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by an official Soviet press representative of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent.

October 1966

Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors to provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their

(Annex A)

October 1966 (continued)

life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.: it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident [the defection]. Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family could be obtained and that interviews with them and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent.

Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request.

28 January 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from personal knowledge): Referring to his own knowledge of KGB organization, [redacted] said if NOSENKO heard his explanation, he would call [redacted] a child, since NOSENKO knew these matters better than [redacted] because he had served at KGB Headquarters longer.

Source

(Annex A)

February 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow): NOSENKO worked only in RU Information Department of the GRU, and only for about five or six months, after which he went to the KGB.

May 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted] The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.

According to a sensitive source [redacted]: When NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked only in the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went to the KGB.

5 June 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted]: There had been some KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of SHAKHOV.

Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV.

ANNEX A - STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS

ABOUT NOSENKO

ANNEX A

STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT NOSENKO

Pages 361 - 398 of the previous summary contain statements by Soviet officials including several sources in regard to NOSENKO. These remarks cover the period of February 1964 to June 1967.

None of the quoted information with the exception of a statement by a Source (a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent) who stated NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB, raises a question concerning the identity of NOSENKO or whether he was actually a KGB officer. It is not considered that the remark by SOURCE can be given any particular weight or that it represents any material evidence he was not a KGB officer.

Of the cited information from Soviets in regard to NOSENKO, the most important, other than statements by GOLITSYN which are cited elsewhere, is the information from sensitive Source #1, sensitive Source #3 and sensitive Source #2 and probably in that order. Source #1, Source #3 and Source #2 had no personal knowledge of NOSENKO and most of their comments were based on information from third parties or obtained through conversation. There are discrepancies between what Source #1 and Source #2 have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has

said, but under the given circumstances of how Source #1 and Source #2 acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected. No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted that Source #2, Source #3 and Source #1 have furnished no information that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector.

It is felt that information from Source #1, Source #3 and Source #2 is a factor which should be given due consideration in the NOSENKO case, but the fact that they furnished no information indicating that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector should not be considered as absolute proof he was not dispatched by the KGB. A decision as to whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched should be based on a full consideration of <u>all</u> available information. It must be realized there is a possibility NOSENKO could have been dispatched by the KGB and Source #1, Source #3 and Source #2 be completely unaware; conversely, a determination that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB does not establish the bona fides of Source #1, Source #3 or Source #2.

NOSENKO, until October 1966, stated that a telegram had been received in the Geneva Residentura ordering NOSENKO to return to the USSR in connection with an expected conference on tourist matters. The telegram,

according to NOSENKO in interviews prior to October 1966, had been received in the Residentura the morning of the same day he met his CIA contacts and stated he had defected.

In October 1966, NOSENKO responded to a casual mention of the "recall telegram" with a complete retraction of his previous statements on the subject. NOSENKO stated, and has subsequently maintained, that there was not a "recall telegram." He has explained that he invented the "recall telegram" matter because he was concerned about his personal safety in remaining "in place" for a longer time. NOSENKO has stated he thought the alleged "recall telegram" would be accepted by CIA as a logical reason for his precipitate defection.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Certain of the discrepancies noted in the previous summary between information from Source #1 and Source #2 and from NOSENKO have been clarified and certain discrepancies could not be clarified. In some instances the information from Source #1 and Source #2 is adjudged to be inaccurate. The judgment is based on the hearsay nature of the reporting by Source #1 and Source #2 measured against the absence of any reason to question this part of his life as related by NOSENKO. Examples are information from Source #1 that NOSENKO had been

affiliated with the KGB since about 1947 and information from [Source #1] that NOSENKO attended the GRU Military Academy and that NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department in Moscow. There are also certain discrepancies between information furnished by [Source #2], [Source #1 and Source #3 in] and in regard to the life and career of NOSENKO prior to 1964.

In regard to discrepancies previously noted between information from [Source #1] as to certain KGB officers whom [Source #1] understood NOSENKO had personally met and concerning whom NOSENKO had previously indicated no knowledge, a satisfactory explanation has been obtained for certain of the discrepancies during current interviews with NOSENKO. In certain other instances, a completely adequate explanation is not available but there is just as adequate reason to believe [Source #1] had obtained incorrect or incomplete information as there is to believe NOSENKO is being deceptive in his failure to recognize a name and/or photograph.

As an example of previous noted discrepancies which have now been completely clarified, it was previously stated that NOSENKO had never commented on the KGB telephone book which [Source #1] had reported NOSENKO, had in his possession. During current interviews, NOSENKO, in response to a query concerning

how an officer in the SCD would obtain the telephone number of an FCD officer, gave a detailed report including information that there was at least one complete SCD telephone directory in each room occupied by SCD officers. In addition, NOSENKO stated he had access to a directory which was maintained in the office of the Chief of the Department and which listed the KGB officers down to Section Chiefs in the various geographical Directorates throughout the USSR.

It is interesting to note that there is a discrepancy between the information furnished by Source #1 concerning the telephone directory and the description furnished by NOSENKO. This is quite logical since Source #1 could hardly give an accurate description of a telephone directory which he had never seen.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : DOS
RECORD NUMBER : 119-10021-10413

RECORDS SERIES :
INR FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : FBI

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : DOS
FROM : CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUB
TO : MEMBERS OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON CASTRO

TITLE :
REPORT FOR JULY - AUGUST ON ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMBAT CASTRO-COMMUNIST S

DATE : 09/30/63
PAGES : 23

SUBJECTS :
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/09/93

OPENING CRITERIA :
DOD AND CIA REVIEW

COMMENTS :
Draft subcommittee report attached.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

September 30, 1963

TO: Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion.

FROM: Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion

SUBJECT: Report for July - August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

Attached is a draft of the Subcommittee's report for July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-communist subversion in the hemisphere. The draft has been prepared on the basis of the material which you furnished with certain modification. The CIA member will note that I have extracted from his submission the items of action taken and placed these in the body of the report. The intelligence information contained in the submission I have made into an annex. I think it is very [illegible] to have the intelligence data form part of the report and suggest that in the future the CIA member prepare his submission in two parts.

May I have your comments on the draft by close of business October 1, 1963.

Copies to: CIA - Mr. [illegible] (?)
DOD - Col. [illegible]
USIA - Mr. [illegible] (1)
FAA - Mr. Herr (1)
Justice - Mr. [illegible]hagham (1)

62-108553-5

ARA:UCChandler:js
[illegible]/63

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

DRAFT SECRET 2 of 7 copies

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished by him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

SECRET 62-108553-5

ENCLOSURE

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of theCongress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica ~~has~~ presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least

until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the ~~government of~~ Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be

returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed U.S. Missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew sh scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor

indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago

urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegates to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29-October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a commercial basis, that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the month of July at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which

was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Havana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defence

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies.

Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.

Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and countersubversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay attention to the information and to take action on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident

brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS."

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commerical and Cultural Missions.

Central Intelligency Agency

(To be filled in by Mr. Wheeler)

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Reassured President Schick of Nicaragua in the most emphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty did not mean that our attitude toward Castro has altered in the slightest, and stressed our interest in seeing steady progress by all the Isthmian countries in implementing the recommendations of the Managua Security Conference to block Cuban subversive efforts.

d. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments in the hourly newscasts.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on

three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

SECRET

September 30, 1963

TO: Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion.

FROM: Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion

SUBJECT: Report for July - August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

Attached is a draft of the Subcommittee's report for July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-communist subversion in the hemisphere. The draft has been prepared on the basis of the material which you furnished with certain modification. The CIA member will note that I have extracted from his submission the items of action taken and placed these in the body of the report. The intelligence information contained in the submission I have made into an annex. I think it is very useful to have the intelligence data form part of the report, and request that in the future the CIA member prepare his submission in two parts.

May I have your comments on the draft by close of business October 1, 1963.

Copies to: CIA - Mr. Wheeler (2)
DOD - Col. Haig (2)
USIA - Mr. Vagley (1)
ARA - Mr. Hert (1)
Justice - Mr. Geoghegan (1)

ARA:JCDreier:jz
9/30/63

62-108553-5

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered Cubana Airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected

62-108553-5

ENCLOSURE

to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, are apparently receiving encouragement and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina.

Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 22 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Juliao to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

In mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrano, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. The purchase of arms and supplies and the recruitment of Nicaraguans for a movement against Nicaragua are also reportedly underway in Costa Rica.

Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator, left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned from attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, was assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July. He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicatin that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/20/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10058-10420

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-109060-3385

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, LO
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 06/23/1964
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
LHO, POST-RP, POSSIBLE CUBAN, ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/14/1994

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : REFERRAL TO CIA

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 6/23/64

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

4-22-93 9803-RDW/dc (JFK Special)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-109060)

FROM: LEGAT, LONDON (62-358) (RUC)

SECRET

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY 11/22/63,
DALLAS, TEXAS
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Classified by 2040
Exempt from GDS, Category 1
Date of Declassification Indefinite

10-25-93 Classified by 9803 RDA/EH
Declassify on: OADR JFK

On 6/22/64 [Mr. R. E. CARTER, CIA, London] (S) on a highly confidential basis, furnished the following information [which comes from a tisur on the Cuban Embassy, London, operated by British Security Service, MI-5 and British Secret Intelligence Service, MI-6.] (S) This conversation occurred on 5/8/64 and was between MARIO RIVA PATTERSON, Counselor, Cuban Embassy, London and an unidentified male visitor, possibly a Colombian. [The conversation was in Spanish and indistinct at times] (S) Information is as follows: (U)

"The visitor [after a question half of which is not heard] (S) asks if in the case of the assassination of KENNEDY if (?) FOSTER [(ph and indistinct)] (S) was ever in Cuba. RIVA replies in the negative. He says that this man applied for a visa to go to Cuba at the Consulate in Tampico. He was refused a visa. Had he been to Cuba he would have had his passport (U)

VISITOR: "A typical F.B.I. job (U)

RIVA: "A thing (una cosa) of the Imperialists - to kill him in the end - really disgusting - (U)

It is possible that the individual referred to above as FOSTER may have been OSWALD. Above furnished for the Bureau's information (U)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. As Bracketed 10-20-93

REC 25 62-109060-

(3) - Bureau
1 - Liaison (sent direct)
1 - London
CWB:rn
(5)

SECRET

18 JUN 26 1964

Approved: C. C. Wick
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

79 JUL 2 - 1964

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10062-10456
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 105-82555-1ST NR 5370

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, BR
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 01/05/1965
PAGES: 1
SUBJECT: LANE, MARK, ADMIN

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 06/30/1997
UPDATE_DATE: 01/19/2001
STATUS: Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

5-124 (Rev. 7-2-64)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 4/14/97

TO : Director, FBI (100-409763) DATE: 1/5/65

FROM : Legat, Bern (105-284) (RUC) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 2040
Exempt from GDS, Category 1
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: MARK LANE
SM - C

Lee Oswald

7/1/77 EFG/TLC

Re Bern letter 12/28/64.

Enclosed are 5 copies of the following:

Letterhead Memorandum dated 1/5/65

Communication dated

Information in the enclosure was received by Legat Bern on 1/4/65
Source in the memorandum or originator of communication is:

- [ ] Bundesministerium für Inneres, Abteilung 13 (Austrian Federal Criminal Police), Vienna, Austria (AFCP).
- [ ] Schweizerisches Zentralpolizeibureau (Swiss Central Police Bureau), Bern, Switzerland (SCPB).
- [ ] Abteilung II, Gruppe Staatspolizei, Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austrian Federal Security Police), Vienna, Austria, (AFSP).
- [ ] Schweizerische Bundespolizei (Swiss Federal Police), Bern, Switzerland (SFP). (S)
- [ ] Office of Special Assistant (covert CIA), American Embassy, Bern, Switzerland (OSA). (S)
- [ ] Research Branch (covert CIA), American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.
- [X] Other: American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF classification DATE

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure is classified Unclassified ☐ By source ☐ See remarks

- [ ] Check name(s) in Bufiles.
- [ ] Check name(s) and/or fingerprints in Identification Division.
- [ ] Furnish results of requested investigation for referral to requesting agency.
- [X] For information.

4 - Bureau (Encl. 5)
(1 - Liaison) (Encl.)
(1 - New York) (100-117844)
1 - Bern

~~Classified by~~ 6/14/93 9803 RDD/GAT
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK)

HDG:mls
(5)

105-82555
NOT RECORDED
199 JAN 18 1965

100-406-154

ORIGINAL FILED IN

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK) 4/28/97
(Per CIA - JM - 4/14/97)

SECRET

60 JAN 19 1965

DATNR5370

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10114-10010
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-109090-356

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, PA
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 10/28/1964
PAGES: 9
SUBJECT: WC, ASSISTANCE, NEWS MEDIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 09/24/1997
UPDATE DATE: 01/23/2001
STATUS: Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INC DIRECTOR, FBI RESPONSE, TRANSLATION FROM SPANISH AND CIA LTR TO LEG, PA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ENCLOSURE

TO : Director, FBI (62-109090) Secret DATE: 10-28-64

FROM : Legat, Paris (62-148) (P.)

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT.

Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of a self-explanatory [Paris Embassy CAS (Controlled American Source - CIA)] memorandum along with a copy of the letter in Spanish mentioned in the memorandum. (S)(U)

The Paris Office has referred this matter to the High General Staff (HGS), Madrid, Spain, with a request for investigation by that service in an effort to locate and identify the sender of the letter, and to interview him for any data he may be able to supply. The results of this Paris request of the HGS will be promptly reported when available. (S)(U)

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Enc. 2)
(1 - Liaison Section)
1 - Paris
HPW:HD
(4)

REC- 53 62-109090-356

EX-114

11-9 OCT 30 1964

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF DATE 7/23/77

Classified by 9803-RDD/..., Declassify on: OADR (JFK Special) 4-29-93

RECEIVED NOV 3 1964

Classified by ... Category 1,2
Exempt from CDS ... Indefinite
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Secret

Reviewed By RB 6/27/77

SECRET

[CAS]-2290
20 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Norman Philcox
Legal Attache

FROM : [CAS]

SUBJECT : Crank Letter Concerning Warren Commission Document

[Our office in Madrid] has sent us a copy of the attached Spanish-language letter addressed to the American Ambassador to Spain, and signed by one Antilin PERIS, alleging in the first paragraph that the author has some information of interest to impart. After opening the second paragraph by saying that he had to flee Paris due to an indiscretion committed there, the author states:

> "There (apparently Paris), in the home of some American friends, I got hold of an authentic document about the assassination in Dallas, which they say was swiped from the Warren Commission and which is certainly prejudicial for President Johnson. I have it on good authority that they are currently trying to sell it to no less than the Director of "Paris-Match." Someone from the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Paris is involved in the matter."

The author closes by suggesting that an advertisement be inserted in a Madrid newspaper if there be any interest in further details.

There are no traces from Madrid on Antilin PERIS, which according to [CAS, Madrid] is almost certainly an alias. Needless to say there is no return address on the letter or envelope, which was mailed from Barcelona on 26 September 1964. [CAS, Madrid] has forwarded us a copy of the letter on the off chance that we may have received similar allegations; in such case [Madrid] would appreciate learning the details so that they might inform the Embassy. It was also suggested that we show you this letter.

[CAS, Paris] has no traces on Antilin PERIS.

62-109090-356

cc: United States Secret Service
Attn: Mr. John Hanly

SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10115-10027
RECORD SERIES: DL
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-3588-29

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, PA
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 10/28/1964
PAGES: 1
SUBJECT: SEE FBI 62-109090-356

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 09/24/1997
UPDATE DATE: 01/23/2001
STATUS: Redact

RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

Director, FBI (62-109090) SECRET 10-28-64

Legat, Paris (62-148) (P.)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT Except Brackets (K 3/26/97)

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of a self-explanatory [Paris Embassy CAS (Controlled American Source - CIA)] memorandum along with a copy of the letter in Spanish mentioned in the memorandum. (S) (C)(U) [S]

The Paris Office has referred this matter to the High General Staff (HGS), Madrid, Spain, with a request for investigation by that service in an effort to locate and identify the sender of the letter, and to interview him for any data he may be able to supply. The results of this Paris request of the HGS will be promptly reported when available. (S)(U)

3 - Bureau (Enc. 2)
(1 - Liaison Section)
1 - Paris
HPW:HD
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Re: ANTILIA PERIS

4-29-93 9803-RAD/mk
Classified by
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK special)

Classified by 2040
Exempt from GDS, Category 1,2
Date of Declassification INDEFINITE
R/S 7/23/99

62-3588-29

SEARCHED...... INDEXED......
SERIALIZED...... FILED......
NOV 9 1964
FBI — DALLAS

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10150-10104
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 62-109060-3681

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, BR
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 08/21/1964
PAGES: 1
SUBJECT: JFK, OPINION, DRAGOMIR, ANGHEL, INTERVIEW

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 06/30/1997
UPDATE_DATE: 02/09/2001
STATUS: Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/21/64

Transmit the following in SECRET
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT (As Sanitized) 9803 RDD GAT 7/9/93

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TO : Director, FBI (62-109060)

FROM: Legat, Bern (62-43) (RUC)

Classified by SP6-Bjo... Declassify on: OADR 1/17/89 Per CIA letter 9/23/88. #6454

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
11/22/63, DALLAS, TEXAS
MISC. - INFO CONCERNING

ReBuairtel 8/7/64.

Enclosed for Dallas are 25 copies each of insert pages 1 and 2 with results of interview of ANGHEL DRAGOMIR. As instructed by the Bureau, this insert incorporates the translated letter from DRAGOMIR with appropriate comments concerning the matter having been referred to the Bureau for investigation.

Information on an individual by the name ANGHEL DRAGOMIR from Bureau files as included in reairtel has not been included in insert since identity has not been proven and the information is not pertinent in any case.

The other Government agency referred to in the insert is the Research Branch (Covert CIA) (S) the Embassy, Vienna, Austria. (S)

6 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)(Encl.)
(2 - Dallas)(89-43)(Encl. 50)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(7)

1cc of airtel & encl 25 copies sent DL via O-1 action 8/28/64

REC-60 62-109060-3691

NOT RECORDED

ENCLOSURE

ST-104

CONSOLIDATION NO ACTION

Approved: Special Agent in Charge — Sent SECRET M Per

C.C. Wick

56 SEP 3 1964

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 11/18/20

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10158-10061
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-82555-1ST NR 5373

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, BR
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :

DATE : 01/08/1965
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS :
LANE, MARK, ACT, SURVEILLANCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/10/1997

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. AS SANITIZED KP 2/11/97

FBI

SECRET

Date: 1/8/65

Transmit the following in ______________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : Director, FBI (100-409763)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FROM: Legat, Bern (105-284) (P)

MARK LANE
SM - C

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (6)
(JFK) 12/1/97

Lee Oswald

Re Bern letter 1/5/65. (U)

On 1/6/65 [JOHN DIMMER, Chief, Office of Special Assistant (covert CIA)] (S) the Embassy, Bern, confidentially informed that he had learned that LANE was to speak in Zurich, Switzerland, some time in the next two weeks on the subject of OSWALD's innocence in the killing of President KENNEDY. LANE's talk is allegedly to be sponsored by HEINRICH BUCHBINDER, well known Swiss Trotskyite who is prominent in the Swiss Movement Against Atomic Armament (Schweizerische Bewegung gegen die Atomare Aufrüstung - SBGAA). (S)

At [DIMMER's] (S) request, he was furnished background material concerning LANE. [DIMMER] (S) stated that he would keep this office informed of further developments in this matter.

~~Classified by 9803 RDD/CAT~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK) 4/13/93

5 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
(1 - New York) (100-117844)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(6)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF
DATE 6-9-77

105-82555
NOT RECORDED
199 JAN 19 1965

EX-112 REC-1 100-409763-155

10 JAN 21 1965

Copy to New York by routing slip for
[x] info [ ] action
date 1/12/65
by

CLASSIFIED BY 2040
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2 & 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C. Wick

60 JAN 19 1965

SECRET

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-409763-155

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10163-10134
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-109060-3942

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLANS
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 12/04/1964
PAGES: 6
SUBJECT: JFK, ASSISTANCE, SUSPECT, RIDDERSTRALE, KARL-ERIK, ALBRECHT, ADOLPH JAY, ABERG, CHARLOTTE, NAME CHECK
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 09/24/1997
UPDATE DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS: Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INCLUDES SEARCH SLIPS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

DEC 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Adolph Jay ALBRECHT

1. Adolph Jay ALBRECHT, born 15 June 1926 in New Jersey, is an industrial advertising copywriter currently residing in Stockholm, Sweden. The holder of U.S. passport No. D 294080, issued 18 April 1963 at New York City, Subject served with the United States Navy from about 1947 to 1955, on active duty for only two weeks, however. As of November 1963 Subject said he was employed by the Andersson and Lembke Advertising Agency, Luntmakargaten 95, Stockholm.

2. On 29 November 1963 Subject, of his own volition, visited the American Embassy in Stockholm and asked to speak with the embassy "security officer." He was interviewed by a representative of this Agency. Subject said that a former girlfriend, Charlotte ABERG (Swedish citizen, born ca. 1943), told him that Karl-Erik RIDDERSTRALE (Swedish citizen, born 24 September 1922), while drunk on 15 November 1963, predicted that within two weeks President KENNEDY would be assassinated while on a trip among his own people. Following the assassination Charlotte was upset and called ALBRECHT on 27 November 1963 to inform him of RIDDERSTRALE's statement made while he was visiting Charlotte and her mother on 15 November. Charlotte described RIDDERSTRALE as normally quiet and refined and one of her mother's suitors. According to Subject, RIDDERSTRALE, though wealthy and a member of Swedish nobility, is a left winger and strong supporter of Fidel CASTRO.

62-109060 - 3942

3. Through Subject, arrangements were made for Charlotte ABERG to be interviewed at the American Embassy on 4 December 1963. Charlotte related substantially the same story as did Subject, with minor contradictions. She said RIDDERSTRALE's comments were made about ten days before the assassination and that he had not given a two-week deadline; he merely said, "soon." She said she knew nothing about RIDDERSTRALE's background. Charlotte was advised to report the foregoing to Swedish authorities. Following an interview with Swedish police officials, Charlotte returned to the American Embassy on 9 December 1963.

No Investigation Conducted by FBI Pertinent to your inquiry. This is the result of a request for an FBI file check only and is not to be considered clearance.

cc to CIA by Liaison 2-22-64

NAT. INT. SEC.

DEC 24 1964

He could not explain such an expression since he could not remember having said anything like it. He knew nothing whatever beforehand about the murder of the President."

6. The files of this Agency contain no recorded identifiable traces on ALBRECHT, ABERG, or RIDDERSTRALE.

7. This office would appreciate receiving any pertinent information your Bureau's files may contain on the Subject, cleared, where possible, [for passing to an official Swedish source.] (S) An early reply would be appreciated.

8. The information contained in paragraphs 1 through 3, above, was given to the Legal Attache in London during early December 1963.

CSCI-316/02509-64

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10180-10295
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 105-93072-4TH NR 101, 102, 1ST NR 102

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, PA
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 12/03/1963
PAGES: 5
SUBJECT: LHO, POST-RP, ASSOC, LIAISON WITH CIA, CONTACT, GIBSON, RICHARD, FPCC
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 10/23/1998
UPDATE DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INC CABLRGRAM, 2 MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum SECRET

TO : Director, FBI (105-93072)

DATE: 12/17/63

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED. JM 7/1/98

FROM : Legat, Bern (105-248) (RUC)

SUBJECT: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
IS - CUBA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ReBulet to CIA dated 9/30/63 and Paris cable dated 12/3/63, latter captioned LEE HARVEY OSWALD, IS - CUBA.

JOHN DIMMER, [Office of Special Adviser] (S) (covert CIA), [the Embassy] (S) Bern, informed that GIBSON had been located in Paris. In view of this, this case is being RUC'D in this office.

(JFK) 8/17/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

7-13-94
Classified by ~~SA8 MBC/KSR~~
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~
(JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

617RB

105-93072-102

14 DEC 26 1963

NAT. INT. SEC.

3 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
1 - Legat, Paris (sent direct)
1 - Bern
HDG/hcs
(5)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

61 JAN 6 1964

180-10082

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/25/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10181-10009

RECORD SERIES : LO

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-358-42

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
SEE FBI 62-109060-3385

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/24/1994

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

SECRET 6/23/64

AIRTEL

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (62-109060)

FROM LEGAT, LONDON (62-358) (RUC)

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY 11/22/63,
DALLAS, TEXAS
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

On 6/22/64 [Mr. R. E. CARTER, CIA, London,] (S) on a highly confidential basis, furnished the following information [which comes from a tisur on the Cuban Embassy, London, operated by British Security Service, MI-5 and British Secret Intelligence Service, MI-6. This] (S) conversation occurred on 5/8/64 and was between MARIO RIVA PATTERSON, Counselor, Cuban Embassy, London and an unidentified male visitor, possibly a Colombian. [The conversation was in Spanish and indistinct at times.] (S) Information is as follows:

"The visitor (S) [after a question half of which is not heard] asks if in the case of the assassination of KENNEDY if (?) FOSTER [(ph and indistinct)] was ever in Cuba. RIVA replies in the negative. He says that this man applied for a visa to go to Cuba at the Consulate in Tampico. He was refused a visa. Had he been to Cuba he would have had his passport.

VISITOR: "A typical F.B.I. job.

RIVA: "A thing (una cosa) of the Imperialists - to kill him in the end - really disgusting -"

It is possible that the individual referred to above as FOSTER may have been OSWALD. Above furnished for the Bureau's information.

3 - Bureau
1 - Liaison (sent direct)
1 - London
CWB:rn
(5)

SECRET

62-358-42

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/1/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10212-10160

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-120916-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 05/01/1963
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
MZF, ASSOC, B/F INT, ACA, INFT, INFO, NEG, GAMBLING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/24/1997

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC LHM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: MAY 1 1963

HAS NO OBJECTION TO CLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS

Classified by SP8 Mac/ude
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-7052) (C)
(105-7055) (C)

SUBJECT: LUIS ALBERTO CONDOM CAJIGAL, aka
Luis Condom
IS - CUBA
(Miami File 105-7052)

ALVARO MARTIN FERNANDEZ FOX, aka
Alvaro Fernandez
IS - CUBA
(Miami File 105-7055)

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum, captioned as above, suitable for dissemination. Two copies are for the use of the Legat, Mexico, in view of the information gathered concerning activities of Cubans in Mexico.

One letterhead memorandum has been written with the dual caption inasmuch as the information gathered concerning one individual pertained to the other.

The letterhead memorandum is classified "Secret" as it contains CIA information so classified. (U)

On 3/11/63, JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF, CIA representative Miami, Florida, advised the the original source of the information in this case and that furnished by his office was [RAFAEL PADRON PRADO, 575 SE 9th Avenue, Hialeah, Florida] (S)

The TULIO PREITO mentioned in the enclosed letterhead memorandum is identical with TULIO INOCENCIO PREETO RUIZ, IS - CUBA, Bureau Origin, Miami file 105-5193. PRIETO is not a source of the Miami Office.

4 - Bureau (RM) (Encls. - 11)
(2 - Legat, Mexico) (RM)
2 - Miami
PJN:jkj
(6)

ENCLOSURE

REC-35

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

105-120916

8 MAY 3 1963

EX-108

Copy to: CIA/State/ONI/OSI/ACSI
by routing slip for info.
Date 5-22-63

67 MAY 31 1963

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SECRET

MM 105-7052
MM 105-7055

LUIS ALBERTO CONDOM CAJIGAL, who furnished information set forth in the letterhead memorandum, also advised [that he worked with CIA in Havana from the beginning of 1960 to November, 1960, through EMILIO FERNANDEZ, a U.S. citizen.] (S)

CONDOM also advised that ALVARO FERNANDEZ FOX, who was also interviewed in this matter, is the nephew of MARTIN FOX, former owner of the Tropicana Nightclub in Havana, Cuba. CONDOM believes that since coming to Miami from Mexico City, ALVARO FERNANDEZ has become involved in the bolita racket inasmuch as his uncle is supposed to be a bolita racketeer in Miami. It is noted that when interviewed, ALVARO FERNANDEZ stated that he is unemployed and lives from money furnished him by his uncle, MARTIN FOX, and another uncle, PEDRO FOX, also residing in Miami at 302 Southwest Beacom Boulevard.

ALVARO FERNANDEZ, in addition to the information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum, advised that while he was in Mexico City he worked as an informant for STEVE MINAS, U.S. Customs representative, U.S. Embassy, telephone 46-94-00, Extension 373, or home phone 48-02-50. He also advised that he was to contact Customs Agent ED FICKIE in Miami at FR 7-3571, which he did; however, FERNANDEZ has not been used by FICKIE in the Miami area. FERNANDEZ advised he helped on narcotics matters.

- INFORMANTS -

The representative of MM T-1, mentioned in the letterhead memorandum, is JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF, CIA, Miami, Florida. MM T-1 is CIA, Washington, D.C. (U)

The following sources, all of whom have some knowledge of Cuban activities in the Miami, Florida, area were contacted with negative results:

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/1/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10212-10337

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 100-401762-2ND NR 35

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 02/02/1960
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
RCF, SHF, EMP, BKG, TRA, CP ACT, ADMIN, INSTR

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA, INDEFINITE

COMMENTS : INC MEMO

1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Floyd

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. except Brackets JM 10-6-97

100-339235
100-401762

Date: February 11, 1960

To: [Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans] (S)(U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
SECURITY MATTER - C

RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
SECURITY MATTER - C

10/12/94 Classified by SP8MAC/GCL Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Reference is made to your letter dated February 2, 1960, concerning the captioned individuals, your file CSCI-3/758,444. (S)(U)

Provided the following change is made, dissemination of the data set out on page two of referenced memorandum [to the Swiss Federal Police] (S) will not interfere with the intelligence and investigative responsibilities of this Bureau. The last sentence on page two of the memorandum should be changed to read as follows:

"He is known to have received Communist literature, is believed to have made financial contributions to the Communist Party in the U.S., and there is information to indicate Communist Party membership on his part as late as 1957."

YELLOW DUPLICATE FEB 11 MAILED

This matter has been referred to the Legal Attaches in London, Paris, and Tokyo [to alert appropriate security services] (S) concerning possible travel of the Franks in England, France, and Japan.

100-339235-45

2 - New York (100-42479)(100-107383)(Enclosure)
1 - London (Enclosures - 3)
1 - Paris (Enclosures - 3)
1 - Tokyo (Enclosures - 3)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)

See note Legats, London, Paris, and Rome, and SAC, New York, page

NOTE ON YELLOW, PAGE 3.
WHF:lmk

ORIGINAL FILED IN
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

11-13-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/IKSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 1.6 (JFK)

53 FEB 18 1960

SECRET

[Director
Central Intelligence Agency] ~~(S)~~ (U)

It would be appreciated if your Agency would furnish this Bureau any pertinent information received concerning possible travel of the subjects to Communist China and concerning their presence in China. Should your Agency receive information that subjects plan to travel in England, France, or Japan, it would be appreciated if you would advise the appropriate Legal Attache in London, England; Paris, France; or Tokyo, Japan. ~~(S)~~ (U)

ATTENTION LEGAL ATTACHES LONDON, PARIS, AND TOKYO, AND SAC, NEW YORK:

A Photostat of referenced Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memorandum is enclosed for all. It is possible that Paris may receive inquiries regarding the subjects through Swiss sources. In referenced memorandum CIA did not identify its [official Swiss] (S) source. This identification subsequently given to Bureau via Liaison. The Bureau approved CIA's furnishing this information [to the Swiss Federal Police inasmuch as CIA had conducted active investigation regarding subjects in Switzerland.] (S)

Also enclosed for each Legal Attache are one copy of a memorandum dated 11-26-58 concerning Richard Cyril Frank and one copy of a memorandum dated 1-26-60 concerning Susan Heiligman Frank. In view of reported plans of subjects to travel in England and France, and since it is anticipated that they may travel in the vicinity of Japan prior to their return to this country, the Legal Attaches at London, Paris, and Tokyo should [alert sources] (S) in England, France, and Japan concerning the Franks' contemplated travel in Europe and their possible plans to travel in China. [Background information concerning the subjects set forth on page two of enclosed CIA letter, as corrected in paragraph two of this letter] (U) may be made available [to your sources] (S) if deemed advisable. For your additional information, both subjects are on the Security Index.

New York remain alert in this matter and submit any information received concerning the subjects in a form suitable for dissemination. If not already done, New York submit FD-122's tabbed "Out of the country."

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

RA

2 FEB 1960 M/14-1,2

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Susan and Richard Frank

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 10-6-97 EXCEPT BRACKETS IN HAND WRITTEN NOTATION SLD/KSR 6-16-98 (JFK)

1. In response to your 22 December communication (File No: 100-339235, 100-401762) we wish to inform you that we have received the following from an official Swiss source:

"Richard Frank (born 1922), U.S. citizen, film technician, resident of New York, arrived at the Hotel Savoy in Bern with his wife Susan on 10 December 1959; they stayed there until 12 December leaving for Zurich. Frank inquired for a flight ticket to Prague from Zurich. While in Bern, Frank had contact with the Chinese Communist Embassy on two occasions; he or Mrs. Frank having called at the Embassy. No information is available on the nature of these contacts, nor do we have more detailed personalia."

2. We have observed that persons desiring to travel to Communist China from Switzerland frequently fly via Prague.

3. The following summary has been drawn from material which you have provided us on Subjects (see NY 100-42479, NY 100-107383 and Bureau 100-339235). Please advise if we may pass this summary to our Swiss source, but without revealing that your organization supplied the information contained in it:

(S)["Swiss source" is Swiss Federal Police] - per conv with Mrs J Roman, CIA 2/9/60

100-401762
NOT RECORDED
128 FEB 14 1960

100-339235-45

SECRET

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/12/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10213-10483

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-121229-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 05/27/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
LCA, ASSOC, CUBA IN ARMS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/19/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	OO- K-3,262,509
SUBJECT	Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria (FIUR)	DATE DISTR.	27 May 63
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	Guide 303-BR
DATE OF INFO.	25 Apr 63 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	---/25 Apr 63 and earlier		

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT the BRACKETS KP 11-18-97 SLD/KSR 1-3-98 (JFK)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national presently residing in the United States.]

(S) [Source was a prominent sports writer and a very active member of the Havana Yacht Club.] He is presently employed as a reporter on a large newspaper and is in close contact with Cuban exile leaders.

[This report was developed by an AFNIN Air Force representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

[ON FILE IN THE CIA LIBRARY is a copy, in Spanish, of the Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria - FIUR.]

1. A Cuban exile, Julio V. Leal, residing at 4823 East 8th Court, Hialeah, Florida, claims to be the US Delegate of the "Cuban Government in Arms". He also claims that he received a copy of a proclamation prepared by members of the FIUR, in Cuba, and was authorized to release it to publicity sources. He provided me with a copy of the FIUR declaration. [See On File Material.]

2. On 25 Apr 63 Leal furnished me with a copy of a document, in Spanish, which showed the appointments to executive and cabinet posts of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Cuba in Arms. The names are:

   President - To be announced at a later date for reasons of security.
   Vice-President - Dr Gustavo Cuervo Rubio
   Premier - Dr Jose Manuel Gutierrez
   Secretary to the President - To be announced at a later date.
   Minister of State - Dr Carlos Prio Socarras
   Minister of Communications - Luis Conte Aguero
   Minister of Transportation - Dr Aureliano Sanchez Arango
   Minister of Commerce - Abel Mestre
   Minister of Justice - ~~Dr Ricardo Rafael Sardinas~~
   Minister of Interior - Dr Manuel Antonio de Varona
   Minister of Education - Dr Jose Ignacio Lazaga
   Minister of Public Works - Ing Manuel Ray
   Minister of Health - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.
   Minister of Defense - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.
   Minister of Labor - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.

Copy to MM/WY/WFO/SJ by routing slip for info action date 6-5-63 by ___/st

4 XEROX JUN 4 1963

1 copies made 2/13/78 105- NEW

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L HQ by ___ request HSCA re 3-14

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	AEC

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/4/95 BY SP8MAC/GCL (JFK)

Minister of Agriculture - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.
Minister of Public Housing - To be announced at a later date.

The following individuals have been named Ministers without portfolio and subsecretaries:

Jose Ignacio Rivero	Humberto Medrano
Manuel Reyes	Fermin Peinado
Jorge Castellanos	Melchor Gaston
Lauraeano Batista Falla	Manuel Fernandez
Agusto Fernandez Conde	Enrique Huertas
Juan Manuel Salvat	

Designated Ambassador to Washington - Dr Guillermo Belt

OAS Delegate - Dr Herminio Portell Vila

3. I doubt that Leal has been designated as the US representative for FIUR, and do not believe that the documents he gave me originated in Cuba. I suspect that another group of exiled Cuban politicians wrote the document in the US, and are trying to get national publicity in order to get support. I have recently heard that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo has been added to the list of Cabinet appointments. I doubt very much that Gutierrez and Ray would be fully accepted by the majority of Cubans in exile.

-end-

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/11/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10221-10229

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-72630-3

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, SJ
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 08/27/1958
PAGES : 9

SUBJECTS :
PDL, ASSOC, PILOT, CASTRO, FIDEL, TRA, FLIGHT PLAN, DESTINATION, RCK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/03/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC 6 S/S, MEMO

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/27/58

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Transmit the following in AIRTEL

(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIR MAIL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT except for the brackets MKH 2-6-98

CLASSIFIED BY: DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAN JUAN (105-new)

SUBJECT: PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ; RENALDO BLANCO HERNANDEZ; ALBERTO EUSEBIO MOJENA IS - CUBA

By communication marked "Secret" dated 8/26/58, [DAVID R. McLEAN] H & R Section, [Fort Brooke (CIA)] advised that they received the following information from a usually reliable source. Information is prefaced with the following statement: "In view of the sensitive means through which we acquired it, it is requested that the FBI take no action which might compromise our source." [X]

Communication states that PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ, also known as PEDRO LUIS DIAZ, a Cuban born November 8, 1926 at Havana, is a pilot, courier, and possible agent for FIDEL CASTRO. DIAZ is reportedly associated with REINALDO BLANCO HERNANDEZ and ALBERTO EUSEBIO MOJENA who are Cubans and not further identified. Jamaican police believe that these three individuals operate from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. [X] (U)

DIAZ passed through Palisades Airport, Kingston, Jamaica, on May 5, 1958. On July 17, 1958, DIAZ arrived at the Palisades Airport, piloting a Cessna aircraft, #M5213D with BLANCO as a passenger. The [X] (U)

3 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Miami (RM)
4 - San Juan
(1 - 97-92)
(1 - 109-26)
JAD:aej
(9)

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/MSR 3-18-98
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

105-72630-3

REC-25

12 SEP 16

AUG 29 1958

SECRET

Approved: Special Agent in Charge Sent M Per

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/11/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10221-10231

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-72630-5

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 10/02/1958
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
PDL, ADMIN, INSTR

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/29/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC LHM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: OCT 2 - 1958

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (105-1598)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Ex Copy For the bracketS MKH 2-6-98

SUBJECT: PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ;
RENALDO BLANCO HERNANDEZ;
ALBERTO EUSEBIO MOJENA
IS - CUBA
OO - Miami

Enclosed herewith is report of SA ROBERT JAMES DWYER, Miami, dated and captioned as above, and Letterhead Memorandum.

REFERENCES

CLASSIFIED BY: DECLASSIFY ON:

San Juan airtel to Bureau, 8/27/58.
Miami tel to Bureau, 9/3/58.
Butel to Miami, 9/3/58.
Legat, Havana, telephone call to Miami 9/3/57.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ADMINISTRATIVE

All information contained in instant report was provided to the United States Customs Office, Miami, on September 3,5,8, and 18, 1958, as instructed by reButel September 3, 1958.

This report is classified "Secret", inasmuch as information received from [CIA, San Juan,] was so [S] classified. This information is set forth in enclosed report under symbol number T-1.

3-18-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/JJSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

INFORMANTS:

Identity of Source	Date of Activity or Description of Information	Date Received	Agent to Whom Furnished	File No. Where Located

2 - Bureau (Encl.22) (RM)
2 - San Juan (97-92) (RM) (Encl.4) (109-26)
1 - Miami
RJD:dlp
(5)

ENCLOSURE

REC- 72 105-72630-5

EX. - 133

14 OCT 3 1958

52 NOV 18 1958

SECRET

SECRET

MM 105-1598

T-1 is [DAVID R. McCLAIN, H&R Section, Ft. Brooke, Puerto Rico] (C/A) (S) [X]	[DIAZ BLANCO and MOJENA] [X] (U)	By rept dated [8/26/58] [X] (U)	[San Juan Office] [X] (U)	Instant report
T-2 is ONI report dated 5/14/58, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	FIGUERO	5/58	Bureau	Instant report
T-3 is Legat, Havana	Telephonic info re DIAZ and GOMEZ	9/3/58	HOWARD R. ALBAUGH	Instant report
T-4 is MM 635-S	PEDRO DIAZ	9/3/58	GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR.	Instant report
"	MOJENA	9/2/58	"	"
T-5 is EDUARDO HERNANDEZ, Cuban Consul General, Miami	Aircraft N48Q	9/8,18/58	ROBERT JAMES DWYER	"
T-6 is MM 639-S	PEDRO DIAZ	9/3/58	"	"
T-7 is BETTY UPDEGRAVE, Service Representative, Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., Miami.	Toll calls of RICARDO LORIE	9/18/58	LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.	"

SECRET

591-10-531

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10225-10195

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-114543-1ST NR 224

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/19/1965
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
MR, CUBAN INVASION, COST, MILITARY MOBILIZATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA

TDCSDB-315/00171-65

DATE OF INFO. JANUARY 1964 - EARLY JANUARY 1965

DISTR. 19 JANUARY 1965

SUBJECT

COST OF MOBILIZATION OF CUBAN ARMED FORCES AND EFFORT TO ECONOMIZE

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (18 JANUARY 1965)

REF IN 62296

D-AAP-06300

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-6535

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [A HIGHLY PLACED CUBAN OFFICIAL WHO HAS PROVIDED DOCUMENTARY INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN CONSIDERED RELIABLE SINCE FEBRUARY 1964.] (S)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Except for the Brackets JM 6-25-97 (SLD/NSR 8-2-97 JFK)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-22-94 BY SP8 MAC/ICSR (JFK)

105-114543 (JURE)

1. DURING THE YEAR 1964, THE ESTIMATED COST OF MOBILIZATION PER MAN PER DAY TO THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT WAS $5.01 PESOS. THE 32-DAY MOBILIZATION OF 51,000 MEN IN THE SPRING OF 1964 REPORTEDLY COST THE MINISTRY OF THE ARMED FORCES A MINIMUM OF $8,176,320 PESOS. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS MOBILIZATION TOOK PLACE BEFORE AND AFTER 20 MAY WHEN AN INVASION ATTEMPT BY EXILE FORCES LED BY MANUEL RAY RIVERO WAS ANTICIPATED BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT.)

105-114543-

NOT RECORDED
JAN 26 1965

2. DURING LATE DECEMBER 1964 AND EARLY JANUARY 1965, THE MOBILIZATION OF 17,000 MEN FOR NINE DAYS RESULTED IN A MINIMUM COST OF

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXX USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO FBI

CIA/NMCC NPIC TREASURY AD/CI I&NS

58 JAN 29 1965

ORIGINAL FILED IN 113-2-210

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10237-10009
RECORD_SERIES: DL
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 89-43-4926

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:

DATE: 00/00/0000
PAGES: 1
SUBJECT: SEE FBI 62-109060-3681

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 04/15/1994
UPDATE_DATE:
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

8/21/64

SECRET

SECRET

AIRTEL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 4/19/97 As Sanitized.

TO : Director, FBI (62-109060)

FROM: Legat, Bern (62-43) (RUC)

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
11/22/63, DALLAS, TEXAS
MISC. - INFO CONCERNING

See Ser 4820

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ReBuairtel 8/7/64.

Enclosed for Dallas are 25 copies each of insert pages 1 and 2 with results of interview of ANGHEL DRAGOMIR. As instructed by the Bureau, this insert incorporates the translated letter from DRAGOMIR with appropriate comments concerning the matter having been referred to the Bureau for investigation.

Information on an individual by the name ANGHEL DRAGOMIR from Bureau files as included in reairtel has not been included in insert since identity has not been proven and the information is not pertinent in any case.

The other Government agency referred to in the insert is the Research Branch (Covert CIA), the Embassy, Vienna, Austria. (S)

#6454

Classified by SP6 BJA/MDC
Declassify on: OADR 1-17-84
PER CIA LETTER 9-23-88

6 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)(Encl.)
(2 - Dallas)(89-43)(Encl. 50)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(7)

Insert filed for 89 copy pulled. RBS

89-43-4926

SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED ___ FILED ___
AUG 26 1964
FBI — DALLAS

SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10239-10171
RECORD_SERIES: MX
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 105-3702-464

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: TRENT, ROLAND E.
TO: LEG, MX
TITLE:

DATE: 03/13/1964
PAGES: 4
SUBJECT: LHO, POST-RP, ASSOC, BKG, LIAISON WITH MX AUTHORITIES

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 12/17/1998
UPDATE_DATE: 02/14/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-108-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Legat, Mexico (105-3702)

DATE: 3-13-64

(9803 RAD/gcl 10/4/93 JFK) 05 RMB/KSR 1-25-94 JFK

FROM : SA Roland E. Trent

Classified by 9803 RAD/KSR
Declassify on: OADR
7-8-93 RL: JF-16

SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
IS-R-Cuba

Re: [Allegation of PEDRO GUTIERREZ VALENCIA] (U)

On 3-13-64, MARGARITA MUNGUIA, Visa Section, U.S. Embassy, Mexico, D.F., made available visa file data concerning ERNESTO MITRANI LEVY, holder of Cuban passport No. 26367, issued in December, 1959, with expiration date in 1964. (U)

Addresses for this individual were given as Miguel Aleman #259, Apartment #301, Colonia Roma, Mexico, D.F., and Calle Arellano Esquina "C", #269, Havana, Cuba. (U)

MITRANI's date of birth is shown as December 29, 1936, at Havana, Cuba, and he is further described as fair complexion, 5' 7"; 176 lbs.; Cuban national, no scars or marks, brown hair and green eyes. The visa file data also shows MITRANI to be of Turkish extraction. (U)

MITRANI secured a one entry B-2 visa on 1-27-61 valid through 4-27-61, for the alleged purpose of a pleasure trip to Los Angeles, California. (U)

The visa file card contains a photograph of ERNESTO MITRANI and this card indicated his employment as of January, 1961, as a merchant and manufacturer of plastics. (U)

The application made by MITRANI as the U.S. Embassy, Mexico, D.F. in January, 1961, was for a non-immigrant visa to visit the U.S. (U)

5/6/85
Classified by 3042 ~~PNT~~/AHR
Declassify on: OADR

RET

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP3JFK/RH/AHR 7-5-79
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2
DATE OF REVIEW 3-13-84

105-3702-464
SEARCHED ___ INDEXED ___
SERIALIZED M FILED M
MAR 17 1964
LEGAL ATTACHE - MEXICO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED - JBH 9/29/93
(9803 RAD/gcl 10/4/93 JFK)

SECRET

9/8/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mdc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK)

SECRET

The following information is classified "SECRET" and not to be further disseminated without specific authority of the CIA, [Mexico City Station] (S)

As of 7-6-61 one E. MITRANI was working in the Cuban Consulate, Mexico, D.F., [and had reportedly offered to cooperate with anti-Castro persons in Mexico, D.F] (S)

The E. MITRANI, mentioned above was subsequently identified as ERNESTO MITRANI. (S)(U)

ERNESTO MITRANI aka E. Mitrani, mentioned above, was subsequently identified as ERNESTO MITRANI LEVY, who in about December, 1959 was employed as an "Auxiliary Consular Clerk" in the Cuban Embassy, Mexico, D.F. [ERNESTO MITRANI LEVY had reportedly been helpful to anti-CASTRO forces in Mexico.] (S) JOSE ANTONIO PORTUONDO

On October 24, 1960, MITRANI received a telegram recalling him to Havana, Cuba; however, he did not want to return to Cuba, and reportedly went to the then Ambassador PORTUONDO, and explained that he planned on marrying a Mexican girl; that his father had offered him employment in Mexico, and for these reasons he did not want to return to Cuba. PORTUONDO reportedly counseled XXXXXX MITRANI to write to the Cuban Foreign Office in Havana and explain his problem, which xx MITRANI reportedly did. At that time MITRANI was the holder of Cuban Diplomatic passport No. 480 and also held a regular passport. (S)(U)

MITRANI reportedly had arrived in Mexico on December 15, 1959; he was a bachelor at the time of his arrival, and his father was reportedly engaged in business in Mexico. His residence in about 1960 was given as residing at the corner of Avenida Insurgentes Sur and Viaducto Miguel Aleman, Mexico, D.F., telephone No. 11-96-11. The telephone and address data was as of 10-24-60 (S)(U)

MITRANI was reportedly in contact with the USIA, U.S. Embassy, Mexico, D.F., in 1960 in regard to his desire to remain in Mexico, [and MITRANI was reportedly told that a visa to enter the U.S. would be arranged for him if he would publically denounce the Cuban regime] (S)

MITRANI reportedly never publically denounced the Cuban regime although CIA file data reflects that someone wrote to the Cuban Embassy in 1960 stating that MITRANI was a "spy" and cooperating with anti-CASTRO forces. (S)

MITRANI reportedly acting as a "cut-out" supplied one report to the CIA, Mexico City station x which was submitted on or about 8-13-62. (S)

The CIA, [Mexico, City Station] has no data on file concerning MITRANI since 8-13-62. (S)

Above CIA data secured from DAVID PHILLIPS. (S)(U)

SECRET

Secret

MC File review concerning ERNESTO MITRANI revealed the following:

[MC File 105-1713, Ser. 18, Pg. 3, and Ser. 19, (Bufile 105-89084)] entitled ["COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS,] FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA" contains letterhead memorandum dated 10-24-60, which indicates that ERNESTO MITRANI LEVI was then an Assistant Consul, Cuban Embassy, Mexico, D.F., classified "SECRET" [from CIA, Mexico City Station.] (S)

MC File 109-70, Ser. 850, (BUfile 109-12-210) enttiled "FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS -CUBA". Report of SA JOSEPH T. GENCO, 1-12-61, at Mexico, D.F., [contains information from PSI FELIX VALDES (MC File 134-612A) that (FNU) MITRANI, an assistant in the Cuban Consulate, Mexico, D.F., was contemplating defecting and leaving his position. As of 1-5-61, according to the PSI, MITRANI was reportedly still working at the Cuban Consulate.] (U)

Secret.

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

TO : MR. BOARDMAN DATE: January 22, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.

Tolson, Nichols, Boardman, Belmont, Mason, Mohr, Parsons, Rosen, Tamm, Nease, Winterrowd, Tele. Room, Holloman, Gandy

On January 10, 1958, Harry Stone of MI-5, Liaison Representative with the Bureau, confidentially advised that his service had determined that Soviet illegal agents all over the world, when they want a meet with their principal, are under instructions to send a proper communication to "K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R." Mr. Stone stated (S) that the aforementioned information was being made available to the Bureau and the RCMP only.

On the basis of this information, we immediately instructed the Washington Field and New York Offices to institute confidential inquiries with appropriate Post Office officials to determine the feasibility of covering outgoing correspondence from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R., looking toward picking up a communication dispatched to the aforementioned address.

On January 21, 1958, SAC Powers of the New York Office called advising that his preliminary inquiries at first disclosed that such coverage could possibly be effected at LaGuardia Airfield. Powers stated that he subsequently received a call from the Chief Post Office Inspector who told him that he would not be able to make such arrangements and explained that something had happened in Washington on a similar matter and that Bureau Headquarters should take up the matter with Post Office Headquarters here in Washington. The Post Office Inspector said that it did not involve our agency and because of what was going on in Washington at the present time, he just couldn't do it on his own.

Almost simultaneous with this advice, Mr. James Angleton of CIA approached our Liaison Agent, Sam Papich on a personal basis. He indicated that if it were known within CIA that he was volunteering this information to the Bureau, he would lose his job. Mr. Angleton stated it had come to the attention of CIA, through the Post Office, that we were making inquiries concerning the coverage of mail to the U.S.S.R., and as a result CIA was expecting to receive an inquiry in Washington from the FBI. Mr. Angleton then admitted that this coverage was one of the biggest and most secret operations being conducted by CIA. He stated the coverage is actually made through the Post Office in New York

WAB:hmm
(5)
cc: 1 - Boardman
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan

105-93089

SECRET

FEB 20 1958

REC-94

MEMO TO: MR. BOARDMAN
RE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

and in view of the volume of material being sent from the U.S., their coverage is an extensive and expensive operation. He indicated that they had to set up an elaborate array of IBM machines to tally and tabulate the results. In addition a complicated indexing procedure was involved, as well as complex scientific examinations of the material. He said two or three hundred CIA employees are exclusively engaged on various facets of the coverage. Angleton also indicated that the cost of the operation was well over a million dollars a year. He further indicated that the coverage has been in existence in excess of a year and he stated that the sole purpose for the coverage was to identify persons behind the Iron Curtain who might have some ties in the U.S. and who could be approached in their countries as contacts and sources for CIA. Angleton indicated that CIA had successfully developed several sources through this means. He stressed the confidential nature of his information and stated that while other officials of CIA more directly concerned with the coverage were expecting a visit from the FBI, he was passing this along for our guidance.

It would appear that our inquiries of the Post Office officials in New York have flushed out a most secret operation of CIA. The question immediately arises as to whether CIA in effecting this coverage in New York has invaded our jurisdiction. In this regard, it is believed that they have a legitimate right in the objectives for which the coverage was set up, namely, the development of contacts and sources of information behind the Iron Curtain, and according to Angleton they have had some success in this regard. At the same time, there is an internal security objective here in which, because of our responsibilities, we have a definite interest, namely, the identification of illegal espionage agents who may be in the United States. While recognizing this interest, it is not believed that the Bureau should assume this coverage because of the inherent dangers in the sensitive nature of it, its complexity, size and expense. It is believed that we can capitalize on this coverage by pointing out to CIA our internal security objectives and holding them responsible to share their coverage with us. Of course, we are not interested in the identities of the numerous persons in this country legitimately corresponding abroad. The Post Office has indicated there are approximately four thousand items of correspondence to the (U.S.S.R.) each day. Angleton said they have not come up with a microdot or secret message communication as yet.

ACTION:

1. On the basis of our inquiries conducted in New York, we are in a position and should, through Liaison, approach CIA, informing them that it has been indicated that their Agency has coverage of mail going to the (U.S.S.R.) We should get from them the details of their coverage and explain our interest in being furnished with the results of the coverage as it might effect internal security matters.

MEMO TO: MR. BOARDMAN
RE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.

2. It is believed that we can and should furnish CIA with the name and Moscow address furnished us by the British, telling CIA that we want to (S) be advised of any communications going to that address. We will not explain to them our interest in the particular address and, therefore, we will not be violating the confidence of the British. (S)

3. In view of the highly sensitive nature of this coverage, we will have to work out arrangements so that knowledge of it is strictly confined within the Bureau. We will handle this the same as handle communications intelligence data.

OK

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 6, 1958

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference my memo of 1-27-58 advising of the briefing given our Liaison Agent by CIA representatives on 1-24-58 as to the nature and extent of CIA coverage of mail going to and coming from (Russia). Our Liaison Agent determined that CIA began this coverage approximately a year and a half ago through confidential arrangements made with postal authorities. Initially, this coverage involved photographing of envelopes; these envelopes were not to be opened. The envelopes were microfilmed and the names and addresses appearing thereon were indexed with IBM equipment. Several months ago CIA began opening some of this mail, microfilming the contents and indexing pertinent data therein. Approximately 250,000 names have been indexed by CIA. Examination of certain of this mail for microdots and secret writing has been made to a limited extent because the volume of mail has been too numerous for the establishment of a practical system without delaying movement of the mail. CIA has advised that to date it has not discovered any microdots or secret writing or information revealing evidence of Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. CIA has also advised that this program has not reached its full potential, but that its system of opening mail is rapidly increasing. CIA has expressed a willingness to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we feel would be of interest to us.

An analysis has been made of CIA capabilities as revealed to the Liaison Agent and it is believed we should request that CIA furnish us information of the following types, both that which has been received in the past and that which they will obtain in the future:

1) All correspondence of a suspicious nature, such as that containing double talk, et cetera.

2) All correspondence indicating that the (Soviets) may be utilizing a hostage situation, i.e., correspondence indicating pressure being exerted on (Soviet) citizens who have close relatives in the U.S. or pressure being exerted on individuals in U.S.

3) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating weaknesses or dissatisfaction on the part of any Soviet presently in the United States so that the Bureau might give consideration to feasibility of approaching such individuals for defection or double agent purposes.

(105-93089-4)

4) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating Soviet control or direction of the Cp, USA.

(APL) DEM:mn (9)

cc - Messrs. Boardman, Belmont, Branigan, Litrento, Baumgardner, JDDonohue, Papich, Turner

REC-94 EX-135

10 FEB 20 1958

SECRET

55 FEB 27 1958

SECRET

Belmont to Boardman (2-6-58)
re: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.

With regard to the above coverage, it is believed desirable that Liaison make arrangements for us to review at CIA any material of this nature and we will then select that which appears to warrant investigation and then make appropriate checks. This procedure will eliminate having CIA sending us a bunch of worthless material with the possible expectation that we will be running out leads for them. It is believed this arrangement can be ~~worked~~ out with CIA in a proper fashion.

In addition to the above it is believed the following arrangements can be effected with CIA:

1) Place stops against names and addresses of individuals possibly presently engaged in Soviet espionage to determine if they are in correspondence with U.S.S.R. This would include a check of the back traffic on these individuals also. We would, of course, make these stops on a highly selective basis.

2) Request CIA to place stops against addresses in Soviet Russia believed by the Bureau to be mail drops or suspected mail drops. (It should be noted that we already have placed a stop with CIA against the name and address of K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R., which, according to information received from MI-5, is a drop utilized by Soviet illegal agents all over the world arranging emergency meetings.

We will, of course, continue to analyze this coverage by CIA to see that we obtain maximum benefits.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) That information received from this source be hereinafter designated as Bureau Informant 200. Records Section has advised that this informant symbol has not been previously used.

2) That this matter and any mail relating thereto be labeled "June" and then filed and maintained in the Sovme Unit, Room 1734 (the regular repository of "June" mail) to afford maximum security to this source.

3) That our Liaison Agent orally advise CIA of the type of data set forth above that would be of interest to us and make arrangements with CIA so that we can review this type of information in order to select that which we feel will warrant further investigation. Liaison should also perfect the arrangement with CIA so that on a continuing basis we can place appropriate stops with them.

SECRET

(1) CIA ADVISED RE TYPE OF DATA OF INTEREST TO US (2) ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO REVIEW INFO. (3) ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR STOPS

4) In view of the extreme sensitivity of this matter, a confirmatory memorandum will not be furnished to CIA.

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

6 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: HUNTER Report #1

1. The intercept project that has been explained orally to Mr. Papich will be referred to as Project HUNTER in correspondence between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency.

2. This explanatory memorandum constitutes HUNTER Report #1. Future disseminations will be numbered consecutively.

3. In submitting possible traces on individuals of interest to you, reports will be submitted in the following form:

a. If the individual named in the intercept appears to be identical with the individual of interest to you, you will be furnished a reproduction of the exterior, and of the contents if the item has been opened.

b. If the individual named in the intercept is only possibly identical with the individual of interest to you, only machine run listing of the items will be submitted. In such cases a reproduction of the exterior and of the contents, if the item has been opened, will be available upon request.

4. In order to facilitate your reading of machine run entries, there follows an explanation of the various types of replies which you will receive in connection with requests. A hypothetical request for any addressee in the U.S. of mail from P. KROVAN whose location is believed to be in Moscow, might result in the following reply:

REC- 94 105-93089-3

EX-135 10 FEB 20 1958

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

SECRET

Date	Name In	Ref	Loc	Name Out	Ref	Loc	Ban	Firms
A 57C05C3325	KROVAN, Paraskoviya	(*)	ABB	EVOSWA, Wasyl	( )	KM		

This reply has the following meaning:

"A" has no present meaning. All numbers are now preceeded by "A" only to allow for future additional classifications. None are presently contemplated.

"57C05"is the date of intercept, namely: "57" is the year. "C" indicates the month. The code key for months is set out as Enclosure 1. "05" is the day of the month. Thus, "57C05" is 5 March 1957.

The group "C3325" is our own internal filing number.

The "Name In" entry identifies the correspondent inside the USSR.

The asterisk in "Ref" column indicates that KROVAN sent the letter.

The entry in "Loc"(ation) column indicates the area or city inside the Soviet Union from which the letter was mailed. In this case it was mailed from the western section of Ukrainian SSR. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 2. This code key is to be used for all items prior to 1 January 1958, on which date a 4-place code was instituted in order to designate more precisely the localities within the USSR. A copy of this new code is enclosed as Enclosure 3.

The "Name Out" entry identifies the correspondent outside the USSR. In both the "Name In" and "Name Out" columns, the last or family name is listed first.

The absence of an asterisk in the "Ref" column after EVOSWA indicates that she is the recipient of the letter.

The entry in the second "Loc"(ation) column indicates the state of the U.S. (in this case, New Jersey) to which the letter was addressed. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 4. You will note that some 3-digit entries indicate large cities within a state, thus KO indicates New York State and KOA indicates New York City. For your convenience an alphabetical list of the states with their code indicator is set out in Enclosure 5.

The absence of an "X" in the "Ban" column means that the letter was not opened and that only the exterior is recorded in our files.

5. Since the hypothetical request was for mail from P. KROVAN, who is believed to be located in Moscow only the listing as set out above would be furnished, since it would not appear that Paraskoviya KROVAN, located in the western section of the Ukrainian SSR is identical. If in connection with future investigation or information otherwise available, you may believe that KROVAN may be identical with the individual of interest to you, you need reference only the HUNTER report number and request the exterior photographs of item No. A57C05C3325, which will be reproduced from the original film and made available to you.

6. If the hypothetical request is for any mail from the Soviet Union to Rose ESTERSON, who resides in Chicago, the reply might be as follows:

Date		Name In	Ref	Loc	Name Out	Ref	Loc	Ban	Firms
A57D23U	57D18	AVRUNINA, Vera	(*)	AAA	ESTERSON, Rose		KKB	X	

The difference in this listing from that previously illustrated is as follows:

"U" is our internal identifying designator. The first date is the date of the intercept. The second date is the date of the communication inside the letter. The "X" under the "Ban" column indicates the letter was opened. Again this indicator would indicate only a possible identification since KKB under "Loc" indicates California. In this instance upon request, identifying the HUNTER report number and referencing both A57D23U and 57D18 numbers, the outer envelopes and their contents will be reproduced and furnished to you.

7. Normal service of either of the above requests will be 24 hours. In an emergency we could service the request in a few minutes.

8. If your first request had been for KROVAN, or P. KROVAN, or Paraskoviya KROVAN located in the western section of the Ukrainian SSR you would have initially received the photograph of the envelope. Likewise, in the second instance, if your request had

been for (ESTERSON, or R. ESTERSON, or Rose ESTERSON) located in Chicago, or Illinois, you would initially have received photographed copies of the envelope and its contents.

9. In order to insure most efficient servicing of your request, it is suggested that you submit trace requests as follows: List the last name first with any known first and given names or initials, and address including state, city and street, if known. If an exact address is not known, a probable state or section will be helpful but is not required. The same would apply to the (USSR) The above should be listed on duplicate 3 x 5 cards. If only a phonetic name is known, various combinations of spellings would be appreciated, together with any other data such as probable address or area. Where an address is known and there are individuals, other than the subject, at this address to whom the questioned communication might be addressed, their names should also be given. For record purposes and in order to facilitate our answers to your request, would you in turn number each card as HUNTER Request No. ________.

10. On each request will you also indicate whether the request is for a one-time check or whether the name should be put on the Watch List. If the latter, please indicate the duration of the Watch List, i.e. 30, 60, 90 days, or "until cancelled". If a Watch List is requested, you should also indicate the treatment desired when a possible hit is made, i.e. photograph outside only; photograph outside and contents; photograph outside, contents, and examine for S/W or microdots. Specifically indicate any Watch List item which should not be opened. In this connection you may also desire to give us a white list of correspondents of interest to you who are not Watch List subjects but whose mail should not be opened in the course of our normal openings for spot-checking for operational or intelligence information. In some instances you may desire to indicate that you are to be informed immediately when a hit is made and prior to the receipt of the letter by the addressee.

11. It is possible to make a special machine run of the names of all correspondents either addressor, addressee, or both, from any specific area in the (USSR) to the United States or to any specific state or city in the U.S., or vice versa. There are various other combinations that could be run, such as all letters mailed in Florida either on a specific date or for any given period. If the above-listed

or any other type of exploratory processing is desired, a presentation of the problem will enable us to tell you immediately what we can do, how long it will take, and the amount of work that is involved. While this type of service is possible, it does involve a great deal of work and should be requested in connection with very important cases only.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

J. Angleton
James Angleton

Enclosures (5)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Litrento
1 - Schweppe

DATE: 4-21-58

SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200) - Policy

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

(Bureau Informant 200) is the symbol number designated for information furnished by CIA to the Bureau from its coverage of mail going to and from the (USSR). This designation was approved in your memorandum to Mr. Boardman dated 2-6-58. That memo pointed out the willingness of CIA to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we felt would be of interest to us. That memo recommended that Liaison effect arrangements with CIA so that we could review information obtained from that coverage.

CIA is furnishing us with certain of the results of the coverage of Soviet mail under the caption "Project Hunter." Each report received is labeled with a report number, for example, Hunter Report # 19.

The reports received are reviewed in the (Sovme) Unit. When the information fails to indicate which Section or Unit would have a logical interest in the report, the names involved will be searched for identifiable information. When we can locate no such information, a case will be opened if deemed warranted. The objectives of those investigations will be the identification of persons of pro-Soviet sympathies whose dealings with the (Russians) are of a security or intelligence interest, the identification of those individuals who might present logical "hostage" possibilities which could be exploited by the Soviets and the identification of any (Soviet) individual in the U.S. who has indicated weakness or dissatisfaction, a situation which the Bureau might exploit for defection or double agent purposes.

Investigations in the field would include a check of office indices and logical sources and informants in order to establish the subject's background, activities, sympathies and the strategic character of his employment. This could culminate in recommendations for interview to clarify certain points not established by investigation and to determine whether the present activities of the subject are inimical to the best interests of the U.S., provided available information does not dictate against such interview and provided the interview can be conducted without compromising (Bureau Informant 200).

Information from (Bureau Informant 200) would be forwarded to the field, personal attention SAC, utilizing the following or similar phraseology: "Information has been received from (Bureau Informant 200)

(105-67845)
WAB:cvg
(5)

REC- 11 (105-93089-9)

58 MAY 8 1958

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200
105-67845

a most sensitive and reliable source, indicating that John Doe has been in direct contact with....." The contents of the Hunter Report should then be summarized as necessary and paraphrased. Following the reporting of information found in Bufiles on the subject, and instructions regarding the investigation to be conducted a paragraph as follows should also be added: "You are being cautioned that information obtained from Bureau Informant 200 is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau and should not be set forth in any investigative reports. Information from this informant should be utilized for lead purposes. only. You must avoid any statement concerning the scope of the coverage in effect in this instance and under no circumstances is the subject or any unauthorized person to become aware that we have knowledge of his contact with a person in Russia."

In those instances where an opened or closed case file on a person mentioned in a Hunter Report is located at the Bureau, the Hunter Report will be forwarded to the appropriate Section Chief or Supervisor for his information and any action he deems necessary. Said Supervisor might desire to advise the field in the manner described above or place a brief, paraphrased version of the Hunter Report into the subject's main file for information purposes.

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the extreme sensitivity of this source, the knowledge of the same is to be confined to a need-to-know basis. Therefore, within the Domestic Intelligence Division the Section Chiefs of the Nationalities and Intelligence Section, the Internal Security Section, and the Subversive Control Section will be advised of the above procedure for their personal information. All supervisors in the Espionage Section will also be informed of this procedure.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 10, 1961

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Parsons
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Belmont
Mr. D. E. Moore
Mr. Branigan
Mr. W. D. Stewart

SUBJECT: HUNTER
ESPIONAGE - R

Hunter is CIA's sensitive project involving the review of mail going to the Soviet Union. CIA makes available to us results of their analysis relative to this project.

On 3-9-61 during a conference on Soviet illegal espionage activities between Special Agents Papich, Litrento, Duckett and and Messrs. Angleton, Horton and Hunt of CIA, we were advised that C IA has now established a laboratory in New York in connection with this project which can examine correspondence for secret writing, micro dots and possibly codes. He said the laboratory is fully equipped and they would be glad to make its facilities available to us if at any time we desire an examination of this nature to be made in NYC and time was of the essence and would not permit the material to be brought to our Laboratory in Washington, D.C. We expressed our appreciation for the offer and said that in the event we desired to utilize their laboratory, we would contact them.

ACTION: For information.

DEM:td (7)

another inroad!

SA S. J. Papich advised 4/19/61 that Hunter material will increase about 20% since NY Lab now established. WDS 4/21/61

EX-114

REC- 22

105-93589-25

7 MAR 23 1961

63 MAR 28 1961

0-14f (Rev. 10-16-70)

SECRET

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

March 10, 1972

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

BY CIA COURIER

ATTENTION: Deputy Director for Plans, [JAMES ANGLETON]

RE: [HUNTER PROJECT]

JFK(2)

Dear Sir:

☐ 1. For your information, I am enclosing communications which may be of interest to you.

☐ 2. It will be appreciated if you will have the investigation conducted as requested in the enclosed memorandum and furnish the results.

☐ 3. No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter.

REC-50 [illegible]-46

☐ 4. You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection with this inquiry.

☐ 5. Please note change in caption of this case.

☐ 6. Status of case: ☐ Completed ☐ Incomplete

MAR 10 1972

Very truly yours,

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

SECRET

Enc.

Reference is made to your special notation on [Hunter Report] No. 27,226, Item 72A13AM. Attached is a list of types of traffic we would like to receive.

ENCLOSURE

97 MAR 1 1972

1

1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - W. O. Cregar

SECRET

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

March 10, 1972

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

We are in the process of reviewing the Watch List and will advise you of additions and deletions. The following types of traffic have been of assistance and continue to be of interest to us:

1. Current and former [Soviet] exchange students, visitors, researchers and scientists.

2. Current and former [Soviet] official visitors.

3. Current and former [Soviet] nonofficial visitors whose U.S. contacts are subversive, would be of interest to the [Soviets] because of their access to classified data or are in a position to be of assistance to the [Soviets.]

4. U.S. exchange students, researchers and persons who have been in the [USSR] with American exhibitions and delegations.

5. Current and former U.S. students and researchers in the [USSR] who do not come under official East-West Exchange Program. This does not include the short-term student tours but does include individuals who are in the [USSR] for some time. We would, of course, like to receive any traffic on individuals who are there for a short time if they have been sponsored by subversive organizations and subversive individuals or have received special invitations or special treatment from the [Soviets].

6. We have no interest in the hundreds of legitimate travelers who visit the [USSR] on regular tours or go to see relatives. We do have an interest in travel and contacts involving persons on the Watch List; known communists, New Left activists, extremists and other subversives; suspected and known espionage agents; individuals known to be of interest to the [Soviets] because of their specialized knowledge or work on classified matters; individuals who appear to have been compromised; and persons who meet with [Soviets] connected with organizations known to specialize in propaganda or in obtaining information regarding the U.S.

7. Communist Party and front organizations (such as [American Russian] Institute, National Council of [American-Soviet Friendship] and ["Ukrainian News"]), extremist and New Left organizations.

[105-93089
M.E.Triplett]met
(4)

(10-93...-1-96)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[Original to CIA, Att'n James Angleton] by
CIA courier 3-10-72.

SECRET

8. Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committee and Women's Strike for Peace.

9. Communists, Trotskyites and members of other Marxist-Leninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalist and Liberation groups, Venceremos Brigade, Venceremos Organization, Weathermen, Progressive Labor Party, Worker's Student Alliance, Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union and other New Left groups. This would include persons sympathetic to the (Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam and Red China.) Far East

10. (Cubans and pro-Castro) individuals in the U.S.

11. Traffic to and from (Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies.

12. Contacts with the (Soviet Red Cross), particularly those made or received by individuals.

13. (Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad) (contacts with emigres and emigre organizations in U.S.).

14. Traffic between U.S. nationals and aliens in the U.S. with individuals attending such institutions as the (Central Komsomol School and Friendship) University. This would include any aliens in the U.S. who have previously been in the (USSR) as students.

NOTE: Above sent in answer to special notation on Hunter Report 27,226, Item 72A13AM ((105-67845-38542)) reading as follows: "Your 30 October 1962 statement of HUNTER Project requirements does not cover contacts such as the one reflected in attached item. Please advise whether you wish to see traffic from U.S. nationals or aliens temporarily residing in the U.S. (e.g., foreign students) to relatives or friends studying at (Friendship) University or similar institutions. You may wish to take this opportunity to review, and possibly revise, your above-cited requirements statement." Subsequent to 10-30-62 memo, there have been several oral requests for other types (Items 1,2,3,12 and 14) and "Hunter" asked us if we desired information on New Left and Black Nationalist fields on 1-15-69 and we advised them that we did. They had made a similar inquiry regarding P.O. Boxes utilized by the (Soviets by Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad.) Hunter Report 27,226 was dated January 25, 1972, and transmittal letter was signed by James Angleton.

JFK (3)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

1-Mr. E. S. Miller
1-Mr. J. P. Lee
1-Miss M. E. Triplett

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: February 15, 1973

1-Mr. Branigan

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/clj
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
10/26/00

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Purvis
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Ms. Herwig
Mr. Mintz
Mrs. Neenan

Bureau Informant 200 is the symbol number designated for information furnished on a highly confidential basis by CIA and referred to by them as "PROJECT HUNTER."

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, Deputy Director of CIA, has an appointment to meet with Acting Director Gray on February 16, 1973. In this connection, at 5:50 p.m., on February 15, 1973, Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA, advised that the reason for General Walters' visit is to discuss PROJECT HUNTER. Specifically, General Walters will raise the question of the Bureau taking the PROJECT over. Angleton stated that Dr. Schlesinger, Director of CIA, had instructed Walters to meet with Mr. Gray prior to his, Schlesinger's, return from overseas planned for February 19, 1973.

Commencing in January, 1958, and continuing to the present time, the Central Intelligence Agency has furnished this Bureau with the product of its highly confidential review of mail going to and coming from the USSR. Arrangements for this review were obviously worked out between the Agency and Post Office officials and we are not privy to the details.

It is obvious that both incoming and outgoing mail is opened and photographed. At one time in March of 1961, we were advised that CIA had established a laboratory in New York where they could examine correspondence for secret writing, microdots, and possibly codes. At that time CIA offered to make these facilities available if we needed them. During the same approximate time, CIA advised that about 500,000 items per month passed to and from the USSR and about 200,000 of these items are screened. Approximately 1,200 items per month received "close scrutiny."

REC-49

On February 15, 1973, Mr. James Angleton advised that at the present time, he has 9 of his people in Washington working on PROJECT HUNTER, and there are 2 additional personnel working in New York, for a total of 11. Presumably, all or most of these people have Russian language ability. Angleton further

22 FEB 27 1973

EX-103

WAB:hke
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200]

[advised that the U. S. Postal Service had raised a question as to CIA's necessity to continue PROJECT HUNTER in view of possible security problems within the Postal Service.]

The Bureau has always handled [PROJECT HUNTER] material on a strict need-to-know basis. The material received is handled on one desk in the Domestic Intelligence Division where it is screened for items of possible investigative use and retention. Material of no interest is destroyed. [HUNTER] material can be only transmitted to our field divisions in paraphrased form and can only be used for investigative purposes. The material can never be incorporated in any communication which is intended for dissemination outside of the Bureau. [HUNTER] material that is retained is kept in a Special File Room in the Records Branch at the Identification Division Building. Periodically CIA has been furnished with general guidelines as to the material which would be of special interest to our needs. [For example, we are currently interested in material concerning current and former [Soviet] exchange students, visitors, researchers, and scientists.] (S) We are likewise interested in Americans who are in the [USSR] for an appreciable period of time. We are interested in American communists and other extremists who may be corresponding with persons in the [USSR.]

We have always considered the product from [PROJECT HUNTER] as valuable to our investigative interests. [In this connection, it has provided us with the identities of Americans in contact with [Soviet] exchange students in the United States who offer some potential as informants regarding the [Soviet] students' activities. We know from highly confidential sources that a proportion of these students have already been recruited by one or the other of the major [Soviet] Intelligence Services. We know also that many of the exchange students will subsequently be posted to the United States in some official capacity.] (S)

[PROJECT HUNTER] has identified numerous individuals from the United States and from other areas of the world in attendance at the [Central Komsomol School and Friendship] University. (S)

CIA has permitted us to furnish them the names of specific individuals in whom we have an investigative interest, and this has been valuable in covering their activities. [The product from [HUNTER] has also been valuable in identifying [Soviets] who plan to and later visit the United States.] (S)

 SECRET CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200]

The [Soviet Union] is currently building up the number of trade representatives who will be assigned in various areas of the United States where we normally would not have coverage. We anticipate that PROJECT HUNTER would be valuable in providing leads for any necessary coverage of these people. (S)

With the relaxation of tensions between the U. S. and the [USSR] the volume of correspondence has obviously increased. We do not currently know what that volume is. To the best of our knowledge, CIA has maintained this PROJECT smoothly and without hitch. It would be necessary to now examine what security problems the U. S. Postal Service is experiencing.

ACTION:

The above is submitted for possible use by the Acting Director for the visit of General Walters.

EM

G 11-16 9:10 P

[DDK/DmR3]

CONFIRMED WITH GEN. WALTERS FOR 2:00 P.M TUESDAY, 2-20-73

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson, DeLoach, Mohr, Bishop, Casper, Callahan, Conrad, Felt, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, Tavel, Trotter, Tele. Room, Holmes, Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/26/00 BY

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

On January 15, 1969, Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The Hunter project for which we have given the designation of Bureau Informant 200 essentially consists of specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia. If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the Soviet Union it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - Liaison
1 - S. J. Papich

SJP:clb
(6)

REC 102 (105-93089-90)

18 FEB 5 1969

Stops not warranted on black extremists at this time JJD 1/31/69

File in 105-93089

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - W. A. Branigan
1 - A. P. Litrento

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: August 24, 1966

FROM : M. E. Triplett

1 - S. Papich
1 - M. E. Triplett

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

From 8-14-65 through 8-13-66, 3028 Hunter Reports transmitting 6077 items were received from Bureau Informant 200. This is a slight increase (almost 3%) in number of items over the previous year.

Although items were received on a continuous basis, the number dropped during the period of August, 1965, through January, 1966. This is believed to be due to the reorganization, transfer of personnel and change in supervision over the Hunter Project at CIA which was taking place during this time.

From February, 1966, to the present, there has been a marked increase in number of items received. The average for the past four months has been 627 per month, whereas the average for the same period last year was 421. There has been no significant change in the type of material except that more items are being received regarding subjects on whom the source has not furnished information previously, necessitating more research. The value of this material is shown by the fact that there was an increase of 53% in number of new cases opened on the basis of information furnished by the source.

Approximately 580 letters were written on information furnished by Bureau Informant 200 during the past year. This is an increase of approximately 9% over those written the previous year. More than 260 new cases were opened and 96 cases were reopened. The majority of new cases were opened on the basis of travel to the USSR and contacts of U.S. citizens, Latin Americans and Cubans in the U.S. with individuals in the USSR. Information was sent to the field to assist in pending investigations and for information. In some cases, data was extracted from several items, summarized and sent to the field in one communication under more than one caption to show relationships between various subjects.

An analysis of information received from the source during the past year is attached.

105-93087-78

EX-110 REC 5

ENCLOSURE

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

SEP 12 1966

Enclosure

10-30-62

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

After an extensive review of 2500 Hunter Reports since our last memo captioned as above and dated 8/21/62, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project Hunter as it related to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense involved in the preparation of such material.

I Traffic Which Holds No Interest:

1. Soviet-bloc immigrants desiring to repatriate to USSR. These people are interviewed by INS and INS refers anything of interest to us.

2. Americans traveling to the USSR as such travel is permissible and several hundred people a year visit the USSR while on tour abroad as well as Soviets returning to visit relatives. We, of course, have an interest in such travel involving people on the CIA Watch List, known Communist Party members, and suspected intelligence agents.

3. U. S. professors in Academic Research corresponding with each other. It is not likely if U. S. professor is passing any data he would identify himself at the same time.

II Traffic of Specific Interest:

1. All data re Cuba. This serves to identify pro-Castro followers in the U. S.

2. All data re U. S. Cubans in contact with Cubans attending Friendship University in Moscow.

3. All material emanating from Puerto Rico of an Anti-U. S. nature and pro-Soviet.

4. Data re U. S. peace groups going to Russia and while in Russia.

5. Data indicating death of any U. S. Communist abroad.

6. Data re [redacted];

7. Any data on [redacted]

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

8. Any traffic from or to U. S. Students in Moscow or to U. S. persons who were former students in Moscow.

9. Any traffic between U. S. persons who are with a current exposition or a previous exposition in the USSR.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6/9/61

FROM : Mr. W. A. Branigan

1 - W. C. Sullivan
1 - W. A. Branigan
1 - W. D. Stewart

SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200) - POLICY

Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, Callahan, Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Malone, Rosen, Sullivan, Tavel, Trotter, Tele. Room, Ingram, Gandy

The purpose of this memo is to bring to your attention, as a matter of interest, the increase in the volume of Hunter Reports received from CIA, the additional administrative controls instituted to cope with increased volume, and lastly the desirable type of information Bureau Informant 200 has been continually furnishing.

Bureau Informant 200 is the symbol number designated for information furnished on a highly confidential basis by CIA and referred to by CIA as "Project Hunter" and the reports emanating from this project as Hunter Reports. This informant originated in 1/58 and furnished its first Hunter Report in 2/58. As of 6/6/61, we have received Hunter Report number 5005; many reports transmit as many as twelve items, and some reports transmitting up to twenty items. My memo to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated 12/5/60 revealed as of that date 3425 Hunter Reports had been received. You may be interested to learn that in the last seven months we have received 1680 Hunter Reports or almost 50% of the number received from 2/58 until 12/60. On 3/9/61 CIA advised representatives of this Bureau that it had recently established a laboratory in New York City in connection with this project. This laboratory is able to process Hunter material for secret writing, microdots and possibly codes. Our liaison representative advised the laboratory would probably increase the Hunter Report volume to us by 20%; however, from the above figures it appears this increase in volume is far greater than 20%.

A memo W. D. Stewart to W. A. Branigan 2/21/61 re captioned matter recommended and received approval for the utilization of a stamped notation on the front of the Hunter Report permitting the interested supervisor to destroy contents of a Hunter Report if found to be of no value after checking the appropriate block on the stamp indicating his reason for destroying same. Approval to destroy these Hunter Reports was received from CIA which can, if necessary, at a later date reproduce any Hunter Report. A memo from Mr. Belmont 3/3/61 to All Supervisors of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Internal Security and Subversive Control Sections instructed all recipients re use of above-mentioned stamp. In addition, above memo 2/21/61 received approval for a proceedure whereby Hunter Reports would be screened for destruction by substantative desk handling captioned matter prior to sending these reports to Records Section for handling to preclude any indexing or handling which would later be deemed unnecessary if report is destroyed.

(105-93089).

REC-8 105-93089-27 JUN 14 1961

WDS:slj

EX 101

Memo Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY
105-93089

A great deal of material furnished by the informant relates directly to contacts and activities of individuals who are of current interest to us such as top level communists as William Z. Foster and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and such espionage subjects as the Maurice Hyman Halperins, who were identified by Elizabeth Bentley, who stated Maurice Halperin was a source of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. The Halperins are now in Russia. Pertinent information relating to individuals of current interest is passed to the field for its intelligence interest. In addition, material is received which reveals the Soviet sympathies of some U.S. citizens and also indicates certain arrangements with the Soviets which may be considered against the best interests of the U.S. Government. The larger amount of data received tends to confirm information already known and it does not require in itself that the field be advised of same.

The informant furnished two specific Hunter Reports reflecting that two different individuals were sending post cards to USSR with another post card deliberately and carefully sealed to the first post card. In a case opened entitled "V. Podgoretsky, IS - R" (105-98499), the informant advised that both of the post cards forwarded by Podgoretsky contained a clandestine message on the inner side of the back post card. Investigations concerning James D. Cawthon, the former individual mentioned, and Podgoretsky are still in progress.

Typical data furnished by Bureau Informant 200 are set out below:

Information concerning travel plans abroad of several SM-C subjects; one namely, Martin Field (101-1019). Contacts in this country of Security Index (SI) subjects vacationing and studying abroad; namely, Mary Lou Patterson (100-136466). Data relating to a contact by Bernon Ferguson Mitchell with his mother in California. As you recall, Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin were employed at NSA a short time ago before they defected to Russia. Data that one D. C. Mac Donald, Jr. of Brighton, Massachusetts, requested publishers of the Soviet "Pravda" to forward to him old issues of that paper so he could distribute same to Americans in various cities here to improve their language skill and to acquaint them with the USSR. Data concerning numerous individuals who sent New Years greetings to Nikita Khrushchev and expressed their sympathies toward Soviet way of life; namely, Donald A. Sawtelle (105-15570), a New York SI subject. Data revealing a contact by John Peter Grothe (62-105833) with the Minister of Culture in Moscow requesting this individual to promise the Moiseyov dancers would perform in U.S. and also indicating to him he expected to visit USSR again in the near future. Grothe advised him that last year

Memo Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY
105-93089

he worked for Senator Hubert Humphrey as a foreign relations advisor and did a lot of work in field of disarmament. He further indicated he was doing graduate work at Stanford but still served as a consultant to Senator Humphrey. Bufiles reveal one Victoria Ivanova Sandor (105-58070), a Russian-born alien and her husband John Sandor who is presently employed as an attorney in the Office of the Attorney General, State of Minnesota, are close friends of Orville Freeman, former Governor of Minnesota and present Secretary of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. The informant advised recently in regard to Victoria Sandor that she advised her mother in USSR she expected to move to Washington where her husband will work for Secretary of Agriculture, Freeman; that she and her husband will be friends of Freeman and President Kennedy; and that she hopes through these connections she will be able to obtain a necessary permit for her mother to come to the U.S. She indicated she will go to the President, to his wife, or to whomever it will be necessary to achieve this goal.

Information received from Bureau Informant 200 cannot be disseminated directly as it might tend to reveal this highly confidential source; however, the information is used to great advantage by the Bureau for its own intelligence at the Bureau and in the field. Investigations are opened on data furnished as above and if we can ascertain confirmation of same data from our sources in the field we can then appropriately disseminate pertinent information.

ACTION:

None, above data are furnished solely for your information.

(WAB) WAB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN DATE: 8/21/61

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

CLASSIFIED BY 5021LWJ/cly 10/26/00
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

Reference is made to memorandum Stewart to Branigan 8/8/61 re same subject wherein it was requested a conference be arranged between Special Agents Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart and an interested CIA representative to explain to CIA specific type of "Project Hunter" material we desire. JFK CIA

On 8/17/61 Special Agents Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart, and CIA representatives, James Hunt, John Mertz and Thomas Chalmers conferred at CIA concerning the "Project Hunter." The observations set out on pages 2, 3, and 4 of the referenced memorandum were individually discussed with the CIA representatives. They appeared very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and were also pleased with the attention afforded it. Mr. Hunt, at the conclusion of the conference, requested we furnish a set of guides, similar to our aforementioned observations discussed, for his people. Attached is a blind memo for CIA setting forth material in which we have no interest and a specific interest.

In order to better understand the coverage of Bureau Informant 200 the writer specifically asked the following questions and received the following answers:

1. Is the informant covering all traffic or selected traffic?

Answer: Approximately 500,000 items pass to and from each month. Approximately 200,000 items are screened. The other 300,000 escape screening because they pass through at hours when no one is on duty. Of the 200,000 items screened, approximately 1,200 items receive "close" scrutiny.

2. What portion of the informant's coverage are we getting?

ENCLOSURE

Answer: Of the 1,200 items closely scrutinized, we are receiving approximately 250 to 300 monthly.

WDS:ct (4)
Enclosure
(105-93089)

REC- 52

AUG 29 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SECRET

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SECRET

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY
105-93089

3. Why are we getting specific type traffic, i.e., Exchange Students, Vladimir Kazakevich material (Kazakevich is a prolific letter writer now in USSR who was formerly a pro-Soviet economist living in the U.S.), and Intourist traffic (general data re arrangements for Americans traveling to Russia)? (S)

Answer: Exchange Student traffic ("Mother writes to son who is a Soviet-bloc exchange student in U.S. and sends family love" and vice versa. Letters are synopsized and are of no interest as such) has been sent because CIA is surveying a certain area of traffic. Mr. Hunt advised they derived no intelligence benefit from their survey and was interested to learn of our similar results. In regard to Kazakevich CIA develops a great deal of foreign intelligence data from material he transmits and receives. Mr. Hunt felt material would be of interest to us. He was advised we have derived nothing to date from this material as we are soley interested in the individuals involved and in order to protect this highly sensitive informant we do not route the informant's material around for general intelligence interest. Mr. Hunt was advised all of the informant's material is handled on a strictly need-to-know basis and the material retained is under strict control. Mr. Hunt was pleased in regard to our secure precautions as only a very few CIA people have any knowledge of "Project Hunter." In regard to Intourist traffic, Mr. Hunt advised we were furnished same because one of the individuals associated with an Intourist agency was suspected of being a Soviet intelligence contact. Mr. Hunt agreed with our observation that all Americans traveling abroad had to obtain a passport from State Department, such travel to the USSR being permissible, we could obtain any necessary data re an individual from State. (S)

In regard to item number three above, it was agreed we would not receive any more Hunter material re Exchange Students, Vladimir Kazakevich (who alone provided 300 items in 1960) and Intourist traffic. In addition "holiday greeting" type traffic will not be furnished. Specific exceptions to the above-mentioned traffic we will not receive are set out in our blind memorandum to CIA and were set out in the referenced memorandum on pages 2 and 3. (S)

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Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY
105-93089

The matter of receipt of illegible material was also discussed and it was pointed out to Mr. Hunt no matter how important the contents may be if the name and address of the U.S. addressee or addressor is illegible the material is of no value. It was specifically requested more legible material be furnished and, if it was obvious reproduction would be poor, we would appreciate it if U.S. person's name and address could be printed or written out. Mr. Hunt advised they were aware of reproduction problem and stated Xerox equipment was to be installed in the near future. This, he believed, would help the problem.

In regard to the CIA Watch List, approximately 535 names now appear on this list which is supplemented each Monday morning. Mr. Hunt requested we specifically place on this list the individuals on whom we want coverage even though we are presently receiving items re these persons. If their names appear on the Watch List, we will possibly get closer coverage. Attached with the blind memorandum for CIA is a list of individuals presently on the Watch List which Mr. Hunt requested. Interested supervisors will be advised and additional names of Communist Party members now in Soviet-bloc countries will be furnished CIA via our Liaison Agent.

In regard to CIA's sampling of certain types of traffic and furnishing same to us, Mr. Hunt was requested to advise our Liaison Agent what it was doing and after a period of six months we would furnish the results of our observations which would dictate whether we would continue to receive this new type material.

Mr. Hunt desired that in regard to any correspondence with CIA wherein a reference is made to a Hunter Report or the Project Hunter in any way that the letter be sent via Liaison as only a few CIA people have any knowledge of "Project Hunter" and CIA does not want such letters in regular mail channels. JFK (4)(31)

As pointed out in the referenced memorandum, the need for this conference was to insure the Bureau Informant 200 Program will continue to operate under maximum economy and efficiency to the mutual interests of CIA and the Bureau. It is believed as a result of the above conference that the Hunter material now received will be reduced approximately 50%.

SECRET

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Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY.
105-93089

At the conclusion of the conference, (Mr. Hunt) and his aides who were obviously pleased with our observations requested a similar conference in approximately six months. (SA Stewart) will prepare an appropriate tickler in this regard and set same for 2/18/62, at which time a suitable memo will be prepared indicating observations which might be discussed and requesting permission to attend such a conference.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the three copies of the attached blind memorandum be furnished to CIA by our Liaison Agent as a guide to the [Hunter] traffic in which we have an interest.

(WDS) WHD

delivered to CIA 8/23/61 WDS

SECRET

SECRET

1 - Stewart

August 21, 1961

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

After an extensive review of 5600 Hunter Reports transmitting innumerable items, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project Hunter as it relates to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense of furnishing our Bureau this unwanted material.

I TRAFFIC WHICH HOLDS NO INTEREST:

1 - Intourist traffic (general data concerning arrangements for Americans traveling to Russia). Such travel is permissible and arrangements have been previously made through State Department for a passport. (S)

2 - Personal type letters, which have been translated into English, between the United States relatives, sweethearts, stamp collectors, and their Russian counterparts.

3 - Letters to and from Exchange Students, which again are synopsized in English and reveal that "Mother writes to son who is an Exchange Student in the United States and sends family's love," and vice versa. (S)

4 - No "holiday greeting" type traffic desired.

In regard to the above four categories, your Agency's laboratory processes all Hunter material for secret writing, microdots and possible codes and presently furnishes us its observations concerning any one of these appearing in the traffic.

II EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABOVE FOUR CATEGORIES:

A. Any traffic in the above-mentioned nondesired categories wherein the translator feels there is some intelligence significance. Numerous letters have the translator's

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Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram

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(5)

SECRET

comments indicating your Agency's Watch List shows the person is a suspected intelligence agent or that the text of the letter indicates some type of code,, et cetera.

B. Any traffic wherein it is revealed United States addressee or addressor is a United States Government employee or is employed in a sensitive industry, i.e., missile field.

C. Any traffic wherein we have an obvious intelligence interest such as an open offer by an individual to assist Soviets, an indication an individual is going to Russia and wants to become a citizen or wherein any individual professes pro-Soviet or procommunist sympathies.

III WE ARE SPECIFICALLY INTERESTED IN:

1 - All traffic relating to top communists traveling abroad which we have been getting regularly and from which we have been extracting a great deal of intelligence data such as Mary Lou Patterson, the Pittmans, William Z. Foster, Claude Lightfoot, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, et cetera.

2 - All traffic on specific individuals we place on the Watch List.

3 - All traffic on special individuals such as NSA defectors William Hamilton Martin and Bernon Ferguson Mitchell.

4 - All traffic of a clandestine type such as that in the V. Podgoretsky case.

IV

If possible, it would be appreciated if an effort could be made to furnish as legible a copy of Hunter material

Project Hunter

as possible. In particular, if it is evident paper from which copy is to be made is not type to give a good reproduction, it would be appreciated if a notation concerning name and address of United States recipient or sender could be made from original. Frequently, information of interest is received but United States person's name on reproduction is indistinguishable and information becomes of no value.

V LIST OF PERSON DESIRED ON THE WATCH LIST AS OF AUGUST 18, 1961

NAME	ADDRESS
BERLAND, MARK V.	Flat 15 Lasvinskaya St. 11 Perm 24, USSR
FOSTER, WILLIAM Z.	Apartment 6B, 1040 Nelson Avenue, Bronx, New York
HASKELL, ROY	12 Crown Street Brooklyn, New York
KAHN, ALBERT EUGENE	1302 Henno Way, Glen Ellen, California
KOVOLENKO, V. P.	General P. O., Kiev I, USSR
PECHTER, BERNARD DAVID	2161 Shattuck Avenue Berkeley, California
ROBERTS, HOLLAND DEWITTE	383 Hadonia, Palo Alto, California. During Week Days - 787 Castro Street, San Francisco, California
SUCHOBECK, ALEX (NMI)	1315 Lincoln Avenue, Pacific Grove, California

SECRET

Project Hunter

TRILUPAITIENE, ALDONA	131/14-1, Antakaenio Street Vilnius, Lithuania
TRILUPAITIS, LEONAS (also card on Leonas Algeda)	Apartment 1B, 104 Irvington Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/2/62

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Stewart

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

Tolson
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Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

This is to advise you that on 10/31/62 representatives of this Bureau conferred with CIA representatives James Hunt, John Mertz and Thomas Chalmers at CIA concerning "Project Hunter." At this conference our observations concerning Hunter material furnished since our last conference on 2/13/62 were given CIA. In addition, we advised CIA specifically of certain Hunter items which were of no interest to us and of certain Hunter items which were of interest to us. These items were set forth in memorandum form and furnished to CIA; a copy of same is attached.

CIA advised that its Hunter-Don coverage was being operated seven days a week until November 15. This concentrated coverage is for the purpose of determining if there is any illegal agent traffic. After November 15 all Hunter coverage can be expected to be reduced until after the Christmas mail rush has subsided.

The CIA representatives were very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and with the attention afforded it by us. They are very cooperative in that they are willing to focus their attention on any particular phase of coverage we suggest for our own benefit. For CIA's interest we furnished them a copy of the attached memorandum of our analysis of typical information furnished by Bureau Informant 200 of interest to us.

ACTION:

None. Above data furnished for your information.

WDS

WDS:jes
(4)

105-93089

Enclosure

REC-35

105-93089-54

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ENCLOSURE

EX-118

65 NOV 9 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Bland
1 - Baumgardner
1 - Donahoe
1 - Stewart

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 8-25-61

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200-POLICY

Tolson
Belmont
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Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
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Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

On 8-17-61, a conference took place between Special Agents Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart and representatives of CIA in regard to Bureau Informant 200. As a result, CIA was recently furnished a guide as to Bureau Informant material we desire. This guide was prepared after discussion with several members of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Subversive Control, and Internal Security Sections. In addition, CIA was furnished a current list of names previously placed on the CIA Watch List by us. In this regard, the CIA representative advised that, although we are getting coverage on certain individuals, to insure we get complete coverage on each individual we desire it on, they should be specifically added to the Watch List. This Watch List is revised each Monday; therefore, any person not included on this list at present can be included by forwarding a routing slip anytime to W. D. Stewart, Room 644 RB, bearing the individual's name, his address in U.S., and indicating the period coverage is desired. A list will be compiled by Mr. Stewart weekly and furnished to CIA via liaison. The CIA representative further advised that very few people there have any knowledge of "Project Hunter" and that any communication referring to this project or a "Hunter Report" should be forwarded to CIA via Liaison and appropriately flagged for our Liaison agent's attention to avoid the communication getting into CIA's regular mail channel.

The CIA representative further advised, if any security subject travels to the USSR and his name is added to the Watch List, CIA will promptly afford him coverage while he is abroad.

JFK JFK

EX-107 REC-47 105-93089-32

RECOMMENDATION:

That the above information be discussed at the next conference held by the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Subversive Control, and the Internal Security Sections and that all agents in the above-mentioned sections be reminded to furnish Mr. Stewart a copy of any letter prepared from Bureau Informant 200 material to assist him in continually evaluating the program.

WDS:ekg
(7)

(105-93089)

WDS WAB

Done at Section Chiefs Conf 9/1/61, Names will be submitted thru Section Chief.

5-WDS

99

10/30/62

RE: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Typical data furnished by Bureau Informant 200:

Information indicating travel plans to the USSR of numerous Communist Party subjects; data indicating pro-Soviet sympathies of U. S. individuals; data indicating a U. S. person may be serving as a Soviet courier; data indicating the existence of particular Russian social and art clubs in the U. S.; data indicating a desire of U. S. students to study in USSR; data indicating pro-Castro sympathies of U. S. persons; data revealing present activity, feelings, and former associates of Bernon Ferguson Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin, recent National Security Agency (NSA) defectors; data revealing U. S. military personnel are in contact with official establishments and/or individuals in USSR; data revealing activities of the Maurice Hyman Halperins, now residing in Cuba, and of their son David Carlos Halperin, a medical student at the University of Chicago; and data indicating current whereabouts of Carl and Alice Jerome, Communist Party subjects; and data relating to the current whereabouts of James M. McMillin, Jr., a former U. S. soldier attached to U. S. Embassy, Moscow, Russia, who previously defected and married a Soviet.

Data of Special Interest:

During the present Cuban crisis, we have identified several pro-Castro sympathizers in U. S. through their contacts with Cubans at Friendship University, Moscow, and have been alerted to their activity. We have learned that Russian school authorities are greatly displeased with Huldah S. Clark, daughter of Negro Communist Party subject William Clark of Newark, because of her behavior. She too evidenced discontentment there. Her educational trip to USSR served as CP propaganda. We were alerted to Maurice Halperins' intended return to U. S. We have been advised of Lillie Mae Teslich's intended visit to USSR. Her daughter in Moscow is suspected as being the propaganda-radio announcer "Moscow Molly." We are developing U. S. contacts of Helen Kagen-Pozner, UN employee discharged in 1950's for failure to answer questions re possible espionage involvement, through correspondence of her with relatives in Russia.

(105-93089-54)

such as (Valeriy Tereshchenko). One of (Tereshchenko's) contacts is believed to be a target for contact by (KGB) and another is the son-in-law of the woman in whose apartment (Viktor Kravchenko) had been visiting. (Kravchenko) is a (Soviet) defector who recently committed suicide. The informant has advised of the activities and contacts of (Vladislaw Krasnow, Soviet) defector to Sweden in 1962. The Bureau was not aware previously that (Krasnow) was in the U.S.

Although much material regarding communists and the Communist Party (CP) is also received from other sources, the informant continues to furnish additional details and new information regarding changes of employment and residence, travel, contacts and activities. Data regarding attempts of the DuBois Clubs to expand nationally and internationally was furnished in items on (Paula Garb), International Secretary, who went to the (USSR) to marry a (Soviet) if he can obtain a divorce. Items pertaining to (Mary Lou Camacho) (daughter of CP leader) told of the birth of her daughter, reconciliation with her (Cuban) husband, plans to go to Cuba to live and that one of her friends, a Security Index subject, was in Ghana when she was believed to be in the U.S.

Data is received regarding travel and contacts of (Mary Rakoczy) (widow of suspected espionage agent), who attended the (Higher Party School of the Ukraine in Kiev, USSR). Information continues to be received regarding her son, (Andrew Rakoczy,) who was allegedly studying ballet but actually attended the above school for almost two years. This has included his contacts, change of employment and residence and racial, poverty and Progressive Labor Party activities in Chicago. One of his contacts now at this school has been identified as (Teddie Kardash), son of Canadian communists. The source has also advised that (Irene Rakoczy) and three unidentified individuals plan to study dancing in (Kiev) this summer (possibly at the above-mentioned school which maintains a special section to combine lessons in dancing and indoctrination) and that (Bernard Francis Taylor) (son of CP official), who went to the (USSR) with a musical and dancinggroup, remained in (Kiev) to attend school. (Don Zurilko), son of the alien wife of a U.S. citizen residing in State of Washington, is attending school in (Kiev). He is believed to be from the U.S. or Canada.

Additional information is received regarding persons involved in the peace movements, anti-Vietnam demonstrations, women's organizations, "teach-ins" (one has been in contact with a (GRU) officer), racial matters, Progressive Labor Party, Students for a Democratic Society, DuBois Clubs, Students Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and other organizations. Items reveal names of U.S. contacts with members of such (Soviet) propaganda organizations as the (Soviet Peace Committee, Soviet Women's Committee, Committee For Return to the Homeland) and others.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 27, 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Stewart
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Harrell

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, Casper, Callahan, Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, Tavel, Trotter, Tele. Room, Holmes, Gandy

For approximately one month beginning in February, 1963, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had coverage of mail destined to Cuba which was funneled through New York City from approximately one-half of the United States. The results of this highly confidential project were furnished us under the code "Hunter-Vince" through special arrangements made with CIA. The project has been temporarily discontinued so CIA can analyze the results and decision will be made as to its reinstitution based on the results achieved.

During the period the coverage was in effect, we received 94 items and opened 15 new cases based on the material. While no specific data was developed indicating clandestine messages were being transmitted, we know that one of the illegal Cuban agent networks has plans for mail drops in the New York City area, and this coverage could conceivably lead us to these drops in the future. We have previously furnished CIA summaries concerning positive results achieved through its coverage of Soviet mail for its assistance in evaluating whether that program should be continued. It is believed we should do so in this instance.

ACTION:

If you approve, the attached memorandum containing a summary of the action taken by us as a result of the Hunter-Vince coverage will be furnished CIA by liaison for assistance of CIA in evaluating whether the program should be continued.

Enclosure

105-93089

RAM:djw
(8)

EX-102 REC-52 105-93089-606

17 APR 3 1963

ENCLOSURE

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INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM (BUREAU INFORMANT 200)

Data received regarding the following current and former double agents and sources has been utilized to evaluate their reliability: (Luke Chia Liu Yuan; Pedro Celestino Jimenez Moreno; Gordon Philip Polley; Hugo Rodriguez-Ramirez; Julius Shell; NH 445-S; Phyllis Oja; Samuel Jaffe; NY 2911-S; NY 3556-S; CG 6562-S; Mr. and Mrs. George R. Atkins; and Boris I. Oblesow) (S) The field has been advised of individuals in close contact with (Soviets) with the request to consider for development as sources.

Information regarding (Soviet) exchange students (eight are (KGB) agents) includes names of associates, activities, travel, types of material requested to obtain and individuals with whom they continue to maintain contact after they leave the U.S. Similar information is furnished regarding other (Soviets) in the U.S. as a result of the exchange program. Material is also furnished regarding U.S. citizens who travel to the (USSR) as part of the exchange.

Data regarding current and former U.S. exchange students shows (Soviet) and U.S. contacts before and after return, romantic involvements, sympathies and difficulties encountered in (Russia). A former exchange student has been in contact with a suspected espionage agent regarding (Ralph Matlaw) (according to (Nosenko) the (KGB) was to attempt recruitment of (Matlaw)). The source has revealed former exchange student (Michael Cole's) travel plans and continued contacts with (Soviets) (one is son of an espionage agent) and (Henry Huttenbach's) attempts to obtain a divorce in order to marry a (Soviet) girl. Similar information is furnished regarding U.S. citizens who are, or have been, in (Russia) but are not under the exchange program. These include (Sally Harris, Natasha Kent, Kathy Boudin and Alexander Nikolauk). Two of the four U.S. citizens who have applied for entrance to (Soviet) universities have stated that they desire to become (Soviet) citizens. (Milagros Ruiz Aponte, Puerto Rican nationalist in the USSR) is using an alias in her correspondence. Another (Puerto Rican) went to (Cuba) before he left for the (USSR).

Material has been received regarding three employees of USIA, two U.S. citizens employed by the UN, a Federal employee who intends to marry a (Soviet) girl, three individuals involved with (Soviet) women and two U.S. contacts of (Galina Smirnova (an Intourist guide) who has compromised Americans in the past).

Contacts of foreign exchange students and aliens in the U.S. from (Canada, Peru, Cuba, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile, Haiti, Italy, France, Iraq and Africa) with their friends in the (USSR) who are studying at (Friendship) University or other schools show that

they may be communists. Two foreign students and an exile from Haiti have been acting as intermediaries. Several have applied for admittance to Friendship University and other schools in the USSR because of finances or ideology. A Nicaraguan Marxist in the U.S. is acting as an intermediary for an individual at Friendship University by forwarding mail to Bolivia. Data is furnished regarding foreign students who attended school in the USSR and are now in the U.S. One of these appears to have been compromised before he left Russia and another brought his Soviet wife to the U.S.

Items are received regarding Soviets who have entered the U.S. as wives of Americans: Victoria Sandor (now a Federal employee); Ala Anderson; Ludmila Olsen who has advised that she was approached by Soviet Intelligence when in the USSR in 1965; Irina Horwitz; Nataliya Konigsford; and Rosita Brayton wife of an Alaskan politician and newspaperman, who has become involved with a Russian-born U.S. Army Captain. The source advised of contacts, travel and study in the USSR of Mrs. Kemp Tolley, Soviet wife of former U.S. Naval Attache, who has admitted furnishing information regarding Americans to the Soviets in the 1940's.

Much material has been furnished regarding U.S. citizens' travel plans, including those of known subversives, their Soviet relatives and contacts and difficulties encountered by two tourists with Soviet authorities. Data has been received regarding Soviets and former U.S. citizens who have traveled, or intend to travel, to the U.S., their contacts, activities and relatives. Several had renounced their U.S. citizenship and had been engaged in questionable activities in the past. Mary Mackler, who recently returned to the U.S., has had numerous contacts with known subversives, at least two of whom were connected with espionage in the past. Material is received on U.S. defectors now in the USSR.

Additional information received includes: plans of seven individuals to repatriate to the USSR; U.S. contacts with current and former known and suspected Soviet agents now in the USSR (Vladimir Sossinskiy, Vladimir Pozner, Eugenia Olkhina, Leonids Rimjans, Vladimir Paramonov, Igor Melekh and others); activities and contacts of current and former known and suspected espionage agents now in the U.S. (Aaron Pressman, Josef Zarovich, Victor Perlo, Helen Pozner Wilga and others); the death of Georgi Lieb (suspected of working as black market currency operator for KGB) and continuation of his contacts by his wife; activities of Kirill Alexeev (suspect in Umbel case) family; Soviet contacts of Gerard Piel who has been in contact with a KGB officer; Soviet contacts and travel of D. G. Brennan who, according to Federa, was to be approached by KGB; contacts of Olga Yourkevitch (widow of ship designer) with KGB agent, travel to USSR as a guest of organization to receive her husband's archives and her illness in the USSR; contact of Major Abdel Okeil of United Arab Republic who was attending the FBI National Academy with individual in the USSR; U.S. contacts of several defectors and Soviet repatriates,

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10273-10104
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-116395-1640

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE
TITLE:

DATE: 02/16/1967
PAGES: 102
SUBJECT: CIA, NATIONAL STUDENT ASSOC, PICKETING, DEMONSTRATION

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 10/30/1998
UPDATE DATE: 02/14/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

Consultation

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(C)

JFK Act 6 (4)

COMMENTS: EBF, INC 2 ADMIN PAGE, 3 T/T, 34 MEMO, 5 LTR, 2 LHM, 6 NEWS ARTIC, 8 A/T

2/18/67

AIRTEL   AIRMAIL

TO: SAC, JACKSONVILLE

FROM: SAC, JACKSON (166-NEW) (P)

WENDELL R. MELCUIST;
ANTHONY LENNON;
ITAR - GAMBLING
(OO: Jackson)

Informant

On 2/16/67, (PCI LOUISE SKELTON, Biloxi, Miss.) advised on 2/7/67 above subjects registered into the Travel Inn Motel, Biloxi. PCI stated that at time of registration above subjects furnished the following information on their motel registration card:

IRAN   WENDELL MELQUIST

"WENDELL R. MELQUEST   MISS
~~260 Vernal Street~~
~~Eugene, Oregon~~
B. APPROX 1937-1942

"1965 Ford, Florida License 8W20164
Employed, U. S. Government"

"ANTHONY LENNON
~~43-24 165th Street~~ MISS
Flushing, N. Y.   DC
"Self-employed"
B. APPROX 1937-1942

PCI described MELQUEST as a white male, age 25-30, height, 5' 5", weight 150 to 160 pounds, dark hair, brown eyes, medium complexion, and subject LENNON as a white male, age 25-30, height 6', weight 175 pounds, light brown or sandy hair, fair or light complexion with freckles.

2 - Jacksonville
2 - New York
1 ~~2~~ - Portland
2 - Jackson (166-NEW)
WDJ/bjk (8)
1 - Bureau 4-12-67

62-80750-4512

ENCLOSURE

166-94-1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 3/6/67

FROM : [LEGAT, HONG KONG] (X)(U) (80-2)

SUBJECT: (X) RELATIONS WITH [CIA] (S)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS JM 6-18-97

ReBulet 2/8/67.

[Assistant Chief of Station, CIA,] Hong Kong, has (S) advised that the situation in Macau has returned to a degree of normalcy in which covert inquiries can again be handled in that colony with no more difficulty than before. (X)

This is submitted for info of Bureau supervisors handling [Chinese] investigative matters. (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

9/29/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668-SLD/nk
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

9/25/95
Classified by 5668-SLD/nk
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

P2 and Bracketed info Classified per Agency ltr dated 11/26/97
9803 RDD/JGL #211,326 5/14/92

1 - Bureau
(1 - Foreign Liaison)
1 - [Hong Kong] (X)(U)
DAC/djw
(4)

REC 10 62-80750-45-(?)

10 MAR 13 1967

EX-114

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

6 MAR 21 1967

SECRET

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS
JM 6-25-97
(SLD/LLSR 8-3-97) JFK

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: March 15, 1967

FROM : R. I. Shroder

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Thompson
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Trotter

Tolson, DeLoach, Mohr, Wick, Casper, Callahan, Conrad, Felt, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, Tavel, Trotter, Tele. Room, Holmes, Gandy

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA
[CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)] (U)
INTERNAL SECURITY - VENEZUELA
KIDNAPING

[C.I.A.] (U)

This relates to information received from CIA indicating the possibility that the Communist Party of Venezuela may attempt to kidnap the child of [a CIA employee Thomas Keogh.] (S) No investigation is being conducted by us and appropriate dissemination has previously been made. (S)

At our suggestion, [through liaison with CIA, fingerprints and photographs have been obtained and were furnished to SA W. O. Cregar by Mrs. Jane Roman of CIA on 3/10/67. This material is being made part of this file for possible use in the event of a kidnaping. Photographs and fingerprints are of the following individuals: Joseph Edward Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, Jr.; Christina Margarita Keogh; Elizabeth Teresa Keogh; Francis Xavier Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, III, and Maria Rita Keogh.] (S)

Agency info classified per CIA ltr 11/26/91. 9803-RDD gcl #211326, 5/14/92

ACTION:

[MRS THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH JR] (S)

This matter has been coordinated with the Identification Division and it is recommended that this memo and attachments be sent directly to SA Carl Volker, Room 4125, IB, in order that the fingerprints may be promptly classified and filed.

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

REC 33

ST-114

62-80750-4563

FDT:emf
(7)

MAR 20 1967

Fingerprints of following detailed and filed ...

MARIA RITA KEOGH
EDWARD JOSEPH KEOGH
CHRISTINA MARGARITA KEOGH
ELIZABETH TERESA KEOGH
FRANCIS XAVIER KEOGH
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH JR.
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH III

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

9/25/95
Classified by SLD/LLSR/...
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

SECRET

71 MAR 29 1967

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classified by 5668-SLD/mlc
Declassify on: OADR
9/25/95

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 3/15/67

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 6-18-97

In connection with developments in the case captioned "NK 2264-S, (IS-R," Bureau file 134-9824, the (S) Director noted "I note more and more we are telling CIA about our domestic operations and always to our detriment. I want this trend stopped. H." (A separate memorandum is being submitted concerning a new development in the aforementioned case).

On 3/15/67, the Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, and took the opportunity to review the status of relations between FBI and CIA. It was felt that this was an opportune time to do so in view of the Director's concern as expressed above.

Helms stated that he personally was pleased with relations between the two Agencies. He stated that sometimes he is irked or disturbed when people outside and inside of the Government ask the question "How are you getting along with the FBI?" He indicated that this question is frequently asked by members of Congress. Helms stated that he religiously has followed a practice of lucidly and firmly advising such people that relations are excellent. He stated that he personally believed that this was true.

The Liaison Agent commented that working relations are good, but there was an area which might not be getting proper attention. The Agent stated that there was reason to be concerned regarding effective coordination on those cases which are of interest to both FBI and CIA because there appeared to be developing an atmosphere where people in both Agencies felt that there was now wide-open liberty to conduct operations and activities of a joint nature. The Agent stated that he wished to emphasize that such an atmosphere cannot exist and that Mr. Hoover would never condone any trend in this direction. The Agent commented that work in this area had to be very efficiently coordinated and that we in the Bureau were closely scrutinizing each situation as it develops where both Agencies had an interest. The Agent suggested that Mr. Helms might desire to alert appropriate subordinates in the Agency on this point. 62-80750-4564

CLASSIFIED BY 5668-SLD/mlc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)
9/25/98

REC 51

CONTINUED - OVER

SJP:rab
(6)

SECRET

MAR 20 1967

59 MAR 24 1967

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/17/67

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________ (Priority)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT.

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-80750)

FROM: SAC, WFO (66-3896)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

On 3/15/67, PSI EMIL R. SVEILIS, the late night desk editor, United Press International, Washington, D. C. who has furnished reliable information in the past, said that he wished to advise this office that he overheard comments indicating that CIA had contributed at least one million dollars to the National Council of Churches. He also advised that he understood that the CIA maintains a "safe house at the Airle House, Warrenton, Virginia." He was questioned specifically about the source of the above information and indicated that he believed that he heard this information from individuals connected with the news media but he could not recall the exact identity of these individuals. He indicated that he got the impression that this information was common knowledge in the news field.

The Bureau may wish to advise CIA by appropriate channels concerning the information that the CIA had allegedly contributed money to the National Council of Churches and maintains a "safe house" at Warrenton, Virginia. This information was not put in LHM form because of its general character and because the PSI was unable to recall his source of this information or when the information came to his attention.

The PSI requested that his identity be protected.

3 - Bureau
2 - WFO
(1-134-7249 Sub A) (SVEILIS)

PAT:mfd
(5)

REC-35 62-80750-4565

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-nel without the express approval of the FBI.

AIRTEL

Approved: ______________________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

INT. SEC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. J. P. MOHR

DATE: 3/24/67

FROM : MR. I. W. CONRAD

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TOUR OF LABORATORY BY TECHNICAL PERSONNEL OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(U)

[Mr. Lon Thomas, Document Examiner for] CIA, called this afternoon to inquire if a tour could be arranged through the FBI Laboratory for himself and two of his co-workers, [Mr. Joseph Hall and Stanley Schultz.] They have [C] no specific problems, but merely wish to visit our facilities briefly. Accordingly, tentative arrangements have been made for the requested tour at 1 p.m., March 29, 1967.

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD /KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)
8-2-97

ACTION:

Unless advised to the contrary, the tour will be conducted as requested.

Bracketed info Classified per CIA ltr 11/26/91 Remainder is unclass. 9803-Rdd/gel #211,326 5/14/92.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR the BRACKETS
JM 6-25-97

1-Mr. Wick (Att: Tour Room)
1-Mr. W. C. Sullivan (Att: Mr. S. Papich)
1-Mr. Conrad
(4) IWC:dmg

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

(SLD /KSR 8-2-97 JFK)

9/25/95 Classified by 5668 SLD/mdc
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

REC 4 62-80750-4567

18 MAR 31 1967

handled 3/29/67

CONFIDENTIAL

SEVEN

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59 APR 10 1967

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. DATE: 4/4/67

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) ALIEN INTERVIEW REQUESTS] (C)

Re memorandum Cotter to Sullivan dated 3/28/67, which instructed the Liaison Agent [to advise appropriate CIA] representatives of the change in handling [alien interview] requests at the Bureau. (C)

On 3/31/67, the Liaison Agent advised [Mr. Leo Dunn] of the change in handling [alien interview] requests at FBI Headquarters. [Dunn] was advised that the overall coordination for handling these requests would be handled by the Bureau's Name Check Section under the coordination of Special Agent J. W. Brown.

Inasmuch as CIA occasionally makes a telephonic request when expedite matters are involved, the Liaison Agent obtained the names of Eugene Young and Becky Vaughn as the persons who would call Special Agent Brown in the event an expedite matter is involved. CIA is well aware that the use of this telephonic request should be held to a minimum and used only at times when time is of the essence and the matter is of sufficient importance to deviate from the normal request procedures. (C)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classification Per CIA Ltr. 11/26/91. 9803-Rdd/gcl #217,326 5/14/92

ACTION:

The above is directed to the Name Check Section for their information and attention.

1 - Mr. Scatterday (J.W. Brown)
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. Cregar

9/25/95
Classified by 5668 SLD/jude
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

REC- 47 62-80750-457

WOC:rab
(6)

8 APR 7 1967

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CONFIDENTIAL

56APR 17 1967

NAME CHECK

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10279-10018

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 109-12-221-1790

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/30/1967
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
EGD, ASSOC, ARRESTED, ROLE, ACAPULCO MURDERS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Confidential
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/30/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN -41475

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC USIA NSA ONE OCR ORR SDO DCS AID CGS

FBI

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE TDCS-314/13013-67

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 300659Z

DIST 30 AUGUST 1967

Political Matters

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 28 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT: ARREST OF FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES FOR AGITATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN GUERRERO

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (29 AUGUST 1967) FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-11,295

SOURCE: [MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICER WITH ACCESS TO INFORMATION] (C)

[DERIVED FROM INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES.] (C) HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE SINCE EARLY 1966.

MEXICO

REC 39 5-

1. (FIELD COMMENT: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL DEPUTY FROM THE STATE OF VERACRUZ, CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES, IN THE CLASH BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS OF THE COPRA GROWERS' UNION IN ACAPULCO, GUERRERO, OVER THE WEEKEND OF 19-20 AUGUST 1967, RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF ABOUT THIRTY PERSONS AND THE WOUNDING OF ABOUT ONE HUNDRED, HAS BEEN WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN THE MEXICAN PRESS. THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT HE WOULD BE ARRESTED, BUT FOR HIS CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY. HIS IMMUNITY, HOWEVER, EXPIRES

109-12-221-1790

SEP 6 1967

Copy to ___ by routing slip for ☑ info ☐ action date 9-1-67 by

232

54 SEP 12 1967 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM 279-100 18

109-12-221

279-10018

AUG 31 11 45 AM '67

LIAISON SECTION, FBI

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

WITH HIS TERM ON 1 SEPTEMBER.)

MEXICO

2. ON 28 AUGUST 1967, AGENTS OF THE MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT (GOBERNACION) ARRESTED FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL AS HE WAS LEAVING THE HOME OF ELENA GARRO DE PAZ, LEFTIST MEXICAN PLAYWRIGHT. HE IS BEING INTERROGATED ABOUT HIS ROLE IN THE "ACAPULCO MURDERS."

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO

REPORT CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10279-10020

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 109-12-221-1792

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/30/1967
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
EGD, CLASH, RIVAL FACTIONS, COPRA GROWERS UNION, ACAPULCO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Confidential
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/30/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN -41475

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC USIA NSA ONE OCR ORR SDO DCS AID CGS

FBI

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE TDCS-314/13013-67

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 300659Z

REC 18

DIST 30 AUGUST 1967

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 28 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT: ARREST OF FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES FOR AGITATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN GUERRERO

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (29 AUGUST 1967) FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-11,295

SOURCE: [MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICER WITH ACCESS TO INFORMATION](C) (C)[DERIVED FROM INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES.] HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE SINCE EARLY 1966.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL DEPUTY FROM THE STATE OF VERACRUZ, CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES, IN THE CLASH BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS OF THE COPRA GROWERS' UNION IN ACAPULCO, GUERRERO, OVER THE WEEKEND OF 19-20 AUGUST 1967, RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF ABOUT THIRTY PERSONS AND THE WOUNDING OF ABOUT ONE HUNDRED, HAS BEEN WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN THE MEXICAN PRESS. THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT HE WOULD BE ARRESTED, BUT FOR HIS CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY. HIS IMMUNITY, HOWEVER, EXPIRES

109-12-221-1792 REC 18 18 SEP 6 1967

Copy to ___ by routing slip for ☑ info ☐ action date 9-1-67 by ___

57 SEP 11 1967

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM 109-12-221

279-10020

AUG 31 11 45 AM '67

LIAISON SECTION FBI

IN-41475

TDCS -314/13013-67

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

WITH HIS TERM ON 1 SEPTEMBER.)

2. ON 28 AUGUST 1967, AGENTS OF THE MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT (GOBERNACION) ARRESTED FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL AS HE WAS LEAVING THE HOME OF ELENA GARRO DE PAZ, LEFTIST MEXICAN PLAYWRIGHT. HE IS BEING INTERROGATED ABOUT HIS ROLE IN THE "ACAPULCO MURDERS."

Mexican

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO

REPORT CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/1/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10279-10209

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-67406-20

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : EDWARDS, SHEFFIELD
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 04/09/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
PPJM, RECRUITMENT, AMERICAN CODE CLERK A/O
DIPLOMAT IN MOSCOW, KGB

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/22/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

Subject advised that Nina and Ed Stevens do a lot of entertaining but he had never attended any of their parties. Subject stated that he would not trust Nina Stevens as far as he could throw an elephant. Subject stated that he had no proof but believed Nina to be a Soviet informant.

Subject advised that Aline Mosby was a newspaperwoman in Schapiro's office. Mosby, during the past year, had been in the hospital on several occasions and one didn't see too much of her. Subject also advised that Mosby stuck mostly to the foreign circuit rather than the Embassy circuit. Subject stated that one of the reasons Mosby was in the hospital on one occasion was the fact that she had an abortion, according to gossip.

Subject stated that another newspaperwoman in Moscow was Priscilla Johnson. Subject advised that Johnson had the reputation of being a fairly good reporter and one whom the Soviets kept on a month to month visa basis. Subject indicated that it was highly possible the Soviets had attempted to recruit Johnson as she spent a lot of time with Soviet nationals.

Subject was queried as to whether he had ever made an unauthorized disclosure of classified information in the Soviet Union, to which he replied that he had not disclosed classified information as such. He stated that his cover, which he had used for the period in between [State Department] (S) assignments, was that he was a [consultant of the AEC, particularly to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, composed of AEC, CIA, State, NSA, Joint Chiefs, and the Armed Services.] (S) Subject stated that he had indicated to individuals, when questioned, that he had done economic research and analysis in the Soviet field and that he had done this ever since he had first become a [State Department] (S) employee. Subject stated that among others he had discussed this with [Ray Hutchins, his counterpart in the British Embassy.] (S)

Subject was asked for his itinerary on his return trip to the United States. Subject stated that he had long planned to come home via the Far East and it was a well publicized plan. He stated that when he left Moscow he stayed over in Delhi for a week to see if there were any objections from Headquarters as to his itinerary. He stated that when he received no instructions to the contrary, he returned to the United States via his previously announced plans and the differences in fares being borne by him.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10279-10258

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 109-12-221-417

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, MX
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 02/10/1960
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
NRO, INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, MATEOS, LOPEZ, SOUTH AMERICAN TRIP, CARIBBEAN POLITICAL SITUATION, CUBAN EXILE ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE

COMMENTS :

SECRET

Date: 2/10/60

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Mexico (100-743G)

Subject: MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

8-10-94 05 Declassify on: OADR

2/13/78 JSG Serial
HSCA re 12/22/77 Request re Rothman
Classified by SPLBJW/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 2/8/85

SYNOPSIS

LOPEZ MATEOS' SOUTH AMERICAN TRIP (cont.)(page 2): Recent South American trip of Mexican President gave emphasis to need for coordinated effort in resolving economic problems of Latin America. Talks dealt with stimulation of commerce, but for present principal importance of trip seems to have been emotional rather than materialistic. DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS (page 3): While recently in Caracas, Venezuela, SIQUEIROS made statements critical of both Mexican President and Mexican Revolution. Mexican administration and public angered by remarks. CARIBBEAN POLITICAL SITUATION (page 3): Cuba. Meeting sponsored by Society of Friends of Cuba held at Mexico City, 1/17/60, to demonstrate support for Cuban Government. Nicaragua: Report received that Cuban Government still planning to support invasion of Nicaragua with pro-Communist elements. Haiti: Political situation reported to be deteriorating. [PARTIDO COMUNISTA MEXICANO - PCM (COMMUNIST PARTY OF MEXICO)] [U] (page 6): XIII National Congress, scheduled for 2/22-26/60, again postponed to provide more time for holding of State Congresses and preparation of discussion material. POCM representatives to be invited to attend Congress. Federal District Committee to step up dues collections and general cell activity. JCM held plenum 1/11-14/60. (U) PARTIDO POPULAR - PP (POPULAR PARTY) (page 7): PP being reorganized and members being solicited to submit background and other data. PP held annual New Year's banquet on 2/6/60. PP inaugurated Pioneers, Boy Scout type organization, on 2/5/60. VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO (page 8): LOMBARDO was principal speaker at PP New Year's banquet and generally spoke favorably of government of LOPEZ MATEOS and his trip to South America. [SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES] (S) (page 9): [VALENTIN VASILEVICH BAKULIN] identified as [new Soviet principal of MEX-87.] (S) Latter made trip to Los Angeles in [January,] 1960, and reported [S] to Soviets.] (S)

8 - Bureau
1 - Mexico City
JNS/GFM/SWP/JTG:plb
(9)

REC 74 105-221-417
FEB 15 1960
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1 - Ag, CP, Rd, SA
SD, Moore + Rio
by the kept 2-18-60
Ramtor

MC 100-743G

Cuban Exile Activities

On January 28, 1960, PSI MIGUEL ANDRES DE LEON ROJAS reported that responsible Cuban exile groups in Mexico City and the United States, who have supported Dr. EMILIO NUNEZ PORTUONDO, are convinced that General JOSE ELEUTERIO PEDRAZA CABRERA, who commands a group of Cuban military exiles in the Dominican Republic, would not be a wise selection as the military leader of the attempt to overthrow the CASTRO government. The PSI further advised that these Cuban exile groups believe that PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ, former Chief of the Cuban Air Force, would be a much better military leader. (S)(U)

The PSI also advised that information received from sources within Cuba reflected that FIDEL CASTRO had prepared a decree ordering the United States to vacate the Guantanamo Naval Base. According to this information, the decree was originally prepared in late November, 1959, but had not yet been signed for issuance. (S)(U)

The PSI further reported that he had heard reports in Miami, Florida, of an invasion attempt which allegedly would be made by supporters of ROLANDO MASFERRER, a Cuban exile who resides in Miami. The PSI stated that MASFERRER, ROBERTO FERNANDEZ MIRANDA, NORMAN ROTHMAN, and their associates form a group which is not regarded in a favorable light by responsible Cuban exiles or by responsible elements within Cuba. The PSI stated that from the information available to him in Miami he doubted very much that MASFERRER would be able to make an attempt at invading Cuba or, if an attempt were made, that it would be successful. (S)(U)

Nicaragua

PSI DE LEON also advised on January 28 that he had received information from within Cuba that ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA has not abandoned his project to utilize pro-Communist Nicaraguan exiles and Cuban "volunteers" in an attempt to invade Nicaragua. This source advised that approximately 400 guerrillas have been trained to make up the invasion force. The PSI stated he had received no information as to the timing of such an attempt, but expressed doubt that it would occur in the immediate future in view of the concern of the Cuban Government over a possible early invasion attempt by Cuban exiles. (S)(U)

age and is disposed to follow an international policy that will not only benefit Mexico but its sister Latin American countries who are bound together not only by historical ties but by the same economic and social conditions and identical perspectives. In apparent reference to DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS, leading PCM figure, he stated that some people, who are unable to understand national and international politics although they expound them daily, have been critical of President LOPEZ MATEOS' trip. During the course of the President's trip SIQUEIROS made a statement to the press wherein he criticized the President for not accepting a bid to visit Cuba and stated that President LOPEZ MATEOS was merely laying the ground work for a subsequent visit by President EISENHOWER. LOMBARDO was critical of President LOPEZ MATEOS in certain respects, particularly in connection with the imprisonment of the railroad strike agitators and PCM and POCM leaders.

ACTION TAKEN: None. Will be disseminated in the next report on the PP.

[SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES] (S)

[LAROB] (S)

Investigation conducted by this office to identify ["VALENTIN," the new Soviet principal] of MEX-[87,] (S) pointed to [VALENTIN VASILEVICH BAKULIN, a Soviet Embassy] (S) employee who arrived in Mexico City with his family on [November 5,] 1959 [S] As soon as a photograph of [BAKULIN] became available, it was [S] shown to MEX-[87] (S) who immediately and positively identified him as [his principal "VALENTIN."] (S)

On [January 11,] 1960, MEX-[87] returned to Mexico City [S] from a trip to Los Angeles. He thereafter kept a prearranged meeting with [BAKULIN] (S) on [January 18,] 1960, and turned over to [S] him a [report of his activities in Los Angeles] (S) as well as a [map] (S) and newspaper clippings gathered by [LA 4199-S.] [BAKULIN] [S] instructed MEX-[87] to pick up a [Soviet message on January 21,] [S] 1960, from [the dead drop at Pilares and Pestalozzi] (S) Streets. The [message] was to contain questions regarding MEX-[87]'s [S] [report on his] trip to Los Angeles. [BAKULIN] also set up a [S] personal meeting for [February 15,] 1960. (S) (S)

[MEX-[87 retrieved Soviet Message No. 22] on [January 21] (S)

1960. Contrary to the usual custom, this message was typed (S) instead of being on undeveloped 35 mm. film. The Soviets (S) inquired how and where LA 4199-S keeps the notes of his observations and the newspaper clippings, among what type of (S) people does the Los Angeles informant initiate his contacts, (S) what his expenses have been, the manner in which the data on the displacement of a ship seen by the informants was obtained, (S) the intensity of traffic noted in the vicinity of the places (S) visited, the possibility of taking photographs, the security of the objectives, how LA 4199-S explains his trips to his (S) family, and the identity of the objectives on which data can be more easily secured. (S)

MEX-87 deposited his Message No. 22 in the established (S) dead drop on January 25, 1960, and generally answered the questions posed in the prior Soviet message. (S)

Soviet Message No. 23 was retrieved by MEX-87 on (S) February 8, 1960. It changed the personal meeting between (S) BAKULIN and MEX-87 from the third Monday of the month to the (S) last Monday of the month at the same time and place. (S)

ACTION TAKEN: None, pursuant to specific Bureau instructions.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10280-10030

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-77667-21

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 07/29/1964
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
CC, SECADES, ROLANDO L. CUBELA, ASSOC, LIAISON WITH CIA, CONSPR, CUBA, CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

4

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-77667)

DATE: July 29, 1964

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR BRACKETS K 5-26-98

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (109-471) (C)

SUBJECT: ROLANDO L. CUBELA Y SECADES
IS - CUBA

105-131629

Remylet 10/11/63.

It is noted that CUBELA is a Cuban Government official whose desire to defect was made known by MM 761-S in June, 1962. [Thereafter, CIA apparently made contact with CUBELA in Europe through [CARLOS TEPEDINO, 9819 64th Avenue, Rego Park, Queens, New York,] a Cuban exile and long-time friend of MM 761-S, who frequently travels in Europe.] (S) (U)

MM 761-S advised that on July 15, 1964, he was visited by [CARLOS TEPEDINO,] at which time he confided (S) (U) certain information concerning CUBELA. He cautioned the informant to say nothing concerning their conversation which would permit the information to reach CIA or any other source through which it might become public, inasmuch as to do so might result in the death of persons in Cuba, as well as [TEPEDINO himself.] (S) (U)

[TEPEDINO] thereupon confided that he has been (S) (U) acting as the contact man between CIA and CUBELA. CUBELA is also in contact with [the Cuban Ambassador in Paris named CARRILLO,] who reportedly is anti-CASTRO. [CARRILLO] (S) has been assisting both CUBELA and [TEPEDINO.] (S) (U)

According to [TEPEDINO,] CUBELA has been constantly (S) (U) complaining to him that CIA refuses to furnish him with certain necessary equipment with which he could take some

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Miami
(1 - 109-471)
(1 - 134-379-Sub A)
THE/neb
(4)

REC 23 105-77667-21

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JUL 30 1964

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-131629

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)

Classified by 5668 MAC/KSR
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED #211,326
DATE 12/4/85 BY SP6BJA/ECL

SECRET

NAT. INT. SEC.

effective action in Cuba. According to [TEPEDINO,] CUBELA (S)(u) desires some sort of compact equipment with which he can possibly eliminate CASTRO; however, CIA keeps offering him only large, bulky, unserviceable material.

According to [TEPEDINO,] there is now under discussion (S)(u) some plan to kill FIDEL CASTRO, in which CUBELA will figure. CIA allegedly was formerly in favor of such a plan; however, inasmuch as Attorney General ROBERT KENNEDY would have no part of it, it was shelved. Now the plan has allegedly been brought up again for consideration. President JOHNSON allegedly is aware of it, and has not ruled against it. If set in motion, it will be scheduled to occur sometime before the elections in November.

[TEPEDINO] told the informant he has not been able (S)(u) to learn much more concerning this plan, other than that CUBELA is supposed to participate, that it is to be accomplished by men in Cuba, and possibly someone from Europe.

The informant advised [TEPEDINO] did not specifically (S)(u) indicate how he had acquired this information; however, the informant presumed from his manner of speaking that he had obtained it from CUBELA.

The above is for the information of the Bureau, and is not being submitted in form suitable for dissemination since both [TEPEDINO] and CUBELA are apparently of operational (S)(u) interest to CIA. Dissemination would also lead to the disclosure of MM 761-S. Although questioned closely, MM 761-S was not able to furnish any further details.

180-10086

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/14/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10281-10028

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 62-80750-4563

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SHRODER, R. I.
TO : ROSEN

TITLE :

DATE : 03/15/1967
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/11/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Rosen

Classified by 5668 SLD/mlc 9/25/95
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

DATE: March 15, 1967

FROM : R. I. Shroder

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Thompson
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Trotter

SUBJECT: [COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA] (U)
[CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)] (S)
[INTERNAL SECURITY - VENEZUELA] (U)
[KIDNAPING] (U)

Classified by SPL BJA/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 11/6/85

[C. I. A.] (S) (U)

This relates to information received from CIA indicating the possibility that the Communist Party of Venezuela may attempt to kidnap the child of [a CIA employee Thomas Keogh.] No investigation is being conducted by us and appropriate dissemination has previously been made. (S) (X) (S)

At our suggestion, [through liaison with CIA,] fingerprints and photographs have been obtained and were furnished [to SA W. O. Cregar by Mrs. Jane Roman of CIA] on 3/10/67. This material is being made part of this file for possible use in the event of a kidnaping. Photographs and fingerprints are of the following individuals: [Joseph Edward Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, Jr.; Christina Margarita Keogh; Elizabeth Teresa Keogh; Francis Xavier Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, III, and Maria Rita Keogh] (S) (S)

1934 1958 1957 1957

ACTION:

Thomas Patrick Keogh Jr. (S)

This matter has been coordinated with the Identification Division and it is recommended that this memo and attachment be sent directly to SA Carl Volker, Room 4125, IB, in order that the fingerprints may be promptly classified and filed.

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

FDT:emf
(7)

REC 33

ST-114

62-80750-4563

MAR 20 1967

Fingerprints of following detached and filed in Ident. Div.

MARIA RITA KEOGH
EDWARD JOSEPH KEOGH
CHRISTINA MARGARITA KEOGH
ELIZABETH TERESA KEOGH
FRANCIS XAVIER KEOGH
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH JR.
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH III

(S)

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IN THIS DOCUMENT.
EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS
JM 6-25-97

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SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

SLD/KSR
8-2-97
JFK

MAR 29 1967

SECRET

64-200-22-4

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10284-10155

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 109-12-210-2088

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, PA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 07/29/1960
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
EPE, BAYO, ALBERTO, POLIT, REVOLUTIONARY ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/03/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Embassy
Paris 8, France

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR 8-1-97
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

SECRET

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Date: July 29, 1960

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Paris (109-24)

Subject: CUBAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

5-15-95 Classified by 5668-SLD/mdc
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

Re Paris letter 7/21/60.

During a visit to Bern, Switzerland, the captioned matter was discussed with [BURTON LIFSCHULTZ, Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Switzerland.] (S) He advised that the Cuban Ambassador, SALAZAR-SANCHEZ, had been dismissed by the Cuban Government and his replacement has not yet arrived. [LIFSCHULTZ] (S) advised that it has been rumored that he will be replaced by one BAYO. He stated that this individual has not as yet been definitely identified and no background information is available regarding him. He stated, however, that he may be identical with the son of "General" ALBERTO BAYO who has previously been reported as a Spaniard who assisted in the CASTRO revolution and who has reportedly been active in revolutionary activities in Spain. (S)

This is furnished for the information of the Bureau. In the event further specific information is received, the Bureau will be advised.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, except the brackets JM 6-25-97

P
3 - Bureau (1 Havana)
1 - Madrid (sent direct)
1 - Paris
NWP:mas
(5)

2 copies made on 10/31/77 for review at FBIHQ by HSCA per req. 9/1/77
See Bufile 62-117290
DJC: mer

REC'D

REC- 9 109-12-210-9088

9 AUG 5 1960

Copy to Havana
by routing slip for
[x] info [ ] action
date 8-10-60
by

EX 109

SECRET

50 AUG 11 1960

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10284-10171

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-83720-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BARRON, JOHN R.
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 12/31/1959
PAGES : 18

SUBJECTS :
EPE, INTV, ARVIER, MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL, AKA,
EMP, RES, ASSOC, POLIT, INTEL ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted; 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/03/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF INS, CIA

COMMENTS : REFERRED TO INS

FD-263 (Rev. 3-3-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
MIAMI	MIAMI	12/31/59	10/9 - 12/28/59

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, aka Maria Mendizabal, "Nene" Mendizabal	JOHN R. BARRON	ems
	CHARACTER OF CASE	
	INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA REGISTRATION ACT - CUBA	

REFERENCES: Butel to Miami, October 9, 1959. 7-9452-13
Miami letter to Director, November 4, 1959. 7-9452-14
Miami report of SA JOHN R. BARRON, November 23, 1959, captioned: UNSUBS; MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ - VICTIM, KIDNAPPING - CONSPIRACY (Bufile 7-9452).

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL 1/5/96
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

- P* -

2 copies made of cover pg and pg 3 9/21/77 DJC/mer for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re req 9/7/77 see Bufile 62-117290

LEADS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

REQUEST OF BUREAU

The Bureau is requested to refer instant matter to the Department for decision regarding the subject's activities while employed as a secretary to ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ and regarding her admission that she furnished information to ALBERTO BAYO, JR., described in instant report, concerning information obtained during her employment. There exists a possible violation of the Registration Act, over which this Bureau has jurisdiction.

7-9452- UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 109-283

APPROVED | SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE | DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

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No. A-11039008)
4 - Miami (2 - 97-300; 1 - 7-479;
1 - 109-39)

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- 83720 -
4 JAN 6 1960
OCT - 2
REC- 26
EX-117

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Notations:
AGENCY State, CIA, G2, ONI, OSI
HAVANA
1/12/60
BY

A.
COVER PAGE

NAT. INT. SEC.

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADD. DISSEMINATION

SECRET

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Will report the decision rendered by the Department.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Information copies have been furnished the New York Office, inasmuch as the subject of this investigation was formerly employed as a secretary to ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ, whom the New York Office is currently investigating.

This investigation is being placed in a pending inactive status, pending departmental decision concerning the subject's activities while she was employed as a secretary to ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ.

The Bureau is advised that investigation appearing in this report conducted prior to October 9, 1959, was made concerning the subject inasmuch as she was suspected of plotting against MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ to arrange his abduction, the details of which have been reported in reference Miami report dated November 23, 1959 (Bufile 7-9452).

MM T-2, utilized in the details of this report was interviewed by Special Agents JOHN R. BARRON and WILLIAM B. HOLLOMAN, [at which time she identified herself as] a CIA informant in Havana (S) [and stated that she was employed as a secretary to] (S) ALBERTO BAYO, JR. (X)

The Bureau is advised that all informants familiar with Latin American activities were contacted, and no information was received indicating that the subject was active in Cuban intelligence activities.

SECRET

The interviews appearing in this report with MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ, Dr. CARLOS SISO, and the subject, appear on SF 64s and FD 302s in original form in Miami case file 7-475, captioned: "UNSUBS; MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ - VICTIM; KIDNAPPING - CONSPIRACY (Bufile 7-9452).

INFORMANTS

IDENTITY	LOCATION OF ORIGINAL INFORMATION
MM T-1 is [CIA, Havana,] (U) information contained in Butel to Miami dated October 9, 1959	7-475-9
MM T-2 is [ANA ROSA GUERRA] (S) (S) [admitted] CIA informant in Havana, [who works in the office of ALBERTO BAYO, JR., Director, Air Fumigation, Havana] (S)	Instant report, page 7.
MM T-3 is JANET SUMMERS, District Manager's Clerk, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami Beach, Florida (nature of information)	Instant report, page 12.

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed in this report, and they were concealed only in those instances where identities must be concealed.

C*

- COVER PAGE -

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

Copy to: 1 - INS, New York (RM)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR BRACKETS pg. 7 Jm 6-25-97

Report of: SA JOHN R. BARRON
Date: December 31, 1959
Office: Miami

Field Office File #: 97-300
Bureau File #: 7-9452 109-283

Title: MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER

SLD/KSR 8-1-97 (JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
REGISTRATION ACT - CUBA

Synopsis: Subject, MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, born November 26, 1916 in Cuba; Immigration and Naturalization Service Alien Registration No. A-11039008. [While employed in Miami Beach, Florida as secretary to MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ, ex-Venezuelan president, reported by MM T-1 to be plant and furnishing information to ALBERTO BAYO, JR. regarding the activities of PEREZ JIMENEZ. MM T-1 described BAYO as being active in intelligence matters for the Cuban government.] Subject interviewed and admitted association with BAYO. (S) (U)

- P* -

1/5/96
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

DETAILS:

This investigation is predicated on information furnished by MM T-1, a United States government agency which conducts intelligence investigations, which advised on October 9, 1959 that the subject, "Nene" MENDIZABAL, was in contact with ALBERTO BAYO, JR., described by MM T-1 as being engaged in intelligence activity for the Cuban government. (S) (U)

SUBJECT'S IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION STATUS

On October 9 and 30, 1959, the files of the District Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), New York City, were caused to be reviewed by SA WILLIAM D. MEEHAN and reflected that on November 2, 1956, one MARIA MENDIZABAL, A11-039-008, date of birth November 26, 1916, in Havana, Cuba, filed an "Application for Immigration Visa and Alien Registration" at the

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American Embassy, Havana, Cuba.

In this application MARIA MENDIZABAL furnished her place of birth as Cieba del Agua, Havana, Cuba, and claimed that she was known by no other names. Her occupation was furnished as that of office clerk, and her last permanent address as "Avenue 19 Number 8203, e/84, Marianao, Havana, Cuba". Her destination and address in the United States were furnished care of the Latina Shipping Company, Limited, 111 Wall Street, New York City, but this was crossed through in ink, and the address 321 East 43rd Street, New York 17, New York, was marked in. She possessed Cuban Passport Number 21566, issued September 20, 1955, by the Cuban Ministry of State at Havana, Cuba, valid until September 20, 1957. She was described as follows:

Race	White (Cuban)
Sex	Female
Height	5 feet 5 inches
Weight	120 pounds
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Fair
Marital Status	Divorced
Minor children	Sons - PEDRO FERNANDO FERNANDEZ Y MENDIZABAL; NELSON JOSE FERNANDEZ Y MENDIZABAL (ages not furnished)

B. APPROX. 1942 Cuba
Cuba B. APPROX 1948

She claimed further in this application that she had previously applied for and was granted visas to enter the United States during 1952 and 1956, but the dates of her previous sojourns to the United States were not furnished.

MARIA MENDIZABAL submitted in support of this application a copy of her Certificate of Birth, Petition for Divorce, and a document attesting that she had no arrest record in Cuba, all of which were

SECRET

SECRET

in the Spanish language.

Her file also contained an affidavit submitted by one EDUARDO M. GONZALEZ, 45 Fifth Avenue, New York City, an American citizen, who was born in Havana, Cuba. It was set out that GONZALEZ was the President and sole owner of the Latina Shipping Company, 111 Wall Street, New York City, and was desirous of bringing MENDIZABAL to the United States to work for the above company. The degree of relationship existing between GONZALEZ and MENDIZABAL was not set forth.

MARIA MENDIZABAL was granted an 0-1 Visa, Number 5686, and arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida, on February 20, 1957. This was the only arrival or departure contained in the INS, New York records.

A search of the Alien Address Report Cards maintained at INS, New York, failed to reflect any record of MENDIZABAL for the years of 1958, and 1959.

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

MM T-1, on October 9, 1959, advised that MARIA MENDIZABAL, also known as "Nene" MENDIZABAL, employed as a secretary of ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ at Miami Beach, Florida, attempted to contact ALBERTO REVUELTA in Havana, at Havana telephone 29-5233, on October 9, 1959. MM T-1 advised that ALBERTO REVUELTA is identical with ALBERTO BAYO, JR., who, according to MM T-1, is engaged in intelligence activities for the Cuban government. MM T-1 believed that the subject was a plant and was furnishing information to BAYO, JR. regarding the activities of PEREZ JIMENEZ. (S)(U)

SPAIN APPROX. 1924

Prior to receipt of the above information as furnished by MM T-1 on October 9, 1959, the following

SECRET

MM T-2, [on October 24, 1959,] (S) advised that ALBERTO BAYO, JR., director of Air Fumigation, Marianao, Havana, Cuba, revealed [in early August, 1959] that "Nene" (S) MENDIZABAL, subsequently identified as MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, was sent on a delicate mission to Miami, and that in fifteen days, there would be an announcement in the press about PEREZ JIMENEZ. MM T-2 advised that he observed the subject [in the office of ALBERTO BAYO, JR. on three occasions] (S)

The following information was obtained in connection with investigation concerning another matter:

On October 29, 1959, MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER was interviewed at Miami, Florida, by Special Agents CHARLES W. EDMISTON and JOHN R. BARRON.

MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, 1951 Park Avenue, Apartment 11, Miami Beach, Florida, after being advised of her right to be represented by counsel, that anything she might say could be used against her in a court of law, stated that she was born on November 26, 1916, at Havana, Cuba.

MENDIZABAL stated that she arrived in the United States on August 15, 1959, aboard Cubana Airlines, which departed Havana, Cuba, at approximately 5:30 p.m. on August 15, 1959. She stated that upon her arrival at the Miami International Airport, she was met by Dr. CARLOS SISO and INES DAVILA, as well as a friend of Dr. SISO, introduced to her as CARLOS ~~PULIDO~~. FLA

MENDIZABAL advised that prior to her arrival in Miami, she had received a letter from INES DAVILA in the early part of August, 1959, wherein DAVILA advised her that PEREZ JIMENEZ, ex-Venezuelan President, was seeking the services of a reliable and competent secretary. She stated DAVILA in her letter to her asked if she would be interested in this position to which she subsequently replied that she would accept the position as secretary to PEREZ JIMENEZ, as she was heavily in debt in Cuba.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10284-10172

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-82352-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 10/27/1959
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
EPE, GONZALEZ, CARLOS HILARIO, SUSP, CONSPR, MURDER, VENTURA, ESTEBAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/03/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

SECRET

Date: 10/27/59

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT EXCEPT FOR BRACKETS IN TP JM 6-25-97

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-)

CARLOS HILARIO GONZALEZ
IS - CUBA; RA - CUBA

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)

Enclosed are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum concerning an alleged plot by the subject to kill ESTEBAN VENTURA NOVO. The source of the information in enclosed memo is [ANA ROSA GUERRA], who contacted this office on 10/24/59 and advised she works for BERNARD L. BARKER, in an undercover capacity in Cuba, where she is employed as secretary to [ALBERTO BAYO COSGAYA, Chief of Air Fumigation-Technical, Cuban Air Force. BAYO has been described as a key figure in the Cuban Air Force and was described by GUERRA] (S) as definitely a Communist. BARKER advised SA JOHN R. BARRON on 10/7/59 that he works for CIA in an undercover capacity in Cuba. This memorandum is classified confidential to protect the identity [of GUERRA] (S) who apparently is a CIA source. GUERRA returned to Cuba on 10/26/59. (S)

Information concerning the alleged plot against VENTURA has been furnished to the Miami Police Department and the Dade County Department of Public Safety. ESTEBAN VENTURA will be advised that there is possibly a plot to kill him but that no protection can be given him by this Bureau.

Classified by 5668 SLD/GCL 10/4/95
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

2 copies made 9/27/77 DJC/
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re req 9/7/77
see file 62-117290

3 - Bureau (AM) (Encl-11) (RM)
4 - Miami (2 - 105- CARLOS HILARIO GONZALEZ)
(1 - 105-1715, Cuban Retailiation Against Batista Adherents)
(1 - 105-1720, ESTEBAN VENTURA)

WBH:sll
(7)

AGENCY State, CIA, G2, ONI
REQ. REC'D OSI, INS, Havana
DATE FORW. 11-2-59
HOW FORW. RS
BY VHN/SP

105-82352-1
REC 7
18 OCT 30 1959

ENCLOSURE

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

63 NOV 17 1959
SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-75776

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10285-10254

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 03/23/1967
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC LHM, MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL

4/3/67

SECRET

airtel

1 - Mr. DeBuck

To: SAC, Miami [(134-1198)] (S)

REC 54

From: Director, FBI [(134-14264)] — 72 (S)

[DOLPHIN
IS - CU] (S)

EX 106

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Reurairtel and LHM both dated 3/23/67.

You are authorized to have [informant] [pass to his Cuban principal] the information set forth in reLHM. (S)

HLD:brr
(4)

NOTE:

[Clearance for passage] (S) was obtained by Liaison Section 3/30/67.

#211,326
Classified by SP8BTJ/gel
Declassify on: OADR 4/30/84
(5668 SLD/GCL - 5/10/95 - JFK)

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(6)
(JFK) 2/4/98

MAILED 19
MAR 31 1967
COMM-FBI

SECRET

APR 7 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FBI

Date: March 23, 1967

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [(134-14264)] (S)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI [(134-1198)] (S) (P)

RE: [DOLPHIN
IS - CUBA] (S)

Classified by ~~SP4BTS/gcl~~
Declassify on: OADR 4/30/84

ReMiamilet 2/20/67.

In accordance with instructions concerning the handling of [double agents,] (S) there are attached hereto the original and 9 copies of a letterhead memorandum. The letterhead memorandum has been classified "SECRET," in order to protect the [identity of a double agent] of continuing value to the U.S. (S)

(S) As set forth in referenced letter, [DOLPHIN's principal] requested him to furnish information on a monthly basis concerning anti-CASTRO activities in the U.S. (S)

(S) In view of this, the Miami Office will have [the informant prepare] and the Miami Office will forward a letter containing the information set out in the attached letterhead memorandum. This information will be prepared [in [secret writing.]] (S)

The Bureau is requested to advise whether or not [DOLPHIN] (S) will be [authorized] (S) to make the information available to [his Cuban principal] on April 7, 1967. (S)

REC 42 134-14264-72 (S)

EX-113

3 - Bureau (Encl. - 10) (AM - RM)
1 - Miami
JEM:ems
(4)

ENCLOSURE

1 MAR 24 1967

LATIN AMERICAN

61 APR 10 1967

SECRET

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 23 1967

SECRET

SECRET

["FISHFACE"](S)

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mdc 11/21/97
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)
(5668 SLD/ecc 5/4/98 - JFK)

Classified by SPS BTT/gel
Declassify on: OADR 11/30/84

The above [code name](S) has been assigned to a [Cuban alien](S) whose activities are being [directed](S) against a [Cuban intelligence service](S) He was requested by [his Cuban principal](S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States.(S)

Through his contacts with anti-Castro individuals in Miami, the following information was obtained: (S)(U)

A meeting of anti-Castro leaders was held recently at the home of Palayo Garcia. Manuel Fernandez, former Secretary of Labor in Cuba, acted as chairman, and the meeting was attended by former Castro officials, such as Manuel Urrutia, Manuel Ray, Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Danilo Mesa, Elena Mederos, and Efreu Gonzalez. (S)(U)

At the meeting, Fernandez suggested that a committee be formed and efforts made to have the committee travel to Cuba for a conference with Cuban officials, in order to discuss the release of political prisoners. It was believed that the discussion concerning political prisoners could be expanded to include a discussion of differences between Cuba and the United States. Those in attendance agreed that such a discussion would be timely, inasmuch as it appears that Fidel Castro is not completely satisfied with Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union. If the discussion of the relations between Cuba and the United States should prove productive, such information (S)(U)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT BRACKETS KP 7-6-98 SLD/KSR 8-8-98 (JFK)

Approved By USER (S)
by Jack Corbett, CIA
Thomas Y. O'Loughlin 3/30/67 WOB

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[134-14261-72](S)

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

[could then be communicated by the committee to the United States Government, in a hope of bringing about a state of coexistence between Cuba and the United States.] (S)

It is requested that [clearance be granted] (S) for [the Cuban alien] (S) to furnish this data to [his Cuban principal.] (S)

This information should not be disseminated.

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 23 1967

11/21/97 CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mdc DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)

(5668 SLO/GCL 2/4/98 - JFK)

SECRET

"FISHFACE" (S)

Classified by SP8 BJJ/gt Declassify on: OADR 4/3/84 (SP8MAC/GCL 5/26/94 JFK)

The above code name (S) has been assigned to a Cuban alien (S) whose activities are being directed (S) against a Cuban intelligence service (S) He was requested by his Cuban principal (S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States. (S)

Through his contacts with anti-Castro individuals in Miami, the following information was obtained: (S)(U)

A meeting of anti-Castro leaders was held recently at the home of Palayo Garcia. Manuel Fernandez, former Secretary of Labor in Cuba, acted as chairman, and the meeting was attended by former Castro officials, such as Manuel Urrutia, Manuel Ray, Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Danilo Mesa, Elena Mederos, and Efreu Gonzalez. (S)(U)

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SECRET

~~GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

CONFIDENTIAL

could then be communicated by the committee to the United States Government, in a hope of bringing about a state of coexistence between Cuba and the United States (S) (U)

It is requested that clearance be granted (S) for the Cuban alien (S) to furnish this data to his Cuban principal. (S)

This information should not be disseminated.

MAR 23 1967

SECRET

["FISHFACE"] (S)

The above [code name] (S) has been assigned to a [Cuban alien] (S) whose activities are being [directed] (S) against a [Cuban intelligence service] (S) He was requested by [his Cuban principal] (S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States. (S)

Through his contacts with anti-Castro individuals in Miami, the following information was obtained: (S)(U)

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At the meeting, Fernandez suggested that a committee be formed and efforts made to have the committee travel to Cuba for a conference with Cuban officials, in order to discuss the release of political prisoners. It was believed that the discussion concerning political prisoners could be expanded to include a discussion of differences between Cuba and the United States. Those in attendance agreed that such a discussion would be timely, inasmuch as it appears that Fidel Castro is not completely satisfied with Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union. If the discussion of the relations between Cuba and the United States should prove productive, such information (S)(U)

SECRET

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

could then be communicated by the committee to the United States Government, in a hope of bringing about a state of coexistence between Cuba and the United States. (S) (U)

It is requested that [clearance be granted] (S) for [the Cuban alien] to furnish this data to [his Cuban principal.] (S) (S)

This information should not be disseminated.

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 2 3 1967

11/2/97 CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mik DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

(5668 SLD/GCL 2/4/98 - JFK)

SECRET

Classified by SP8 BTT/gcl Declassify on: OADR 4/30/84 (SP8 MAC/GCL 9/26/94 - JFK)

["FISHFACE"](S)

The above [code name](S) has been assigned to a [Cuban alien](S) whose activities are being [directed](S) against a [Cuban intelligence service](S) He was requested by [his Cuban principal](S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States. (S)

Through his contacts with anti-Castro individuals in Miami, the following information was obtained: (S)(U)

A meeting of anti-Castro leaders was held recently at the home of Palayo Garcia. Manuel Fernandez, former Secretary of Labor in Cuba, acted as chairman, and the meeting was attended by former Castro officials, such as Manuel Urrutia, Manuel Ray, Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Danilo Mesa, Elena Mederos, and Efreu Gonzalez. (S)(U)

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SECRET

~~GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

CONFIDENTIAL

could then be communicated by the committee to the United States Government, in a hope of bringing about a state of coexistence between Cuba and the United States. (S)/(U)

It is requested that [clearance be granted] (S) for [the Cuban alien] (S) to furnish this data to [his Cuban principal.] (S)

This information should not be disseminated.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10291-10236

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 97-4546-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/24/1961
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
MR, MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO, ACA,
INTERNAL RESISTANCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/11/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In) — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-12-94 BY SP8 MAC/KSR (JFK)

COUNTRY: CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/490,978

SUBJECT: STATEMENTS OF MANOLA RAY, EXILE LEADER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

DATE DISTR. 24 OCTOBER 1961

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

RECEIVED FROM OCT 25 1961 CIA SJP

DATE OF INFO.: OCTOBER 1961

REFERENCES: IN 11257

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: ENGLAND, LONDON (24 OCTOBER 1961)

APPRAISAL: 3

FIELD REPORT NO. OEL-30,995

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: [OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE] FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS".

1. MANOLO RAY, EXILE LEADER OF MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT) SAID IN EARLY OCTOBER THAT HE WAS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY INVASION OF CUBA INSISTING THAT CASTRO'S OVERTHROW WAS TO BE ACHIEVED BY INTERNAL RESISTANCE AND THIS HAD ALREADY STARTED.

2. THE MRP WAS ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND AND SUPPORTED BY ALL CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. IT HAD MEMBERS IN ALL 33 TRADE UNIONS, THE G-2, MILITIA AND THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION. RAY ESTIMATED 80 PERCENT OF POPULATION WERE OPPOSED TO CASTRO, THOUGH MAJORITY WERE NOT ACTIVELY SO, HE CONSIDERED THE MRP AT PRESENT ENJOYED MORE SUPPORT THAN THE ORIGINAL REVOLUTION HAD

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT Brackets KP 11-18-97 SLD/KSR 1-7-98

REC- 46 97-4546-9

SECRET — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL** — OCT 31 1961

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	EXO	FBI

I&NS TREASURY REPC INCLANT

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

1 PC - Miami ... 10-30-61

66 NOV 3 1961

97-4546

HAD AGAINST BATISTA.

3. THE MRP WAS PRESENTLY SHORT OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES BUT THE POSITION WAS IMPROVING (A MILITIA CAPTAIN WAS RECENTLY SENTENCED TO 30 YEARS IN PRISON FOR PASSING ARMS TO THE MRP). NO HELP WHATSOEVER HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE FROM THE "SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES, WHO PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THE INVASION". THESE SOURCES WERE STILL THINKING INEFFECTUALLY IN TERMS OF A FURTHER INVASION.

4. THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE RESISTANCE IN CUBA TOWARDS THE EXILES WAS ONE OF INDIFFERENCE MOUNTING TO CONTEMPT FOR SPECIFIC MOVES SUCH AS THE PROPOSED PROMOTION OF A CUBAN GOVT IN EXILE. WHAT THE RESISTANCE WANTED WAS FUNDS AND THE RETURN, BY INFILTRATION, OF TRAINED EXILES, PARTICULARLY COMMUNICATION EXPERTS.

5. ON THE TIMING OF CASTRO'S OVERTHROW, RAY SAID CASTRO WOULD NOT LAST ANOTHER YEAR. HE ADDED THAT THE SITUATION IN CUBA IMMEDIATELY AFTER CASTRO'S DOWNFALL WOULD BE DANGEROUS AND COULD DEVELOP INTO A CIVIL WAR.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE. CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/22/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10291-10319

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-117262-25, 24

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, PA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 08/18/1965
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
SBE, REL, WINNER, MIRIAM FINKELMAN, AKA, PERSONAL HISTORY AND BKG

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/29/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC 2 MEMO, LHM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

SECRET

DATE: 10/6/65

FROM : SAC, CINCINNATI (105-3048)(C)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: MYRIAM FINKELMAN Y WINER
IS - CUBA
(00: Cincinnati)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT EXCEPT BRACKETS MKH 2-6-98

Re Legat, Paris, letter to Bureau 8/18/65.

Enclosed for Bureau are nine copies of letterhead memorandum with accompanying evaluation memo concerning captioned matter. It is classified Confidential because of the source from which the information emanated.

The source is identified as Liaison Section of (S) [CIA] American Embassy, Madrid, Spain.

Cincinnati is closing its case since subject is in Spain, has never been to the U. S., and there is no reason to believe she will come to this country within the near future.

2-Bureau (Enc. 9) (RM)
1-Cincinnati

RFM:blb
(3)

ENCLOSURE

Classified by [illegible] JFK
Declassify on: OADR

5-30-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: X (JFK)

EX-112

REC-43

105-117262-25

1 OCT 7 1965

SECRET

cc Miami - info 4/26/66

Copy to: CIA/STATE/RAO
ONI/OSI/ACSI
By routing slip for info.
Date 10/15/65 by [signature]

NAT. INT. SEC.

5010-108

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: MYRIAM FINKELMAN Y WINER

SECRET

Sam Benton 1800 SOUTH TREASURE DRIVE MIAMI BEACH FLA.	Brother - same as above
Francis Lyons	Sister - 14 Walton Street, Portland, Maine
Salomon Finkelman	Brother - 3105 SW 79th Avenue, Miami, Florida
Clara Delaster	Sister - Miami, Florida
Julie Abramson	Niece - 57 State Road, Portland, Maine

(U)

According to [Dr. Manuel Cortina, who was formerly acquainted with Winer in Santa Clara,] (S) she is currently Director of English Language at the Mangold Institute in Madrid. He has no information concerning her present address, however, he said she is believed to be living with an unidentified Cuban exile who was a professor in Las Villas. According to the knowledge of the source, they are not married. The source could not furnish any additional information concerning Winer's activities and stated there is no indication she will leave Spain and come to the United States. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

821-1031

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-03

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 8/18/65

SECRET

FROM : LEGAT, PARIS (105-3551) (RUC)

SUBJECT: MIRIAM FINKELMAN WINNER
IS - CUBA
(OO - Cincinnati)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Re Cincinnati letter to Bureau 6/29/65.

There are enclosed for the Bureau and Cincinnati each one copy of a memorandum dated 8/9/65 prepared by the Liaison Section [(CIA)] (S) American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, containing background information regarding the captioned subject (S)

It appears that the subject is presently residing in Madrid and is employed as the Director of English Language at the Mangold Institute in Madrid. (U)

The Consular Section has no record of an application for a United States visa from the subject. We have requested that they advise us in the event a visa application is received.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT except for brackets MKH 2-6-98

4 - Bureau (Encs. - 2) ENCLOSURE
(1 - Liaison Section)
(1 - Cincinnati, 105-3048)
1 - [Paris]
NWP:eim
(5)

5-30-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/JFK
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

Classified by
Declassify on: OADR

REC-54 105-117262-24

14 AUG 26 1965

SECRET

MCT-45

Copy to Cincinnati
by routing slip for
☐ info ☒ action
date 8-25-65

53 SEP 1 1965

NAT. INT. SEC.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Consular Section 9 August 1965

FROM: Liaison Section

SUBJECT: Miriam Finkleman WINNER (or WINER)

According to usually reliable Cuban exile sources in Madrid, the Subject was born in Poland on 5 February 1922; she became a Cuban citizen in 1945. Subject arrived in Madrid, Spain, on 12 May 1963, bearing Cuban passport #34059 issued on 24 July 1956. Her last known address in Cuba was Ronda 17, Apt. 18, Habana.

The following is Subject's educational history:

1930 to 1936 - Primary school at Ludwipol, Poland
1938 to 1942 - High school-Instituto Marianao, Habana
1942 to 1947 - University of Habana (degree in Philosophy and Letters)
1958 - University of Columbia, New York (summer school studying German literature).

From 1956 to 1961, Subject was a professor of literature and languages at the Central University in Santa Clara, Las Villas. She held the same position from 1961 to 1962 at the University of Habana. She reportedly speaks English, German and Spanish fluently.

On arrival in Madrid in 1963, Subject listed the following members of her immediate family:

Ana Winner	- mother	- 1800 S. Treasure Drive, Miami Beach, Florida
Sam Benton	- brother	- same as above
Francis Lyons	- sister	- 14 Walton Street, Portland, Maine
Salomon Finkelman	- brother	- 3105 SW 79th Avenue, Miami, Florida
Clara Delaster	- sister	- Miami, Florida
Julie Abramson	- niece	- 57 State Road, Portland, Maine.

According to [Manuel Cortina, who was formerly acquainted with Subject in Santa Clara,] the Subject is currently the Director of English Language at the Mangold Institute in Madrid. He has no information concerning her present address, however, he said Subject is believed to be living with an unidentified Cuban exile who was a professor in Las Villas; to Source's knowledge, they are not married. Source has no additional information concerning Subject's current activities.

GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

105-117

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

SD1-1031d

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10300-10012

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-147458-52

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 07/14/1967
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
MR, LORIE, JORGE RAUL ROBLEJO, RES, POLIT ACT, TRA, ASSOC, POLIT PRISONERS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC LHM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS ON PG. 2 JM 9-3-97

FBI

Date: 7-14-67

Transmit the following in (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL (Priority)

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1)(6) (JFK) 11/18/97

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

REC 82

Classified by SP8BTS/gcl
Declassify on: OADR

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-147458)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-9977) (P)

SUBJECT: COMITE PRO-LIBERACION DE LOS CIEN
(CPLLC - COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION
OF THE ONE HUNDRED)
IS - CUBA

place cc in 105-162207 (U) C. Roblejo
105-80787 (Cuban Intelligence activities)

Re Miami airtels 7-10-67, captioned "JORGE RAUL ROBLEJO LORIE, IS - CUBA" and "SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO, aka - PSI, IS - CUBA".

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 14 copies of a LHM dated and captioned as above. Extra copies of this LHM are being furnished for transmittal to Legats, Ottawa (2) and Mexico City (1).

It is to be noted limited dissemination has been made concerning this matter and the enclosed LHM due to the sensitivity of the information concerning the

REC 82 105-147458-52

5-Bureau (Enc. 14) (RM)
(1-Legat, Mexico City 105-4967)
(1-Legat, Ottawa 105-3083)
1-New York (info) (105-77103) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1-San Juan (info) (105-9215) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1-Washington Field (info) (105-69372) (Enc. 1) (RM)
3-Miami
(1-105-9977)
(1-105-12062) (Roblejo)
(1-134-1433-Sub-A)
JDH/al
(11)

ENCLOSURE

ST-103

11 JUL 19 1967

1 copies made 2/9/78 for review at FBIHQ by HSCA RE: 12/14/77 REQUEST

State/CIA/ /RAO/INS
Army/Navy/Air Force/DIA/
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, State
By R/S For Info
Date 7-20-67 By VHN/ek

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN 105-162207 / 105-80787

LATIN AMERICAN

62 AUG 4 1967

SECRET

possibility of ROBLEJO being involved in possible intelligence activities.

The FBI does not actually utilize Building T90 or T94 to conduct interviews of Cuban refugees. However, CIA under the guise of U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service interviewers interrogate these arrivals at this location (S) A supply of the FBI "aviso" and the Director's message to newly arrived Cubans are distributed at this location.

It is to be recalled previous investigation has disclosed ROBLEJO has been in contact with REINALDO ABREU, Attache at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and connected with Cuban Intelligence (S)

Also on June 29, 1967, MM 1115-S reported LUIS RICARDO ALONSO, former Cuban Ambassador to London, who defected in 1965, has been in correspondence with ABREU, having been introduced to him by RAUL ROA, Cuban Minister of Foreign Relations, in 1964. ABREU reportedly is in charge of dealing with Cuban exile groups and Cuban guerrilla groups and more specifically, has been in contact with ROBLEJO since he, ABREU is handling the matter of Cuban political prisoners. In addition, ABREU, since he is unable to travel to Miami, has requested ALONSO to come to Mexico or to converse with NICOLAS RODRIGUEZ AZTARAEN, attached to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York City in connection with this matter (U)

MM T-1 is SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO.

The enclosed LHM is classified SECRET to protect the identity of a potential informant of continuing value.

In the event the Bureau decides that the enclosed LHM may be disseminated, a copy of this LHM may be furnished to the RCMP inasmuch as it does not contain any information (U)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10300-10024

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-162207-3

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 07/10/1967
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Class
DATE 5/10/84

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Wick
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI SECRET

Date: 7/10/67

Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 9-3-97 EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS ON PG. 2

REC 11

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-12062) (P)

SUBJECT: JORGE RAUL ROBLEJO LORIE
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

OO: Miami

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Re Miami airtel dated 6/21/67, captioned COMITE PRO-LIBERACION DE LOS CIEN (CPLLC) (COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE ONE HUNDRED), IS - CUBA.

On 7/5/67, SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO, 35 West 9th Street, Apartment 4, Hialeah, Florida, telephone 887-7218, voluntarily furnished the following information:

10-11-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/HSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

8 - Bureau (RM)
(1 - 105-147458)(CPLLC)
(2 - Legat, Mexico)(Info.)
(1 - 105-4947)(CPLLC)
(2 - Legat, Ottawa)(Info.)
(1 - 105-3083)(CPLLC)
2 - New York (Info.)(RM)
(1 - 105-77103)(CPLLC)
2 - San Juan (Info.)(RM)
(1 - 105-9215)(CPLLC)
3 - Miami
(1 - 134-New)(Betancourt Collazo)
(1 - 105-9977)(CPLLC)
JDH:jhk
(15)

2cc Ottawa + 2cc Mexico 7/17/67

#211,326
Classified by SP8 BTS/gcl
Declassify on: OADR 5/2/84

SP8 MAE/KSL 8-23-94 (JFK)

EX-103

REC 11 105-162207 - 3

copies made 2/9/78 JSG
R M Rey
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 12/16/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

JUL 20 1967

C. C. Wick

105-162207

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

SECRET

Approved: Special Agent in Charge Sent M Per

SECRET

BETANCOURT indicated that he had been the General Coordinator of the 30th of November anti-Castro organization in Cuba during 1959, 1960 and the first part of 1961. He arrived in the United States at Miami on June 29, 1961, via small boat. Upon his arrival in the United States, he assumed leadership of the 30th of November movement in Miami until approximately October, 1962, when he entered the U. S. Army under the Cuban recruitment program at Fort Jackson, S. C. Subsequent to this, he has been affiliated with the 30th of November movement in Chicago for approximately two years, 1963-1965, and in Miami, 1965 to date.

BETANCOURT is currently employed as a security guard for the National Patrol Detective Agency and the National Industrial Security Corporation (affiliates), 590 S. W. 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida. In connection with this employment, he is a guard at the Cuban Refugee Processing Center of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) three days a week. The Processing Center is located in Buildings T-90 and T-94 which are utilized by the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in processing, fingerprinting and photographing Cuban refugees upon their arrival in the United States. (CIA [under the guise of INS interviewers] interrogates these arrivals [at this location). (S) (S)

BETANCOURT related he met ROBLEJO around the first of January, 1967, when ROBLEJO reportedly returned from Mexico City where he had been attempting to seek the release of Cuban political prisoners in Cuba. He met ROBLEJO through ANGEL ESTEVEZ, a coworker of BETANCOURT at the Hotel Fontainebleau where both were employed as waiters at that time. At the request of ESTEVEZ, BETANCOURT furnished ROBLEJO a table gratis at the Frank Sinatra show at the Fontainebleau Hotel, for which ROBLEJO was apparently grateful. As a result of this, ROBLEJO sought BETANCOURT's assistance in attempting to obtain the release of political prisoners and recently BETANCOURT was made a member of the Executive Committee of the CPLLC.

In this connection, BETANCOURT accompanied ROBLEJO to San Juan, Puerto Rico, the first week of June, 1967. BETANCOURT by this time had the impression ROBLEJO was actually anti-United States and he considered ROBLEJO a "leftist-socialist." While in Puerto Rico, they met with MANOLO RAY and RUFO LOPEZ FRESQUET. ROBLEJO discussed the possibility of RAY and LOPEZ FRESQUET becoming active in seeking the release of Cuban political prisoners. However, no definite agreement or conclusion was reached.

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SECRET

BETANCOURT stated that on or about June 15, 1967, he and ROBLEJO, while temporarily staying at 2930 Loiza, Santurce, Puerto Rico, were having a general conversation and ROBLEJO changed the topic to BETANCOURT's current work as a security guard at the Miami Airport where the Cuban refugees are processed. ROBLEJO asked detailed questions concerning the nature of the activities at this location, to which BETANCOURT explained that Cuban refugees upon their arrival in the United States are processed here, including having their photographs taken, being fingerprinted, and being interrogated. ROBLEJO asked BETANCOURT if the FBI was there, which BETANCOURT acknowledged in the affirmative, and ROBLEJO asked, "What do they do there?" BETANCOURT answered, "They investigate and clear all of the refugees arriving from Cuba in the United States." ROBLEJO was interested in knowing if BETANCOURT saw "those papers" and BETANCOURT stated he had seen them. (BETANCOURT indicated this was entirely fictitious, but since he did not trust ROBLEJO, he felt he might be in a position to be of possible assistance to the U. S. Government). ROBLEJO asked BETANCOURT if he could "photograph...take a picture of the documents or the people the FBI investigates." BETANCOURT asked ROBLEJO if he was "crazy," stating that if he did something like that, he could be put in the "electric chair." ROBLEJO indicated that with the use of a small camera, this could be accomplished very easily. Almost immediately, the topic was changed and BETANCOURT indicated to ROBLEJO he had to leave San Juan immediately because his child had just broken his collar bone. BETANCOURT also indicated to ROBLEJO that his, BETANCOURT's, wife had called and said she did not have any money in the house to buy food, etc. At this point, ROBLEJO gave BETANCOURT a check in the amount of $300.00, drawn on the First National Bank of Miami, on the account of the Committee of Relatives of the One Hundred. ROBLEJO made out this check in BETANCOURT's presence and requested $50.00 be given to ROBLEJO's mother. Immediately, BETANCOURT cashed the check and sent a money order to his wife, ERMITAS RAMON ARIAS.

BETANCOURT stated ROBLEJO had given him $50.00 in cash prior to their departure for Puerto Rico.

BETANCOURT advised he returned to Miami from Puerto Rico on June 18, 1967, and ROBLEJO remained in San Juan until June 28, 1967. He recalled ROBLEJO attempted to have him stay in Puerto Rico and was "mad" at BETANCOURT for leaving early.

On June 30, 1967, ROBLEJO telephonically contacted BETANCOURT, during which conversation ROBLEJO indicated he

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planned to go to Venezuela, Panama and Ottawa, Canada, and would see BETANCOURT upon his return. ROBLEJO is interested in obtaining a Mexican visa in order to go to Cuba to possibly converse with FIDEL CASTRO or other important leaders in the communist government of Cuba in connection with the possible release of Cuban political prisoners.

Local stops have been placed with INS in order to be notified of ROBLEJO's return to the United States.

Miami plans to locate and possibly monitor the bank account of the Committee of Relatives of the One Hundred and any other accounts where ROBLEJO is the authorized signature of an account.

The Bureau is being requested in a separate communication captioned "SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO, aka "Ariel," PSI - CUBA," to grant authority to contact him in order to follow up in connection with ROBLEJO's request as mentioned above in the event ROBLEJO attempts to pursue this matter further.

The Bureau will be kept advised. LHM incorporating pertinent data regarding subject's activities will be promptly furnished to the Bureau.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/14/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10311-10292

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-27799-513

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, BR
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 12/23/1964
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
USSS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/27/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-03

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 12/23/64

FROM : Legat, Bern (62-70) (RUC)

SECRET

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH SECRET SERVICE
THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT

ReBulet 11/19/64. 62-27799-507

Files of Legat, Bern, have been reviewed for individuals residing in Switzerland and Austria considered to be a possible threat to the President, and no one was found to fit this category.

In addition, discreet inquiry was made of the following sources, all of whom had no knowledge of individuals who might be considered threats:

Consular Section, the Embassy, Bern;
Office of Special Assistant [(covert CIA),] (S) the Embassy, Bern;
American Consulate General, Vienna;
Research Branch [(covert CIA)] (S), the Embassy, Vienna;
Security Officer, the Embassy, Vienna.

In this regard, however, Bureau attention is called to the case entitled PAUL GEORGE ANDERSON, aka, IS-X (Bufile 100-415051). ANDERSON has been reported to be of interest to the Secret Service (Legat, Paris, letter dated 10/16/64). While he does not reside in territory covered by this office, he is in rather frequent transit en route to Hungary, where he is attempting to obtain a visa for his Hungarian wife to enter the U.S.

3 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
2 - Bern
(1 - 105-213)

HDG:mls
(5)

100-415051-
62-109060-

3-14-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)

REC-108 62-27799-513

14 DEC 28 1964

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SECRET

JAN 5 1965

64 JAN 6 1965

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/10/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10320-10087

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 100-409763-79

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BR
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 05/13/1964
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
MARK LANE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted; 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/04/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

5-126 (9-19-62)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Director, FBI (100-409763) DATE: 5/13/64

FROM : Legat, Bern (105-284) (RUC)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT BRACKETS

SUBJECT: MARK LANE
SM - C

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(6)
(JFK) 4/21/97
K 5-6-98
SLD/KSR 5-27-98 (JFK)

Re Bulet 4/20/64.

Security information furnished by referenced communication was disseminated to the indicated sources of this office on 5/4/64:

[X] [Abteilung II - Gruppe Staatspolizei, Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austrian Security Police), Vienna, Austria.] (S)

[ ] Security Branch, American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.

[ ] U. S. Consulate General, Vienna, Austria.

[ ] [Schweizerisches Bundespolizei (Swiss Federal Police), Bern, Switzerland.] (S)

[X] Other: [Research Branch [(covert CIA)] (S) American Embassy, Vienna.] (S)

Data furnished to the U. S. sources was classified Confidential. Material furnished to the foreign sources will be handled as Confidential under existing security agreements.

Appropriate notations are maintained in the files of the indicated sources to insure that this office will be notified in the event subject comes to their attention.

3 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(4)

EX-115
100-409763-79
REC-49
6 MAY 18 1964

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBV. FROM

SECRET

68 MAY 22 1964

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10325-10318

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-80750-4166

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BRENNAN
TO : SULLIVAN

TITLE :

DATE : 09/11/1963
PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON FILE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/29/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC MEMO, SUMMARY

SECRET

Wash DC

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH J. J. MC CONE

Although Mr. McCone John A. has indicated he will not be raising any problems or issues, the Director may find the following of assistance:

STATUS OF RELATIONS WITH CIA

To say that the two agencies work in complete harmony is not true. Conflicts of past years have had their influences. Fortunately we have been successful in establishing very effective working relations with several key figures in the agency who have been very cooperative and who are sincerely interested in getting the job done. Without this existing framework our relations with CIA could degenerate into a chaotic state.

With regard to differences with CIA, there were two situations during the past year which had a significant bearing on the relations between the two agencies. Approximately a year ago we learned that CIA had established contact with a Cuban exile who had come into the U.S. and who had confessed to the agency that he had been trained as a Cuban Intelligence Agent. CIA had this information for nearly a month before notifying the Bureau. We lodged very vigorous protest (re: Alwin Odio Tamayo). (S) The other event which led to a heated conflict arose from information which we disseminated to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concerning Bureau's technical coverage of diplomatic establishments in this country. On May 15, 1963, McCone informed Mr. Belmont that a letter which the Bureau had sent to the aforementioned Board should be retracted because the communication included statements which incorrectly were attributed to him, the CIA Director. Mr. Belmont adamantly refused to retract the letter and after McCone asked for an apology, Mr. Belmont again made it clear that no apology was coming from him. The Bureau never retracted the letter because statements disseminated by us were predicated on information which had been given to us by two top CIA officials. The conflict was eventually resolved by McCone writing a letter to the Board and admitting that two of his subordinates had erroneously briefed the Bureau on a particular matter.

STATURE OF MC CONE IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION

McCone obviously enjoys acquiring and using power. He considers himself not only the head of a particular government agency but also "the Director of Central Intelligence" and in

62-80750-4166

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

fiasco, we have not seen any evidence of high-grade intelligence being developed by CIA in Cuba since McCone became Director of the agency. To show impressive results, McCone must fall back on intelligence information developed through high-altitude photography and the use of other sophisticated technical equipment being used to photograph targets and to intercept communications. Much of this is, of course, being done in collaboration with other U. S. agencies such as the Air Force.

FBI COOPERATION WITH CIA

During the past year there have been numerous instances of excellent cooperation rendered by the Bureau to CIA. Set forth are some outstanding examples:

INFORMATION FROM SENSITIVE SOURCE SOLO

We have furnished CIA information from our sensitive Communist Party source who has traveled to Russia and has been in contact with Soviet leaders. This information has been most valuable to CIA in following developments particularly the differences between Red China and Russia.

TOPHAT

Our sensitive penetration of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service (GRU) has produced highly valuable information of use to CIA.

GIMME (S)

This is a highly sensitive penetration of the Czech Intelligence Service. His information (S) has significantly assisted CIA in obtaining a current picture of the Czech intelligence organization. (S)

BUREAU FURNISHES CIA A VALUABLE SOURCE

Our sensitive Czech source, Gimme, is (S) scheduled to return to Czechoslovakia. Arrangements (S) have been made to make him available to CIA.

FEDORA

Through this sensitive KGB penetration, we have furnished CIA leads pertaining to Soviet intelligence operations abroad. In addition, we have given the agency data pertaining to the organization and functions of KGB.

SOVIET MAIL DROPS OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

Through our investigations in this country, we have identified Soviet mail drops in other areas and we have given this valuable information to CIA.

CIA APPROACHES OF THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES

Under agreed-to restrictions we have permitted CIA to contact Soviet and Satellite visitors in this country for the purpose of assessing their potential as sources when they return to their native countries.

CUBAN SOURCES

We have afforded CIA the opportunity to brief Bureau sources before such sources made trips to Cuba.

SENSITIVE CUBAN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

Both FBI and CIA have had access to intercepted radio communications being utilized by Cuban Intelligence. The Bureau has been far ahead of CIA in identifying agents mentioned in the communications and has furnished pertinent information to CIA.

TECHNICAL DATA TO CIA

The Bureau has been very successful in identifying Soviet and Cuban secret writing techniques. We have made this knowledge available to CIA.

CIA COOPERATION WITH BUREAU

TOPHAT

CIA did an excellent job of servicing drops [S] in Moscow in this very sensitive case. This was done at considerable risk and was productive for us.

DOUBLE AGENTS FOR BUREAU

There have been a number of instances where CIA operated Soviet double agents outside of the U.S. and then made these individuals available to the Bureau for use in the U.S. In this connection it is also noted that in our development of the sensitive sources, Fedora (KGB penetration) and Gimme (penetration of Czech Intelligence Service) CIA furnished valuable assistance. (S)

VLADIMIR ROMASHKIN CASE

Several weeks ago, CIA advised us that one of its employees had been contacted by the Soviets. With CIA's cooperation, we conducted investigation which led to the ouster of a Soviet official and very favorable publicity for the Bureau.

COVERAGE IN MEXICO (S)

Through surveillances and surreptitious entry, CIA produced valuable information in our investigation of Franz Froehlich, a GRU Agent whom we since have doubled. (S)

AVAILABILITY OF DEFECTORS

CIA has been most cooperative in making defectors available to the Bureau for interviews.

COOPERATION WITH LABORATORY

From time to time CIA has made certain documents and equipment available to the Bureau's Laboratory. For example, a few weeks ago CIA made available to our Laboratory, at no cost, a portable unit designed for making radiographs (X-rays) of papers recording such characteristics as watermarks, printing, etc.

ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING A KEY CRIMINAL INFORMANT

Through assistance afforded by CIA, we gained access to an individual who subsequently became a valuable informant in the labor rackets field (NY 3936-C).

SECRET

(FRENCH) ACTIVITIES (S)

Information provided by a sensitive CIA source has been very useful in following the activities of (French) agents in the U. S. (S)

POSSIBLE TOPICS WHICH MC CONE MAY REFER TO

JACK EDWARD DUNLAP

This is the National Security Agency employee who supplied information to the Soviets and who committed suicide in July of this year. We recently received information from our sensitive source Tophat in Moscow confirming that Dunlap worked for the Soviets. Tophat's information was furnished to McCone last week. McCone is particularly concerned about the possibility that Dunlap may have furnished the Soviets information which led to the compromise of Oleg Penkovsky, a sensitive CIA source in Russia.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

The Dunlap Case has been raising questions concerning the effectiveness of security within U.S. agencies. McCone anticipates that Congress eventually may initiate some inquiry and he already has been informed that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is looking into the matter. Last week Mr. McCone asked Mr. Belmont for his views on personnel security. McCone, at that time, was briefed concerning our careful screening of applicants and our strong administrative controls including inspections. It was emphasized that the Bureau always resolved security problems in favor of the FBI rather than the individual involved. Mr. McCone was told that the key to the situation appeared to be tight screening and control procedures and the willingness to take prompt action.

COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE U. S.

In the Spring of this year, McCone brought up this matter before the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and he subsequently

SECRET

had a discussion with Mr. Belmont. Essentially, McCone is most interested in technical coverage of individuals and installations of non-Soviet Bloc countries. He has left the impression that in his opinion such coverage could be expanded in the U.S. and thereby produce more intelligence and more sources. Our coverage in this field at the present time is quite extensive. With regard to CIA, we have the understanding that if the agency desires particular technical coverage, we will give each request the necessary consideration.

FRENCH ACTIVITIES (S)

In the early part of this year, we initiated extensive investigation of the alleged French (S) agents in this country on the basis of data furnished to us by a sensitive CIA source. This source has informed CIA that De Gaulle has (S) embarked on an extensive espionage program in the U.S. primarily designed to collect scientific data which will enable France to hasten its (S) development of a nuclear capability. We have disseminated the results of our investigation to CIA and we are continuing the handling of numerous leads. The information developed by us so far has failed to disclose any evidence that the French are stealing any classified (S) secrets in the U.S. The French appear to be (S) obtaining voluminous information available to the French through normal contacts between (S) French officials and their counterparts in the (S) U. S.

TOPHAT

A CIA agent recently obtained the message which our sensitive source Tophat secreted in a drop in Moscow. (S) The message included information concerning Soviet activities in France, Germany and Austria. We have given this data to CIA. In addition, McCone was told that Tophat identified Dunlap as a Soviet agent. We have told CIA that Tophat may have loaded the drop as early as June, 1963. The delay in obtaining the communication prevented us from getting into the Dunlap Case well before the subject committed suicide.

SECRET

CIA did not service the drop because our informant did not exhibit an agreed-to signal. He apparently did not use the signal in order to fully protect himself. On the other hand, CIA was unable to service the drop until August because State Department adamantly refused to give CIA clearance to conduct any activity in Moscow. This position was taken by State because it felt that any operational activity might jeopardize the test ban talks. (S)

ANATOLI GOLITZYN AKA ANATOLI KLIMOV

This is the Soviet KGB defector who came to the U. S. under CIA control, feuded with the agency, left for England under British Intelligence control and very recently returned to the U.S. Since his return, he has met with the Attorney General and with McCone. He has been extremely critical of the U.S. position toward Russia. Although a prima donna, Golitzyn has been the source of extremely valuable information for all U.S. agencies including the Bureau. Since his return, he has indicated to the Attorney General and CIA that he will contact appropriate agencies when he sees fit. In the past, Golitzyn has asked to meet with the Director. The Director has made it very clear that he will not see Golitzyn.

MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI

The subject is a former high-ranking official of the Polish Security Service who defected in January, 1961, and in recent weeks has been an embarrassing problem for CIA because of his many complaints. He has communicated with the President, the Attorney General and has been in contact with a Congressman. He is slated to testify before the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee in the near future. He has accused CIA of dishonesty and over-all failure to comply with his needs. We have had access to Goleniewski who has been a valuable source of information. However, we have been most careful not to become involved in the feud between him and CIA. We have cooperated to the extent of furnishing CIA any information received from Goleniewski which might be of assistance to the agency.

SECRET

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

For your information, McCone has found this Board to be a constant irritant. This Board was established several years ago by the Eisenhower administration then continued by President Kennedy. It is designed to periodically review foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The present chairman of the committee is Clark Clifford and the staff director is J. Patrick Coyne. Apparently, McCone does not like a group such as this Board looking into his operations. There is some indication that his irritation arises from personal differences with Coyne.

WENNERSTROM CASE

Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, the Swedish Military Attache who, a few weeks ago, admitted to his government that he had been working for the Soviets. Wennerstrom was in the U. S. from 1952 until 1957 and was collaborating with the Russians while he was here. Recently, McCone indicated that a "damage report" should be prepared on this case and he expressed the opinion that this should be the responsibility of the Bureau. With regard to damage, he was referring to an evaluation of all information which Wennerstrom may have gained from the U. S. We have taken the position that we will not prepare such a damage report and if one is needed the work should be done by each interested agency.

UNKNOWN SUBJECT; KGB AGENT KNOWN AS "SASHA"

This is a Bureau investigation predicated on information furnished to us by Anatoli Golitzyn, the KGB defector who advised that CIA had been penetrated by KGB. We have been endeavoring to identify the unknown Soviet agent. We do have a suspect, [John S. Barescu] [S] who was born in Russia and who has been working for CIA for several years. McCone may not mention this matter but he is very much concerned about the situation. We have been keeping CIA advised of all pertinent developments.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10098

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : KEAY
TO : BELMONT

TITLE :

DATE : 06/10/1953
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: June 10, 1953

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY-
INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM JAMES ANGLETON

Tolson, Ladd, Nichols, Belmont, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Rosen, Tracy, Gearty, Mohr, Winterrowd, Tele. Room, Holloman, Sizoo, Miss Gandy

SYNOPSIS:

James Angleton, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official, is in charge of [the Special Projects] unit located in the Foreign (S) Intelligence division of CIA. [During past year he has been very cooperative and has volunteered voluminous information of interest to Bureau. At the present time he more or less falls in category of Confidential Informant. In order to handle his material in a more efficient and secure manner, it is being recommended that a control file be created. Section Chiefs are also being alerted regarding the handling of information received from Angleton.] (X)(U)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that the attached memorandum be disseminated to all Section Chiefs of the Domestic Intelligence Division, which sets forth instructions concerning the handling of information transmitted to the Bureau by Angleton.

7-26-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
(JFK)

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LEE 7-8-98

2. It is recommended that a separate control file be created which will contain a copy of each ["SP"] memorandum which (X)(U) Angleton furnishes the Bureau. Such copies will be maintained in the file in numerical order and it will not be necessary to index the names. It is suggested that this file be entitled, "Central Intelligence Agency - James Angleton."

10/5/89
Classified by SPYEW/KFA
Declassify on: OADR F.A.#88-1826

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DETAILS:

James Angleton, a CIA official, is in charge of a section referred to as [Special Projects,] which is a part of CIA's Foreign (X)(U)

RECORDED-108 62-99724
JUN 12 1953
24

SJP:lw
Attachment
1 - Mr. Medler
- Mr. Wannall

56 JUN 23 1953

SE 50

SECRET

Intelligence Division. Angleton handles special cases of a various nature and he is usually given considerable freedom and leeway in directing the operations of his unit. In general, he is responsible only to the Director of CIA. (S) He has numerous foreign sources and channels for developing information. The primary source is the [Israeli Intelligence Service.] (S) In addition to this, he is in contact with (S) [Jay Lovestone,] who periodically makes available to Angleton copies of reports which [Lovestone] has received from [American Federation of Labor] (S) representatives throughout the world. These representatives (S) are associated with the Free Trade Union Committee, which is subsidized by the CIA. Angleton also has independent sources in the intelligence services of France, Italy, Greece, and Great Britain. On occasion he utilizes sources in the Vatican. Some of the men under his control are on various foreign assignments in Europe and are responsible only to him. Most of them are traveling under commercial cover. (S)

During the past several months Angleton has been very cooperative with the Bureau. He has volunteered voluminous information of interest to the Bureau and he has followed Bureau leads in an effective manner. Much of the information which Angleton has furnished appears in the raw form, that is, it consists of the actual reports received from Angleton's sources. This has been of advantage because the Bureau has been in a position to better evaluate the information instead of waiting for the delay and processing through normal channels in the CIA. In addition to information regarding security matters furnished by Angleton, he has also been of valuable assistance by keeping the Liaison Agent apprised of administrative changes and reorganization within the CIA. Angleton is thoroughly informed regarding the foreign intelligence activities of his agency and he frequently clarifies matters which the CIA sometimes camouflages with some of its cloak and dagger techniques. (U)

For your information, Angleton was instructed by General Walter Bedell Smith, while he was still Director of the CIA, [to cooperate fully with the Liaison Agent and was told that he, Angleton, could disseminate any information he saw fit.] This policy has continued under Allen Dulles. (U)

Since the volume of information received from Angleton has increased the Liaison Agent has endeavored to encourage Angleton to establish some uniformity in the dissemination of information to (U)

Memo to Mr. Belmont   Re: Central Intelligence Agency, Information Received from James Angleton

the Bureau, particularly with regard to that information which he receives from [the Israeli Intelligence Service.] (S) Angleton is now furnishing the Liaison Agent blank memoranda which are dated, captioned, and which carry a control number; for example, "SP-1." This number will serve as a ready reference when some question comes up within the Bureau or the CIA. The Liaison Agent will make an appropriate notation on each memorandum indicating that the documents emanate from Angleton. It is believed advisable to set up a control file containing a copy of each document furnished by Angleton. This can be done in a manner similar to the arrangement effected in handling reports received from [Stott.] (S)

In view of the above, Angleton more or less falls into the category of a Confidential Informant. He furnishes information of a sensitive nature and it is, therefore, believed that when disseminating his data, he should be protected as a source. Up to date Supervisors have been handling this information in a secure manner; however, since the volume of data received from Angleton has increased, it is believed desirable to alert all Section Chiefs regarding the handling of information received from Angleton. (~~S~~)(U)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10099

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-8

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : KEAY
TO : BELMONT

TITLE :

DATE : 03/09/1954
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SECRET

DATE: March 9, 1954

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr
Trotter
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

FROM : V. P. Keay

10/9/89 SPYEDWKFA
Classified by
Declassify on: OADR 8.A. #88-1826

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: JAMES ANGLETON
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

As you know, the captioned individual has been providing the Bureau with considerable information, much of it being of a very sensitive nature. It has been noted that in transmitting communications to Angleton some memoranda have been sent to the Director of CIA, Attention: James Angleton, in care of [E. F. Hall.] (S) Other memoranda dealing with [Israeli Intelligence] matters have (S) been directed to James Angleton, in care of [E. F. Hall] (S)

In order that the Bureau would have a uniform procedure in transmitting mail to Angleton, the Liaison Agent discussed the matter with Angleton on March 5, 1954. Angleton requested that in the future mail being directed to him be transmitted to the Director of CIA, "Attention: James Angleton." Angleton stated that the above request was being made with the approval of Allen Dulles, the Director of CIA. He further indicated that he desired the above method of designation in connection with correspondence dealing with [Israeli Intelligence matters.] With regard to Bureau (S) reports concerning [Israeli matters,] Angleton advised that such (S) material is being retained under his personal supervision and control.

Angleton also asked when the Bureau found it necessary to disseminate information to him and other agencies, that his identity not be revealed to the other agencies. He explained that he is involved in several sensitive projects, such as [Israeli Intelligence,] and if his identity were known to the other agencies, the security of CIA operations could be prejudiced.] (S)

ACTION:

Attached hereto for your approval is a Memorandum to all Section Chiefs.

SJP:lw

Attachment

1 - Mr. Wannall
- Reading Room

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LEE 8-7-98

7-26-98 SLD/KSR
5668 1,5 (JFK)

RECORDED - 36
EX. - 107

LIAISON

66 MAR 19 1954

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10100

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-9, 10

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BRANIGAN
TO : BELMONT

TITLE :

DATE : 04/30/1954
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC MEMO

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: April 30, 1954

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: JAMES ANGLETON
CIA

Tolson, Ladd, Nichols, Belmont, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Rosen, Tracy, Gearty, Mohr, Winterrowd, Tele. Room, Holloman, Sizoo, Miss Gandy

10/6/98 Classified by SP4ELW/KSR
Declassify on: OADR
CA #88-1826

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

As you are aware, James Angleton of CIA frequently turns over to the Bureau on a highly confidential basis information which has been developed through operations headed by Angleton. In many instances the information is given to the Bureau without clearing through regular CIA channels. In almost all instances it is given to us with the clear understanding that if included in a report or other communication prepared for dissemination outside the Bureau the information will be so set forth that it cannot be traced back to either Angleton or CIA. In such instances where the information relates to [Israeli] (S) matters, it has been the practice of [Israeli] (S) supervisors to clear with Angleton before disseminating information from him outside the Bureau. (S)

In taking up such a matter with Angleton last week it was determined that he objected to attributing information which he had furnished to "Confidential Informant T-2, an Agency of the Government which conducts personnel and intelligence investigations." He pointed out that by describing T-2 as an agency of the Government which conducts personnel and intelligence investigations the Bureau was revealing to outside agencies that the material did in fact come from another Government agency. Since the material related to an individual who now resides in [Israel,] (S) Angleton stated that, in his opinion, recipient agencies could logically conclude that the information had originated with CIA since such an individual would be under CIA jurisdiction insofar as investigations abroad are concerned. Angleton requested that the information merely be attributed to Confidential Informant T-2, who, in this instance, could be described as being of known reliability.

It is suggested that it would materially assist in the handling of information received from Angleton in the future if the Liaison Section could work out a procedure whereby Angleton might be referred to as a Bureau informant. This would permit the Supervisors receiving the Angleton material firsthand to transmit it to the field and advise the field that the information in any report should be attributed to an informant with a temporary symbol number, which informant could be evaluated as having furnished information of a reliable nature in the past. On the informant page the temporary symbol number could be identified by the regular Bureau symbol assigned to Angleton. (U)

WRW:mh

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR 7-26-98
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6 (JFK)

RECORDED - 24 62-99724-9

68 MAY 26 1954

SECRET

EX-125

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LEE 8-7-98

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10103

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-74

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BRENNAN
TO : SULLIVAN

TITLE :

DATE : 03/17/1965
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3/17/65

FROM : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 ISD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
7-24-98
(JFK)

SUBJECT: [BUREAU INFORMANT 100] (S) (U)

In 1954, a procedure was approved whereby we could attribute certain information received from James Angleton, CIA, under the symbol "Bureau Informant 100." This information, for the most part, emanated from a liaison arrangement which CIA maintained with (S) [the Israeli Intelligence Service] and from other sources under the control of Angleton. Much of the information developed by Angleton was not disseminated within CIA but he felt that the data should be passed on to the Bureau. Allen Dulles gave him authorization to handle dissemination in this matter. We continue to receive information of value on a regular basis. (S)

By SAC Letter 54-27 dated 5/25/54, we informed the field regarding Bureau Informant 100 and issued instructions that information from this source be described under an appropriate T symbol and characterization. Because of the passage of time and since some offices have had rare occasion to receive Bureau Informant 100 information, it is believed desirable to reiterate instructions to the field. This should be done since the Informant has been developing information in recent months regarding the travel of U. S. citizens (S) [to Russia via Israel.] Such travelers come from various parts of the U. S. (S)

10/28/89 SP4GEW/KGA
Classified by
Declassify on: OADR
CA #88-1826

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ACTION:

If approved, there is enclosed herewith a recommended SAC letter.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
LEE 8-7-98

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. R. W. Smith
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:chs
(10)

62-99724-75

REC 12
EX-112
10 MAR 24 1965

XEROX
MAR 24 1965

F B I

58 MAR 30 1965

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10104

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-78

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BRENNAN
TO : SULLIVAN

TITLE :

DATE : 01/13/1967
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 1/13/67

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

Classified by SP4EPWLKEA 10/24/87
Declassify on: OADR
C.A.#88-1826

Tolson, DeLoach, Mohr, Wick, Casper, Callahan, Conrad, Felt, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, Tavel, Trotter, Tele. Room, Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM JAMES ANGLETON

In 1953 we created a separate control file (62-99724) under the caption, "CIA - James Angleton," for the purpose of retaining copies of certain types of memoranda disseminated to us by James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA. We believe that it is no longer necessary to maintain this control file.

In the way of background, the control file was created to give us the opportunity of closely monitoring our liaison with Angleton on a variety of matters which were not reported through normal CIA channels. CIA Directors permitted Angleton to run several intelligence projects, many of them with [the Israeli Intelligence Service.] (S) He was given authority by CIA to handle these projects and report only to the Director, CIA. He was given authority to disseminate to the FBI on all matters of interest to us. In 1953 we worked out an agreement where Angleton disseminated to us, and we attributed the information to Bureau Informant 100. The field was given appropriate instructions regarding the handling and reporting of the information. This procedure is still in existence and is operating satisfactorily. (S)

The information disseminated by Angleton is filed in the case file of an individual or an organization. The control file consists of copies of communications already recorded in separate case files. There has been little or no occasion to use the control file, and its usefullness at this point can be characterized as being obsolete.

62-99724-78

REC 32 6 JAN 18 1967

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that it no longer be necessary to place copies of [Bureau Informant 100] material in the control file. The file will continue to be used for retention of mail of a policy nature. (U)

Completed By Purge Unit. 29 Serials of Mail Destroyed. 1/23/67

1-19-67 OK To Destroy Existing copy material other than policy matters per Mr Papich

62-99724

1 - Mr. DeLoach	1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Mr. Tavel	1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Sullivan	1 - Mr. Papich

EX-115

(7)

61 JAN 24 1967

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10149

RECORD SERIES : NY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-35253-991

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : NY
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 04/05/1962
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
ANTI CASTRO ACTIVITIES IS-CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/09/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

DIRECTOR, FBI (109-584) APR 5 1962

SAC, NEW YORK (105-35253)

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS-CUBA

ReNYlet to Bureau dated 3/29/62.

MICHAEL J. P. MALONE, Vice-President, Czarnikow-Rionda Company, 106 Wall St., NYC, who is also employed by ROBERT KLEBERG of the King Ranch, Kingsville, Texas, advised on 3/30/62, that he had memoranda of his recent conversations in Washington, D.C., which he furnished the NYO. The memoranda of MALONE were written for ROBERT KLEBERG as a result of KLEBERG's meeting with Vice President LYNDON B. JOHNSON on 3/15/62.

In connection with MALONE's conversation with (U) (X) [Mr. HERBERT of the CIA,] who was described as an assistant to Colonel KING, MALONE wrote that [HERBERT] had informed (X) (U) him that [CIA] had separated the section in [CIA] which (U) deals solely with Cuban matters. MALONE wrote in his memorandum that [HERBERT] reported to him that he, [HERBERT,] (X) (U) did not agree with the general opinion of Vice President LYNDON JOHNSON relative to the lack of plans by President KENNEDY relative to Cuba. [HERBERT] told MALONE that he believed that President JOHN F. KENNEDY would act in the event of a crisis in Cuba and he believed that the opinion expressed by LYNDON B. JOHNSON with ROBERT KLEBERG on 3/15/62, was true as of many months ago.

(U) (X) MALONE wrote in his memorandum to KLEBERG that [HERBERT] was of the opinion that within the next two to three months, a favorable and appropriate climate will be created inside Cuba which would be favorable to some type of activity to overthrow the CASTRO Government.

MALONE in the same memorandum wrote that [HERBERT] (X) (U) expressed the opinion that the US Government should not loan Chile 385 million dollars as proposed by TEODORO MOSCOSO of the Alliance For Progress Program. [HERBERT] stated (X) (U) that he is very familiar with Chile and did not believe that they were in a position to intelligently utilize such a large sum of money and expressed an opinion that at the Foreign Ministers meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January, 1962, Chile was against the US's

2-Bureau (109-584) (RM)
1-New York (105-35253)

FJO:kap

105-35253-9

position. [HERBERT] (S)(u) expressed the opinion that the US should give more encouragement to Colombia and Argentina, who have already drawn up programs for social reform within the countries.

MALONE also wrote in his memorandum that [HERBERT] (S)(u) expressed the opinion that MALONE and his associates should attempt to discuss the Cuban question with Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY as he believes the Attorney General was a very strong minded individual and if he made a decision, would carry it out. (S)(u) [HERBERT] also stated that he believed MALONE and his associates should also talk with Senators HUMPHREY and MC CARTHY, both members of the "New Frontier", who are also individuals who can make a tremendous impression on President KENNEDY. [HERBERT] (S)(u) stated that he would furnish MALONE some ideas relative to contacting Senator HUMPHREY.

MALONE, on 3/30/62, furnished a second memo which he had written to ROBERT KLEBERG relative to his conversation with a CIA contact, [CHARLES MAECHIN] (ph). (S) MALONE wrote that [MAECHIN] had informed him that the section within [CIA] handling Cuba has been separated from the rest of [CIA] and now functions as an individual unit and has its counterpart in the Departments of Defense and State.

MALONE wrote that he had discussed with [MAECHIN] (S) Vice President JOHNSON's opinion that President KENNEDY would not act in Cuba or commit US troops in Cuba, and (S) [MAECHIN] stated that he did not exactly agree with this opinion of Vice President JOHNSON's, but believed that if President KENNEDY was confronted with a situation, he would act with firmness despite possible repercussions in Berlin and Viet Nam.

SECRET

NY 105-35253

(U)(S) MALONE stated that [MAECHIN](S) indicated that there was a [CIA] plan in the formative stage relative to Cuba, and that he was hopeful that they would have something to work on soon which would give [CIA](S)(U) more authority on which to operate. [MAECHIN](S) also indicated to MALONE that a military build-up can be expected in the Florida area, and that a minor one is already taking place at the present time at the US Naval Base at Guantanamo, Oriente Province, Cuba. (S)[MAECHIN] stressed that out of necessity future operations against Cuba would have to take place from an off-shore area because of security of the operation. MALONE also wrote in his memo that [MAECHIN](S) told him to tell ALBERTO FERNANDEZ of Key Biscayne, Florida, to be patient and that before long, [CIA] would fully utilize his abilities and equipment. (S)(U)

MALONE also furnished on 3/30/62, a copy of his memo to ROBERT KLEBERG relative to MALONE's conversation on 3/15/62, with SERAFINO ROMUALDI of the Latin American Section of the AFL-CIO. In this memo to KLEBERG, MALONE wrote that ROMUALDI stated that President KENNEDY was still being pushed and pulled by the "Intelligentia," who were identified as ARTHUR SCHLESINGER and ADLAI STEVENSON, toward following a soft line relative to Cuba. ROMUALDI told MALONE that RICHARD N. GOODWIN of the US Department of State apparently was waking up to the fact that the future of President KENNEDY depends upon a strong, firm policy and the elimination of CASTRO and Communism in Cuba immediately. ROMUALDI told MALONE that his opinion of GOODWIN's present thinking was gathered from individuals who dealt directly with GOODWIN concerning Cuba.

MALONE wrote to KLEBERG that ROMUALDI also recommended that he, MALONE, and his associates attempt to get an appointment with Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY relative to Cuba as ROBERT KENNEDY is the strong influence on the President and has been pressuring the President to get rid of what he calls the "featherheads"

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10191

RECORD SERIES : NY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-35253-987

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : NY
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 03/29/1962
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
ANTI CASTRO ACTIVITIES IS-CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

DIRECTOR, FBI (109-584) SECRET MAR 29 1962

SAC, NEW YORK (105-35253)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKET K 9-21-98

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS - CUBA

Re NYlet to Director, dated 3/14/62.

MICHAEL J. P. MALONE, Vice-President, Czarnikow-Rionda Company, 106 Wall Street, NYC, who is also employed by the King Ranch of Kingsville, Texas, advised on 3/20/62, that he had accompanied ROBERT KLEBERG of the King Ranch to Washington, DC, on 3/15/62, for KLEBERG's meeting with Vice-President LYNDON B. JOHNSON at 4:00 p.m. on that date.

MALONE advised that he did not accompany KLEBERG to the meeting with Vice-President JOHNSON, but KLEBERG informed him that they discussed the Cuban problem and what course of action the US was going to follow in this matter. KLEBERG, according to MALONE, was advised by Vice-President JOHNSON, that President JOHN F. KENNEDY has no contemplated plans at the present time for any large scale movement against Cuba, and there are no plans for the use of US troops in Cuba.

MALONE advised that KLEBERG told him that Vice-President JOHNSON stated that President KENNEDY was much concerned about the world situation, and is devoting most of his time to the problems relative to Berlin, Laos and South Vietnam.

MALONE advised that KLEBERG stated that from his conversation with Vice-President JOHNSON, it was clear to him that the present administration has no intention of using US military force in the Cuban

2 - Bureau (109-584) (RM)
1 - Miami (105-1742) (Info.) (RM)
1 - Washington Field (105-29995) (Info.) (RM)
1 - New York (105-35253)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

6-25-98

FJO:gag
(6)

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

Searched
Serialized
Indexed
Filed

SECRET 105-35253-987

problem, and that the Cuban problem has taken 4th place in the order of importance as far as President KENNEDY is concerned.

MALONE further advised on March 20, 1962, that while in Washington, DC, he had made arrangements to contact [Mr. HERBERT, who was described as the assistant] (S)(U) to Colonel KING of the CIA. MALONE stated that in conversation with [HERBERT,] the question of United States (S)(U) action in Cuba was discussed, and [HERBERT] stated that (S)(U) he did not agree with the opinion expressed by Vice-President LYNDON B. JOHNSON. [HERBERT] told (S)(U) MALONE that he and his associates should get together with Senators in Washington who are close to perfect agreement with the "New Frontier" such as Senator HUBERT HUMPHREY of Minnesota, and bring pressure to bear on them since these Senators exert a certain degree of influence over the President.

MALONE stated on 3/20/62 that he also had a meeting on 3/15/62 with his CIA contact, [CHARLES MAECHIN.] (S) MALONE stated that [MAECHIN] gave him the definite (S) impression that he thought that President KENNEDY and the US would at some time make a move in Cuba. (S) [MAECHIN] stated that the CIA continues to operate but not with the complete authority with which they would like to carry out their plans. [MAECHIN] suggested (S) to MALONE that MALONE and his associates attempt to see Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY and see if some pressure could not be brought to bear on the Cuban matter from Attorney General KENNEDY.

MALONE advised that from his conversations with CIA on 3/15/62, and from the conversation of ROBERT KLEBERG with Vice-President JOHNSON, he definitely was confused as to whether or not the US had any definite plans for participation in an attempt to overthrow the present Cuban regime. MALONE stated that from conversations with other individuals in Washington, he got the impression that the Cuban Revolutionary Council was falling apart, and that Dr. JOSE MIRO CARDONA had very little influence over the Cuban exiles in the Miami area.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10332-10018

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-88025-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : MM
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 08/04/1961
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE

COMMENTS :

MM 105-2234

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

In view of the relative inactivity of subject at this time insofar as Cuban revolutionary matters are concerned, no further investigation is being conducted, and this case is being closed. Should subject subsequently emerge as an active leader in anti-CASTRO activities, his case will be re-opened, and investigation conducted concerning his activities, and the Bureau will be advised.

On August 1, 1961, [WILLIAM HERRINGTON], CIA covert representative, Miami, Florida, informed that CIA had an operational interest in subject during the Cuban invasion in April, 1961. [HERRINGTON] said that while there is no interest in subject at the present time, CIA still has an operational interest in subject's son, whom he identified as SANTIAGO ALVAREZ.

[HERRINGTON] indicated that CIA did have considerable operational interest in subject's yacht, the "Alisan", but that there is no interest at the present time. [HERRINGTON] indicated he would advise the FBI at Miami if CIA develops any further interest in subject.

[Miami indices contained a communication from JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF, CIA representative, under date of February 7, 1961, which, among other things,] identified subject as a former Cuban senator who had collaborated on matters relating to the publication from time to time called "Esbirros". [This information, according to CIA, came from a usually reliable source. Communication was classified "secret"].

An investigation by the Miami Office of "Esbirros" disclosed it was a two or three-page mimeographed "scandal sheet" directed against the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), as well as all other groups and individuals both pro and anti-FIDEL CASTRO, according to MM 492-S. It was noted that many individuals, anti-CASTRO and anti-communist, had accused many other individuals of printing "Esbirros", which had resulted in the paper not being printed or published in January, 1961. This paper received very limited distribution, and it was not believed it had been printed in December, 1960.

-B-

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SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MM 105-2234

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

This report is classified confidential since data reported from MM T-1, who is MM 726-S, would reasonably result in the identification of a confidential informant of continuing value and compromise the future effectiveness thereof. (U)

INFORMANTS

IDENTITY	LOCATION OF ORIGINAL INFORMATION
MM T-1 is MM 726-S, contacted by SA LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.	134-307-Sub A-98 Instant report, page 4,5
MM T-2 is MM 492-S, contacted by SA JAMES D. HAYES	Instant report, page 5
MM T-3 is MM 724-S, contacted by SA JAMES D. HAYES	Instant report, page 6

(U)

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed in this report, and "T" symbols have been utilized only in those instances where identity must be concealed.

- C* -

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10332-10047

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 2-1622-178

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : MM
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 10/19/1962
PAGES : 19

SUBJECTS :
SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/22/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

MM 2-156

Copies Made:

9 - Bureau (2-1622)(RM)
1 - INS, Miami, Florida (RM)
1 - U. S. Customs, Miami, Florida (RM)
1 - U. S. Border Patrol, Miami, Florida (RM)
1 - Louisville (Info)(RM)
1 - Newark (Info)(RM)
1 - New Orleans (Info)(RM)
3 - New York (RM)
(2 - 105-52912)(1 - 105-38120)
3 - Miami
(2 - 2-156)(1 - 105-5003)

* * * * * * * * *

MIAMI:

AT FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA

Will attempt to locate and interview ORLANDO PIEDRA for any information concerning this matter, it being noted he has been reported to be vacationing in Florida at the present time.

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

1. Will maintain close contact with MM 639-S and other sources and informants for any additional pertinent information concerning subject's activities. X(u)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

MM 2-156

2. Will locate and interview BATISTA's son-in-law, ROBERTO FERNANDEZ MIRANDA, in an effort to obtain additional details concerning allegations as set forth in Bureau letter to Assistant Attorney General J. WALTER YEAGLEY dated July 31, 1962.

- ADMINISTRATIVE -

This report is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as data received from the Department of the Army on July 25, 1962, and furnished to Assistant Attorney General J. WALTER YEAGLEY was so classified.

Not classifiable Army Letter 10/25/82

- INFORMANTS -

Individuals contacted, as mentioned in this report, [who had no knowledge of any training groups in the Florida Keys] are identified as follows: X (X)

[RENE A. RAIOLE (NA)
CIA Covert Representative
Contacted August 7, 1962] X (S)

PSI (under development) FRANK HERNANDEZ
Contacted August 16, 1962

PSI (under development) MANOLO STINCER X (X)
Contacted August 30, 1962

MM 674-C
Contacted September 5, 1962

- C -

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SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET SECRET SECRET

MM 2-156

All of the above sources were contacted by SA RALPH L. JENSEN.

Identity	Location
MM T-1 is MM 639-S, contacted by SA ROBERT JAMES DWYER.	134-238 Sub A-630 and 631.
MM T-2 is FELIPE CATASUS PAZOS, former Vice Chief of Cuban Air Force under President BATISTA, contacted by SA LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR. (protect, by request).	Instant report page 3.
MM T-3 is MM 492-S, contacted by SAs JAMES D. HAYES and LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.	Instant report page 3.

- D* -

- COVER PAGE -

SECRET SECRET SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10369-10022

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-117290-ADMIN FOLDER-Y8

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : JONES
TO : WICK

TITLE :

DATE : 12/28/1966
PAGES : 322

SUBJECTS :
HSCA ADMINISTRATIVE FOLDER, LEE HARVEY OSWALD
VOLUME XII

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/23/1999

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC FOLDER, MEMO, A/T, TTY, LET, NOTES, LHM, PRESS RELEASES, TESTIMONY, NEWS ARTICLES, TRANSLATION

SECRET

1-Mr. Mohr
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. Callahan
1-Mr. Conrad

SAC, WFO [(100-18032)] (S)

11/22/66

Director, FBI [(100-357510)] (S)

1-Mr. Baker
1-Mr. Allen

[OFFICE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE IS - R; CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION] (S)

Classified by SP6BJA/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 12/5/84
#21,326

ReBuairtel 10/25/66 reflecting installation authorization. (S)(U)

This letter is for information and record purposes. (S)(U)

[In response to your request, a new closed-circuit television system was recently installed in connection with the captioned case. The system consists of a remotely controlled video camera, zoom lens and pan-tilt head mounted in a special disguise. A 17-inch monitor is located nearby and provides a view of the pertinent scene. Monitor personnel can remotely change the focal length, focus, aperture and field of view of the lens. Certain compensation for changing light conditions can also be made at the monitoring site.] (S)

Attached is a technical addendum listing the equipment installed together with special circuit and cable data to assist WFO personnel in the maintenance of the equipment. Appropriate inventory changes should be made. (S)(U)

1 - [80-829] (S)
CTA:ev
(10)

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures (2)

REC- 47 (S)

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

53 DEC 9 1966

19 NOV 30 1966

DEC 5 1966

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

T Oswald Folder

SECRET

Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. 8/22/66

S. J. Papich

JOACHIM JOESTEN
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

On 8/19/66, Cal Tenney, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised that the Swiss Federal Police received a letter from the subject, postmarked Milan, Italy, on 8/13/66, which read as follows:

"The final accounting with the Johnson gang is imminent. Each of you who continues to partake in the actions of the Johnson gang or their German officials, the Gehlen gang, or those who disrupt the plans of American patriots against the usurper regime, will shortly pay with their lives. Be it well understood, Greetings."

Tenney advised that this information has been disseminated by CIA to the White House and Secret Service.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Soviet Section.

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:rab
(4)

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90037-10081

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 100-380792-26

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BN
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 01/29/1959
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
MARTIN GREENDLINGER

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA, INDEFINITE

COMMENTS : MEMO

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 1/29/59

FROM : LEGAT, BONN (100-633)

SUBJECT: MARTIN GREENDLINGER, aka SECURITY MATTER - C

Classified by SPGBJA/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 8/28/85
(SPS MAC/GCL-4/15/94-JFK)

Reference New York letterhead memorandum 11/17/58, furnished by Bureau routing slip 11/24/58.

The following agencies were furnished a summary of the New York information on the subject and were requested to provide any information which might come to their attention regarding the subject's travels or activities:

G-2, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe;
Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Forces, Europe;
[Office of Coordinator and Special Advisor (confidential CIA), American Embassy, Bonn, Germany;] (S)
[British Services Security Organization, British Forces in Germany;
Abteilung II (Security Police), Austrian Ministry of the Interior;
Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV - West German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)] and, (S)
Security Office, American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.

None of these agencies, [except the British,] (S) have furnished any information to date. [The British Services Security Organization advised under date of 12/30/58, that it had no trace in its records on the subject, his parents, Mr. and Mrs. DAVID GREENDLINGER, or his wife, ELENA IVANOVNA] (S) Greendlinger

RUC.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 10-10-97

3 - Bureau
1 - Bonn
(4) GAV:tlc

REC-60 100-380792-26

EX-102

7 FEB 3 1959

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SUBV. CONTROL

52 FEB 11 1959

POUCH MAIL

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/23/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90041-10023
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 97-3856-13

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM : CIA
TO :
TITLE :

DATE : 10/26/1959
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
CRUZADA REVOLUCIONARIA ANTI COMUNISTA
JOSE RASCO BERMUDA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/18/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : RPT

with his local supporters through three women who visit him periodically. He has been apprised of the activities of his followers in Miami and has requested that $20,000 be furnished to a 40-man group of his followers in Camaguey Province. The Camaguey group is the one he has charged with making a raid on La Cabaña prison and freeing him.

6. Under the orders of Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro, one [PRUNA Blanco (fmu)] (S) has contacted one [Narciso NAVARRO] (S) who has a group of followers in [Pinar del Rio] (S) and has arms, ammunition, and dynamite buried on his farm in that province. [PRUNA Blanco] (S) also has a group of followers in [Pinar del Rio] (S) province which is led by [Jesus CABRERA] and former sergeant [MARTINEZ (fmu)] (S) The [CABRERA] (S) group is called [Legión Democrática Cubana (LDC, Cuban Democratic Legion).] (S) The buried arms and dynamite are to be used in sabotage and assassination attempts.

7. [PRUNA Blanco] (S) has also sent one [Bernardo PARETS Gonzalez] (S) to contact Manuel BLANCO Navarro in Miami. [PRUNA Blanco] (S) is attempting to set up an arms drop to the [LDC] (S) at a point 10 kilometers north of Los Palacios (22 36N, 83 16W). (S) [LDC] men will be waiting at this point and will signal the plane making the drop with four flashlights.[9]

8. Besides the two groups in Pinar del Rio province and the group in Camaguey, Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro also has two groups in Matanzas and Santa Clara provinces.[10]

9. On about 25 August 1959 Manuel BLANCO Navarro, in Miami, wrote a letter to one of his followers in Cuba. Enclosed with the letter were two messages which BLANCO asked be forwarded to [Orlando VELAZCO, Distribuidora de Refrescos ARENAL Y] (S) [HNO SA, Avenida No. 515 y 517, Cardenas, Matanzas, telephone 632.] (S) BLANCO also asked that [CELAZCO] (S) be informed that the letters were "from his sister [Haydee"] (S) (Sic). One of the messages reads as follows:

Dear Brother:

I am writing these lines to accompany a letter from my friend Dr. Rodriguez Couceiro , in whose house I am staying since I found out that they have arrested Leonel and that I cannot return there. As you will see in the letter, I am sending you a series of instructions to see if we can maintain the group that is presently without any leaders. Just as you have probably read in the newspapers, they have caught all the leaders in the roundup. This doesn't mean anything more than that we shall be delayed until we are reorganized again. Only about 100 were arrested, and the group numbered about 3,000.

As he (my friend) informs you, I do not believe that you ought to visit Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro in La Cabaña prison. You should send someone in whom you have confidence. In the new contacts that you made do not use your own name. Use an alias so that, if anyone should talk, they will not be able to identify you. You should protect the place where you live. When you have meetings, hold them at prearranged places, never in your home. I know that you know how to do these things, but I want to warn you to be careful and use other persons to make your contacts. Don't do it personally. The principal objective is to be able to maintain yourself as the leader of the movement at least until you select chiefs if your work prevents you from leading in Habana.

We have made contact here with a large group which was not caught and which is also organized from Autentico people. This group did not lose its leaders, since, as I say, it was not caught because it had joined us only a few days previously. This group is almost ready for action; so it is urgent that you reorganize our people rapidly in order

that Don Fidel may not last until the New Year. In the next letter we shall send more details and possibly give the main outlines of the business. As soon as you have anything to report, use a courier in whom you have confidence. Do not use the name of [Carlos LOSADA](S) since that name is now "burned". Use the name [Angel MARTINEZ,](S) and use the address which you already have for the time being. I think that we shall soon change residence, but I will send you the new address as soon as we do.

When you reply, use the name "little grandmother" (abuelita) since as you know, ~~my~~ "name" is also "burned". Many regards to all and an embrace from your sister

[Haydee.](S)

10. The second message reads as follows:

Miami 21 August 1959

[Orlando VELASCO](S)
Dear Friend:

As I suppose you already know, because of the treason of William Morgan [12] and Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo[12], the leaders of the Organization have been arrested, and it is most necessary that our people be reorganized so that the movement is not lost. The only person who is able to do so is you. I know that the responsibility is very great, but I also know your abilities, and we are sure that you will be able to do the job.

As a first objective, it is necessary to establish contact with Captain Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro. He is the chief of our organization and will continue to be. He is in prison in La Cabaña, according to our information, but is allowed to receive visitors. He knows you, since you met each other in his office. You can introduce yourself as the brother of [Haydee.](S) He will give you names of persons and instructions to follow. However, it is very important that, while he remains a prisoner, you set up a courier so that you don't have to make subsequent visits. This would be dangerous in the extreme.

With respect to the rebels, be very careful in making your contacts, since one lesson is enough. There is one safe person whom you can trust, [Dr. Fran MARSHALL.](S) He is secretary of the Union Club[13](S) You can see him on our behalf and on that of the ["Mejicano"](S) [11] So that he will not mistrust you, you can tell him that the last time we saw him was at a dinner on the terrace of the [Union Club.](S) Tell him that it rained a lot. Find out from him if [Lt. PEÑA](S) can or cannot be trusted, since our information is contradictory. Be very careful with the rebels, and don't make the contacts with them directly. It is better that you designate another person for the purpose. [Fran](S) is trustworthy but very easygoing.

Another group you can contact is that of [Jorge GUTIERREZ Izaguirre](S) in the Rosita de Hornedo. Tell him that you were sent by Francisco GONZALEZ, who is in Montclair, New Jersey; that here we are united; and that he should join his group to our movement. I shall send you more information on this group.

You should also see [Dr. Valentin ARENAS Amigo](S)[14]. His office is at [Aguiar No. 556,](S) Habana. Tell him that you come on my behalf and to recall the last visit of ~~myself~~ and the ["Mejicano"](S) to his office, in which ~~we were~~ speaking of CASTRO. I recently wrote him a letter from New York. He leads a group of followers of [Jose Ignacio RASCO](S) [Artimes](S) etc.[15] (sic) of the Agrupacion.

You should also see [Señor Agustín BATISTA, Jr.] (S) in the [Banco Trust Company.] (S) He knows [Fran] and is a cousin of [Enrique LLACA.] (S) So that he doesn't mistrust you, tell him that you are the messenger (enviado) and tell him to recall the interview we had in the lobby of the Savoy Hilton of New York. Up to recently he had a group.

For financial matters you can see Señor [BELT] (S) a friend of (S) [Haydee,] and Señor [Alin SUERO Falla.] (S) To contact the latter, see secretary Señor [Jorge MACHADO] (S) and tell him that you come on my behalf and that of the word Sugar (sic.) It is very important that you get together a good finance committee to handle the money problem there. Also talk to [BLANCO] (S) about persons you can see about money. Another person that you can see is [Julio LOBO] (S) with [Dr. BELT.] (S)

You should also see [Alejandro VERGARA] (S) the chancellor of the [Spanish Embassy,] for me. He can help you a lot, above all with [Valentin ARENAS] (S) etc. The cousin of [Rosarito] (S) is [Elena SOTO Martinez.] (S) Her name is ["Carolina"] (S) and her telephone number is [W-0746.] (S) She lives at [Galiano and Lagunas,] (S) upstairs in the [Tinaje (?), Apartment] (S) [No. 7.] She receives our letters and can help you. Introduce yourself as the brother of [Haydee] (S) No one else should see her but you, and no one should know that you see her. You must be extremely careful to protect her.

Well, I believe that this is enough for now. Be extremely careful, and reorganize our rank and file, since the thing is soon.

(signature illegible)

Field Comments

1. Previously reported as a Cuban Rebel Army captain heading a counter-revolutionary group in Cuba. BLANCO was one of the chief conspirators arrested in August 1959, when the Cuban Government smashed a plot against it.

2. Brother and father respectively, of Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro.

3. Presidential candidate of the Cuban People's Party in the 1958 Cuban elections. He took asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy in July 1959 and was last reported in exile in Caracas on 26 July. At that time he reportedly said that he would soon leave for New York, where his family was.

4. In an open letter dated 6 June 1959 at Miami, one [Francisco RODRIGUEZ Tamayo] (S) aka ["El Mejicano"] (S) a former Rebel Army captain, invited his former companions-in-arms to join CRAC.

5. The BLANCO group was reportedly without funds or arms as of 31 August 1959.

6. In a memorandum dated 16 September 1959 the U. S. Air Attache in Habana reported information from a wife of one of the prisoners in La Cabana that CRAC had gathered $1,000,000 to get Reinaldo BLANCO, Enrique OVARES, Gustavo de los REYES, Kuku BRINGUIER, and Dr. CAINAS Milanes out of prison. OVARES, REYES, and CAINAS are also high-level conspirators who were arrested in the roundup of August 1959.

7. According to a memorandum dated 26 August 1959, from the Protection Section of the American Embassy, Habana, an American citizen who had just been released from La Cabana prison after five months' imprisonment reported that a group of approximately 460 political prisoners and former prisoners are actively engaged in counter-revolutionary activities. Three hundred of the group were said to be at liberty in Habana, approximately 100 still held in prison, and about 70 in

open rebellion in Pinar del Rio under [Luis LARA Crespo,] (S) a former corporal of the BATISTA army. Among the leaders of the group was one [Fernando PRUNA Blanco,] (S) who was said to be held in the Castillo Prison at the time. [PRUNA Blanco] (S) (fnu) may be a relative of or identical with [Fernando PRUNA Blanco.] (S)

8. Identified by Source as the brother of [Angel NAVARRO,] (S) previously reported as co-ordinator of a group of counter-revolutionaries in Miami.

9. On 22 September 1959 source reported that this army drop had been scheduled between 8 and 10 p.m. on 25 September 1959.

10. Source did not know the size of any of the groups.

11. This probably refers to [Dr. Francisco RODRIGUEZ Couceiro,] (S) reported by a usually reliable source in July 1959 to be a leader, together with one [Jose Luis PUJOL,] (S) of a Cuban counter-revolutionary movement. [RODRIGUEZ Couceiro] (S) was reported by the same source to be a first cousin of [Francisco RODRIGUEZ Tamayo, aka "El Mejicano" (the Mexican).] (S) The Habana telephone directory lists a [Dr. Francisco RODRIGUEZ Couceiro,] (S) a lawyer, at [Pasco No. 652,] (S) Habana.

12. Morgan and GUTIERREZ are two Cuban Rebel Army majors who penetrated the conspiracy that was smashed in August 1959.

13. The Habana telephone directory lists a [Union Club] (S) at [San Lazaro No. 12,] (S) Habana.

14. This is possibly a reference to [Dr. Valentin ARENAS Arminan,] (S) reported in July 1949 by a usually reliable source as the notary handling the purchase of the [Banco Ultramar] (S) for Spanish pro-Franco interests. The [Banco Ultramar] (S) was later absorbed by the [Banco Continental Americano,] (S) now known as the [Banco Continental Cubano.] (S)

15. The Habana telephone directory lists a [Jose I. RASCO] (S) at Avenida [31 No. 7406, Marianso.] (S)

16. The Habana telephone directory lists a [Banco Trust] (S) Company of Cuba with main offices at [Obispo No. 257,] (S) Habana.

17. This is possibly a reference to [Enrique LLACA Orbiz,] (S) reported in the Habana press on 18 June 1959 as an [executive] (S) of the [Julio LOBO] (S) organization and former newspaper business manager who was released by Cuban Government authorities on 16 June. [LLACA] (S) and his son, [Dr. Enrique LLACA, Jr.] (S) had been held on charges of conspiracy. A United Press report dated 24 July 1959 at Santiago, Chile, said that [Enrique LLACA Orbiz] (S) a lawyer and one-time economic editor of [Diario de la Marina] (S) had arrived in Chile as an exile.

18. This is possibly a reference to [Guillermo BELT,] (S) former Cuban Ambassador to the United States under BATISTA. (S)

19. Wealthy Cuban businessman with large sugar interests.

20. Wealthy Cuban businessman with large sugar interests.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90060-10015

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 163-15064-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : PA

TITLE :

DATE : 07/12/1966
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
LUCIEN CONEIN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/15/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

Legat, Paris (163-1071)   7/12/66

EX-103

Director, FBI (163-15064)   SECRET

2 - Orig & 1
1 - Yellow
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Flemister

LUCIEN CONEIN
FPC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Reurlet 6/2/66.

Bufiles reveal that the name Lucien Emile Conein, born 11/29/19, appeared in a 1963 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) communication indicating Conein at that time was a staff employee of the Agency. The files of the Identification Division contain no arrest record for Lucien Conein. (S)(U)

Through Liaison channels, Bureau determined that Conein is currently a covert employee of CIA, under the cover of a State Department employee. He is presently in Saigon, South Vietnam, on an extremely sensitive assignment. CIA has requested that no information be furnished to the French regarding his affiliation with CIA or with regard to his present whereabouts. (S)

For your information, Richmond determined (by a pretext telephone call) from the present occupant of 1111 Ingelside Avenue, McLean, Virginia, who is presently renting this residence from Conein, that the latter is a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the U. S. Army and is presently working and assigned to the U. S. Embassy in Saigon.

No arrest records were located for Conein in either Arlington County or Fairfax County, Virginia. Records of the Credit Bureau, Incorporated, of Washington, D. C., reveal a credit report dated 9/21/65, indicating that Lucien Conein, of 1111 Ingelside Avenue, McLean, Virginia, was then married to Ebjette and divorced from Carmen (last name not shown).

In view of CIA's request, under no circumstances should any information be furnished to the French concerning subject's present affiliation with CIA or his whereabouts. You may furnish the French the results of the credit and criminal checks as noted above. If the French raise the (S)(U)

2 - St. Louis (Enclosure)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)
HCF:jkm
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR (JFK)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 8-8-98

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MAILED 6
JUL 13 1966
COMM-FBI

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM [x] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

10/24/94
Classified by
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

question of subject's whereabouts, you should inform them that inquiries to date reveal no information concerning his present whereabouts. You may advise the French that Conein's military service record is being reviewed for any pertinent information. (S)(U)

St. Louis should promptly locate and review Conein's military service record. According to Army sources in Washington, D. C., Conein's military service record was transferred to the U. S. Army Records Center, St. Louis, on 6/30/62. His military serial number was either 01320769 or 01322769. Furnish results in letterhead memorandum.

Enclosed for St. Louis is one copy of relet.

NOTE:

Subject was convicted by a French court in 12/47* to pay his wife (Monique Veber) a monthly sum of 8,000 francs (about $16) for the support of her and two children which resulted from the marriage. Subject has never followed the orders of the court and is currently the subject of an investigation at the request of the Investigative Magistrate in France. Information in the possession of the French indicated that Conein resided at the Ingelside address and they requested investigation by the Bureau to verify his residence and to determine his present situation with regard to employment and standard of living. Legat, Paris, requested Bureau check Bufiles, Ident files, and requested Bureau have Richmond check credit and criminal records and conduct discreet limited investigation to comply with the request of the French Police.

In view of CIA's request as indicated in this letter, it is felt that under no circumstances should we make any mention of our knowledge of subject's whereabouts. (S)(U)

* and was ordered

SECRET

163-15064-1

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90092-10001

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-68227-927

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : NY
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 10/08/1965
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
ROBERT GLENN THOMPSON
WILLIAM K. HARVEY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/15/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : RPT

FD-263 (Rev. 5-1-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
NEW YORK	NEW YORK	10/8/65	3/15 - 9/23/65

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
CHANGED ROBERT GLENN THOMPSON aka Samuel Katzman, James Olson, Bob Robertson, "Tommy"	ROBERT F. LAUDWEIN	dmk
	CHARACTER OF CASE ESP - R	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON - FCIM II, 1-2. 4. 2
DATE OF REVIEW

The title of this report is marked "Changed" to add the name, BOB ROBERTSON, which THOMPSON indicated he had possibly used in the Fall of 1959 in a flight from Detroit to NYC, and the name, "TOMMY" by which name Mrs. HAROLD RETZLAFF, El Paso, Texas, knew THOMPSON.

Bureau has advised that the code name, "OXTANK", formerly used in communications other than reports and letterhead memoranda will no longer be used.

REFERENCES

NYreps of SA ROBERT F. LAUDWEIN, 3/15/65 and 5/28/65.

P

ADMINISTRATIVE

Regarding the summary of THOMPSON's story in the "Saturday Evening Post" (SEP), the following information, obtained through interviews of THOMPSON and through other sources, is set forth to clarify the SEP story.

APPROVED — SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE — DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

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2 - New York (65-22427)

65-68227-927

REC-41

OCT 11 1965

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SOVIET SECTION

Dissemination Record of Attached Report — Notations

Agency: State, CIA, OSI; ONI, ACSI, DIA
Date Fwd.: 10/26/65

See other side

copies made
Wm. Harvey (this page & page N)
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 11/10/77 request. 2/10/78 DJC/mea

SECRET

57 FEB 28 1966

53 FEB 7 1966

SECRET

Copies of Index pages 241 thru 256
[se]nt to State, CIA, OSI, ONI, ACSI, DIA
[Ju]stice (Hall) by liaison 11-22-65. INH/pds
Pls attach this index to NY report in this
[cas]e dated 10/8/65 which was disseminated to
[abov]e 10/26/65 by liaison

1 copy recd from NY by R/S 7-7-66
(S) in response to Bureau R/S 6-30-66
and sent to [Legat Ottawa] (S) for delivery to
(S) [RCMP] by, by O-T- 7-13-66
(pp 1-256)

REC'D DOM INTELL DIV. OCT 29 11 06 AM '65

REC'D DOM INTELL DIV. 23 12 44 PM 1965

REC'D DOM INTELL DIV. OCT 13 6 31 PM '65

REC'D DOM INTELL DIV. OCT 11 3 47 PM '65

JAN 28 1966

FEB 1 1966

SECRET

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF [illegible] DATE 1/17/84 [illegible]

100-1-28096

NY 65-22427

SECRET

WILLIAM K. HARVEY (S) (U) FOREIGN

THOMPSON stated that this individual's face was somewhat familiar, and that the name definitely was familiar to him. THOMPSON identified this individual as a Captain HARVEY, whose name appeared on communications directed to OSI from the 7983rd Army Unit. (S) Specifically, THOMPSON remembered that Captain HARVEY's name had appeared on name check requests submitted to OSI, Berlin, from the 7983rd Army Unit. (S) THOMPSON believed that the Soviets either showed THOMPSON a picture of HARVEY or asked THOMPSON about HARVEY. THOMPSON stated that he furnished whatever available information he had about HARVEY to the Soviets, but he could not now recall the nature of this information (S)

SECRET

Cover Page

-N-

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90092-10002

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-68227-649

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : NY
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 03/15/1965
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :

OXTANK
WILLIAM K. HARVEY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/15/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : RPT

FD-302 (Rev. 10-11-63)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS

Date 12/4/64

ROBERT GLENN THOMPSON
ESP - R

1\.

ROBERT G. THOMPSON, 1693 North Gardiner Drive, Bay Shore, Long Island, New York, was interviewed on December 2, 1964. At the outset of the interview THOMPSON was advised by SA PAUL BOYCE TOMPKINS that he was not under arrest, that his meeting with the Special Agents was strictly voluntary, and that he could leave at any time he wished to do so. THOMPSON was also advised that he had a right to say nothing at all, and that anything he did say might be used in a court of law against him. He was also advised that if he did say anything about a crime he had a right at any time to talk to a lawyer of his own choice or anyone else with whom he might wish to speak before saying anything.

The interviewing agents advised THOMPSON that they had in their possession a list of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) male personnel who were assigned to the Berlin Base of that agency during the period that THOMPSON was assigned to OSI, Berlin. The names on this list were then read off to THOMPSON, at which time he was asked to comment on any names that he recognized. (S)(U)

THOMPSON made the following comments concerning the individuals listed below, whose surnames he recognized. (S)(U)

[ROBERT A. ACKERMANN] (S)

THOMPSON stated he recalled an individual named [ACKERMANN] (S) who had some connection with Army Intelligence or CIA in Berlin while THOMPSON was with OSI, Berlin. He could recall nothing further regarding this individual nor could he recall if he furnished any information about [ACKERMANN] (S) to STEVEN. (S)

On 12/2/64 at Bay Shore, LI, NY File # 65-22427

by SAS PAUL BOYCE TOMPKINS & GEORGE W. O'CONNOR:emv Date dictated 12/4/64

Cover Page

[WILLIAM K. HARVEY](S)(U)

THOMPSON stated that he recalled an individual by the name of HARVEY whom he believes was an officer with the [7983rd Army Unit](S) which THOMPSON stated was a covert CIA outfit, or was an officer with an Army Intelligence Unit in Berlin. THOMPSON believed that this individual had the rank of Captain or Major, and that he was an administrative or liaison officer. THOMPSON stated that STEVEN, his Soviet principal, asked him about this individual and THOMPSON told STEVEN whatever he knew about this individual. THOMPSON advised that he thinks he, THOMPSON, might have met this individual on one occasion.(X)

Germany

[CLARK JUNG](S)

THOMPSON advised that he recalled an individual having the last name [JUNG](S) who was a civilian employee of the [7983rd Army Unit](S). THOMPSON recalled a great many details about this individual, including the fact that he was a civilian employee of CIA in Grade GS-9 or 10. THOMPSON believed that this individual was an "agent handler" and furthermore, that he had some connection with photography. THOMPSON stated that this individual may have been a "counterfeiter of documents" or he may have been a "bug" on photography.(X)

THOMPSON also recalled that this individual lived on Argentinische Allee or Onkel Toms Strasse in Berlin, Dahlem.(X)(U)

THOMPSON also recalled that the individual whose last name he believes was [JUNG](S) had some sort of an association with two German nationals, whose release from jail in Germany, United States Intelligence had obtained in order that their talents might be utilized by the [7983rd Army Unit](S). THOMPSON stated that one of these individuals was a counterfeiter and that the other individual was a safe-cracker. STEVEN told him this.(X)

F

Cover Page

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90092-10016

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-67235-648

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : WMFO
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 03/05/1963
PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :
WILLIAM K. HARVEY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/15/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : RPT

WFO 65-8517
AWN:ljp/jet/mfm

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(S-1)(S) [GOLD] knew of no relatives of the KARLOWs living abroad nor was he aware of any financial interests which either of the (S-1)(U) KARLOWs held in Germany. In discussing KARLOW's associates, [GOLD] (S) furnished the following individuals as being KARLOW's overseas friends: (S-1)(S)

GORDON STEWART, Head of the CIA [Station at Frankfurt] (S)
WILLIAM K. HARVEY, CIA representative in Berlin
[PETER SICHEL, CIA representative at Berlin
WALTER JESSELL] CIA official in Germany. (S) GER (S-1)(S)

(S-1)(S) [GOLD] characterized KARLOW as being primarily interested in associating with "front office personnel; that when KARLOW did mingle with the co-workers, it was more or less an act of condescendence." (S-1)(U)

(S) [GOLD] advised that because of the wide area that TAD was servicing in behalf of CIA, it was necessary that a number of TAD personnel be constantly travelling. (S) [GOLD] remarked that he was travelling steadily and that KARLOW was a frequent traveler in behalf of TAD. (S) [GOLD] could recall no specific dates of trips by KARLOW during the period 1950 to 1953, but furnished the following in this regard: (S-1)(S)

[Vienna] (S-1)(S)(U)

(S) [GOLD] estimated that KARLOW probably made 12 to 15 trips to Vienna during this period for Agency purposes. He recalled that the Agency was servicing a number of requests from Vienna; that at one time, "We had a riotous operation going there and [ED FOSTER] needed some help." (S) [GOLD] believed that [FOSTER] (S) could furnish substantial information regarding KARLOW's activities in Vienna. (S-1)(S) AUSTRIA

(S) [GOLD] recalled that during this particular period there were no travel restrictions on American personnel in and around Vienna; that frequently one was not aware he was even in a Soviet zone. (S) [GOLD] could not recall how long KARLOW remained in Vienna on his trips there. (S-1)(S)

WFO 65-8517 (S)(U)
MAT:jet

SECRET

was not sure of the date. He mentioned HOUCK was still Chief of Base at Berlin (S) and said he saw HOUCK. KARLOW explained that military orders were necessary for any travel into Berlin, including flight by Pan American Airways, which also operated under military control. He stated the orders for travel by train were the most formal, since a check by the Soviets was involved. (S-1)(S)

KARLOW related one of his men from TAD, DANIEL C. NIESCHIUR (S) was stationed in Berlin (S) under the name of DANIEL O'NEILL. He thought this was in 1951 or after 1951. He also stated that other men from TAD had temporary duty in Berlin (S) and recalled vaguely the photography men had set up some new equipment and dark room there, JOHN KOPERA (S) had visited Berlin in connection with some Polish matter, WESLEY PARCELLS on some German "things," and (S) JOUBLANC the chemist, in connection with some case. (S-1)(S)

KARLOW said he could not say whether he was in Berlin in August, 1951, but recalled he was there on at least one occasion in the summer because he clearly remembered how early the sun rose in the morning. (S-1)(S)(U)

HARRY H. ROSITZKE

KARLOW stated he rarely became involved in operations and was usually occupied in making arrangements and setting things up for use of the facilities of TAD. He recalled, however, he was involved in an operation with JOHN PARKER (S) and HARRY ROSITZKE of the SR (Soviet Russia) Division and flew to Berlin in 1952 in this connection. KARLOW explained the operation involved a planned attempt to steal the latest model MIG fighter plane and great preparation had been made but at the last minute the adventure was called off because of possible political and diplomatic repercussions. (S-1)(S) JOHN WILLIAMS PARKER (S)(S)

KARLOW first said he was unable to recall visiting Berlin in 1953 but later said he recalled seeing WILLIAM K. HARVEY, Chief of Station, (December, 1952, to August, 1959) on more than one occasion so he supposes he did make such visits. When informed that it was understood that KARLOW had been to Berlin ten to fifteen times in the period 1950 - 1953, KARLOW offered no objection and said it was possible that this was true. With reference to his later assignment in Munich from November, 1953, to the end of 1955, KARLOW stated he was fairly certain he had not visited Berlin during this period. (S-1)(S)(U)

SECRET

KARLOW stated he had stayed with Agency associates on some visits to Berlin and on one or more occasions he stayed at the Harnach House, an Army guest house for the Berlin command. (S-1)(S) (U)

KARLOW further advised that before his marriage he and his mother had visited Italy and Corsica, and also the Austrian spa town of Bad Gastein and thought that may have been during the Summer of 1951. He said on a second trip to those areas he was accompanied by his mother and his wife. (S-1)(S)(U)

KARLOW also stated that after his marriage he and his wife had gone to Corsica on two occasions, and to Rome, and had spent New Years Eve 1952 - 1953 at a small town in Austria. These were purely personal trips. He said he did not recall having taken a trip to Berlin for purely personal purposes. (S-1)(S) (U)

KARLOW stated that before their marriage "LIBBY" RAUSCH had gone to Berlin and stayed at the residence of WILLIAM K. HARVEY. KARLOW said he had not visited Berlin with "LIBBY" before marriage but recalled he had done so on one occasion after marriage and he recollected he had become ill on the train from some oysters he had eaten. (S-1)(S)(U)

KARLOW explained in early February, 1950, he proceeded to [Frankfurt] (S) and took over as Chief of TAD which was located in the [Frankfurt] (S) suburb of [Hoechst at Feldbergstrasse 44,] (S) and had mail address APO 709. KARLOW resided in an apartment located in an adjoining building. KARLOW advised when he assumed charge of TAD the unit consisted of only about nine persons. From recollection KARLOW identified TAD personnel as follows: (S-1)(S)

Major ROBERT HARRIS, the previous Chief of TAD, and a former officer of National Security Agency, (NSA); (S-1)(S)(U)

Captain GUY DRENNAN, also formerly with NSA, and currently night Duty Officer with the Intelligence Branch of the Department of State; and (S-1)(S)(U)

(S) [EARL ALLEN GOLD,] a civilian scientist-chemist, who became deputy of KARLOW and had a small laboratory with several technicians and operated what KARLOW described as a postal censorship; and (S-1)(S)

SECRET

SECRET

WFO 65-8517
DEW:lpr

SECRET

2

today is closely similar to that of his appearance 15 years ago. He said he has never worn glasses and his weight has increased only ten pounds since he was in college and it has never varied more than that at any time. He said he has never worn a mustache.

Late in the interview, DULIN said upon further recollection he remembers contacting a Professor HAROLD MOSELEY, who was Head of Soviet Studies at Columbia University in New York City, when DULIN was recruiting employees. DULIN said that upon thoughtful consideration of his activities at that time he recalled that there was a CIA interest in obtaining a well-qualified man for a position in Moscow. He said efforts were being made to find a man who was to have a cover in the Embassy in Moscow. This person to be hired was supposed to have a fluent command of the Russian language and he had to be of Anglo-Saxon descent. He said CIA gave instructions that the man to be placed in the position in Moscow could not be of Slovak descent. DULIN said it is possible that HAROLD MOSELEY referred ROBERTS to DULIN as a prospective employee for the position in Moscow but at this time he has no recollection of either the name or the face of ROBERTS. He said he could definitely state he had never taken any recruit to Admiral HILLENKOTTER to discuss employment. DULIN said he does not know and does not believe he has ever known the identity of any CIA employee in Moscow, Russia.

DULIN said he is unable to explain why ROBERTS would have addressed any correspondence relating to his CIA employment to an individual using the name of DULIN. He further said he cannot understand why correspondence would have been addressed to SPENCER ROBERTS in New York City with an address on the bottom of the letter "c/o R. E. DULIN, 2001 16th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C." DULIN said he had never authorized HARRY ROSITZKE or WILLIAM HARVEY to use his name and address as a cover in correspondence relating to recruitment of employees.

DULIN said he is acquainted with HARRY A. ROSITZKE, who is also employed with CIA. DULIN said his association with ROSITZKE is not now and has never been close. He said he is unable to recall exactly when he became acquainted with ROSITZKE but he associates their meeting with a period shortly following World War II. He is unable to state how they became acquainted because they have never been assigned to the same work. They have never lunched together and they

SECRET

SECRET

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(S) (U)

SECRET

133

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90110-10070

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-114623-6

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : CIA

TITLE :

DATE : 04/10/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
FRANC PECAR
JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

NOTE:

(S) [Subject is a commercial representative from Yugoslavia. Information was received from CIA that an individual with the same last name was a member of Yugoslav Intelligence Service (YIS). However, another source of CIA advised subject was not a member of YIS. CIA has learned that an individual believed to be the subject is being recalled to Yugoslavia, but this individual wishes to remain in the U. S. X CIA desires verification of this information because if it is true [CIA may wish to consider contacting subject in an effort to persuade him to return to Yugoslavia under control of CIA.] (S) Subject is supposed to return to Yugoslavia at end of April, 1963. X Approach to subject by FBI is not recommended because New York informants said in March, 1963, subject is not engaged in intelligence activities and because State recently denied clearance for approach in similar case.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90110-10071

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-114623-6

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM : CIA
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 03/29/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
FRANC PECAR
JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

29 MAR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [Franc PECAR](S)(U)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS KP 5-26-98 SLD/KSR 5-30-98 (JFK)

1. Reference is made to our memorandum number CSCI-3/773,057, subject as above, dated 10 October 1962.

2. Joseph MEROLA, 2018 North Bay Road, Miami Beach, Florida, has advised representatives of another office of this Agency that he learned from contacts in New York that (fnu) PECAR, a Yugoslav trade official in the U. S., is being recalled to Yugoslavia and wishes to remain in the U. S. According to MEROLA, PECAR will visit Miami from 12 to 19 April 1963.

3. While MEROLA has an unsavory background, the representative who spoke with him is inclined to believe that he was telling the truth in this instance. MEROLA claimed that he has also informed the U. S. District Attorney of the above development.

4. It seems probable that (fnu) PECAR is identical with the subject of referenced memorandum, who was assigned to New York in late 1962 as in INTERTRADE representative.

5. We would appreciate receiving any information available to your Bureau concerning PECAR's alleged desire to remain in the U. S.

6. If the above information is true, this Agency may wish to consider [the desirability of contacting PECAR in an effort to persuade him to return to Yugoslavia at our behest.](S)

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

2/18/95
FBI INFO
Classified by SP8 MAC/KFA
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK)

JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-3/775,509

REC- 74 [105-114623-6](U)

(FBI INFO)
DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/ML
ON 5/28/98
(JFK)

APR 5 1963

NAT. INT. SEC.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90110-10072

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-114623-7

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM : CIA
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 04/09/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
FRANC PECAR
JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED IN
APR 12 1963
LIAISON

9 APR 1963

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS KP 5-26-98

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT : [Franc PECAR] (S)(U)

1. Reference is made to our memoranda CSCI-3/775,509, dated 29 March 1963, CSCI-3/775,572, dated 2 April 1963, and CSCI-3/775,622, dated 4 April 1963, all with the subject as above.

2. Another office of this Agency has provided the following additional information from Joseph MEROLA concerning Subject.

a. Subject arrived in Miami, Florida, on 4 April and resided with Joseph MEROLA until 6 April 1963 when he was scheduled to return to New York. Subject planned to return to Miami for the period of 12-19 April following which he would go to Vienna for a short visit, returning to the United States about the end of April. Subject's family will remain in the United States.

b. According to MEROLA, Subject met Assistant Attorney General William Kenny in Miami, but MEROLA had no further details on their conversation except that PECAR appeared most eager to make arrangements to stay in the United States. Subject showed MEROLA and Kenny voluminous documentation.

3. [This office is considering contacting Subject during his visit to Vienna for the purpose of attempting recruitment to return to Yugoslavia.] (S) An early reply regarding information available to your Bureau concerning PECAR's activities in the United States would be appreciated.

6 page statement of Pecar furnished CIA by Bulet dated 4/18/63

Copy to N.Y. Miami by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 4-19-63
by H.C.F. [illegible]

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

J. Angleton
JAMES ANGLETON

2/18/95
FBI INFO
Classified by SP8MAC/KFA
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK)

(S)(U)

CSCI-3/775,718

1 copies made 2-26-78 [illegible]
REC 91
105-114623-7

EX-1 for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 1-20-78 request. (See Bufile #62-117290)

1 Xerox copy made re: J. Morela 4-18-63 HCF[illegible]

APR 15 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

56 APR 29 1963

SECRET

FBI INFO
DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR ON 5-30-98 (JFK)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90110-10083

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-89923-184

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : MM
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 04/13/1961
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
CLIP
JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : TT

FD-4-41 (Rev. 1-25-61)

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

DECODED COPY

SECRET

☐ Radio ☒ Teletype

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS ON PG. 2

URGENT 4-13-61 4-17 PM SK

TO DIRECTOR

Classified by ... Declassify on: OADR

FROM SAC, MIAMI 131836

INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA

CLIP. ~~IS-CUBA~~. BUFILES 105-89923, 137-6257, 87-58729. ON APRIL 3 LAST MM 722 C FURNISHED FOLLOWING RE JOSEPH R. MEROLA, FORMER CI, NOW SUSPECT IN "UNSUBS (TWO) ARMED ROBBERY OF APPROXIMATELY $117,200 IN JEWELRY AND CASH, RESIDENCE OF EDITH AND FRITZ DORIGO, HALLANDALE, FLORIDA, MARCH 20, 1961, ITSP, MAJOR THEFT, OO MIAMI." MEROLA RECENTLY TOLD CI HE IS CONNECTED WITH CIA IN SOME CAPACITY IN WHICH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE ACCESS TO ALL FORMS EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION, BEING FURNISHED BY CIA TO SOME ANTI CASTRO GROUP. MEROLA CLAIMED CIA SENDS THIS EQUIPMENT TO MEROLAS HOME WHERE IT IS SUBSEQUENTLY PICKED UP BY BOAT FROM REAR MEROLA RESIDENCE. CLAIMED HE IS REQUIRED HAVE CUBANS WHO OBTAIN GUNS SIGN RECEIPT FOR SAME. OPERATION TAKES PLACE UNDER COVER DARKNESS. CLAIMED TO HAVE TAKEN FROM EQUIPMENT SEVERAL AUTOMATICS EQUIPPED WITH SILENCERS. INFORMANT CLAIMS MEROLA IS "ARMING THE OUTFIT" AND IS FURNISHING THESE WEAPONS TO VARIOUS HOODLUM ACQUAINTANCES FOR SUM $500 EACH. MEROLA EXHIBITED ONE SUCH AUTOMATIC TO CI AND DEMONSTRATED BY FIRING SHOT INTO AIR. CI "COULD NOT HEAR A THING." ON APRIL 5 JOHN NOBLE, COVERT CIA AGENT WORKING OPERATIONAL LEVEL, ADVISED DID NOT BELIEVE CIA HAD OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MEROLA BUT WOULD CHECK. ON APRIL 6 HE ADVISED CIA HAD NOT OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MEROLA. ON APRIL 7 JUSTIN

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)
5-30-98

Brazil
BZA.
137-6257-
87-58729-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-92

Tel to Miami 4/14/61 [CLIP] (U)
EX-139
C.I.A. Liaison 4/18/61
REC 105-89923-184

* CRIMINAL INFORMANT
** INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY

25 APR ~~19~~ 26 1961

XEROX APR 24 1961

63 APR 26 1961

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4-41 (Rev. 1-25-61)

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ Radio ☒ Teletype

SECRET

PAGE TWO: FROM SAC, MIAMI 131836

GLEICHAUF, OVERT CIA REPRESENTATIVE, MIAMI, ADVISED ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO HE WENT TO MEROLAS HOME AFTER MEROLA PESTERED HIM WITH PHONE CALLS OFFERING RENT PLANE OR HELICOPTER TO CIA FOR USE BY FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO, ANTI CASTRO ORGANIZATION UTILIZED BY CLIP. MEROLA SHOWED GLEICHAUF BOAT "TERRY KNAUT" DOCKED BEHIND HIS HOME AND IMPLIED THIS WAS HIS BOAT AND IT HAD ALREADY BEEN USED BY FRENTE. MEROLA SEEMED EAGER GET OUT OF U. S. AND SUGGESTED CIA USE HIM ON SOME MISSION TO BRAZIL WHERE MEROLA PLANNED WORK OUT DEAL TO SHIP WHISKEY TO BRAZIL DUTY FREE THROUGH BRAZILIAN POLITICIAN. GLEICHAUF TOLD MEROLA HE WAS NOT INTERESTED. AFTER FURTHER CHECK, GLEICHAUF ADVISED MIAMI THIS BOAT HAS BEEN USED ON ONE OR MORE OPERATIONS BY FRENTE, BUT NOT LIKELY BE USED AGAIN BECAUSE IN BAD SHAPE. BOAT 63 FEET, BEARS REGISTRATION NUMBER 270404. GLEICHAUF STATED MEROLA NOT WORKING FOR CIA OR FRENTE SO FAR AS CAN DETERMINE. ON APRIL 5 [DAVID GLASS,] (S) COVERT CIA AGENT, FURNISHED MIAMI LIST BOATS BEING USED IN VARIOUS OPERATIONS IN WHICH CIA HAS INTEREST. "TERRY KNOTT" ON THIS LIST. AFTER SEVERAL UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT VARONA PERSONALLY, ON APRIL 13 JORGE MORAN, SECRETARY TO MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA LOREDO, GENERAL COORDINATOR OF FRENTE, CONFIDENTIALLY ADVISED MEROLA IS WORKING ON THE BOAT "TERRY KNOTT" OWNED BY MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION DE LA REVOLUCION, MRR, WHICH IS MEMBER ORGANIZATION OF FRENTE. MORAN STATED BOAT WAS OPERATED BY SANTIAGO BABUM APRIL 8 AND JOSE "PEPE" ARRIOLA WAS IN CHARGE OF "TERRY KNOTT" (S)

No locality

SECRET

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/4/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90124-10055

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 97-3224-NR

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : MX
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 10/11/1962
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
MANUEL FUEGO
MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/12/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

MC 97-71 SECRET

[It is pointed out that CIA in both Managua, Nicaragua, and Guatemala City, Guatemala, is investigating this matter] and [the U.S. Army (S)(U) Attache, Guatemala City, has also done some investigation through his close contact with Lt. Colonel JOSE LUIS AGUILAR DE LEON, who is the confidential source abroad mentioned in the accompanying report.] (S)(U) 2nd set of brackets declass per Army on 2-20-98

[SCOTT HOLLOWAY] (S) Head of the CIA Station, [American Embassy] (S) Managua, Nicaragua, advised on 9-5-62 that NOEL PALLAIS, [who is T-1 in the accompanying report,] (S) runs the financial enterprises of General ANASTASIO SOMOZA of Nicaragua. [HOLLOWAY] (S) stated that PALLAIS has been [in close contact with the CIA Office in regard to this case.] (S) He was made available for contact by HOLLOWAY (S) and was subsequently interviewed [at the CIA office] (S) in Managua. [HOLLOWAY] (S) stated he personally has encouraged [General SOMOZA] (S) not to have anything to do with WERBELL, SMITH and associates. He stated he feels the offer to sell arms and ammunition and provide mercenaries which was made to the Guatemalan Government was only of secondary interest. (S)

[MICHAEL F. TAYLOR] (S) of the CIA Station, (S) [American Embassy,] Guatemala City, advised on September 10, 1962, that it was ascertained that the woman who accompanied WERBELL to Managua is LUCY LUCHIEN, who owns the Duplex Building in Guatemala City. She returned to Guatemala City on September 1, 2 or 3, 1962. (S)

(S) [TAYLOR] advised that when ARTHUR L. SMITH left Guatemala City on September 3, 1962, he left as a forwarding address 1025 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 405, Washington, D.C. According to [TAYLOR] (S) WERBELL told the manager of the Maya Excelsior Hotel that he had the clearance of CIA. (S)

(S) [TAYLOR] stated that MIGUELITO YDIGORAS, son of the President of Guatemala, advised that neither WERBELL nor SMITH had made personal contact with him. At the request of MIGUELITO YDIGORAS, the Judicial (S)

Police put a surveillance on WERBELL and SMITH, which apparently was rather obvious. The police also monitored their telephone conversations. Subsequently, [the Judicial Police] (S) advised CIA that SMITH had made one telephone call to MARIO GARCIA KOHLY in Washington, D.C., and another to a man by the name of DIGGS or BRIGGS in Washington, D.C. He also made a telephone call to Handy of Jones and Handy, Marine Architects, Miami, Florida. SMITH received a telephone call which was reported as having been from ARNOLD in Washington but (S) [TAYLOR] stated that CIA believes it was from FRANK AUSTIN, who he said is connected with MARIO GARCIA KOHLY in Washington. (S)

WERBELL tried to make telephonic contact with FRANK MARSHALL, Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica. (S) (U)

In telephone calls made just prior to 8-20-62 mention was made of meeting someone referred to only as "the general" at the Hotel El Salvador, San Salvador, El Salvador. According to [TAYLOR] (S) CIA does not believe the meeting took place in San Salvador as planned. (S) [TAYLOR] had previously mentioned on 8-13-62 that when WERBELL and SMITH first contacted MIGUELITO YDIGORAS during early August, 1962, they stated they were waiting for PINEIRO and seemed to think PINEIRO was someone YDIGORAS would know. They stated they would contact him as soon as PINEIRO arrived. [TAYLOR] (S) advised on 9-10-62 that it had been ascertained that Colonel JOSE PINEIRO PAEZ was apparently the one they were expecting. (S)

(S) [TAYLOR] stated that the telephone conversation between SMITH, WERBELL and the individuals they were talking to were apparently rather cryptic and [the Judicial Police] (S) obtained little more than the identities of the individuals making the calls. (S)

MC 97-71

SECRET

SOURCES

[The confidential source abroad is Lt. Colonel JOSE LUIZ AGUILAR LEON, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, National Police, Guatemala City, Guatemala.] (X) [S] T-1 is NOEL PALLAIS, first cousin of President LUIS SOMOZA, and General ANASTASIO SOMOZA of Nicaragua, who handles financial enterprises of General SOMOZA. Located in instant report. Source concealed as [he is a contact of CIA,] Managua, Nicaragua. (S)

CLASSIFICATION

Enclosed report is classified "Confidential" as it contains information from [an official] of [a foreign government] and from an individual who has close connections with a second [foreign government.] Both (X) [S] requested the information be regarded as confidential.

STATUS

While this case and also the case on MANUEL FUEGO, RA - Central America, are being placed in an RUC status, they will be reopened if any pertinent information is received.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/4/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90124-10092

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : DOMR
TO : HQ

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 07/16/1965
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/12/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : AT

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 7-16-65

SECRET

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via **Airtel** ______________________ (Priority)

Classified by SP8 MAC/KSR
Declassify on: OADR

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Santo Domingo (134-31) (RUC)

Subject: ANTONIO HECTOR RIVERO JUARRERO - PSI
IS - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Reference Buairtel dated June 28, 1965. Reference also Santo Domingo teletype number 163, dated June 23, 1965, captioned, "MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WARBELL, III, PSI."

Information received from the local office of CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) on May 30, 1965, revealed that subject, born in Havana, Cuba; 52 years; height 5'11"; weight 190 pounds; gray hair; brown eyes; married with no children; is employed by the Cia. Dominicana de Seguros, a subsidiary of AMADEO BARLETTA's Enterprises in Santo Domingo. The report indicated that RIVERO had worked in the General Motors set-up in Havana, Cuba, under BARLETTA. When CASTRO moved into Cuba, RIVERO exiled himself to Miami. BARLETTA then offered RIVERO a job in Santo Domingo and placed him in charge of the Division of Insurance of BARLETTA's General Motors set-up. RIVERO was described as a boisterious, gregarious type, who hits every bar in town and who is extremely loud mouthed. (S) (U)

Files of the Dominican Immigration Service checked on July 13, 1965, revealed that ANTONIO HECTOR RIVERO JUARRERO has permanent Dominican Resident Visa 10349, issued to him for the year 1965. He has had permanent resident status in the Dominican Republic since 1962..

The file further indicated that he entered the Dominican Republic at Santo Domingo on February 2, 1962, from Miami, Florida. He was described as follows:

SECRET

4 - Bureau
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Santo Domingo

AAC:wlg (5)

REC-133 134-13856-2

JUL 20 1965

JUL 27 1965

Approved: ______________________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ____________ M Per ____________

Airtel to Director, FBI
RE: ANTONIO HECTOR RIVERO JUARRERO - PSI

DOB:	July 15, 1911
RACE:	White
COMPLEXION:	Light
WEIGHT:	175 lbs
HEIGHT:	5' 11"
EYES:	Brown
HAIR:	Gray
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
RESIDENCE:	Arzobispo Marino Number 30, Santo Domingo

JOHN CASSERLY (protect identity), correspondent for the American Broadcasting System who is known to this office, advised on July 11, 1965, that RIVERO is currently living with MITCHELL WARBELL.

This source advised that RIVERO is notoriously known as a "wheeler dealer." He has a number of different businesses all concerned with automobiles and automobile insurance. He has associated with BARLETTA who had the General Motors franchise in Havana, Cuba, for many years.

Source stated that RIVERO has a pleasant personality but described him as a heavy drinker and stated that RIVERO would do anything for money. He advised that RIVERO's wife is one EVANGELINA HERNANDEZ, a Cuban national. He further stated HERNANDEZ has relatives in Miami, Florida, and makes frequent trips to Miami. He advised RIVERO allegedly was mixed up in gambling enterprises but added that he had no proof of this.

Inasmuch as RIVERO is reported to be extremely loud mouthed and inasmuch as he is currently reported to be living with MITCHELL WARBELL, [who at one time was reported to be employed by CIA and who is currently characterized by CIA as a "wild man,"] (S)(U) no further action is being taken with reference to developing this individual as a PSI.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/10/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90130-10005

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-88731-32

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : MM
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 07/09/1960
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ TAMAYO
PAN AMERICA CONFEDERATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : RPT

MM 105-2643

FD-302 reflecting identities of CYpress telephone numbers in Key West, Florida, was furnished by Mrs. POLLY ANDREW, District Manager's Clerk, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Coral Gables, Florida, who furnished same to SA LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.

INFORMANTS

Identity	Location of Original Information
MM T-1 is GILBERT BARRERAS, PSI, an American citizen, who has a wide acquaintanceship with Cubans in the Miami area.	134-409 Sub A
MM T-2 is [RAY O'MERA, CIA, Miami] (S)	Instant report, page 143

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed in this report and "T" symbols were utilized only in those instances where identities must be concealed.

- D * -

COVER PAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90135-10074

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-82298-164

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/18/1963
PAGES : 28

SUBJECTS :
ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/19/1999

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : SUMMARY

SECRET

CORRELATION SUMMARY

Main File No: 105-82298 Date: **January 18, 1963**

Subject: Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo Date Searched: 10/26/62
Kiko Pernas*
One Gutierrez**
One Martinez***

All logical variations of subject's name and aliases were searched and identical references found as:

Summary

Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guiterrez
Eloy Guitierrez
Eloy Guterrez
Eloy Gutierez
Eloy Gutierres
Ely Gutierres
Elog Gutierrez
Eloy Gutierrez
Eloy Manoyo Gutierrez
Eloyo Gutierrez
Ely Gutierrez
Gallego Gutierrez
Eloy Gutierrez Manoyo
Lazaro Martinez
Lazaro O. Martinez
Lazaro Cristobal Florian Martinez
Lazaro Cristobal Florian Martinez Mendez
Lazaro Martinez Mendez
Lazaro O. Martinez Mendez
Ely Gutierrez Menjoya
Eloy Gutierrez Menoy
Gutierrez Menoya

23

Eloy Gutierrez Menoya
One Menoyo
Eloy Menoyo
Elog Gutierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guitierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guterrez Menoyo
Eloy Gutierez Menoyo
Eloy Gutierres Menoyo
Eloy Gutiirrez Menoyo
Eloy Gutterrez Menoyo
Eloyo Gutierrez Menoyo
Ely Gutierres Menoyo
Ely Gutierrez Menoyo
Gallego Gutierrez Menoyo
Guterriez Menoyo
Gutierre Menoyo
Gutierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guiterrez Menoyo
Eloy Monoya
Eloy Gutierrez Monoya
Floy Gutierrez Monoya
Eloy Gutierrez Monoyo

22

7/25/94 05RMBGA
Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR 2/13/8[illegible]
(JFK

Also searched as One Gallego, see page 27 of summary.

(continued on next page)

THIS SUMMARY HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR USE AT THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT AND IS NOT SUITABLE FOR DISSEMINATION.

105-82298-164

Analyst	Coordinator	Approved
James F. Kline	Mary H. Elgin	Norman F. Stultz

ENC. BEHIND FILE

JFK:jeb

*Gutierrez was alleged to have used the nickname Kiko Pernas. See serials 72 and 95 of main file (105-82298). See also 105-98002-1.
** Not searched, see page 56 of search slip.
***Not completely searched, see page 56 of search slip.

62 JAN 29 1963

SECRET

organization rather than through file on GUTIERREZ MENOYO as an individual. Accordingly, Miami file 105-2102 (Bufile 105-82298) is being closed at this time and all leads regarding the II Front or GUTIERREZ MENOYO will be handled in 105-5948. For this reason a report was prepared at this time instead of the letterhead memorandum as requested in referenced Bureau letter.

- INFORMANTS -

Identity	Location
[MM T-1 is MM 639-S	134-238 Sub A-479 and 134-238 Sub A-478] (U)

SECRET

Hector Peter Ordetx, 1802 Lamar St, Tampa, Fla., furnished on 1/26/62, a quantity of miscellaneous papers, some of which bore the name of Roberto De Los Rios (100-431672) and appeared to be correspondence between him and members of his family in Cuba. One of these papers was a carbon copy of a typewritten letter in Spanish to "Dear Father", dated 4/7/59, at Tampa, with no signature. The writer said that Nelson had written him asking for declarations of the committee in regard to Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and his insidious declarations. No further information.

100-431672-27 p.16,17
(3,36)

Correlator's Note: It was noted that Roberto De Los Rios had a brother named Nelson.

Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas (100-344127) advised on 4/29/59, that he had heard that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and William Morgan, former leaders in Sierra del Escambray, Second Front, were dissatisfied with the situation in Cuba.

100-344127-18 p.19
(3)

CIA Information Report, dated 5/19/59, revealed that Temistocles Fuentes Rivera (105-62455) stated that when Ernesto "Che" Guevara arrived in Las Villas Province, Cuba, during the revolution, he was in the zone of the Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray which was headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. Gutierrez and an armed troop met Guevara with drawn guns, accused him of being a communist and demanded that he and his men leave their area of operations. (S)(U)

105-62455-10 p.1
(3,36)

MM-635-S, employed by the Cuban Air Force, advised that on 5/20/59, Major Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, Major Pernas, and Major Armando Fleitas, all leaders of the Second Front of the Escambray, came to consult with Major Marcos Diaz Lanz, chief of the Revolutionary Air Force in Cuba. Gutierrez told Marcos Diaz that they had 400 men who were unemployed and whom they would like to put to work in order to keep them out of trouble. (X)(U)

[109-599-6 Encl.p.1
(13,47)] (X)(U)

On 3/18/59, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, at a press conference, stated that his organization* supported the Castro Government "as long as it lives up to the principles for which we fought", and that if it should deviate "we will take whatever steps circumstances dictate". He further stated that his group was 100% anti-communist.

On 4/20/59, Gutierrez left Havana to visit Miami at the invitation of Miami's Mayor, (source not clear).

Paul Bethel, Press Officer, U.S. Embassy, Havana, Cuba (protect identity), advised that Tony Beacon was appointed Gutierrez's press secretary on the above mentioned trip and Beacon was paid by Nick Bartone, an American who was attempting to sell C-74's (Globemaster I) to Cuba.

"The Havana Post ", dated 5/27/59, carried an article to the effect that the Second National Front of the Escambray (105-78831) had issued a statement which endorsed the Agrarian Reform Program of the Cuban Government. The statement was signed by Gutierrez, National Chief, and Armando Fleitas, Secretary General of the organization.

Add. info. according to PSI Hugo Gonzalez Lajonchere (protect identity). (S)(U)

105-78831-1 p.1,2
(5/38)

A Foreign Service Dispatch from the Department of State, dated 5/28/59, revealed that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo had told the Embassy in Cuba that the Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray (105-78831) was strongly anti-communist and would take action if necessary should the Government come under communist control or domination. (S) (U)

State also advised that a source, who had spent a month with the Segundo Frente under the command of Gutierrez, advised that the group was non-political and definitely not communist. Gutierrez felt that Fidel Castro had a number of communists among his advisors and he believed one of these was "Che" Guevara. Guevara had been joined by some of the members of the Segundo Frente, with Gutierrez's approval, but Guevara's followers had not been allowed to take arms with the Segundo Frente. (S)(U)

105-78831-3 p.2,3,4
(5/38)

TP's 6 & 7 is now declass per Dept. of State ltr. dtd 3-19-98 SLD/ICSR 5-13-98 (JFK)

* Second National Front of the Escambray.

SECRET

Francisco Rodriguez Couceiro, 6424 S.W. 38th St., Miami, Fla., advised that the Crusade of Revolutionaries Against Communism (CRAC) had planned an invasion of the Isle of Pines, Cuba. In June, 1959, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and William Alexander Morgan, Commanders in the Cuban Army, were in contact with the Movimento Revolucionario Democrata in Havana, and this was known to the CRAC in Miami. Rodriguez had advised the group in Cuba and the anti-Castro movement in the Dominican Republic, not to trust either Morgan or Gutierrez because he considered them both to be loyal to Castro, and their cooperation with the group was for the purpose of entrapment.

Add. info. according to Rodriguez.

105-81502-7 p.20
(6,38)

A teletype from San Juan, dated 6/5/59, concerning Nicaraguan revolutionary activities, set out the following: "Second Front Escambray Forces under Commandant Ely Gutierrez Menjoya requested immediate dissolution from Government. Message conjectures that this may mean a breakaway from policies of July 26 and could mean participation in other revolutions." Not further clarified. (X)(U)

[109-12-222-503] (X)(U)
(26)

[MM 685-S*] (S) advised on 6/26/59, that Paul Hughes, an American pilot, flew for Commander Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo during the Cuban Revolution. Hughes was suspected of taking guns that were stored at Miami International Airport and which belonged to the Cuban Government. Hughes had come to Miami from Cuba on a mission for Gutierrez. (X)

On 7/2/59, Sergio Diaz Brull, former advisor to the former Chief of the Cuban Air Force, advised that Gutierrez was sympathetic with the anti-Fidel Castro Movement and was waiting in the mountains of Cuba with approximately 2,000 men for instructions when to attack the forces of the Cuban Revolutionary Government.

105-79528-2 p.B, Encl.p.7
(5,38)

SECRET

Department of the Army advised that in an interview with Florencio Pernas Lorenzo (105-98002) on 2/14/61, Pernas advised that from January to March, 1959, all he did was attend social and official gatherings in Cuba. During this period he made a trip to Miami, Fla. with Comandante Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. In about July, 1959, he was requested by Gutierrez to participate in an action against Trujillo and Batista followers who were to attack Cuba. From 12/20-23/59, Pernas made a trip to Tampa, Fla., accompanied by Gutierrez to collect toys for needy children of the Escambray. (X)(u) ¶'s 1 & 2 IS NOW DECLASS PER ARMY LET. DTD. 4-16-98 SLD/KSR 5/13/98 (JFK)

Pernas entered the U.S. with Gutierrez* and planned to go to Miami and wait for orders of Gutierrez as to his future actions. (X)(u)

Add. info. according to Fernando Prio Hernandez, 1330 Southwest 12th Ave., Miami, Francisco Prio Socarras, 2200 Southwest 2nd Ave., Miami, Antonio Prio Socarras, 1001 Southwest 22nd St., Coral Gables, Fla., and duplicate informant.

105-98002-11 p.4-6,8-10
(8,41)
SI 105-98002-2 p.2,3
(8,41)
SI 105-98002-9 p.3,4,6-8
(8,41) Add. info.

*Entered U.S. January, 1961

CIA advised that a meeting composed of anti-Franco elements and communists took place on 2/4/61, at the camp of the Spanish Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion de Espana-ELE) on the Isle of Pines near Havana. Abderraman Muley More and his aide, Manuel Perez, leaders of DRIL (Iberian Revolutionary Directorate of Liberation) who had taken charge of ELE since the departure in late January, 1961, of Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, were threatened with expulsion from Cuba for resisting communist efforts to take over ELE. (X)(u)

109-587-47
(13,47)

Miguel Antonio Sanchez Ramos, who was interviewed in Room 615, Roger Williams Hotel, 28 East 31st St., NYC (not further identified) (Protect identity), and who had furnished reliable information in the past, advised on 1/27/61, that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, who was involved in the "double cross" of the Dominican Republic's attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro in August, 1959, had a price of $100,000 on his head, put there by Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. (X)(u)

105-93789-39 Encl.p.7
(7,40)

On 2/23/61, Cirita Lopez Cejas, residence, Miami, Fla., and a messenger for Manuel Ray and the underground, advised that Manuel Ray had helped Gutierrez Menoyo and the group who came with him, to escape from Cuba on 1/27/61. Lopez stated that she assisted in the arrangements for the defection and had hidden 5 or 6 of the revolutionaries in her home in Havana. She advised that Ray recognized that Gutierrez pulled a considerable amount of support and following as a former leader of the Escambray. He was considered a good campaigner and knew the Sierra Escambray Mountains extremely well.

[113-7-210-252 Encl.p.7,8
(51)] (S)(U)

The 2/1/61, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled "Economic Crises Won't Topple Castro-Prio" in which Carlos Prio Socarras (109-430) stated his views on Cuba and Castro. Prio also expressed concern that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, the rebel commandante who had sought asylum in Miami, was still being detained by U.S. authorities: Guiterrez was an anti-communist, according to Prio.

109-430-2390 Encl.p.3
(23)
SI 109-430-2395 p.10
(23)

CIA Information Report, dated 2/10/61, revealed that a source who belonged to a group which assisted defectors to escape from Cuba, had been trying to get Humberto Sori Marin (105-93839) out of Cuba. The source visited Miami to determine whether the means of escape from Cuba had been compromised by Gutierrez Menoyo and his companions. He also wanted to determine if Sori would be interned as was Gutierrez, and how Gutierrez had learned about this escape route and how he was able to highjack the boats. (S)(U)

105-93839-20
(29)

CIA furnished on 3/6/61, a memorandum captioned "DRIL Plans For Action In the Iberian Peninsula" , which stated that the Iberian Revolutionary Directorate of Liberation (DRIL) planned to infiltrate a group from Portugal into the Sierra Morena mountain range. According to the secretary of DRIL leader Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, DRIL had a clandestine printing shop in Madrid. Field Comment: According to a 2/14/61 report from [an official Spanish service, Gutierrez's secretary] (C) in Havana, said that DRIL leader Abderraman Muley More had commented that his plan had been to charter a boat to be used for clandestine landing in Spain or Portugal. (S)

109-587-48 p.3
(13,47)

On 6/30/61, Ralph Huguet, former officer in the Cuban Rebel Air Force, advised that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Max Edgardo Lesnick Menendez (105-64869) resided with him at the Blue Bay Motel, Normandy Isle, Miami Beach, Fla. Gutierrez desired to come to the Miami Office for an interview. Huguet advised that to his knowledge, neither Lesnick nor Gutierrez were involved in any acitvity or in any way connected with the current Cuban government. (S)(U)

105-64869-11
(4/36)
SI 105-64869-12 p.1-3
(4/36) Add. info.

MM 639-S advised that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, a recently defected military commander of the Cuban Revolutionary Army, and closely associated with the Frente Revolucionario Democratico, a leading anti-Castro organization, planned to attend, as an observer, military demonstrations with maneuvers that were to be held at an abandoned airport at Davie, Fla., on 7/1/61. These demonstrations were held by the Revolutionary Junta of National Liberation (2-1683). (S)(U)

2-1683-3 Encl.p.2
(1/34)

MM 639-S advised on 7/2/61, that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, did not attend the demonstration held on 7/2/61, at Davie Airport, Davie, Fla., by the Revolutionary Junta of National Liberation (2-1683). (S)(U)

2-1683-7 Encl.p.2
(1/34)
SI 2-1693-31 p.11
(2/35) (Add. info according to Gerald Patrick Hemming, 1936 Southwest 3rd St., Miami, Fla.)
SI 2-1499-78 p.11
(1/34)

Miami report, dated 10/4/61, revealed that MM-639-S advised that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo's father and brother were both known communists in Cuba and Eloy himself fought on the side of the communists in Spain in the 1930's. Eloy was further accused of being responsible for over 200 innocent people being put in jail in Cuba and having participated in the William Alexander Morgan affair at Trinidad, Cuba, in August, 1959. He was not well considered by Cuban nationals in Miami, had a bad reputation and was not generally trusted. (S)(U)

Add. info.

2-1693-39 p.1,3-7,11
(2,35)

Roger Redondo Gonzalez, 730 W. 11th Ave., Miami, Fla., advised on 11/13/61, that a captain Antonico (LNU), who furnished the transportation for a group of Cuban exiles to infiltrate Cuba in August, 1961, was in charge of contacting the Cuban underground for Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. (S)(U)

Rafael Huguet Del Valle, Blue Bay Motel, 2070 Bay Drive, Miami Beach, Fla., advised on 11/13/61, that Antonico (LNU) was a fishing boat captain from Cayo Guillermo, Cuba, who was a member of the revolutionary movement of Gutierrez and who had contact with the underground section of this movement in Cuba. (S)(U)

Add. info. according to Huguet and duplicate informants. (S)(U)

2-1693-50 p.1-4,6
(2,35)

(S) [NY 2965-S*] advised that on 12/22/61, Herbert Matthews ("NY Times" correspondent) contacted Mario Garcia Inchaustegui (105-99238), Cuban Ambassador to the UN. Garcia asked Matthews if there was any news of the "invasion of my country". Matthews replied that there was nothing new, only "the ravings of that 'jerk' Gutierrez (probably Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo) and Miro Cardona" (anti-Castro Cuban revolutionary leaders). (S)

[105-99238-26 p.1
(8,41)] (S)

Gerardo Gabriel Antonio Hernandez Perez (105-113456), residence, Miami, Fla., advised on 8/3/62, that he and many other Cubans had a poor opinion of Jose Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, Manuel Ray Rivero, former member of the council, and Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, because they were once with the Castro regime and probably would have stayed if there had been sufficient opportunity for them to advance politically and financially. Ray was considered the most anti-American of any of the exiled leaders. (U)

105-113456-1 Encl.p.7
(9/42)

On 9/12/62, Rene Dechard, 1174 S.W. 12th St., Miami, Fla., advised that Max Garcia (97-4345) had made phone calls to his home at various times in the past in attempts to locate Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo.

97-4345-35 p.1,2
(3/36)

CIA Information Report, dated 9/18/62, revealed that General Generoso Campos Marquetti, President of the Alliance For the Liberty of Cuba (105-114160), stated that the Alliance sought a unification of all elements, except those of the Castroite bloc whose "hands are stained with blood". Campos was adamant in refusing to accept anyone of the ilk of Gutierrez Menoyo (FNU). (X) (U)

Headquarters Comment: This probably refers to Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, Commandant of the former anti-Batista Second National Front of the Escambray, who took exile in the U.S. in January, 1961.

105-114160-2 p.3,4
(9/42)

MM 639-S advised that on 9/28/62, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, Tony Cuesta and about 4 others attended a meeting in Miami, Fla., which was considered a meeting of Operation Alpha 66 (105-112098). Cuesta had lived at 2753 N.W. 13th St., Miami, and had been in contact with Gutierrez and a number of American soldiers of fortune and mercenaries. Gutierrez was last known to reside at 1126 S.W. 12th Ave., Miami, and it was not known if he was a member of Operation Alpha 66. (X) (U)

105-112098-40 Encl.p.5
(9/42)

SECRET

REFERENCES NOT INCLUDED IN THIS SUMMARY

The following references on One Gallego, located in files maintained in the Special File Room of the Files and Communications Division, Records Branch, were not reviewed: (S)

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
64-330-237-1545	(62)
64-330-239-825	(62)

(S)

The following reference on One Gallego was not available during the time this summary was being prepared: (S)

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
64-1200-1063	(62)

See the search slip filed behind file for other references on this subject which contain the same information (SI) that is set out in the main file. Differences in source and additional nonpertinent information will be noted on the search slip.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/16/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10067

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-30972-68

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : PAPICH
TO : LALLIER

TITLE :

DATE : 09/14/1960
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
PETROS MOUTSOS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. L'Allier

DATE: September 14, 1960

FROM : S. J. Papich

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS KP 11-17-97 JM 6-23-98

SUBJECT: PETROS MOUTSOS
INTERNAL SECURITY - GREECE AND CUBA

(S) The subject was [utilized by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an informant] in the communist-dominated Greek Maritime Organization, OENO. (S) His past activities have been the subject of correspondence between us and CIA. During the past year, [his usefulness to CIA had practically expired, primarily because of] (S) subject's desire to remove himself from the OENO atmosphere. (S)

On September 13, 1960, Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, advised that the subject is currently a crew member of the SS Radnor, which is scheduled to dock at New Orleans within the next two weeks. [CIA has had clandestine meetings with Moutos and] is (S) now endeavoring to work out an arrangement whereby he can travel to Cuba [and can serve as a source of information in that country.] (S) In order to arrange for such travel, it will be necessary for Moutos to jump ship at New Orleans. This will be done [with the approval] (S) (S) [of Immigration and Naturalization Service. CIA] will then hold conferences with Moutos and subject will thereupon proceed to Havana [under a cover being established for him.] (S)

Prior to leaving for Havana, Moutos will endeavor to have contact with his wife, Angela Boyer, who is well known to us and who has a communist background. His marriage to Boyer [was actually promoted in order to improve his position in OENO.] (S) He has been separated from his wife for a lengthy period although she has indicated that she desires to live with him again. [CIA hopes that] a resumption of relations between the two will help (S) Moutos [in establishing worthwhile contacts] in communist circles in Cuba. (S)

SJP:bas
(4)

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

8/9/93 Classified by 9803 ...
Declassify on: OADR
(5668 SLD/GCL - 3/24/95 - JFK)

EX-105

REC- 5 105-30972-68

7 SEP 27 1960

12-10-97

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)

LET: New Orleans
9/23/60
VHN: wmt: feac
1 - Baltimore 1 - NYO

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

JFK Assassination System Date: 4/16/201
Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10230

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-30972-68

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : NO

TITLE :

DATE : 09/23/1960
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
PETROS MOUTSOS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

1 - Mr. Nasca

SECRET

SAC, New Orleans 9/23/60

Director, FBI REC- 5 (105-30972) -68

EX- 105

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS KP 11-17-97 JM 6-23-98

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

PETROS MOUTSOS
MISCELLANEOUS-INFORMATION CONCERNING
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

The captioned individual was [utilized by CIA as an informant] in the communist-dominated Greek Maritime Organization, (S) OENO. During the past year [his usefulness to CIA has practically expired, primarily because of] the subject's desire to remove (S) himself from the OENO atmosphere. (S)

On September 13, 1960, CIA advised that the subject is currently a crew member of the SS "Radnor," which is scheduled to dock at New Orleans within the next two weeks. [CIA has had clandestine meetings with Moutsos and] is endeavoring to work out (S) an arrangement whereby he can travel to Cuba [and serve as a source of information.] (S) In order to arrange for such travel, it will be necessary for Moutsos to jump ship in New Orleans. This will be done [with the approval of INS. CIA] will then hold (S) conferences with Moutsos and the subject will thereupon proceed to Havana [under a cover being established for him.] (S)

Prior to leaving for Havana, Moutsos will endeavor to establish contact with his wife, Angela Boyer, who has a communist background. This marriage [was actually promoted in order to improve subject's position in the OENO.] The subject has been separated from (S) his wife for a lengthy period although she has indicated she desires to live with the subject again. [CIA hopes that] a resumption of (S) relations between the two will help Moutsos [in establishing worthwhile contacts] in communist circles in Cuba. (S)

(S) This is being furnished for your information and under no circumstances should any of this data be furnished to anyone outside the Bureau. Any pertinent information received concerning the subject should, of course, be promptly furnished to the Bureau.

1 - New York (105-15613)
1 - Baltimore (134-571)

1 - 100-398547 (Angela Boyer)

VHN:wmt:kac
(7)

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

12-10-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)

8/9/93
Classified by 9803 ndd/gcl
Declassify on: OADR 241,326
(5668 SLD/GCL-3/29/95-JFK)

58 SEP 29 1960

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SEP 23 1960
COMM-FBI

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NW 50953 DocId:32337464 Page 2